War it is. Part IV.

[DinoDoc]

We aren't embargoing rent.

[Dr Strangelove]

Re: .

Originally posted by MOBIUS
.

Has anyone heard of a North Ossetian independence movement? Maybe they like what they've got. Word is that they're living on Ingushetian land. It seems that back during WW2 the Ingushetians sided with the Nazis, so after the war Comrade Stalin made them go live in Siberia for awhile. When they came back they found much of their land occupied by Ossetians.

[onodera]

Re: Re: .

Originally posted by Dr Strangelove


Has anyone heard of a North Ossetian independence movement? Maybe they like what they've got. Word is that they're living on Ingushetian land. It seems that back during WW2 the Ingushetians sided with the Nazis, so after the war Comrade Stalin made them go live in Siberia for awhile. When they came back they found much of their land occupied by Ossetians.

If we let them go, Ingushetians will do some more Beslans.

[Serb]

Originally posted by Patroklos
BTW, since I missed the weekend, a comment of the Black Sea Fleet.

For all intents and purposes it is impossible for the Russians to have made it to the Georgian coast that fast if they were not already ready for it. If it were a surprise then stores would have to be taken on, crews recalled, etc.

Who told you we weren't ready? It wasn’t a surprise for us that Sukashvili is going to war.
When you have a zone of conflict near your borders, where one side of the conflict is clearly preparing for war - you put your forces at high alert.
It was pretty obvious that Sukashvili is going to resolve the SO question through force, since he ordered to begin reconnaissance flights of Georgian unmanned aerial vehicles over the South Ossetia in May 2008. That was a CLEAR VIOLATION of the cease-fire treaty of 1992 and a CLEAR SIGNAL he is gonna attack soon. And when he later initiated provocations at SO border and started to amass his troops there, nobody else here had a doubt he want to invide.
So the level of readiness of our armed forces in the region was higher than always. I just don't understand why it surprises you so much. You are a military man after all, and that’s a military basics.

Not only that, but 25 knots are the TOP speeds of these vessels, and while they might get that speed through the water,

Oh really?

RFS Moskva (Slava class)
speed - 32 knots.

RFS Mirazh (Nanuchka class)
speed - 32 knots.

RFS Smetlivy (Kashin class)
speed - 33 knots.
RFS Smetlivy
speed – 33.6 knots.

And notice these are not top speeds of these ships (f.e. the same source which says about 33.6 as the speed of Smetlivy, also claims that the top speed of Smetlivy is 37 knots).

And you, Sir, can pretty well shove your “their top speeds are 25 knots� and your not so humble opinion about abilities of our Navy into your deluded “I suppose to be an expert� ass.

they are not going to get that as speed over ground.

We didn't have to.

That and I seriously doubt the ability of Russian plants to maintain that stress for 24 hours (and at that extremely uneconomical speed, and not stopping to fuel once underway, their tanks would be dry upon arrival).

Oh great, now you demonstrate us the famous American math and georaphy skills again.
As was already said earlier (not by me), the distance between Sevastopol and Abkhazia is about 400 nautical miles. First of all, even if we assume that you are right about the top speeds of these ships, then 400 (miles)/25knots (top speed according to you) = 400/25=16 hours, not 24 hours as you calculated. Great math, man!
Now as for the range of these ships, then check it out:

RFS Moskva (Slava class)
Range - 10, 000 miles.

RFS Smetlivy (Kashin class)
Range - 3, 500 miles.

RFS Mirazh (Nanuchka class)
Range - 2, 500 miles.
Sure those ranges are for economic speeds, not for top speeds, but still, the range of the smallest vessel with the shortest range - RFS Mirazh (Nanuchka class) is 2,500 nmi at 12 knots and 900 nmi at 30 knots - about as twise as greater than the distance they had to cover. So, they didn't have to refuel in travel at all.
Now, please explain to me once again, why the **** "their tanks would be dry upon arrival", if the distance they had to cover is just 400 miles?

Also, while it might be different in the Russian Navy since life is cheap for them, the major weapons of those warships would probably not be aboard unless some extreme coincidence was in play.

