Abortion and capital punishment

[loinburger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
One can be alive and not necessarily a person, or even a human. One can possess human DNA, yet not be a person. I'm trying to account for both sides at the same time.

This doesn't eliminate the circularity, and also fails to address the fact that without using circular reasoning it is impossible (using your definition of personhood) to distinguish between a person (e.g. you or I), and a brain-dead patient (who is human and alive when the dictionary definition of the term is applied, and is thus a person using your definition) and a white blood cell (which has human DNA and is thus human under your definition of "human," and which is also alive, and which is thus a person using your definition).

You'll need to give a reasonable definition of personhood before this can continue. "Human and alive" is insufficient, for the reasons I stated in my last post -- the standard definition of "alive" would count a brain-dead patient as a person, and your modified definition is circular.

We're going to have to work out sentience as a boolean value first.

Before any of that, I need your definition of personhood. There's really no point to arguing over sentience if you're just going to turn around and say "Well, the zygote might be sentient at some future date..." What matters is that the zygote is not sentient, since any definition of sentience cannot classify a non-thinking entity as sentient.

I don't like anthropocentric, because according to what we know now, your argument is less broad than mine.

The real issue is that your argument is ad hoc -- you've decided ahead of time what you want your definition of personhood to include and what you want it to exclude without any consideration for the impact that definition might have elsewhere, which is how you wound up using a circular argument. Rather than designing an argument to fit your conclusions, try designing an argument based on first principles and then derive your conclusions from that argument, i.e. forget all of your presuppositions and try to define personhood starting from scratch. Otherwise we're going to just keep covering old territory over and over again ("I have defined a person to be 'any sentient human or any non-sentient human that has no less than a 50% chance of attaining sentience within a nine-month time period,' therefore clearly a zygote is a person").

Give a concise definition of personhood, and more importantly, give a concise explanation as to why you have defined personhood in this way. If you're operating from a set of unsuspendable presuppositions such that you are incapable of being swayed from your conclusions (e.g. "God says that zygotes are persons, and God can't be wrong") then I want to know this now, because there won't be much point to my continuing in this debate if your position is founded on unassailable presuppositions.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
Part of what makes us people is the capacity for sentience, but other qualities can be included as well. My definition states person as the intrinsic capacity to function as a person, and I go with whatever people believe people need to function.

I am sure being alive is quite an important assumption. Other than that, making too many assumptions will make one look arbitrary.

Originally posted by obiwan18
Intrinsic:

1 a : belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing.

That's the definition I've been using throughout.

No disagreement there.

Originally posted by obiwan18
Part of the essence of the zygote includes the DNA inherited at conception. This DNA provides the instructions needed for the zygote to grow a heart/lungs/brain, etc. This DNA is inside of the one-celled zygote, and is therefore a part of the constitution of the zygote. Without the diploid DNA, you cannot have a zygote, so therefore, this DNA is part of the essential nature of the zygote.

Certainly.

All human body cells have the same set of 23 pairs of chromosomes that make them distinctly human. Therefore, all these cells can potentially become human. Be that as it may, this does not make sentience an intrinsic characteristic of a zygote or a body cell, because they are not capable of sentience. Having the potential to have such a capability is not intrinsic. Having the capability as a built-in, integral function of an organism, without the need of external assistance, is.

Originally posted by obiwan18
I meant show me the theory.
Never heard of this before.

That's pretty easy.

A zygote is the same as any of your body cells. The difference is a zygote can divide and multiply to form an entire organism while your body cells can't. It's just a case of certain genes have been switched off. If you want details, Provost Harrison is a better person to ask.

[Worthingtons]

There are many Interesting views on here both for and against. What I will say is that this issue is often changed when people are actually put in this situation. Before you find yourselves in the shoes of being an to-be parent when you dont want to be, it's hard to imagine what you'd choose to do.

Unwanted pregnancies can happen because of a unfortunate accident (as someone said , 0.1% condoms dont work) , a mistake on your or a mistake on your partners part. If you are indeed not wanting a child then the sentance issued to you, the seintient being is life ... and that will be no doubt passed on to your child who you resent having.

[Urban Ranger]

That's why I say: let them decide.

If you can prove beyond reasonable doubt that fetuses are sentient after n number of weeks, then we draw the line there.

[Urban Ranger]

*bump*

[Ben Kenobi]

Sorry guys.

UR:
I'll PM Provost Harrison for the details.

loinburger:

Okay. Time to go over the argument again to make sure I'm not being circular.


1. First presupposition:

Human persons have intrinsic worth and value.

