Abortion and capital punishment

[Ben Kenobi]

But this capacity also exists in a singular sperm/egg. True, the sperm/egg requires assistance in order to mature into a sentient being (namely a counterpart egg/sperm with which it can fuse, in addition to a uterus etc.), but at the same time the zygote/embryo also requires assistance in order to mature into a sentient being (namely a uterus etc.).

namely a counterpart egg/sperm with which it can fuse,

How does this compare with the zygote? Look at the genetics involved. Your sperm or a woman's egg will bear the same genetic code as their respective donors; it is a part of your body.

Zygotes differ because they already contain all the instruction that they need to grow, as a diploid cell. This combination differs from the parents, unlike that of the sperm or the egg.

It is true, that by themselves, zygotes will not grow, as they require nourishment and shelter, no different from any other person. Deprive zygotes of either, they will die. Deprive newborns, and they will die as well.

As for percentages, things happen to born people as well. The failure of the zygote to implant, or to grow and develop, will usually come from either errors within the cell, or other extraneous factors.

We can discard extraneous factors, because they have no bearing on the personhood of the zygote.

[MrBaggins]

I am ProChoice but I'm ambivilent towards the Death Penalty. The poll is designed badly.

[loinburger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
We can discard extraneous factors, because they have no bearing on the personhood of the zygote.

Look, there's one thing that has bearing on the personhood of the zygote -- whether or not it is sentient. The zygote has no brain, we've agreed to that. Sentience means "The quality or state of being sentient; consciousness" or "Feeling as distinguished from perception or thought" -- a zygote is not conscious (since it has no brain) and it doesn't think or perceive (since it has no brain), therefore, regardless of what other caveats are included into this definition, a zygote is not sentient. It might develop sentience at some future date, but sentience is defined as whether or not a being is conscious/thinking, not whether or not a being may become conscious/thinking at some future date.

So, are you arguing that sentience does not require thought/consciousness? Then you'll need to explain why the dictionary is wrong. Are you arguing that a non-sentient being is ethically equivalent to a sentient being? Then you'll need to explain why this particular non-sentient being is a "person" while another non-sentient being (say, an ape, or a computer) is not a "person" -- in particular, it is conceivable that my computer could attain sentience by merely changing its programming (no physical change would even be necessary, which is more than can be said for the zygote), so if a non-sentient zygote is a person then my computer must also be a person (unless, of course, you can prove that a computer could never be sentient).

Yes, the zygote may develop into a sentient being, but that means that aborting the zygote is the act of killing a person who doesn't even exist nor will ever exist, which is a pretty bizarre crime IMO. I also still fail to see the distinction between killing a person who doesn't even exist who will develop from a zygote and killing a person who doesn't even exist who will develop from a sperm/egg -- the zygote is a new organism while the sperm/egg are not, but the zygote is every bit as non-sentient as the sperm/egg (and thus is every bit as much of a non-person as the sperm/egg), and is also every bit as necessary for the development of sentience as the sperm/egg.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
What about pain sensation? Would this count as well for sentience?

Here's a source with the cited medical journals.

Pain can be detected when nociceptors (pain receptors) discharge electrical impulses to the spinal cord and brain. These fire impulses outward, telling the muscles and body to react. These can be measured. Mountcastle, Medical Physiology, St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, pp. 391-427 "Lip tactile response may be evoked by the end of the 7th week. At 11 weeks, the face and all parts of the upper and lower extremities are sensitive to touch. By 13 1/2 to 14 weeks, the entire body surface, except for the back and the top of the head, are sensitive to pain." S. Reinis & J. Goldman, The Development of the Brain C. Thomas Pub., 1980

I don't think the ability to feel pain is indicative of sentience. It seems that sentience originates from the cerebral cortex, while pain is a much, much more primitive function for the survival of the organism. IIRC, pain short circuits at the brain stem, that's where you get the conditional reflexes from.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
Zygotes differ because they already contain all the instruction that they need to grow, as a diploid cell. This combination differs from the parents, unlike that of the sperm or the egg.

I found this qualification to be a bit arbitrary. Why is it necessarily for it to have "different combination" genetic information from its parents? What if it doesn't, e.g. a clone from a single parent? What if the mother is not the parent, i.e. a cloned cell in a surrogate mother? What about identical n-lets? Are these all right to abort because their DNA is not unique?

[Switch]

I oppose the death penalty (life in jail is much worse, I would think).

