South Dakota is introducing a bill that will ban abortion

[Ben Kenobi]

I don't understand what you're saying here. Are you saying that you can determine which children will live and which children will die at conception? What about miscarriages?

No, what I am saying is that your standard will decide whether or not an embryo can or can not be killed. That's why the language must be so precise, because this is what is at stake.

Secondly, miscarriages are like dying prematurely. Just because one may die prematurely, does not mean that you stop being a person.

Infants satisfy necessary conditions for sentience (except for those few infants who are born without brains, but these infants always die shortly after birth anyway), and nobody has provided any arguments (except for those based entirely on intuition and not on scientific evidence) to suggest that infants fail any necessary conditions for sentience.

I'm thinking of folks like Peter Singer, who argues that infants do fail a test of sentience.

This is why I, personally, would set the cutoff point halfway through the second trimester (where evidence of brain function is still rather shaky-to-nonexistent) and not at the start of the third trimester (where evidence of brain function is solid).

And what evidence is there against the brain function in the earlier parts of pregnancy? Just because the evidence is uncertain is argument in favour of not killing these children.

Infants are born as humans, and they are born with brains. I don't see where there's a problem.

Again, M'sieu Singer.

Comatose patients still have brain function, albeit at a reduced capacity (e.g., they cannot respond to most stimuli).

And so do unborn children. What level of 'functioning' ought to be sufficient for personhood?

What definition are you using? Certainly not mine. Human infants are human and (except for those with terminal medical conditions) are born with functional brains, hence, by my definition human infants are sentient for all intents and purposes.

Self-concept is a philosophical term, not a scientific one. You assume that just because one has a brain, one has a self-concept. Again, I'm looking at Singer's arguments, and how he defines self-awareness, most of which has nothing to do with science.

You have failed to define "personhood," unless your definition of personhood is "something that begins at conception."

Intrinsic capacity to grow and develop. For the sake of this argument, we could define this as attaining increasing sentience but this is just one aspect of the growth and devlopment of a human person. This development begins at conception.

I can live with an artificial circulatory system, though.

For long enough to properly replace all your veins and arteries throughout your body?

How much of your body can be replaced by machinery or transplants or whatever before you cease to be "you"?

Crux of the argument. Good!

This is one of the biggest problems that Singer has. People are people because of their essential nature present at conception, that exists regardless of their current capacities. This essential nature remains with the person, so long as they are alive.

Now, let's go back to open heart surgery. So long as the person remains alive they remain a person, EVEN without their heart. With an artificial heart, they have not lost their essence or nature present from before.

In this case, it remains the question of whether the brain can exist without the body, or if one could replace every functioning organ of the body, without the deterioration of the brain due to the seperation from their body.

I do not believe this is possible. One of the reasons could be that this connection between the brain and the body is part of this essential nature of who we are, and cannot be lost without losing who we are.

I'd stated in my dilemma that the brain is capable of limited interaction with its environment, e.g., though some sort of speech machine.

And why would the connection work, for the brain to communicate directly with the machine? That's something that has not been shown to be possible either.

Let's suppose we hear certain words, how could we ever prove that this communication to still be the same person as before?

There's really no good answer to either dilemma until we're better able to determine somebody's thoughts from their EEGs (or whatever).

I think we already have a good answer. If we can put someone back together without harm, then we should do so, because to keep the two seperate would be like keeping a heart from another person during heart surgery.

Secondly, this sort of solution seems rather convoluted to the problem of a disease that would be fatal, and incurable. Why not work on curing the body, rather than seperating the body and the brain.

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
Rather vague standard, considering when you will be killing people for falling short of this standard.

No, just vague wording on my part. And no, I can't give less vague wording, because I don't have a PhD in neurobiology.

And embryos aren't rocks. Point?

Embryos aren't rocks, true. They're more like algae, except without the ability to perform photosynthesis.

[Ben Kenobi]

I don't think you need a degree to come up with a clear position.