Once again – our armed forces in the region (including our Navy) were on higher alert than always, when it became clear that Sukashvili is going to attack. And it was very clear months before the actual attack had happened at August 8. Besides, to deal with the Georgian Navy we simply didn’t need a major weapons on all our ships. Who the **** in his straight mind would spent a SS-N-12 Sandbox missiles with a one ton high explosive warheads to sink a Georgian missile boats, if the SS-N-9 missile launched by the smallest of our combat ships Mirazh just vaporized the Georgian boat?
And one more thing, those ships just returned from the big naval exercises (and part of the fleet was still in Novorossiysk), so they were fully loaded and ready.

Most importantly, they brought 3000 troops with them. Unless you think it is normal practice for a regiment of infantry to berth on their ships constantly for no reason, then we are take at least a day to marshal, equip, and embark those troops.

First of all, we brought 4, 000 troops (other sources say 9, 000), not 3, 000. Secondly, who told you we brought them on ships? Three Russian "large landing ships" participated in the mission and each ship of Ropucha class can transport 300 troops maximum. So, 3*300=900 troops. The rest of the troops were AIRLIFTED to Tsukhumi (Abkhazia).
You seems to don’t understand (famous Amercian georgrafy skills again) that Sevastopol is in Ukraine and Ukraine is not part of Russia anymore. So you JUST CANNOT bring 4000 troops into other country without their permission. Ukrainians would simply not allowed a build-up of our forces in Sevastopol. And your fleet JUST CANNOT leave the Sevastopol harbor unnnoticed, so ALL movements of our ships were carefully recorded by the Ukranians. This is the enterance to the Sevastopol harbor (Aug. 24, 2008, Moskva returning to its home port after the end of the mission).

The war started at 0:30 Aug.8.
According to Ukranians, at the same morning (Aug. 8) the large landing ship Yamal quit the Sevastopol harbor and took direction to the Russian naval base Novorossiysk (a lot of Russian forces located there). Moskva, Smetlivy and Mirazh quit Sevastopol harbor at AUGUST 9 – more than 24 hours after the war started. The same day Yamal arrived Novorossiysk where two other Ropucha class transport waited (being loaded). So, here we go, here is your 24 hours needed for preparation of our combat ships and 24 hours needed for preparation of troops. At Aug. 9 three transports carrying about 900 troops from Novorossiysk joined main combat ships from Sevastopol and the joint flotilla took direction to Abkhazia. They arrived at Abkhazian port Ochamchira at early morning Aug. 10.
So, dude, you can shove your claim about a regiment of infantry to berth on their ships constantly for no reason into your deluded ass once again. We simply couldn't have 3000 troops in Sevastopol "to berth on their ships constantly" and three transports participated in the mission simply couldn't carry that much troops.
Once again – the movements of our ships was not a secret for Ukranians, they know the exact time when our ships quit Sevastopol.



So, your claim that our ships just waited for a “go� signal and left their port immidiatelly after the outbreak of war "they engineered this a week ago" is


just


a bullsh!t,


as always.

[Serb]

Originally posted by Saras
Guys, can we already drop this notion of Russia being surprised and all by the Georgian "aggression"? The version supported by most of the impartial or corroborated information is that Georgia was provoked (and not just this August but for more like a year), and Russia was ready. OF COURSE the ships were underway.

OF COURSE they were not, but OF COURSE you are lying again.

[Serb]

Originally posted by Patroklos
How absolultey ridiculous does Russia look keeping baby food and diapers away from a civilian populous it is illegally occupying?

Honestly Serb, are you done looking like an idiot yet?

Dude, when we bring humanitarian aid anywhere it's first of all MEDICATIONS, mobile hospitals, food, warm clothing, disel generators, tents, etc.
You brought water (there are no water shortages in Georgia, we didn't destroy their water pumping stations, like they did in South Ossetia (to cut off the water supply from Tskhinvali was one of the first things they done)), baby food and DIAPERS.

Sure diapers is the first thing a refugee needs.

I do understand that your loyal monkey Sukashvili is a certified sh!tbag, who sh!ts his pants all the time therefore he needs a lot of Libero diapers, but, imho, he needs medication (haloperidol) much more than diapers. So if you really wanted to help, you would brought some medications, instead of diapers.

I hope you are proud your former destoyer now become a diaper delivery vessel.

[Serb]

Originally posted by Patroklos

It doesn't matter if their support ships arrived at the same time. In order for the warships themselves to have gotten there when they did they would have needed prior warning.