I am pro-life, though I wouldn't wish it to be made into law. It is just how I wish the world could work (but it couldn't...povery and the like make pro-life sometimes unreasonable).

[curtsibling]

Rapists, Muderers shoud get fried.
Abortion in cases where pregnancy is life threatening or the child will have no quality of life.

Circumstances would dictate though.

[Ben Kenobi]

Loinburger:

I agree the zygote by your definition is not currently sentient. That I do not dispute.

What I do dispute is the necessity of current sentience for personhood.

The zygote if left alone will develop sentience.

What about a coma, where one is temporary non-sentient? Are you then no longer a person?

UR:

I found this qualification to be a bit arbitrary. Why is it necessarily for it to have "different combination" genetic information from its parents? What if it doesn't, e.g. a clone from a single parent? What if the mother is not the parent, i.e. a cloned cell in a surrogate mother? What about identical n-lets? Are these all right to abort because their DNA is not unique?

Treating each example in turn.

3) Identical (n) lets differ from their parents, and so fall under my old definition. Notice I do not use the word 'unique'.

1&2)

Show me a living clone. Can we create a living clone, who bears all the genetic information of one person?

Do you consider a cloned zygote to be a person, UR?

[loinburger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
I agree the zygote by your definition is not currently sentient. That I do not dispute.

Fair enough. I'd thought that you might have been extending sentience to the zygote.

What I do dispute is the necessity of current sentience for personhood.

The zygote if left alone will develop sentience.

What about a coma, where one is temporary non-sentient? Are you then no longer a person?

1. If you're claiming that an unthinking entity is ethically equivalent to you and I by virtue of the fact that it may obtain the capacity to think at some future date, then you need to explain a. why a sperm/egg is excluded from being a person and b. why my computer is excluded from being a person. You've addressed the sperm/egg contention previously by claiming that a sperm/egg cell is not ethically equivalent to a zygote simply because of the differences in the genetic codes of the two entities, but I fail to see how genetics can be the determiner of personhood -- are you claiming that only non-cloned humans are capable of being persons? More importantly, you'll also need to explain c. why it is that we ought to treat an unthinking entity as our ethical equivalent even when this entity is fundamentally incapable of moral behavior -- we don't treat very young children as being ethically equivalent to us (e.g. parents will send a misbehaving child to "time out" or whatever have you, but they won't send a misbehaving spouse to "time out") since they're less capable of understanding reason than we are, so why, if we don't treat children as our equivalents based on the assumption that "someday they'll understand reason so we ought to treat them as though they understand reason right here and now," ought we to treat a zygote (an entity that is fundamentally incapable of reason) as being ethically equivalent to the unborn child's mother, or even as being ethically equivalent to a newborn or a third-trimester fetus? In other words, if a non-sentient entity is capable of being morally equivalent to you and I, then why does sentience matter at all (e.g. when determining whether it is moral to take a brain-dead patient off of life support)? It just strikes me as being inconsistent to apply a sentience argument to justify taking a brain-dead patient off of life support, while at the same time rejecting a sentience argument being used to justify aborting an entity that is no more capable of thought than the brain-dead patient. Who is being killed by an early-term abortion? Not what, but who -- I just don't see how you can apply a "who" to an entity with no capacity for reason, with no identity, with no "self."

2. There is no certainty attached to the zygote's future sentience -- it doesn't have much better than even odds at attaining sentience. Furthermore, "if left alone" is a bit of a fudge term, since the whole point is that the zygote can't develop sentience on its own -- otherwise an abortion would be nothing more than the mother preemptively disowning her child.

3. If the brain completely shuts down, then the person has lost sentience. If the brain is functional then there is no more reason to deny the person's sentience than there would be to deny a sleeping person's sentience. A comatose patient is not equivalent to a zygote, since the zygote hasn't even got a brain, whereas a comatose patient's brain retains at least some functionality.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
3) Identical (n) lets differ from their parents, and so fall under my old definition. Notice I do not use the word 'unique'.

What is the rationale behind this?

Originally posted by obiwan18
1&2)

Show me a living clone. Can we create a living clone, who bears all the genetic information of one person?

Ethics is about what should be, not what is. Why do you consider X to be unethical? Possibly because what is happening is not what should be happening?

Originally posted by obiwan18
Do you consider a cloned zygote to be a person, UR?

Clearly, a cloned zygote is no different from one that is formed naturally. Both contain human DNA but posess no sentience. Is it a person to you?