Perhaps the problem is with your position, if you need a degree to properly clarify what you believe.

They're more like algae, except without the ability to perform photosynthesis.

There a baby, just less developed than the one we see outside the womb.

Why is that so hard to see?

[Kuciwalker]

They are no different from any other random mass of cells, except for potential future state, is basically what you are saying.

[Ben Kenobi]

They are no different from any other random mass of cells,

Hardly random.

Otherwise, how would a child come to be born? There has to be real structure and form well before birth.

[Kuciwalker]

Ok, the only difference that could possibly have any bearing on this discussion between it and any other random mass of cells.

Inherently, a bunch of cells has no special right to live. But if you make the case that its potential future state gives it rights, then you cannot stop at conception. Would you say masturbation is killing unborn children? Every sperm is sacred?

[loinburger]

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
I'm thinking of folks like Peter Singer, who argues that infants do fail a test of sentience.

What test of sentience does he use?

And what evidence is there against the brain function in the earlier parts of pregnancy?

The lack of a brain.

And so do unborn children.

Are you claiming that a zygote has a brain? Which cell in the single-celled organism comprises the brain?

Self-concept is a philosophical term, not a scientific one. You assume that just because one has a brain, one has a self-concept.

As I've repeatedly stated, brain function is a necessary condition for determining sentience, not a sufficient condition for determining sentience. Otherwise everything with a brain would be "sentient."

Intrinsic capacity to grow and develop.

Then why isn't a bird a person? After all, it has the intrinsic capacity to grow and develop.

Do we stop being persons at middle-age, when we stop growing/developing?

For the sake of this argument, we could define this as attaining increasing sentience but this is just one aspect of the growth and devlopment of a human person.

Then what else, besides sentience, sets humans apart from, say, birds?

For long enough to properly replace all your veins and arteries throughout your body?

Sure. It's not as though they all need to be replaced in one fell swoop.

This is one of the biggest problems that Singer has.

...

One of the reasons could be that this connection between the brain and the body is part of this essential nature of who we are, and cannot be lost without losing who we are.

You didn't answer my question. How much of your body can be replaced by machinery or transplants or whatever before you cease to be "you"?

And why would the connection work, for the brain to communicate directly with the machine?

For pity's sake, man. If you're going to operate on the assumption that medical science is static, then there's no reason why we can't use GePap's definition of "personhood."

Why not work on curing the body, rather than seperating the body and the brain.

Who cares? It's a friggin thought experiment. Presumably the hypothetical disease being cured spreads rapidly, takes several months to eradicate, and cannot be cured once it reaches the brain, so that the only safe way to cure the disease is to separate the infected body from the uninfected brain.

[GePap]

Originally posted by loinburger

This test would essentially be assigning rights to the unborn based entirely our level of technology, i.e., it doesn't make sense that a 6-month-old fetus would be a "non-person" in 2004 but would suddenly become a "person" in 2015 when it's able to be kept alive in an artificial incubator thingimajigger. If we change the test to say "at what point could it live separately from the mother without machine assistance," then we might as well just unplug everybody who's in the intensive care ward at the hospital while we're at it.

I don't get the second part at all: the question here is a test at which one can claim that a fetus becomes a human being-it has 0 bearing on the question of mechanical assistance to any individual we accept as a human being already-ie, passed our first test.

I failt o see at all the implied connection you attempt to make.

[loinburger]

Originally posted by GePap
Only if you don;t include the statement- at which point could a fetus be viable sans technological help.

Then it remains fully biological.

Somebody doesn't become a "non-person" just because they're living with machine assistance (e.g., an artificial heart), so why should the rules for determining personhood be different for the unborn?

[GePap]

Originally posted by loinburger

Somebody doesn't become a "non-person" just because they're living with machine assistance (e.g., an artificial heart), so why should the rules for determining personhood be different for the unborn?

Sorry, but I edited the post after this.

