Top 10 Anti-Christian Acts of 2009

[Darius871]

It was explicitly targetted at federal and state regulations that either reduced or eliminated the civil protections and rights of black people. This is why I'm making the argument that Roe is our modern day Dred Scott, and the unborn need to be extended the equal protection under the 14th amendment, which would preclude state regulations permitting the slaughter of the unborn, just as they precluded state regulations permitting the buying and selling and owning of slaves throughout the US.

No. Perhaps you've heard of the THIRTEENTH Amendment, which actively prohibited selling and owning of slaves. "State regulations permitting the buying and selling and owning of slaves" were not even in existence by the time the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was adopted three years later for the separate purpose of ceasing a number of state actions actively discriminating against the already-freed slaves (e.g. the "Black Codes"). This may come as a surprise to you, but a state passively declining to prohibit abortion is not an active state action favoring abortion, such as mandating it or funding it.

That's not all the Equal Protection clause states. It states that not only shall the state restrain itself from discrimination, but also that the state has an obligation to protect US citizens under the law. A state cannot have a law permitting abortion, any more than it could have a law permitting blacks to be lynched. This is why the 14th amendment is worded this way, and why the equal protection clause exists.

Who said anything about a "law permitting abortion"? We're talking about a consensual act between two private citizens, which is presumed legal unless and until specifically prohibited by the state. Passively declining to prohibit X is not a state action endorsing X.

Yes, there is. The state has the obligation to extend the civil protection to all of it's citizens. For example, lynch mobs which were private actions are explicitly banned, because if the state would permit them, it's essentially saying that there are two classes of people, blacks and white, and the state is only obligated to protect white people.

What about lynching? The analogy relates to lynching which is and was barred by the 14th amendment. We aren't talking about a policy which permits a store to only serve white customers, but we are talking about the obligation of the state to protect the life of their citizens.

No. Assuming no state official was involved, a lynching is not "barred by the 14th Amendment," and I defy you to cite any legal authority to the contrary. In fact, the inability of the 14th Amendment to compel prosecution of lynchers was a driving force behind a few early-20th-century attempts to pass federal anti-lynching statutes, which failed to pass Congress and left it to the states to enforce their own homicide laws. If I go out and lynch a black guy this afternoon, the only things I have to worry about are the laws of Minnesota and vigor of the county prosecutor, not Uncle Sam.

Yes, they would. This is exactly what the 14th Amendment was designed to do. These 'persons' are declared to be citizens of the US, and entitled to the protections available to all other citizens.

No, no, no. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits state action that affirmatively harms or benefits one group more than another similarly situated, on the basis of an arbitrary distinction. The word "protection" by no means implies that a state cannot passively decline to "protect" one private citizen from another private citizen, and indeed it probably never would have been passed had the ratifiers perceived it to impose such a heavy burden on states.

This is the very essence of "state action doctrine" that has defined 14th Amendment jurisprudence for the almost 135 years since the seminal case of U.S. v. Cruikshank, which held in pertinent part (emphases added since I'm sure you'd love to totally disregard it):

...The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society. As was said by Mr. Justice Johnson, in Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 244, it secures 'the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice.' These counts in the indictment [against private citizens] do not call for the exercise of any of the powers conferred by this provision in the amendment.

...When stripped of its verbiage, the case as presented amounts to nothing more than that the [private citizen] defendants conspired to prevent certain citizens of the United States, being within the State of Louisiana, from enjoying the equal protection of the laws of the State and of the United States.

The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but this provision does not, any more than the one which precedes it, and which we have just considered, add any thing [92 U.S. 542, 555] to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another. The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its power. That duty was originally assumed by the States; and it still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the national government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.

...

U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)

[Ben Kenobi]

It seems incredibly strange to use Leviticus for the basis of some prohibitions, while at the same time saying Christ released us from others (mostly the eating of pork and shellfish and whatnot).

God, this is a tired trope. I'm referring to the point that God established a law for Israel as evidence that he's got a Law that people ought to be governed by. I'm actually arguing that his law for Israel is contrary to his true Law, which Christ revealed. Things like Divorce, which people NEVER MENTION when taking the piss like you are here.

Why is it that no one mentions leviticus permitted divorce contrary to the Law of God?

[Darius871]

How is a perversion of the 14th? It's exactly what the 14th was designed to do. Of course it's a perversion which would infringe on the holy sacrament of privacy as enshrined in Griswald, but lets call attempts to claw back at prior judicial activism as violations of stare decesis.