400nm at <25 knots plus port transit times/crew recall/fueling/troop onloads = Russians engineered this weeks ahead of time.

Oh, no, not this sh!t again!


Why wouldn't you admit that Russians demonstrated an impressive level of readiness, organization, skill, firepower, etc, etc, etc? Why wouldn't you admit that your so low opinion about the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces and Russian hardware has nothing common with reality and just an opinion of ignorant and arrogant self-loving jackass?
You (I don't mean only you, but David, and 99% of the westerners) live in your own world where Russians are drunk retards operating rusty and poorly designed harware.
But your little fantasy universe has nothing common with reality. In reality, our Armed Forces kick asses. In reality we just "shock&awed" your beloved aggressive fascist puppet.
You should stop using your imbecile Hollywood movies as the main source about the Russians and Russian military.
Wake-up Neo

[Serb]

Check this out:

E-Notes
Russia Resurgent: An Initial Look at Russian Military Performance in Georgia
by Felix K. Chang

August 13, 2008

Felix K. Chang was a senior planner and an intelligence officer in the U.S. Department of Defense. He is currently a partner at CVP Ventures and a senior fellow at FPRI. His publications and ongoing research concentrate on military, economic, and energy security issues in Asia as well as financial industry trends around the world.

It is no surprise that tensions between Russia and Georgia have mounted. On August 3 Moscow warned of the growing danger of a “large-scale military conflict� between Georgia and its separatist province of South Ossetia; that warning drew a reply from Washington two days later urging Moscow to refrain from provocative actions in the region.[1]

As the conflict unfolded during the night of August 7 with a Georgian military offensive into South Ossetia, it soon appeared that Tbilisi miscalculated the Russian response. By the morning of August 8, Russian forces were streaming into Georgia. While news reports from the frontlines remain preliminary and incomplete, the scale and speed of Russia’s military operations between August 8 and 12 do shed some light on Russian military capabilities and operational readiness and raise new questions regarding the events leading to the conflict.

Russian Ground Forces
Within hours of the overnight Georgian offensive beginning August 7, an estimated 6,000 to 10,000 Russian troops were on the main highway leading into Georgia. By 1:00 pm on August 8, witnesses reported roads filled with hundreds of tanks, armored personnel carriers, towed artillery, and truck-mounted rocket launchers already travelling into the Roki Tunnel, which passes through the mountainous area that separates Russia and Georgia.[2]

From the number of troops and types of equipment, and given the units of the 58th Army based nearby, it is clear that Russia deployed the equivalent of a motor rifle division. For such a force to move from bivouac into the field, Russian army commanders would have needed time to coordinate the mobilization—distributing ammunition and supplies, establishing the right of way on the only highway to Georgia, and sorting out the proper ordering of the advancing column so that it could combat any resistance it may encounter.

In addition, Russian media reported on Saturday that elements of the 76th Air Assault Division based in the Leningrad Military District had already been airlifted into the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. Elements of the 98th Airborne Division and 45th Intelligence Regiment based in the Moscow Military District were slated to follow soon thereafter. These may have constituted the “battalion task forces� that General Vladimir Boldyrev, commander of Russian Ground Forces, said captured the capital city early on that same day. These elite formations, which represent part of Russia’s strategic reserve, are likely to have units on constant alert for rapid deployments. Still, to fully equip, embark, transport, and coordinate the arrival and integration of these troops into combat operations alongside the 58th Army units moving overland is a notable demonstration of not only long-range airlift capability involving over 100 airlift sorties, but also improved command and staff arrangements, which proved so difficult for Russia’s army in the 1990s.[3]

Surely with rising tensions, Russian army commanders likely had contingency plans in place for such an operation. Even so, it remains remarkable that such sizable forces could have been orchestrated and arrayed in under half a day, even if decision-making in Moscow was instantaneous, especially if the actual timing of the Georgian offensive was unknown to Russian leaders. For by the early afternoon on August 8, Russian mechanized infantry responding to the Georgian provocation were already battling in Tskhinvali, about 40 km from Russia but less than 5 km from where Georgia’s offensive began.[4] Certainly, most of the Russian ground units that participated in the incursion into Georgia must have been placed on a higher state of readiness and their commands coordinated earlier last week to achieve such a fast and smoothly executed response.

