What American's Ought to Know About Canada, But Don't

[Ben Kenobi]

I'm surprised it took people so long to note that Canadian inflection, eh?

[Uncle Sparky]

Originally posted by Starchild
The Canadians being polite yet unfriendly is a trait inherited from the British, were we can be painfully nice to you while stepping over your bleeding corpse.

If the bleeding corpse were not quite dead yet and Canadian, it would apologize for the mess and inconvenience.

... And we are very friendly - we just have a low tolerance for drama queens (outside of Quebec).

[Ned]

NYE, I refer you to No.s 47-9. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed47.htm

No. 47 includes this:

"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct. The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point. The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged, so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of elementary truths, the several characteristic principles of that particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn.

On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him, can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional council to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote. From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred that, in saying "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates,'' or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers,'' he did not mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. This would have been the case in the constitution examined by him, if the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete legislative power, or the supreme administration of justice; or if the entire legislative body had possessed the supreme judiciary, or the supreme executive authority.

This, however, is not among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive department. The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body,'' says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate should ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner. '' Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR. Were it joined to the executive power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence of AN OPPRESSOR. '' Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author."

[Barinthus]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker


There's something seriously wrong with that map. Northern Virginia is not part of the "Lower South"

Whose side did the state fight on during the American Civil War?

Here you go.

[Dr Strangelove]

So tell me something I've been dying to know, do Canadians think of themselves as Americans? The reason I ask is that I am curious about something that Charlton Heston, actor, gun nut and all around irrate citizen once said. In response to the PC proposal that American Indians be re-named "Native Americans", Chuck exclaimed: " I'm a Native American!" Chuck is infact a naturalized US citizen, having been born in Canada. While I realize that Canada is indeed located on the North American continent, I believe that most Canadians do not habitually think of themselves as Americans. Am I right? If I polled one thousand Canadian citizens on whether or not they thought of themselves as Americans how many would say that they did?

What's your opinion?

[Richelieu]

Out of 1000? Maybeee ... none.

[Ben Kenobi]

I believe that most Canadians do not habitually think of themselves as Americans. Am I right? If I polled one thousand Canadian citizens on whether or not they thought of themselves as Americans how many would say that they did?

More Empire folks than Continentalists here.

[notyoueither]

Originally posted by Ned
This, however, is not among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive department.

By that last paragraph you quoted, it seems that Westminster passes muster.

The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body,'' says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate should ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner. '' Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR. Were it joined to the executive power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence of AN OPPRESSOR. '' Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author."

... and by that bolded bit Ottawa, today, is very near failing due to the way party discipline has evolved.

First, you have to make a distinction. The PM and cabinet (the exectutive of today, but also the Monarch in days gone by) being members of Parliament is not a bad thing, since they may make no law without the consent of a majority in both houses of Parliament. Incidently, there is no law that requires that the PM or any cabinet minister actually be a Member of Parliament. However, custom has evolved that they either come from Parliament or seek a seat there at the earliest occassion (probably because that is the only point at which a member of the executive would face the public in a parliamentary system). So, the British Parliament passes on this score.

What makes what you quoted apply here is exactly what I have been on about. In Ottawa the PM and cabinet can, under a majority government, ram through controversial legislation by exercising an undue level of discipline over backbench MPs from their party. The ultimate weapons in this closet of discipline are expulsion from caucus and the denial of any hope for the party's nomination for the next election through the witholding of signed nomination papers. So, in the wording of your quote, the PM and cabinet could force the enactment of tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner. In short, one branch has very largely subverted another.

[Tingkai]

Originally posted by notyoueither


Oh. Well I guess this guy is too inexperienced to see where those checks are. Maybe you should drop him a line and show him where he's gone wrong on the topic.

http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2002/10/21/martin_021021

[q]Martin urges parliamentary reform, end to 'democratic deficit'
Last Updated Tue, 22 Oct 2002 7:57:17
TORONTO - Individual MPs need more power and freedom in the House of Commons, says Liberal MP Paul Martin.
In his first major policy speech as a Liberal leadership contender, Martin said Canada's lawmakers are hampered by a system where power is centralized and where MPs must toe the party line.