By "stare decisis" I never referred to Griswald, which I consider poorly reasoned judicial fiat just like Roe, both of which I would like to see overturned for legal faults even if I weren't pro-life, which I am. I was obviously referring to Cruikshank, which (based on the unfounded nonsense you're spouting) you evidently had never even heard of until today. Try picking up a book sometime.

[DinoDoc]

It seems incredibly strange to use Leviticus for the basis of some prohibitions, while at the same time saying Christ released us from others (mostly the eating of pork and shellfish and whatnot).

Matthew 5:17-20
"Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished. Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven."

Regarding dietary provisions though: Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man. - Matthew 15:11

[Ben Kenobi]

No. Perhaps you've heard of the THIRTEENTH Amendment, which actively prohibited selling and owning of slaves. "State regulations permitting the buying and selling and owning of slaves" were not even in existence by the time the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was adopted three years later for the separate purpose of ceasing a number of state actions actively discriminating against the already-freed slaves (e.g. the "Black Codes").

Or the lynch mobs perhaps?

This may come as a surprise to you, but a state passively declining to prohibit abortion is not an active state action favoring abortion, such as mandating it or funding it.

I'm very well acquainted with the difference as I live in a regime that does fund it.

Who said anything about a "law permitting abortion"? We're talking about a consensual act between two private citizens, which is presumed legal unless and until specifically prohibited by the state.

So if two people agree between themselves to lynch a third it ought to be permitted without the consent of the third person being lynched? This is no different here. Is it ok, or is it not ok to lynch black people? Why then is it ok to kill unborn black people in the womb?

No. Assuming no state official was involved, a lynching is not "barred by the 14th Amendment," and I defy you to cite any legal authority to the contrary. In fact, the inability of the 14th Amendment to compel prosecution of lynchers was a driving force behind a few early-20th-century attempts to pass federal anti-lynching statutes, which failed to pass Congress and left it to the states to enforce their own homicide laws.

The failure was not the 14th, but in the political will to enforce it starting from Hayes onwards (a Democrat btw), who attacked many things (including the 15th), etc. Why do you think that the Crow laws were slapped down eventually, by arguments to the 14th, especially equal protection. Yes, you are right that there was blowback, but I'd argue that the original intent was for the provision of equal protection of the laws to apply to a black man. To argue the distinction between state powers and private actors as justifying lynching seems to me entirely contrary to the spirit in which the amendment was passed.

No, no, no. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits state action that affirmatively harms or benefits one group more than another similarly situated, on the basis of an arbitrary distinction.

Where does it say 'state action?' The amendment makes no distinction between the actions of the state, and between those of private actors within the state. Harlan Fiske argued quite vehemently what I am arguing here, that this whole distinction is made up of whole cloth. It's not an interpretation that's been held to hold any water.

The word "protection" by no means implies that a state cannot passively decline to "protect" one private citizen from another private citizen, and indeed it probably never would have been passed had the ratifiers perceived it to impose such a heavy burden on states.

Huh? That's the whole point of the law. The state cannot turn a blind eye to a black man and deny him the civil protections available to the white man. One of the essential duties of the state is to protect private citizens from assaulting one another.

The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.

This is an interpretation, yes, but the actual amendment says nothing about the distinction between private and public actors.

[Darius871]

So if two people agree between themselves to lynch a third it ought to be permitted without the consent of the third person being lynched? This is no different here. Is it ok, or is it not ok to lynch black people? Why then is it ok to kill unborn black people in the womb?

Who said anything about it being "ok"? I only said it's not prohibited by the 14th Amendment, which fortunately doesn't matter because state law prohibits lynching anyway. Do I think state law should prohibit abortion too? Sure, but that still has nothing whatsoever to do with the 14th Amendment.

The failure was not the 14th, but in the political will to enforce it starting from Hayes onwards (a Democrat btw), who attacked many things (including the 15th), etc. Why do you think that the Crow laws were slapped down eventually, by arguments to the 14th, especially equal protection.

Yes, because the Jim Crow laws were affirmative state action.

To argue the distinction between state powers and private actors as justifying lynching seems to me entirely contrary to the spirit in which the amendment was passed.

If you want to make the assertion that the "spirit" of the 14th Amendment was always to impose a criminal sanction upon private citizens not acting under color of law, I'd love to see some actual evidence from the drafting or ratification history supporting it.

