My reply to all the different claims:
1. On the issue of Soviet weapons: As I have said before, soviet arm shipments until after 1967 did not give the Arab states better capabilities overall. Israel had a much better arms procurement schedule and plan. It did so after 1967 as well, even with the much increased Soviet support to the Arab states. The 1973 war does show the difference in Arab abilities, at least, in a very short campaign of limited obvectives. Yet even at this point, israel had better equipment as well as its ususal superiority in training and organization.
2. Israel's army was stronger than the combined forces of its foes in 1967 and 1973, as Israel can count on its superior reserves and short lines of internal movement within a short time of the start of war, the Israeli army swells in size, and it has a much easier time of moving troops from one side of itself to the other. Add to this the fact that the Arab armies usually were not acting in coordination (as theyc ertainly were not in 1967) and it shows that Israel has alway been able to put the most force on those spots that mattered quickly. Again, the only break form this tradition was 1973, which is why that war, while eventually a total israeli victory, was so costly.
3. Nasser never meant to wage war against Israel in 1967: He did what he did to deter a possible Israeli attack on Syria (his assesment based on pooor or false Soviet intelligence). The fact that his whole third army was in Yemen at the time should make it clear that he was not planniong a war. And yes, this is exaclty whgat the Egyptians woul do from a possition of weakness. They knew that if Israel attacked Syria, Israel would win, and once a war started ther was little Egypt could do, so better threaten a two front war to have Israel giv it a second thought than to let the war start. Nasser's sins were the terrible way he handled his detterment policy, escalating the rhetoric too quickly while sill being utterly unprepared.
1. On the issue of Soviet weapons: As I have said before, soviet arm shipments until after 1967 did not give the Arab states better capabilities overall. Israel had a much better arms procurement schedule and plan. It did so after 1967 as well, even with the much increased Soviet support to the Arab states. The 1973 war does show the difference in Arab abilities, at least, in a very short campaign of limited obvectives. Yet even at this point, israel had better equipment as well as its ususal superiority in training and organization.
2. Israel's army was stronger than the combined forces of its foes in 1967 and 1973, as Israel can count on its superior reserves and short lines of internal movement within a short time of the start of war, the Israeli army swells in size, and it has a much easier time of moving troops from one side of itself to the other. Add to this the fact that the Arab armies usually were not acting in coordination (as theyc ertainly were not in 1967) and it shows that Israel has alway been able to put the most force on those spots that mattered quickly. Again, the only break form this tradition was 1973, which is why that war, while eventually a total israeli victory, was so costly.
3. Nasser never meant to wage war against Israel in 1967: He did what he did to deter a possible Israeli attack on Syria (his assesment based on pooor or false Soviet intelligence). The fact that his whole third army was in Yemen at the time should make it clear that he was not planniong a war. And yes, this is exaclty whgat the Egyptians woul do from a possition of weakness. They knew that if Israel attacked Syria, Israel would win, and once a war started ther was little Egypt could do, so better threaten a two front war to have Israel giv it a second thought than to let the war start. Nasser's sins were the terrible way he handled his detterment policy, escalating the rhetoric too quickly while sill being utterly unprepared.
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