Russian Air Forces
Russia operates a number of air bases near Georgia. Many of these supported military operations in Chechnya between 1994-2000, when separatists in that province sought autonomy from Russia. Clearly, the Russian military has also improved its air-ground coordination since its poorly managed Chechen campaigns. In Georgia, the Russian air force appeared to have provided effective close air support to the army units advancing into South Ossetia. News reports indicated that Georgian defenses blocking the Russian advance were struck from the air.[5] Given the fast tempo of the action, only good coordination between air and ground units would have ensured such support.

With over 300 combat aircraft—including Su-24, Su-25, and Su-27 fighters and Tu-22 bombers—reportedly participating in the operation, Russia clearly had little problem achieving air superiority over Georgia, which could field only eight Su-25 fighters. Given that many of its jets were probably on alert, the Russian air force could quickly take to the sky. Just as important, it likely possessed excellent intelligence on key Georgian military sites, which is unsurprising since Russian troops had been stationed in Georgia until 2007 and its peacekeepers have been present in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another breakaway Georgian province.

So far, four Russian and one Georgian aircraft are confirmed to have been destroyed, though each side has claimed higher numbers. It appears that all the losses have been due to ground-based air defenses, mainly surface-to-air missiles. While the Su-25 losses on both sides are readily understandable given their role in close air support, the Russian loss of a Tu-22M3 bomber, which normally operates at high altitude, remains unexplained.[6]

As a whole, the intensity of Russia’s air operations should also be noted. From a cold start, the Russian air force activated a broad array of combat units and maintained a high operational tempo for over four days. It would have required foresight to stock the needed bases with sufficient stores of fuel and ammunition. In July 2007, Russia may have had the chance to prepare for such an action during a large-scale training maneuver simulating the defense of Russia’s southern border called Exercise Caucasian Border 2007 that featured more than 400 air sorties. If nothing else, Russian air units demonstrated that they were well prepared for this sort of contingency and performed their duties with greater skill and coordination than had been seen in the 1990s.

Russian Naval Forces
Possibly the most striking performance may have been that of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, whose capabilities have not been highly regarded. On Saturday, Georgian sources announced that Russian warships had begun to blockade its coast. The presence of the ships was seemingly confirmed by Russian-backed Abkhaz authorities, who claimed that the ships had deflected a Georgian attempt to close off the coastline of Abkhazia. In the meantime, Russian media reported that the Moskva, a Slava-class cruiser, and the Smetlivy, a Kashin-class destroyer, as well as a small number of supply and logistics ships had sailed from Sevastopol and arrived in the region on Sunday to “provide aid to refugees� and not to “blockade the Georgian coast.� The reports concluded that after “several maneuvers� as part of an anti-terror exercise, the ships sailed onto Novorossiysk.[7]

Though not confirmed by Georgian sources, the Russian Navy informed media outlets that four Georgian fast-attack craft had crossed the border of the established security zone and threatened the Russian flotilla. In response, after firing warning shots, the Russian warships sank one of the craft with gunfire. Another unconfirmed claim was made by Georgia that the Russian navy landed troops into Abkhazia over the weekend. If true, these troops probably sailed aboard the three “large landing craft,� which Russian news reported had sailed from Novorossiysk, where ground troops are known to be based nearby. The “large landing craft� were either the three Alligator-class or three Ropucha-class LSTs based with the Black Sea Fleet. But even if accurate, these ships could not have lifted more than 900 troops at one time, far fewer than the Georgian claim.[8]

While the claims of a naval clash and a troop landing remains unclear, the speed with which the Russian vessels based at Sevastopol must have put to sea is not. Since the Moskva and Smetlivy were accompanying much slower supply and logistics ships, whose maximum speed range between 12 and 16 knots, the flotilla would have taken 25 hours to transit the 400 nm between Sevastopol and the Georgian coast. For the ships to have arrived on Saturday, they would have to have sailed on Friday, just hours after Georgian troops crossed into South Ossetia.

Thus, the Russian vessels must have been on alert with their crews aboard and the supply ships already loaded with whatever humanitarian aid they were intended to transport. Otherwise, the Black Sea Fleet would have required at least a full day, if not longer, to get its ships underway, so that naval commanders could plan the mission, crews could be recalled, and appropriate supplies could be found and loaded onto the ships. In addition, the ease with which those supplies were offloaded at their destination implies further coordination as to who would receive them and how they would be distributed. For the Black Sea Fleet, its ability to respond as quickly as it did shows that it had not only been held at a high state of operational readiness, but also made substantial preparations for the action.