Where does it say 'state action?' The amendment makes no distinction between the actions of the state, and between those of private actors within the state. Harlan Fiske argued quite vehemently what I am arguing here, that this whole distinction is made up of whole cloth. It's not an interpretation that's been held to hold any water.

"[N]ot an interpretation that's been held to hold any water"? Did you miss the part where an 8-to-1 majority of the highest court in the land "held" over a century ago that this interpretation is binding law? That's a much smaller dissent and much more long-term pedigree than any abortion case you and I find faulty.

Or do you perhaps mean it's "not an interpretation that's been held to hold any water" since 1875? Also demonstrably false. It has been repeatedly reaffirmed over the years; not only was Cruikshank generally assumed to remain good law in the 2008 Heller case about the 2nd Amendment, its particular proposition about state action was very explicitly reaffirmed as recently as 1985 (with even the 4-justice dissent assuming that Cruikshank's proposition was valid and only arguing that a statute should be interpreted differently):

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from denying any person the equal protection of the laws. The First Amendment, which by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment now applies to state governments and their officials, prohibits either Congress or a state from making any "law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble". Had § 1985(3) in so many words prohibited conspiracies to deprive any person of the Equal Protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment or of Freedom of Speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, it would be untenable to contend that either of those provisions could be violated by a conspiracy that did not somehow involve or affect a state.
"It is commonplace that rights under the Equal Protection Clause itself arise only where there has been involvement of the State or of one acting under the color of its authority. The Equal Protection Clause 'does not ... add any thing to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another.' United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-555 [23 L.Ed. 588]. As Mr. Justice DOUGLAS more recently put it, 'The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals.' United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 92 [71 S.Ct. 581, 593, 95 L.Ed. 758] (dissenting opinion). This has been the view of the Court from the beginning. United States v. Cruikshank, supra; **3358 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 [1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290]; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 [3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835]; Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 [27 S.Ct. 6, 51 L.Ed. 65]; United States v. Powell, 212 U.S. 564 [29 S.Ct. 690, 53 L.Ed. 653]. It remains the Court's view today. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 [86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373]; *832 United States v. Price, post, [383 U.S.] p. 787 [86 S.Ct. p. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d p. 267]." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1176, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966).
The opinion for the Court by Justice Fortas in the companion case characterized the Fourteenth Amendment rights in the same way:
"As we have consistently held 'The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals.' Williams I, 341 U.S., at 92 [71 S.Ct., at 593] (opinion of Douglas, J.)" United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 799, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1160, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966).

In this respect, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was thus correct in holding that a conspiracy to violate First Amendment rights is not made out without proof of state involvement. Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, supra, at 1193.

United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO, 463 U.S. 825 (1983)

This is an interpretation, yes, but the actual amendment says nothing about the distinction between private and public actors.

It "says nothing" about imposing criminal sanctions on anybody (as opposed to legally invalidating actions), so your interpretation is no more sound than my reading the abundantly explicit "NO STATE SHALL" to imply state action. The fact that the drafters knew to use the wording "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude...shall exist" in the 13th Amendment shows that they were more than able to prohibit private acts if they wanted to, which makes the 14th's "no state shall" especially conspicuous. It's also in the very nature and structure of a constitution to simply regulate the powers and limitations of governmental operation, leaving it to governmental acts to regulate private conduct. The Supreme Court explained these and other points of context rather well:

...The first section of the fourteenth amendment,-which is the one relied on,-after declaring who shall be citizens of the United States, and of the several states, is prohibitory in its character, and prohibitory upon the states. It declares that*11 *‘no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‘ It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws. It not only does this, but, in order that the national will, thus declared, may not be a mere brutum fulmen, the last section of the amendment invests congress with power to enforce it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited state law and state acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void, and innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon congress, and this is the whole of it. It does not invest congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of state legislation; but to provide modes of relief against state legislation, or state action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the action of state officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment. Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the fourteenth amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against state laws and state proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by power given to congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect; and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed state laws or state proceedings, **22 and be directed to the correction*12 of their operation and effect. A quite full discussion of this aspect of the amendment may be found in U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, and Ex parte Virginia, Id. 339.