Personally, I consider Gen 1:27 to explain this presupposition, which is a major part of my Christian testimony.

There are other defenses, though I think we can all agree on this presupposition.

2. Killing innocent living human persons is wrong.

This is a value statement, which assumes the above is true. If human persons have intrinsic worth and value, killing innocent living human persons will be wrong.

Why the innocent exception? To allow for a death penalty defense, and for deaths of combatants.

For me personally, I would say killing living human persons is wrong, without the innocence qualifier.

3. Abortion kills an unborn child.

Abortion is defined as a surgical procedure that results in the expulsion of the unborn child from the womb with the intent to destroy the entity.

This will include surgical procedures, as well as chemical means, including the morning after pill.

The definition of unborn child I use is the entity that exists within the womb of the mother, existing from conception to birth.

4. The unborn child is an innocent living human person.

This is the core of a prolife defense.
If I can make this point,

The unborn child is innocent because, as you admit yourself, it is currently incapable of sentience. One cannot be guilty of a crime unless one has the capability to make choices.

The unborn child is living, because living things can only come from other living things. Sperm and egg, which are alive, unite to form the zygote which is also alive.

How do we know the zygote is alive? Look at in-vitro fertilisation, where we can see the zygote, and the embryo grow.

The unborn child is of the human species because it's parents are human. That is the generally accepted principle, that like begets like.

So what we have left is the definition of personhood.

Personhood is a legal definition, established by each society in turn. Therefore, we need to examine the law, as it stands, for what is a person.

Currently, the law in Canada, and the US, holds that infants are persons, and that all born people are considered persons.

So what I need to do is to compare born people with unborn.

My argument for personhood is this:

To be a person requires the intrinsic capacity to function as a person, as opposed to the current capacity to function as a person.

There. I think that's fixed. The zygote has DNA with the capacity to grow and develop, thereby qualifying as a person. The brain-dead patient may be alive in the sense that his organs work, but not a person

The infant has this intrinsic capacity, as does the zygote, as has any other born person.

So tying everything all together.

Both children born and unborn have the intrinsic capacity to function as a person.

Unborn children are human when they have human parents.

Unborn children are alive because they grow and develop, from the zygote onwards.

Unborn children are innocent because they are not currently sentient.

Therefore, unborn children are human persons, no different from other human persons.

If human persons have intrinsic worth and value, unborn children, as human persons have intrinsic worth and value.

Abortion kills an unborn child, who, as a person has intrinsic worth and value.

Therefore, abortion is wrong, because it kills a human person, the unborn child.

[loinburger]

My argument for personhood is this:

To be a person requires the intrinsic capacity to function as a person, as opposed to the current capacity to function as a person.

That's still circular -- you're using the term person to define the term person. Leaving aside the vagueness of "intrinsic capacity" for the moment, you're not actually defining what it means to function as a person.

[Ben Kenobi]

Leaving aside the vagueness of "intrinsic capacity" for the moment, you're not actually defining what it means to function as a person.

There are lots of things that people do. Some define brainwaves as indication of higher thought processes. Some use a definition of lung capacity. Some, like Peter Singer say that they need to have a function of reason. Others a heartbeat. Some say the child has to interact with others.

All these are part of what it means to function as a person, and all are incomplete because they exclude some born people, people whom we already define as persons.

This includes your quality of sentience.

All of these are signposts that point towards something more significant. That's what I'm trying to say through intrinsic capacity, or even the essence possessed by the unborn child.

Where does sentience come from, Loinburger? I try to explain this by saying, that the unborn child has this capacity to attain sentience starting from conception. Part of this has to do with the DNA instructions, that will determine many features and functions of the person.

[loinburger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
This includes your quality of sentience.

I grant that the brain-dead patient is a born human who is non-sentient (and is thus not a person using my definition), but I was under the impression that you agreed with this assessment.

Where does sentience come from, Loinburger?

Thought. No thought, no sentience.

I try to explain this by saying, that the unborn child has this capacity to attain sentience starting from conception. Part of this has to do with the DNA instructions, that will determine many features and functions of the person.

None of which gives your definition of personhood.

Are you saying that organisms that are sentient are persons? If so, then why classify non-sentient organisms as persons?

Are you instead saying that organisms that may attain sentience are persons? If so, then what is the cut-off probability at which an organism that may attain sentience becomes a person rather than a non-person, and how is this cut-off probability determined? Furthermore, why should sentience matter at all to personhood, if an organism needn't even be sentient in order to be a person? (All organisms have the intrinsic capacity to die, yet we don't treat all organisms as though they were already dead -- if we did, then it wouldn't really matter whether an organism were alive or dead, since we would treat it the same regardless. Similarly, the fact that an organism may have the intrinsic capacity to attain sentience, to use your phrasing, does not justify our treating that organism as though it were already sentient -- if we did, then sentience wouldn't really matter at all. If sentience doesn't matter in any way shape or form in your definition of personhood, then you're confusing the issue by bringing up this idea of an intrinsic capacity to attain sentience.)