Operational Axes
Russian forces eventually advanced across two fronts. In South Ossetia, Russian troops took Tskhinvali and then crossed into undisputed Georgian territory to cut the main highway and rail line west of Gori. A second front was opened when Russian mechanized infantry passed through the UN security zone and entered undisputed Georgian territory from Abkhazia. At least 2,000 troops occupied Zugdidi, a Georgian town 10 km from the border and a sector headquarters of the UN peacekeeping force. The Russian column continued another 30 km to Senaki, where it captured a Georgian military base and airfield, severing the main highway and rail line at a second location and effectively controlling all heavy traffic movement across Georgia. It is reasonable to assume that at least some of the 9,000 troops and 350 armored vehicles the Russian military had stationed in Abkhazia as peacekeepers participated in the advance. Meanwhile, Abkhaz separatists subdued Georgian positions in the Kodori Valley and Russian air power destroyed key military facilities in Tbilisi and port of Poti.[9]

No doubt Russia’s military action in Georgia will prompt many countries to view Moscow in a sharper light, from the capitals of Europe to Beijing and Tokyo. However the world eventually interprets Russia’s intervention in Georgia’s civil conflict—whether as a “humanitarian effort� as Moscow portrays or as a “full scale invasion� as Tbilisi portrays—it does demonstrate the Russian military’s renewed ability to prosecute a relatively complex, high-intensity combined arms operation. Still, the evidently high state of readiness of such a broad array of Russian military units across all three services raises more questions about Moscow’s intentions and planning prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200808.chang.russiaresurgentgeorgia.html

[Serb]

Good reading too:

Don't pick a fight you can't finish, Mr Miliband
When he visits Kiev, the Foreign Secretary should remember the threats posed by Nato's drive eastwardsAnatol Lieven
Before making his speech on policy towards Russia in Kiev, Ukraine, later this week David Miliband would do well to ponder some wise advice from a great predecessor. Lord Salisbury, Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister in the days of the British Empire, dispensed immense global power; but that did not mean that he liked playing about with that power.

Faced with proposals for British policy that he understood to be deeply damaging to the interests of other great powers, Salisbury would look his colleagues in the eye and ask simply: “Are you really prepared to fight? If not, do not embark on this policy.�

If the events of the past fortnight in Georgia have demonstrated one thing clearly, it is that Russia will fight if it feels its vital interests under attack in the former Soviet Union - and that the West will not, and indeed cannot, given its conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Other Western threats are equally empty. Russia itself pulled out of co-operation with Nato. If a real threat is made of expulsion from the G8, Russia will leave that organisation too - especially since a club that does not include China and India is increasingly meaningless anyway. The threat of being barred from joining the World Trade Organisation is a bit stronger - but Russia has done so well economically without membership that this goal too has lost much of its allure.

Moscow has reminded Nato of the importance of Russian goodwill to secure the supply lines of the US-Nato operation in Afghanistan through Central Asia. Alternatively, Nato can become wholly dependent on routes through Pakistan. From where I am sitting, that does not look like a very good move - and where I am sitting at this moment is a hotel room in Peshawar, Pakistan.

By siding fully with Iran, Russia has the capability to wreck any possibility of compromise between Tehran and the West, and to push the US towards an attack that would be disastrous for Western interests - and enormously helpful to Russia's.

However, if only he will take it, Mr Miliband's speech could be a magnificent opportunity to set British policy towards Russia on a footing of sober reality - strengthening Western unity and resolve on issues such as reducing our energy dependence on Russia; but eschewing empty promises and shelving hopeless goals such as restoring Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and forcing Russia to change its Constitution to extradite Andrei Lugovoi, accused of killing the former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko.

Russia, for its part, will have to abandon or shelve its own hopeless goals such as restoring Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo and forcing Britain to change its laws to extradite Boris Berezovsky and the Chechen leader Ahmed Zakayev.

