South Dakota is introducing a bill that will ban abortion

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Rogan Josh
The concept of sentience is fairly complex. I think you are dooming half of the world's population to non-sentience here.

No - the concept of sentience is innate to any sentient being. That's part of being sentient.

[Ben Kenobi]

No - the concept of sentience is innate to any sentient being. That's part of being sentient.

Skywalker:

Then what is your definition of sentience? When does it arise?

Is sentience the intrinsic capacity formed at conception, or when one actually attains these capacities?

[Kuciwalker]

Then what is your definition of sentience? When does it arise?

Is sentience the intrinsic capacity formed at conception, or when one actually attains these capacities?

It obviously does not arise at conception - the only difference between an embryo and any other random mass of cells is potential future form. An embryo certainly has the potential to become sentient, but is not.

The test for sentience is simple, but virtually impossible to perform - an organism is sentient if, and only if, it possesses the concept of sentience. Only a sentient being can understand sentience, and all sentient beings do so, innately. Sentience is self-awareness - it is that thing, that not only knows that my eyes are seeing my computer screen, but actually sees my computer screen. The "uncontaminated" thing that I mentioned earlier is because the organism obviously has to communicate this concept to us, somehow, and so we have to distinguish actual knowledge from repetition (I could write a computer program that printed "I am sentient" on the screen, but that wouldn't mean anything).

I personally think sentience is an emergent property of matter - that it is a result of the interaction of the various laws of physics, not that there is some soul flying in soul-space that sees my body and decides to inhabit it. However, unless we had a computer capable of simulating the motions of every particle in the human body, it would be impossible to test.

[Ben Kenobi]

but that in no way nullifies the necessary condition that we already know of.

I have already argued against these points. Your condition and test does not provide the precision necessary to tell one child from another in terms of who will live, and who will die.

Secondly, you have not provided adequate protections for infants, as the basis for sentience can be argued against them.

How much precision is needed? By using a necessary and insufficient condition to measure sentience we may inadvertently assign sentience to organism that do not possess sentience, but the opposite problem (that of misclassifying certain persons as non-persons) is not present.

You need to be able to tell one day from another. Anything else is not precise enough to gage one child, because you might kill those children who are sentient, and thus persons.

Secondly, you need to be also able to affirm the personhood of all those who are born using your criteria, so that people cannot say that infants are not persons because they fall short of the current standard.

Both of these criteria must be met by any criterion for personhood, and are already met by the criteria of conception.

It makes no sense to say that the embryo's brain may begin to function at a later date, because it has no brain. You can't reverse the cessation of an organ that does not exist, because the non-existent organ's functionality can't have ceased in the first place.

But the lack of brain function, like the person in a reverseable coma is a temporary condition.

I've already provided a set of necessary conditions for establishing 'self-concept.' If you argue that there is a better test, then please describe it. Otherwise, what exactly is wrong with the test that I've already proposed?

Infants do not have a self-concept by your definition, and are hence, not persons.

Can you define "person" as you are using it? I've been using it to mean a "rights-bearing entity," but from this and other parts of your post it appears that you are using it in the more restricted sense of an "entity bearing the intrinsic right to life," in which case it is circular for you to argue that personhood is intrinsic.

Personhood begins at conception. Hence my argument is not circular.

If my arm is separated from the rest of my body, then they (my armless body and my severed arm) are not one person. Ditto if my body is separated from my brain.

No. The two are different in that one can live without an arm. One cannot live without a circulatory system of some sort, and even without one, only for a very short time.

Do you mean that somebody with an artificial heart is "dead" because they have been separated from their real heart? If not, then what's wrong with replacing more than just the heart with a machine, as in the dilemma that I posed?

You replace the heart. You do not replace the entire body, and the entire circulatory system.

I was under the impression that a patient was not clinically dead until either the cessation of brain function or until the cessation of total body function (depending on the definition being used).

Given time, this will occur, unless the heart is replaced in the body. That is true, that with brain activity, one is not considered brain dead, only if the cessation is reverseable, in the case of a coma, or in heart surgery.

Do you mean that you have ceased to be a person by virtue of the fact that your brain and body have been temporarily separated?

No. The case remains, whether or not one can remove all my body from my brain, and still keep both parts alive so that they can be rejoined. I don't see how that can be possible.

If you are inert because your body does not have a brain, then why isn't the embryo inert?

Yes, good point. I didn't like that analogy after I wrote the analogy because it is wrong. One can be alive and not a person. The embryo is alive and a person because they are only temporarily without brain function, in having the capacity to grow and develop.

If you are inert, then who or what is in charge of your still-functional brain? That is to way, who or what is thinking, feeling, dreaming, etc.?

No one. I doubt the brain can function seperate from the body for any period of time.