What's at issue here is that by recursively defining personhood ("To be a person requires the intrinsic capacity to function as a person, as opposed to the current capacity to function as a person") you have essentially classified everything as a person. The zygote would be a person since it has the intrinsic capacity to function as a person (by possibly developing a brain at some future date), the sperm would be a person since it has the intrinsic capacity to function as a person (by possibly fusing with an egg and developing into a zygote, which has already been defined as a person since it has the intrinsic capacity to function as a sentient being), protein molecules would be persons since they have the intrinsic capacity to function as persons (by being used to construct sperm/egg cells which then might form into zygotes which then might form into sentient entities), ad infinitum, right on down to the quantum level. Potentially dead organisms aren't dead, potentially sentient entities aren't sentient, and potential persons aren't persons.

[Ben Kenobi]

Are you saying that organisms that are sentient are persons? If so, then why classify non-sentient organisms as persons?

Organisms that are sentient currently express their capacity for sentience. Organisms such as the unborn child before sentience do not currently express their sentience. Both have the capacity in common, and this is why both should be classified as persons.

The problem is with those in a coma. Are they currently sentient, in the sense that they can think and act as we do? No. Do we consider them persons? Yes. So how does your definition account for these?

I've ducked this point since the beginning of the thread since UR was here before. Now it's just you, so I can concentrate on your definition of sentience.

Why should sentience be a boolean value?

Thought. No thought, no sentience.

Now we have an epistemological problem. Suppose our eeg equipment is limited in sensitivity. Suppose an unborn child exhibits brain waves of low sensitivity, that we cannot detect them.

Would it then be possible for unborn children to think without us knowing about the ability to think?

the sperm would be a person since it has the intrinsic capacity to function as a person

Sperm requires something outside of itself to become a zygote. It is not of the essence of the sperm to function as a person.

[loinburger]

You still haven't defined personhood.

Originally posted by obiwan18
Organisms that are sentient currently express their capacity for sentience. Organisms such as the unborn child before sentience do not currently express their sentience. Both have the capacity in common, and this is why both should be classified as persons.

They do not have the capacity in common -- the unborn child (prior to a certain level of development) does not have the capacity for sentience, since it hasn't got a brain. Are you referring to this "intrinsic" capacity idea? Since I have the intrinsic capacity to die, am I currently dead? Why should life/death matter at all if I'm "dead" regardless of whether I'm currently alive or dead? Why should sentience/non-sentience matter at all if a zygote is "sentient" regardless of whether it is currently sentient or non-sentient? In either case the word in question is rendered meaningless by this idea of "intrinsic" capacity. And regardless, a sentient organism doesn't have the "capacity" for sentience, it is sentient.

Anyway, why does sentience matter at all to personhood? If it isn't even a requirement, then why worry about it at all? Some persons may be sentient, sure, but some persons may also wear hats -- why not just argue that "persons are organisms with the intrinsic capacity to wear hats"?

The problem is with those in a coma. Are they currently sentient, in the sense that they can think and act as we do? No. Do we consider them persons? Yes. So how does your definition account for these?

The comatose patient thinks, since he/she has a functional brain (albeit a damaged one). A sleeping person thinks, since he/she has a functional brain (albeit a recuperating one). A newborn thinks, since it has a functional brain (albeit a developing one). A zygote can't think, since it hasn't got a brain. A brain-dead patient can't think, since the patient's brain is non-functional. A dead person can't think, for the same reason that the brain-dead patient can't think.

Why should sentience be a boolean value?

This isn't germane to the discussion -- what matters is not whether sentience is a boolean or a continuum, all that matters is whether a zygote is sentient. It is not, since it cannot think.

Now we have an epistemological problem. Suppose our eeg equipment is limited in sensitivity. Suppose an unborn child exhibits brain waves of low sensitivity, that we cannot detect them.

Would it then be possible for unborn children to think without us knowing about the ability to think?

Sure, it's also possible that dolphins and elephants are sentient but simply lack the means to use tools or otherwise express their sentience. It's also possible that our brain-dead patient isn't actually brain-dead at all, but simply has such a diminished brain functionality that we cannot detect the patient's brainwaves. It's also possible that somebody who is convicted in court is actually innocent, or that somebody who is acquitted in court is actually guilty. Lots of things are possible.