[Ben Kenobi]

I'll deal with UR first, since I expected these arguments.

What is the rationale behind this?

I have two choices.

1. I can say the zygote is a unique, living, human person and make two exceptions by saying clones and twins are special cases where the genetic code is not unique.

2. I can do away with the unique qualifier, as I have done here by specifying a genetic code differing from the parents to clarify the difference between sperm & egg and the zygote.

There are tactical reasons why it makes no sense to extend 2. to include an exception clause for cloned people:

First of all, we cannot make clones without destroying other embryos in the process. By stating that embryos are persons, one is not justified in killing embryos to create clones. Until scientists devise a procedure creating clones without killing another embryo, then I will have no problem.

Secondly, why would one abort a clone? Since we have to go through so much trouble to make a clone, no one who is pregnant with a clone will wish to abort.

Agreed, these are merely tactical objections. I used 2) before to clarify the difference between sperm & egg and the zygote, whereas 1 is superior to account for clones.

Loinburger:

b. why my computer is excluded from being a person.

No human DNA. It may function as a person, though it cannot be human.

we don't treat very young children as being ethically equivalent to us (e.g. parents will send a misbehaving child to "time out" or whatever have you, but they won't send a misbehaving spouse to "time out") since they're less capable of understanding reason than we are,

You're confusing two concepts here.
'ethically equivalent,' with personhood.

Do you believe children should be considered persons, just like adults? Should we legalise infanticide because infants cannot currently function as a person?

Just because a child cannot act as a moral person, this does not excuse us as moral persons from acting immorally to children.

Who is being killed by an early-term abortion? Not what, but who -- I just don't see how you can apply a "who" to an entity with no capacity for reason, with no identity, with no "self."

If you follow my definition, you come to one conclusion, that abortion kills a living human person, no different from ourselves. You were once a zygote, an embryo and a fetus, but were lucky enough not to have been aborted.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
I have two choices.

1. I can say the zygote is a unique, living, human person and make two exceptions by saying clones and twins are special cases where the genetic code is not unique.

How is a zygote a person since it seems implausible that is has sentience?

Originally posted by obiwan18
2. I can do away with the unique qualifier, as I have done here by specifying a genetic code differing from the parents to clarify the difference between sperm & egg and the zygote.

There are tactical reasons why it makes no sense to extend 2. to include an exception clause for cloned people:

First of all, we cannot make clones without destroying other embryos in the process. By stating that embryos are persons, one is not justified in killing embryos to create clones. Until scientists devise a procedure creating clones without killing another embryo, then I will have no problem.

Secondly, why would one abort a clone? Since we have to go through so much trouble to make a clone, no one who is pregnant with a clone will wish to abort.

Agreed, these are merely tactical objections. I used 2) before to clarify the difference between sperm & egg and the zygote, whereas 1 is superior to account for clones.

It remains unclear that why a unique set of chromosomes is a necessary condition for a human to be a person. The entire reason for pointing out clones is not whether they are feasible without destroying existing embryoes, but rather separate persons can have identical DNA. Same with identical n-lets.

[loinburger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
You're confusing two concepts here.
'ethically equivalent,' with personhood.

"Personhood" is an ethical concept -- somebody is a person if there exists a moral imperative to (at least attempt to) treat them as we'd like them to treat us. A zygote is fundamentally incapable of moral behavior.

Do you believe children should be considered persons, just like adults? Should we legalise infanticide because infants cannot currently function as a person?

That's a strawman. A child is not ethically equivalent to you or I (which is why e.g. they're not allowed to vote), but a child is also not ethically equivalent to a zygote, by virtue of the fact that the child is sentient while the zygote is not. My point is that we don't treat children based on their behavior ten years from now ("Well, in ten years Bobby will be able to take care of a pony, so I'll buy him a pony now"), so by the same token, why treat a non-sentient zygote as though it were sentient?

If you follow my definition, you come to one conclusion, that abortion kills a living human person, no different from ourselves. You were once a zygote, an embryo and a fetus, but were lucky enough not to have been aborted.

"I" did not exist when I was a zygote or an embryo -- my immature body may have existed, but "I" did not. "I" am not my DNA, nor my cell structure, nor any other incidental feature that makes me a human, but rather "I" am my mind -- y'know, the part that does the thinking, the sentient part, the part that is able to make the claim "I think therefore I am." My DNA can't make that claim, since my DNA can't think, therefore my DNA doesn't have a concept of self like I do. My body may at one point have been in the form of a zygote or an embryo, but "I" never existed in that form.