Above all, Mr Miliband needs to think hard before committing Britain to support Nato membership for Georgia and Ukraine. He should look carefully at the widespread Western belief that Russia “set a trap for Georgia� in South Ossetia. There was no Russian trap. In recent years Moscow has made it absolutely, publicly and repeatedly clear that if Georgia attacked South Ossetia, Russia would fight.

The obvious trap was set by President Saakashvili for the West, and was based on the belief that if he started a war to recover Georgia's lost territories, the West would come to his aid. This didn't work as well as Mr Saakashvili wished, because we have not gone to war for Georgia. On the other hand, every Western government statement offering future Nato membership is an implicit promise that we will do so in future if necessary. How can we make such a promise to a man who tried to involve us in a war without even asking us first?

On Ukraine, Mr Miliband should study carefully a range of reliable opinion polls showing that by a margin of about three to one, ordinary Ukrainian voters are opposed to Nato membership. This is not only because they want good relations with Russia, but because they fear being dragged into disastrous American wars in the Muslim world.

Even when it comes to the wider question of alignment with the West rather than Russia, the Ukrainian majority in favour of the Western line is slim - about 53 to 47 per cent to judge by the last Ukrainian presidential election. We should have learnt by now from the ghastly examples of Bosnia and elsewhere that a narrow numerical majority is simply not enough when existential national issues are at stake.

In other words, it is Nato's eastward drive, not Russian ambition, that is the greatest threat to Ukrainian stability and unity. A realistic British policy towards Ukraine should mean a genuine commitment to help it to develop economically, socially and politically in ways that will gradually draw it closer to the West and may one day make European Union membership possible. Under no circumstances should it mean plunging Ukraine into a disastrous crisis for the sake of a Nato alliance that cannot and will not defend it anyway.

Viewing this conflict from Pakistan gives some interesting perspectives. The first is the absolute insanity of the West's stoking a crisis with Russia while facing such intractable problems in the Muslim world.

It is also striking that the Pakistani media have been very balanced in their coverage of the crisis, despite their traditional hostility to Moscow.

Is this because they have suddenly fallen in love with Russia? Not a bit. It is because when it comes to international lawlessness, bullying and aggression, they no longer see a great difference between Russia and America. The moralising of Western leaders, therefore, no longer cuts much ice in Peshawar - or anywhere else much outside the West itself.

Anatol Lieven is a professor at King's College London and a former Times correspondent in the Soviet Union

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4607471.ece

[Serb]

And this one is pure gem. The Georgian deputy defence minister explains who started this war.

Tbilisi admits misjudging Russia
By Jan Cienski in Tbilisi

Published: August 21 2008 19:21 | Last updated: August 21 2008 19:21

Georgia did not believe Russia would respond to its offensive in South Ossetia and was completely unprepared for the counter-attack, the deputy defence minister has admitted.

Batu Kutelia told the Financial Times that Georgia had made the decision to seize the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali despite the fact that its forces did not have enough anti-tank and air defences to protect themselves against the possibility of serious resistance.

“Unfortunately, we attached a low priority to this,� he said, sitting at a desk with the flags of Georgia and Nato (to which Georgia does not belong) crossed behind him. “We did not prepare for this kind of eventuality.�

The Georgian military felt there was only a low probability of a massive Russian counter-attack, despite the bloody way in which Russia destroyed Chechnya, on the other side of the Caucasus mountains, in two wars during the 1990s and the fact that separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had Russian backing.

Georgian forces were unprepared when the Russian counter-strike came, Mr Kutelia said. “I didn’t think it likely that a member of the UN Security Council and the OSCE would react like this,� Mr Kutelia said.

His amazement that Russia would use force against a smaller neighbour was echoed by David Darchiashvili, head of the parliamentary European integration committee. “No one expected Russia would mobilise and invade,� he said

Georgia’s 20,000-man army, built up at a cost of $2bn with the help of US trainers and cast-off Warsaw Pact equipment, was organised to deal with “brushfire� wars with separatist enclaves on its borders and to contribute to missions such as Iraq as a way of shoring up Georgia’s ties with the west, not to do battle with Russia.

Mr Kutelia still puts blame for the war squarely on the Russians and their South Ossetian allies, saying that in early August Ossetian fighters began to shell Georgian positions and villages.

He said Russia had begun to move heavy armour through the Roki tunnel from North Ossetia before President Mikheil Saakashvili unleashed his military against the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali on August 7, but offered no evidence to back this up.