Sperm requires something outside of itself to become a zygote. It is not of the essence of the sperm to function as a person.

And the zygote requires a uterus in order to become a fetus, thus it is not of the essence of the zygote to function as a person. The sperm requires an egg to fulfill its intrinsic capacity to function as a person, and the zygote requires oxygen and nutrients to fulfill its intrinsic capacity to function as a person -- in terms of sheer volume, the zygote requires far more exogenous material in order to become a newborn than does the sperm to become a zygote. The zygote has different DNA than the sperm, but this isn't relevant, unless you presuppose that an organism must have human DNA in order to be a person (which, as I've already noted, is an extremely anthropocentric presupposition, and is also an unjustified presupposition given the extreme sampling error in its formation, namely, a sample of one planet's biosphere out of quadrillions of planets). And besides, if DNA denotes sentience then white blood cells are sentient (since they've got human DNA).


But before any of this can continue, I need you to give me your definition of personhood, as well as your justification of this definition. Your previous definition was circular.

[Ben Kenobi]

A zygote can't think, since it hasn't got a brain.

Okay. I can work with this.

Your real criteria for personhood seems to be the presence of a brain sufficiently formed to permit sentience.

How does the brain form in the womb?
Is this an increment, or is there a decisive moment when everything comes together?

If there is a decisive moment, when does this occur?

But before any of this can continue, I need you to give me your definition of personhood, as well as your justification of this definition. Your previous definition was circular.

Personhood requires the possession of DNA that will code the growth and development of a brain sufficiently advanced to achieve sentience.

This trait is possessed by all people we consider to be persons, and excludes those on the fringes. Therefore, this definition is superior to that of sentience or sufficient brain development.

The comatose patient thinks, since he/she has a functional brain.

No according to the medical definition of coma.

http://www.postgradmed.com/issues/2002/02_02/malik.htm

"Coma is defined as a sleeplike state with total absence of awareness of self and the environment, even after vigorous external stimulation."

This is different from a locked-in state, where the patient is aware of their surroundings.

the zygote requires oxygen and nutrients to fulfill its intrinsic capacity to function as a person -- in terms of sheer volume, the zygote requires far more exogenous material in order to become a newborn than does the sperm to become a zygote.

Compare the physical requirements for a zygote with those of an infant. Both require enormous amounts of sustenance, but we still consider the infant to be a person.

The volume of the physical requirements does not matter, but the nature. The sperm stops being a sperm when it unites with the egg, as does the egg stop being a sperm. You do not stop being loinburger when you eat a truly huge meal.

This isn't germane to the discussion -- what matters is not whether sentience is a boolean or a continuum, all that matters is whether a zygote is sentient. It is not, since it cannot think.

Defend your definition. Why is sentience boolean? What justification do you have for this statement?

[loinburger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
If there is a decisive moment, when does this occur?

It's debatable -- I set the moment at the time when the unborn child first exhibits brain activity (somewhere around the end of the second trimester), others set the moment at the time when the unborn child's brain is fully developed (somewhere around the end of the third trimester). This particular side debate isn't relevant to the topic at hand, though, since you claim that sentience isn't even a requirement for personhood (which makes the precise definition of sentience irrelevant).

Personhood requires the possession of DNA that will code the growth and development of a brain sufficiently advanced to achieve sentience.

So is somebody's soul made out of DNA?

Are you allowed to cremate me, since I'm basically already dead (since I have the intrinsic capacity to die)? If not, then why must we treat a non-sentient organism as though it were sentient, and yet not be allowed to treat a living organism as though it were non-living?

Anyway, if human DNA is all that is required for personhood, then a brain-dead patient is still a person -- the patient's DNA has not changed as a result of brain-death. If personhood requires more than human DNA, then you'll need to give a more developed definition than that which you have given.

And you still haven't explained why sentience even matters to your definition. Why use "sentience" in your argument at all, as opposed to, say, "the ability to wear hats"?

This trait is possessed by all people we consider to be persons, and excludes those on the fringes. Therefore, this definition is superior to that of sentience or sufficient brain development.

The only reason that it could be considered superior is that it fits your presupposed notion that the zygote is a person. It is still an inadequate definition, though, since it a. implies that a being's "self" or "atman" or "soul" or whatever have you is somehow made out of DNA (since a non-thinking entity, namely the zygote, apparently has a self/soul/atman), and b. does not account for the fact that a brain-dead patient is not a person despite having the same DNA that it had as a zygote.

No according to the medical definition of coma.