Are you claiming that what makes you "you" is not your mind, but rather your physical body? If somebody were to damage your physical body in such a way that your mind remains intact, would you no longer be "you"? I certainly don't feel like I've lost a part of my soul when I e.g. cut my finger... Heck, change my DNA in such a way that my mind isn't affected (f'rinstance, I've got crooked fingers, and I doubt that the section of DNA that dictates that my fingers are crooked is also the same section of DNA that dictates how my brain functions) and "I" will still me "me," I'll simply be a me with straighter fingers.

[Ben Kenobi]

The entire reason for pointing out clones is not whether they are feasible without destroying existing embryoes, but rather separate persons can have identical DNA. Same with identical n-lets.

UR:

I'll be brief.

Yes, I believe one can have DNA identical to someone else, in the case of clones and still be an individual human person.

How is a zygote a person since it seems implausible that is has sentience?

See my coma example. We consider a person who is in a coma to still be a person, despite current non-sentience. What counts for personhood is not the current function, but the capacity to function as a person, possessed by zygotes as well as everyone else.

loinburger:

"I" am not my DNA, nor my cell structure, nor any other incidental feature that makes me a human, but rather "I" am my mind.

Does your mind remain the same over time?

Are you claiming that what makes you "you" is not your mind, but rather your physical body? If somebody were to damage your physical body in such a way that your mind remains intact, would you no longer be "you"? I certainly don't feel like I've lost a part of my soul when I e.g. cut my finger... Heck, change my DNA in such a way that my mind isn't affected (f'rinstance, I've got crooked fingers, and I doubt that the section of DNA that dictates that my fingers are crooked is also the same section of DNA that dictates how my brain functions) and "I" will still me "me," I'll simply be a me with straighter fingers.

Just the opposite. Who you are does not depend on the current state of your body, but on the capacity of your body to attain sentience. As you grow, you do not become another person, since what was to grow comes from part of you earlier. You start with a bucket, and while the bucket may vary in the amount filled, the intrinsic capacity will not.

Heck, change my DNA in such a way that my mind isn't affected.

So change the mind and you change the person?

That's a strawman.

Yet you ignore the other much more substantive point.


As moral persons we should act moral even to those who are currently incapable of acting morally.

Do you believe this to be true?

[loinburger]

Originally posted by obiwan18
Does your mind remain the same over time?

I learn new things, if that's what you're referring to... I'm the same "me" whether or not I know how to e.g. numerically solve the Heat Equation, though...

Just the opposite. Who you are does not depend on the current state of your body, but on the capacity of your body to attain sentience.

"I" am not my body, though, regardless of the potential sentience of that body! Take away my body but leave my mind (I dunno, put my brain in a jar or something), and "I" still exist. Take away my brain (or don't give me a brain), and "I" do not exist, even if my body is kept as a living husk capable of having a new brain transferred into it (thus giving my body "the capacity to attain sentience"). Why else would it be ethical to take a brain-dead patient off of life support, if the patient's "self" weren't the patient's mind?

As you grow, you do not become another person, since what was to grow comes from part of you earlier.

Sure, but I've first got to grow into or become a person. If your brain were destroyed, would your "self" be gone? If so, then how can you claim that your "self" could exist before your brain even formed in the first place? If you have no self without a brain, then who the heck is being harmed by an early-term abortion? A "self-that-might-have been"? A nonexistent person? If my parents had never had any children, then I'd be in the exact same state of non-existence now than I'd be in if they'd aborted me as a zygote -- in either case my "self" would have never even existed.

So change the mind and you change the person?

Give me a different brain/mind, and I'd no longer be me -- I'd be the guy whose brain/mind now occupies my body.

Yet you ignore the other much more substantive point.

Your "other point" is just a more generalized version of the infanticide strawman.

As moral persons we should act moral even to those who are currently incapable of acting morally.

Do you believe this to be true?

No, which is why I'm in favor of locking up murderers despite the fact that they may at some future date become reformed. This is also why I'm in favor of not allowing a 5-year-old to vote despite the fact that the 5-year-old will somebody be an 18-year-old. Locking people up and not allowing people to fully express their opinions can hardly be regarded as "moral behavior" with all things being equal, but all things are not equal -- the murderer is a murderer and the 5-year-old is immature.