An apt illustration of this distinction may be found in some of the provisions of the original constitution. Take the subject of contracts, for example. The constitution prohibited the states from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. This did not give to congress power to provide laws for the general enforcement of contracts; nor power to invest the courts of the United States with jurisdiction over contracts, so as to enable parties to sue upon them in those courts. It did, however, give the power to provide remedies by which the impairment of contracts by state legislation might be counteracted and corrected; and this power was exercised. The remedy which congress actually provided was that contained in the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of 1789, giving to the supreme court of the United States jurisdiction by writ of error to review the final decisions of state courts whenever they should sustain the validity of a state statute or authority, alleged to be repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States. By this means, if a state law was passed impairing the obligation of a contract, and the state tribunals sustained the validity of the law, the mischief could be corrected in this court. The legislation of congress, and the proceedings provided for under it, were corrective in their character. No attempt was made to draw into the United States courts the litigation of contracts generally, and no such attempt would have been sustained. We do not say that the remedy provided was the only one that might have been provided in that case. Probably congress had power to pass a law giving to the courts of the United States direct jurisdiction over contracts alleged to be impaired by a state law; and, under the broad provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, giving to the circuit courts jurisdiction of all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, it is possible that such jurisdiction now exists. But under that or any other law, it must appear, as *13 well by allegation as proof at the trial, that the constitution had been violated by the action of the state legislature. Some obnoxious state law passed, or that might be passed, is necessary to be assumed in order to lay the foundation of any federal remedy in the case, and for the very sufficient reason that the constitutional prohibition is against state laws impairing the obligation of contracts.


And so in the present case, until some state law has been passed, or some state action through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity, for the prohibitions of the amendment are against state laws and acts done under state authority. Of course, legislation may **23 and should be provided in advance to meet the exigency when it arises, but it should be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the amendment was intended to provide against; and that is, state laws or state action of some kind adverse to the rights of the citizen secured by the amendment. Such legislation cannot properly cover the whole domain of rights appertaining to life, liberty, and property, defining them and providing for their vindication. That would be to establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between man and man in society. It would be to make congress take the place of the state legislatures and to supersede them. It is absurd to affirm that, because the rights of life, liberty, and property (which include all civil rights that men have) are by the amendment sought to be protected against invasion on the part of the state without due process of law, congress may, therefore, provide due process of law for their vindication in every case; and that, because the denial by a state to any persons of the equal protection of the laws is prohibited by the amendment, therefore congress may establish laws for their equal protection. In fine, the legislation which congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation; that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the states may *14 adopt or enforce, and which by the amendment they are prohibited from making or enforcing, or such acts and proceedings as the states may commit or take, and which by the amendment they are prohibited from committing or taking. It is not necessary for us to state, if we could, what legislation would be proper for congress to adopt. It is sufficient for us to examine whether the law in question is of that character.


An inspection of the law shows that it makes no reference whatever to any supposed or apprehended violation of the fourteenth amendment on the part of the states. It is not predicated on any such view. It proceeds ex directo to declare that certain acts committed by individuals shall be deemed offenses, and shall be prosecuted and punished by proceedings in the courts of the United States. It does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by the states; it does not make its operation to depend upon any such wrong committed. It applies equally to cases arising in states which have the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, ans whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws as to those which arise in states that may have violated the prohibition of the amendment. In other words, it steps into the domain of local jurisprudence, and lays down rules for the conduct of individuals is society towards each other, and imposes sanctions for the enforcement of those rules, without referring in any manner to any supposed action of the state or its authorities.


If this legislation is appropriate for enforcing the prohibitions of the amendment, it is difficult to see where it is to stop. Why may **24 not congress, with equal show of authority, enact a code of laws for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of life, liberty, and property? If it is supposable that the states may deprive persons of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, (and the amendment itself does suppose this,) why should not congress proceed at once to prescribe due process of law for the protection of every one of these fundamental rights, in every possible case, as well as to prescribe equal privileges in inns, public conveyances, and theaters. The truth is that the implication of a power to legislate in this manner is based *15 upon the assumption that if the states are forbidden to legislate or act in a particular way on a particular subject, and power is conferred upon congress to enforce the prohibition, this gives congress power to legislate generally upon that subject, and not merely power to provide modes of redress against such state legislation or action. The assumption is certainly unsound. It is repugnant to the tenth amendment of the constitution, which declares that powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people.

...

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)

[Ben Kenobi]

"[N]ot an interpretation that's been held to hold any water"? Did you miss the part where an 8-to-1 majority of the highest court in the land "held" over a century ago that this interpretation is binding law? That's a much smaller dissent and much more long-term pedigree than any abortion case you and I find faulty.