The question is not one becoming a non-person after the fact of being a person. The question is, in a state of nature, at which point does a fetus become viable and capable of having a good chance of survival seperate from the mother.

At which point is the life of the fetus viable as an individual distinct from the body of another human being. That is the question. So as I said above, I fail to see the connection you are trying to make with machine assistance to anyone we consider a human being already- and this would include any premature births, since they are obviously no longer in the mother's body, so the woman's right arguement is gone and if the woman does not want to care for it at this point she can give it up for adoption.

[loinburger]

Originally posted by GePap
At which point is the life of the fetus viable as an individual distinct from the body of another human being.

Why is this question even relevant for determining personhood?

So as I said above, I fail to see the connection you are trying to make with machine assistance to anyone we consider a human being already- and this would include any premature births, since they are obviously no longer in the mother's body, so the woman's right arguement is gone and if the woman does not want to care for it at this point she can give it up for adoption.

What's the difference between a premature birth living with the assistance of a machine and a fetus living with the assistance of a machine? Wouldn't it be more consistent to say that children born prematurely are non-persons?

[GePap]

Originally posted by loinburger

Why is this question even relevant for determining personhood?

Why is it not? It is as useful as any of the theoritical and unprovable assertions made here. Anything based on sentience or pain involves knowledge of the brain we lack-theological assertions simply can;t be proved, and if you make personhood based on sentience or pain you always get the problem of people in coma's and whatever. This is a simple, relatively easy test that says- as long as the fetus in essence is a parasite of the women's body, she can remove it. Once we can show that the fetus is now an occupant being cared for within the woman and no longer fully dependent on the woman for survival (without getting into the issue of technology), we can consider it a seperate human being.

What's the difference between a premature birth living with the assistance of a machine and a fetus living with the assistance of a machine? Wouldn't it be more consistent to say that children born prematurely are non-persons?

A fetus living with the assistacne of a machine would no longer be in a woman's body, NO? So this would no longer be an issue of abortion, which is the point of the thread. As for consistency-consistency is a virtue of limited value on issues in which each case is so damned particular.

[loinburger]

Originally posted by GePap
Why is it not?

Because it isn't relevant for determining the personhood of any other organisms, e.g., children born prematurely.

A fetus living with the assistacne of a machine would no longer be in a woman's body, NO? So this would no longer be an issue of abortion, which is the point of the thread.

If a fetus being kept alive on a machine is a person, then so is a fetus that is not being kept alive on a machine (i.e., a fetus that is still in the womb). If you claim that a fetus being kept alive on a machine is a non-person, then why do you claim that a child born prematurely that is being kept alive on a machine is a person?

[GePap]

Originally posted by loinburger
If a fetus being kept alive on a machine is a person, then so is a fetus that is not being kept alive on a machine (i.e., a fetus that is still in the womb). If you claim that a fetus being kept alive on a machine is a non-person, then why do you claim that a child born prematurely that is being kept alive on a machine is a person?

You are attempting to define "personhood" on abstract notions-which means you will never get a resolution.

I am using a very simple physical definition-
what you pose is a sidenote- if for some reason a fetus is being fed and nurtured by machines, even if biologically they would not be viable, we are assuming that someone has taken responsibility for the life of this fetus-otherwise it would simply have been terminated, and under my simple little test, that would have been OK, since the fetus would still not have reached independent personhood.

Is this metaphysically fulfilling? No. But it is as good a working definition as you can get without it being based on theology.

[Elok]

Fetuses being the only "parasite" which are deliberately created by their host, are the same species as the host, and are in fact required for the future existence of their host's race?

Recall the siamese twin argument-if some lousy punk is using my liver and heart to support his head, without contributing to the well-being of those organs or supplying anything in return, can I kill the stupid thing? He's not needed to keep me alive, so how is it his body when the only things that are distinctly "him" are superfluous to my survival? "Parasitism" is a bit oversimplified, GePap.