A coma is not the same as brain-death no matter how you slice the definitions. If the comatose patient exhibited no brain activity, then the comatose patient would not be comatose at all, but would instead be brain-dead.

Compare the physical requirements for a zygote with those of an infant. Both require enormous amounts of sustenance, but we still consider the infant to be a person.

Of course we consider the infant to be a person -- the infant is sentient, while the zygote is not.

The volume of the physical requirements does not matter, but the nature. The sperm stops being a sperm when it unites with the egg, as does the egg stop being a sperm. You do not stop being loinburger when you eat a truly huge meal.

1. An argument relying on something's "nature" is vague to the point of being meaningless, unless you give a precise definition of what you mean by an organism's nature.

2. The zygote stops being a zygote when it develops sentience (or rather, when it develops into a sentient fetus/newborn) -- prior to that, it has no more of a self/soul/atman/whatever than does the sperm, or (for that matter) my truly huge meal. "loinburger" did not exist as a sperm, nor did "loinburger" exist as a zygote, since in either case the self/soul/atman of "loinburger" had not yet come into existence.

If you're using "nature" to mean "has human DNA," then the brain-dead patient is a person. If you're using "nature" to mean "has the intrinsic capacity for 'X'," then we're both already dead since we both have the intrinsic capacity to die. If you're using "nature" to mean "is sentient," then the zygote is not a person since it isn't sentient. If you're using "nature" to mean "is a person," then your use of the term is simply begging the question.

Defend your definition. Why is sentience boolean? What justification do you have for this statement?

What relevance does this have to the debate?

1. No reasonable definition of sentience could classify the zygote as a sentient entity, since sentience requires thought.
2. The precise amount of thought required for sentience is not what is at issue here, but rather what is at issue is whether or not non-sentient organisms are persons. Since zygotes are non-sentient, it is not necessary for a precise definition of sentience to be given in order for you to sufficiently justify your position. On the contrary, an argument over the precise definition of sentience will simply side-track the debate, and give you the opportunity to continue to duck questions regarding your definition of personhood.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
To be a person requires the intrinsic capacity to function as a person, as opposed to the current capacity to function as a person.

I think your confusion arises in mixing up intrinsic and potential. There are very different concepts.

An analogy may help. A car parked on the side of the road has the intrinsic ability of movement, even though it is not currently moving. A car parked on the side of the road without the engine has the potential ability of movement, but this potential cannot be realised until somebody put a proper engine in.

Originally posted by obiwan18
There. I think that's fixed. The zygote has DNA with the capacity to grow and develop, thereby qualifying as a person. The brain-dead patient may be alive in the sense that his organs work, but not a person

As I pointed out above, a zygote has the potential capability of becoming a person, but it is not intrinsically a person. There is a difference.

[Ben Kenobi]

I'll start with UR since I may answer Loinburger's questions in the process.

UR:

A car parked on the side of the road has the intrinsic ability of movement, even though it is not currently moving. A car parked on the side of the road without the engine has the potential ability of movement, but this potential cannot be realised until somebody put a proper engine in.

Thank you. Your analogy helps my position.

You confuse substance things with property things. There is a big difference between a car, and a person. What happens when you replace the engine of a car? Do you still have the same car as before? No, we have a different car.

Now, what happens with organ donation? We consider the person to be the same person before the operation as after.

Now why is this?

Suppose I said that the engine of the car were such that you could not seperate the car from the engine, without destroying the car? Would this not be the case of something intrinsic to the object itself?

Now we can consider your example. Is it the intrinsic ability of a car with an engine to move?

No. By itself, the car with an engine will rust just as the car without an engine.

I cite Galileo, that an object at rest will continue to be at rest unless acted upon by an outside force.

What about the person? What makes the person different from the car?

Remember I mentioned an engine, that could not be seperated from the car. We have this analogy in our DNA.

It is not possible to remove all of your DNA from your body without your complete distruction. In this sense, what you are is related to your DNA. Our intrinsic capacity in this sense is bottled up in our DNA.

Loinburger:

So is somebody's soul made out of DNA?

I don't know what you mean by a soul.

For me, the Catholic church says that the unborn child is ensouled at conception.

Accordingly, the soul as they perceive it, cannot be of the same substance as the person.

Perhaps DNA is a marker, to help us know what is and is not ensouled.

One misunderstanding,

A coma is not the same as brain-death no matter how you slice the definitions. If the comatose patient exhibited no brain activity, then the comatose patient would not be comatose at all, but would instead be brain-dead.

I AGREE!

I'm saying the person in a coma is still a person, and will still be, according to my definition.