When I quote the dissent I think you can safely say that I'm aware. Jim Crow laws were passed and enacted, Civil rights were stripped away, this is the era of Plessy vs Ferguson, etc. Why does the "Civil Rights Act" have any more bearing then Plessy vs Ferguson, both decided by the same court, and both passed by 8-1 margins?

Why should we abide by the faulty interpretation of the 8 who also sided in the majority with Plessy vs Ferguson which was eventually overturned by Brown?

Or do you perhaps mean it's "not an interpretation that's been held to hold any water" since 1875? Also demonstrably false. It has been repeatedly reaffirmed over the years; not only was Cruikshank generally assumed to remain good law in the 2008 Heller case about the 2nd Amendment, its particular proposition about state action was very explicitly reaffirmed as recently as 1985 (with even the 4-justice dissent assuming that Cruikshank's proposition was valid and only arguing that a statute should be interpreted differently):

My question is simple. Where does the actual amendment make the distinction between state actors and between individuals? I understand that the consensus of the decision back in the 1890's is that it ought to do so, but my argument is that this particular court is very unreliable wrt to civil rights issues. Why should we abide by their ruling here and overturn Plessy vs Ferguson? I think we ought to take the interpretatin of John Marshall Harlan who was adament in dissent. He was spot on about Plessy, why is he also not spot on about civil rights?

"Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved."

[Darius871]

When I quote the dissent I think you can safely say that I'm aware. Jim Crow laws were passed and enacted, Civil rights were stripped away, this is the era of Plessy vs Ferguson, etc. Why does the "Civil Rights Act" have any more bearing then Plessy vs Ferguson, both decided by the same court, and both passed by 8-1 margins?

Because Plessey was overturned by Brown, whereas Cruikshank has been reaffirmed repeatedly, even decades after Brown. Oddly enough, such a case and numerous others cited therein are in the post immediately above yours, apparently ignored. Fancy that.

I understand that the consensus of the decision back in the 1890's is that it ought to do so, but my argument is that this particular court is very unreliable wrt to civil rights issues.

Wait, so you're seriously claiming that the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist courts were "unreliable wrt to civil rights issues"? They're the ones that repeatedly reaffirmed state action doctrine in numerous cases listed in the 1983 case I cited, regardless of what the Plessey-era court had to say.

Why should we abide by the faulty interpretation of the 8 who also sided in the majority with Plessy vs Ferguson which was eventually overturned by Brown?

...

Why should we abide by their ruling here and overturn Plessy vs Ferguson? I think we ought to take the interpretatin of John Marshall Harlan who was adament in dissent. He was spot on about Plessy, why is he also not spot on about civil rights?

You just BAM that it's a "faulty interpretation" without presenting evidence that it's not what the 14th Amendment's ratifiers intended, or even explaining how it's remotely similar to Plessey other than that both happened to touch on "civil rights issues." The mere fact that something happened to occur within the same half-century as a miscarriage of justice doesn't automatically make it one.

In any event, both Plessey and Brown distinguishably were limited to facts of state action: the Segregated Cars Act passed by the Louisiana legislature and segregated schools operated by the state of Kansas, respectively. Thus, neither the letter nor the spirit of Brown had any bearing on the totally unrelated state action doctrine, which has been reaffirmed since Brown.

My question is simple. Where does the actual amendment make the distinction between state actors and between individuals?

Oddly enough, the direct answer to this simple question is in the post immediately above yours, apparently ignored. Fancy that. To repeat, the "actual amendment" uses the phrase "no state shall," distinguishable from the 13th Amendment, the one and only provision in the entire Constitution to regulate nongovernmental actors by its own words ("shall [not] exist").

Frankly, the onus is on you to explain why "no state shall" somehow really means "no one shall," not on me to explain why the unambiguous is unambiguous.

[Imran Siddiqui]

Anyone who was born after the law passed saying it was legally ok to kill us inside the womb.

How has anyone who was born after the law suffered harm due to abortion laws? I think you don't understand how standing works.

Matthew 5:17-20
"Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished. Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven."

Regarding dietary provisions though: Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man. - Matthew 15:11

Ah, point. However, there are other aspects in Leviticus that are troubling. Leviticus 23:30 says that anyone who works on the Day of Atonement (10th day of the 7th month) shall have their soul destroyed. Leviticus 18:19 states you can't have sex with a woman who has her period. LEV 12:3 mandates circumcision, which a lot of Christians do not do because they believe Jesus has freed them from that mandate.

[Berzerker]

Matthew 5:17-20
"Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished. Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven."