The brain-loinburger is "me," because it's still functional -- it's still thinking and feeling and dreaming all of my loinburger thoughts, loinburger feelings, and loinburger dreams. The body-loinburger is just a meat suit (albeit one that I have grown rather attached to).

Good. I had hoped this is how you are thinking. Now, you are left with the puzzle as to why our bodies ought to be respected and loved if they are just, as you say, meat suits.

I believe that our bodies and brain cannot be seperated from each other, that they come as a package. To change either in their entirety, changes the person.

For example, if you were to take your brain, now seperated from your body, and put it in the intact body of someone else, you would have a different person than before.

In the dilemma that I posed, yes -- it is a necessary medical procedure to which I have presumably given consent. In general, no -- it would be no more right to arbitrarily separated somebody's brain from their body than it would be right to subject them to any other bizarre (or mundane) medical procedure (f'rinstance, IIRC it's a crime to snatch somebody off of the street, anesthetize them, and remove their appendix).

Right, but I have a different question. How long would one be required to keep the brain 'functioning' since there is no way for us to tell what the brain is doing other than electrical impulses? Would it not be better to just let the person die than to indefinitely postpone death by these means?

[Ben Kenobi]

The test for sentience is simple, but virtually impossible to perform

Then it is useless as a criterion for personhood.

[Ben Kenobi]

The "uncontaminated" thing that I mentioned earlier is because the organism obviously has to communicate this concept to us,

One can be sentient without communicating with anyone else.

It is like this. The hermit does not stop being a person, nor do any of us when we are alone. We are simply not communicating.

Therefore, it is impossible to say that the unborn children are NOT sentient just because we cannot communicate with them. They may in fact lack sentience, but without communication we have no way of knowing for sure.

[Ben Kenobi]

Finally, in regards to the question you're throwing at Ben, if it's got your DNA it is, or should be, legally "you." You can choose to donate organs, but the body parts of others should not be used against their wishes no matter what IMO. Does that answer your question?

Yep.

Dump the reference to chromosomes determining personhood. You don't need it.

[Kuciwalker]

Then it is useless as a criterion for personhood.

Nope. You just don't apply it to individuals. I know that I'm sentient, and I know that there are other humans who are/were sentient, so I extrapolate that the next person I meet is also sentient, without actually testing him or her

[Kuciwalker]

One can be sentient without communicating with anyone else.

Yes, but "anyone else" can't tell.

Therefore, it is impossible to say that the unborn children are NOT sentient just because we cannot communicate with them.

I'm claiming that unborn children at certain levels of development aren't sentient, not because they don't communicate it to us, but because they lack the requisite hardware.

[Ben Kenobi]

Here is a MUCH simpler test-at what point does a fetus become viable-ie, at which point could it live seperate from the mother?

Gepap:

We are all dependent on others for our survival, even after we are born. Why should we have different rules for the unborn?

make some vague and completely unproveable consideration of what kind of brainwave counts as thought.

Funny thing, viability. It measures how good our machines are at keeping tiny children alive. It keeps drifting to younger ages as our technology improves. It is not a stable, nor a definitive measure of anything relating to the unborn child, but everything relating to how hard the society works at saving children.

Finally, would you agree with me to ban all abortions done after 20 weeks, on the grounds that the children are viable? If not, why not?

[Ben Kenobi]

You just don't apply it to individuals.

Then why apply the standard to individual unborn children?

not because they don't communicate it to us, but because they lack the requisite hardware.

What is the requisite hardware for sentience? How do we know this?

[Kuciwalker]

Then why apply the standard to individual unborn children?

I meant the test. Rather, you extrapolate from the fact that it appears in general they become sentient at a certain point in development, to the individual.

What is the requisite hardware for sentience? How do we know this?

A brain of a certain complexity. The fact that rocks aren't people.

[loinburger]

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
I have already argued against these points. Your condition and test does not provide the precision necessary to tell one child from another in terms of who will live, and who will die.

I don't understand what you're saying here. Are you saying that you can determine which children will live and which children will die at conception? What about miscarriages?

Secondly, you have not provided adequate protections for infants, as the basis for sentience can be argued against them.

Infants satisfy necessary conditions for sentience (except for those few infants who are born without brains, but these infants always die shortly after birth anyway), and nobody has provided any arguments (except for those based entirely on intuition and not on scientific evidence) to suggest that infants fail any necessary conditions for sentience. I don't see what the problem is.

You need to be able to tell one day from another. Anything else is not precise enough to gage one child, because you might kill those children who are sentient, and thus persons.

This is why I, personally, would set the cutoff point halfway through the second trimester (where evidence of brain function is still rather shaky-to-nonexistent) and not at the start of the third trimester (where evidence of brain function is solid).

Secondly, you need to be also able to affirm the personhood of all those who are born using your criteria, so that people cannot say that infants are not persons because they fall short of the current standard.