Mr Kutelia said that the Georgians moved despite not having enough anti-tank and air defences, not expecting the Russians to react with overwhelming force.“At some point there was no choice,� he said.

Mr Kutelia said damage to Georgia’s military infrastructure was “significant�, and it would take an enormous amount of foreign help to rebuild Georgia’s defensive capabilities, something the Russians have promised to flatten again if they feel it poses a threat.

Russian troops have entered many of Georgia’s military bases, often under the eyes of a cowed Georgian army. They have confiscated US Humvee vehicles, blown up coastguard vessels and ransacked some of Georgia’s most modern military bases, destroying radar and other air defences, as well as reportedly capturing Georgian tanks, small arms and ammunition. So far Russia has made no move to return its booty.

The cost of Georgia’s lack of preparation could be seen earlier this week, when seven soldiers killed in earlier fighting were buried in a cemetery on a dusty hillside outside the capital.

About 20 troops in fatigues, and one in black track pants, watched from the shade of a pine tree as a bulldozer pushed sandy soil into the long trench holding the bodies.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d8beefe-6fad-11dd-986f-0000779fd18c.html?nclick_check=1

[Saras]

Originally posted by Serb
Check this out:



http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200808.ch...ntgeorgia.html

You realise this argues that you were ready to go? combined with continued provocations of your S.Ossetian friends, all should now be clear, right?

[Lancer]

South Ossetia: Russia intends to absorb region

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080829/ap_on_re_eu/georgia;_ylt=AmaQ.n2THiVtMj9oHnKkf8tvaA8F

12 minutes ago


TSKHINVALI, Georgia - Officials in South Ossetia say Russia intends eventually to absorb the breakaway Georgian province.

ADVERTISEMENT


South Ossetian parliamentary speaker Znaur Gassiyev says that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the region's leader, Eduard Kokoity, discussed South Ossetia's future earlier this week in Moscow.

Moscow has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a second separatist region of Georgia, as independent, drawing criticism from the West.

Gassiyev said Friday that Russia will absorb South Ossetia "in several years" or earlier. Gassiyev said that position was "firmly stated by both leaders."

His deputy, Tarzan Kokoiti, says South Ossetia has the right to reunite with North Ossetia, which is part of Russia.

The Kremlin declined immediate comment.

[Serb]

Originally posted by Saras


You realise this argues that you were ready to go?

Nope. It just shows the superb readiness and high combat capabilities of our military.
If your military is not ready for action then what the hell do you need this military for?

combined with continued provocations of your S.Ossetian friends, all should now be clear, right?

Yep. For me it was very clear from the beggining. Intensive reamring of Georgian military combined with constant sable rantings (wrt SO) of your paranoid fascist Georgian friend, it was pretty clear that sooner or later he will create some kind of excuse to start another conquest of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

What is clear for you? That the full-scale Georgian offensive, the night attack on Tskhinvali and Ossetian villages, bombings of Russian peacekeepers's positions in Tskhinvali NEVER HAPPENED?
HOW THE **** CAN YOU JUSTIFY THAT?

[Serb]

Originally posted by Lancer
South Ossetia: Russia intends to absorb region

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080829/ap_on_re_eu/georgia;_ylt=AmaQ.n2THiVtMj9oHnKkf8tvaA8F

12 minutes ago


TSKHINVALI, Georgia - Officials in South Ossetia say Russia intends eventually to absorb the breakaway Georgian province.

ADVERTISEMENT


South Ossetian parliamentary speaker Znaur Gassiyev says that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the region's leader, Eduard Kokoity, discussed South Ossetia's future earlier this week in Moscow.

Moscow has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a second separatist region of Georgia, as independent, drawing criticism from the West.

Gassiyev said Friday that Russia will absorb South Ossetia "in several years" or earlier. Gassiyev said that position was "firmly stated by both leaders."

His deputy, Tarzan Kokoiti, says South Ossetia has the right to reunite with North Ossetia, which is part of Russia.

The Kremlin declined immediate comment.

OBS (One Babushka Said) News Agency (c).
In other words - blah-blah-blah.

[Lancer]

I also just watched FOX business news and they reported that Russia was going to reduce oil shipments to europe but I can't find it elsewhere. Have you heard anything Serb?