Regarding dietary provisions though: Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man. - Matthew 15:11

Jesus didn't change any laws, but he did away with all those dietary laws and eating with heathens and the other unclean? He also changed divorce law, working on the Sabbath, and a few more. So either Jesus is caught in a contradiction or Jesus defined the Law of the Prophets differently than you've interpreted him. How did Jesus define the Law of the Prophets? What commandments is he talking about? He told us - love God and love others. Jesus said the entire Law of the Prophets comes from those 2 commandments. Moses and his gang killed a guy for gathering firewood on the Sabbath. Is that the Law Jesus came to fulfill?

I'll get to yer post Ben, but right now I'm watching the Ravens upset the Pats

[Ben Kenobi]

How has anyone who was born after the law suffered harm due to abortion laws? I think you don't understand how standing works.

If there were a law permitting you to be killed without recourse, do you have to be killed in order to have standing? Would it be restricted to someone like Gianna Jesson who survived an abortion?

Seems to me anyone born after '73 has standing for the simple reason that they could have been aborted.

[Imran Siddiqui]

"Could have been" has never worked under standing laws. There must be actual injury (with the one exception being religious establishment clause issues - mostly due to tax dollars paying for it, IIRC)

Standing may work for a survivor of an abortion. I'd imagine whatever groups could structure the lawsuit correctly, but probably would entail some form of suing the doctor (or practice) for injuries the person has suffered as a result of the procedure and attempt to ban all abortion from them.

[Darius871]

"Could have been" has never worked under standing laws. There must be actual injury (with the one exception being religious establishment clause issues - mostly due to tax dollars paying for it, IIRC)

Technically a second exception is "imminent" injury, but even that doesn't help Ben much except in the case of a particular pregnant woman who is known to have scheduled an abortion or somesuch. Even then, who would be the plaintiff? Some random pro-life group with a generalized desire to prevent any abortions certainly suffers no injury, but maybe a guardian ad litem?

[Ben Kenobi]

Wait, so you're seriously claiming that the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist courts were "unreliable wrt to civil rights issues"? They're the ones that repeatedly reaffirmed state action doctrine in numerous cases listed in the 1983 case I cited, regardless of what the Plessey-era court had to say.

I'm referring to the Plessey- era court. I'm saying that despite what we might think, most of the democrats were cowards and didn't want to lose the south until the Civil Rights bill came down. Why did it take to '65 to enact when it was a Wilson-era issue? Dims over and over said that they'd sooner take Wilson down.

You just BAM that it's a "faulty interpretation" without presenting evidence that it's not what the 14th Amendment's ratifiers intended, or even explaining how it's remotely similar to Plessey other than that both happened to touch on "civil rights issues."

Sigh, quoting the dissent is not enough for you? He argued very stridently that the course of the court was to consistantly roll back civil rights provisions enacted under the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments. You look at the legislation, and this is exactly what you see in the Plessy court.

WRT to the actual content of the 14th amendment, I think it was very clear. It was written by a radical republican, who wanted to see slavery and all it's trappings utterly abolished. The 14th amendment is a radical document because they sought to overturn and destroy Dred Scott as well as all the other trappings of the laws entrenched throughout the union to discriminate against.

Read the quotes of the author and his intent is clear. I see no evidence that he intended lynching blacks to be permitted anywhere under the 14th amendment and the gist of his language where he states that they have an obligation to protect under the equal protection laws most certainly applies to the simple provision of security from organised lynch mobs.

Frankly, the onus is on you to explain why "no state shall" somehow really means "no one shall," not on me to explain why the unambiguous is unambiguous.

No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

If a state would permit black people to be lynched within their jurisdiction, then they have denied the black people the equal protection of their laws. Presumably all states have laws against homocide and murder. If a state chooses not to prosecute offenders involved in the lynching of blacks, then they have denied black people the equal protection of their laws regarding murder and homocide.

[Ben Kenobi]

Standing may work for a survivor of an abortion. I'd imagine whatever groups could structure the lawsuit correctly, but probably would entail some form of suing the doctor (or practice) for injuries the person has suffered as a result of the procedure and attempt to ban all abortion from them.

Argument would be that it wasn't a localised problem and that the only solution is not to target the doctors, but the law in itself which permitted the injury to occur.

Again, I don't buy your argument that a law which applies to all children born after 1973, prevents anyone younger than 36 from having standing. If the law applies to them and could very well have killed them, then the fact that they are a survivor means they ought to have standing.