Infants are born as humans, and they are born with brains. I don't see where there's a problem.

But the lack of brain function, like the person in a reverseable coma is a temporary condition.

Comatose patients still have brain function, albeit at a reduced capacity (e.g., they cannot respond to most stimuli).

Infants do not have a self-concept by your definition, and are hence, not persons.

What definition are you using? Certainly not mine. Human infants are human and (except for those with terminal medical conditions) are born with functional brains, hence, by my definition human infants are sentient for all intents and purposes.

Personhood begins at conception. Hence my argument is not circular.

You have failed to define "personhood," unless your definition of personhood is "something that begins at conception."

No. The two are different in that one can live without an arm. One cannot live without a circulatory system of some sort, and even without one, only for a very short time.

I can live with an artificial circulatory system, though.

You replace the heart. You do not replace the entire body, and the entire circulatory system.

You have admitted that your heart can be replaced by a machine and that you would still be "you," hence you have failed to answer my dilemma (since you'd previously set the cutoff point at the heart, or rather, at the loss of the heart). How much of your body can be replaced by machinery or transplants or whatever before you cease to be "you"?

Given time, this will occur, unless the heart is replaced in the body.

So what? Given time, we're all going to die, so it's meaningless to say that somebody is "potentially dead."

No. The case remains, whether or not one can remove all my body from my brain, and still keep both parts alive so that they can be rejoined. I don't see how that can be possible.

...

I doubt the brain can function seperate from the body for any period of time.

Are you now simply dismissing the thought experiment? If so, then I don't see any alternative but to stop debating you. It's pointless for me to try to present arguments if you're just going to essentially say "I don't like your argument."

On the other hand, if you're still being open-minded here, then please define "body" as you have used it in the above statements. We have already established that "body" in this case does not include arms or a heart, but beyond that I don't know what you're referring to. Will my brain die if I have part of my colon replaced with a colostomy bag? Will my brain die if I have a kidney removed?

Good. I had hoped this is how you are thinking. Now, you are left with the puzzle as to why our bodies ought to be respected and loved if they are just, as you say, meat suits.

Our bodies shouldn't necessary be respected. We should be respected. If somebody hacks off my arm, then they cause me pain, they cause me to suffer the impaired functionality that accompanies the loss of an arm, they cause me to possibly suffer the complications of infection. They are morally responsible for harming me. However, once I lose that arm, then my assailants can abuse it to their hearts' content -- they are no longer morally responsible for abusing me, because they are now abusing my severed arm.

How about you? If somebody were to cut off your arm, would they be "murdering" your arm?

I believe that our bodies and brain cannot be seperated from each other, that they come as a package. To change either in their entirety, changes the person.

You haven't yet defined a point at which somebody's body has been "changed in its entirety." You'd previously set this point at the loss of the heart, but you then changed your mind when I brought up artificial hearts.

For example, if you were to take your brain, now seperated from your body, and put it in the intact body of someone else, you would have a different person than before.

I disagree. I'd still be thinking my same loinburger thoughts and dreaming my same loinburger dreams. It's not as though my lungs or my spleen are going to have much of an effect upon my thought processes, upon "me." (Well, maybe if I suffer terrible indigestion in my new body then I might be in a foul mood as a result, and if I suffer terrible flatulance in my new body then I might be embarrassed as a result, but I'd hardly say that I cease to be "me" as a result of my newfound indigestion and/or flatulance.)

Right, but I have a different question. How long would one be required to keep the brain 'functioning' since there is no way for us to tell what the brain is doing other than electrical impulses?

I'd stated in my dilemma that the brain is capable of limited interaction with its environment, e.g., though some sort of speech machine.

Would it not be better to just let the person die than to indefinitely postpone death by these means?

Why Ben! I never expected to hear you start talking like a Utilitarian...

I'm not really sure, I guess. I've actually wondered the same thing regarding people in comas, who for all we know are stuck in the most horrible nightmare of their life for years at a time. There's really no good answer to either dilemma until we're better able to determine somebody's thoughts from their EEGs (or whatever).

[Elok]

Oh, geez. Loin, I think you're being a little legalistic here. I know about chromosomal abnormalities, as I mentioned Klinefelter's earlier. My point isn't supposed to be the number of chromosomes as such, only the consistency of that number. It's got 46 when it's fertilized, it's got 46 when it's a little old man confined to his bed, it's got 46 at every point in between. Biologically, it's the same organism/entity/thingamabobber. Tumors don't count because they will only grow and grow until they kill the host, or, if they are benign, will merely use up resources until the person dies. A fetus will eventually become independent to some extent.

[Ben Kenobi]

A brain of a certain complexity.

Rather vague standard, considering when you will be killing people for falling short of this standard.

The fact that rocks aren't people.

And embryos aren't rocks. Point?