You do know that this was just politics to make Chretien look bad. It certainly doesn't mean that it is true or that Martin believes it.

The PM does not have dictorial power. Instead, power resides in the Cabinet. The PM must lead through persuasion. If the PM tries to act as a dictator, he/she could face a cabinet revolt. This has happened in the past.

The PM must also keep the support of the MPs or they will turn against him. Just look at what happened to Chretien.

Government policies are set by the cabinet after extensive discussion and lobbying behind closed doors. Those discussions will involve backbenchers, but backbenchers tend to have less influence.

Within the Liberal party there are numerous factions, each jostling for power, but when the cabinet reaches a decision, everyone must publically support that decision. As a result of this show of unity, some people tend to think that the PM has dictorial power. They are mistaken.

[notyoueither]

Ahh. I see. We need a secret decoder ring to be able to tell when a politician is speaking about something real, and when they are just playing nice to gain our support.

Pray tell why he would seek the support of Liberals by criticising current Parliamentary practice if there were no perception of there being a problem with those practices?

One would think that his first significant speech of a campagn would be something of a keynote and have some substance, no?

[Tingkai]

Originally posted by notyoueither
Ahh. I see. We need a secret decoder ring to be able to tell when a politician is speaking about something real, and when they are just playing nice to gain our support.

Pray tell why he would seek the support of Liberals by criticising current Parliamentary practice if there were no perception of there being a problem with those practices?

One would think that his first significant speech of a campagn would be something of a keynote and have some substance, no?

Nye, Nye, Nye. Don't go into politics.

A campaign policy speech should:
- Subtlely attack the opponent. In this case, Martin paints Chretien as an unethical dictator without actually calling him an unethitical dictator;
- Be about a motherhood issue that no one will disagree with (or something that if anyone disagrees with it, the opponent will look bad);
- Sound bold without actually being bold (the Liberals had drafted a bill to create an independent ethics commissioner and tabled it the day after Martin's speech. Odds are Martin knew that)
- Contain vague statements rather than specific promises.
- Promise the voters something (In this case, Martin is promising MPs more power without actually giving them any specific powers.


And finally, you don't need a secret decoder ring. You just need to use your brain and read between the lines.

[notyoueither]

Ummm. Is the New Democratic Party of Saskatchewan failing to read between the lines? I admit, they are going much further than Mr. Martin, but at least they are not denying that there is a problem, which you seem to want to do.

http://www.saskndp.com/cw/64.3/democraticreform.html

Paying down the democratic deficit:
Feature: Federal Election

Federal NDP Platform
Awareness Campaigns
Democratic Reform
Voter Turnout
Women Vote NDP
Skip Hambling Candidate
Does Canada need democratic reform?

by Sarah McQuarrie

Two years ago, in a landmark speech to Osgoode Hall Law School, then Liberal leadership candidate Paul Martin committed to strengthening Canada's democracy: a "vital precondition to our future success as a country."

Less than a decade after he enacted drastic measures to reduce Canada's fiscal deficit, Martin was warning of a new crisis - the so-called "democratic deficit."

The Prime Minister labelled this "one of the fundamental issues facing us as a country," and proposed a six-point democratic reform plan to restore debate in the House of Commons by enhancing the role of parliamentarians and committees.

In addition to the creation of an independent Ethics Commissioner, Martin committed to strengthening the role of private members, loosening party discipline, and reforming standing committees and government appointments.

As Martin argued, "it is in the House of Commons where our greatest debates should occur; where duly elected Members of Parliament come together from every corner of our country and represent every community and constituency in between."

Today, in the midst of a federal election, the need for democratic reform appears even more urgent. Voter turnout has been falling steadily, reaching a new low of 61 per cent in 2000. As few as 25 per cent of Canada's young voters are expected to turn up at the polls. Trust in politicians and public officials is dangerously low; the 2000 Canadian Election Survey found a majority of Canadians felt that politicians were ready to lie to get elected.

Canadians are eschewing traditional means of interacting with political affairs. When they choose to influence public policy, they are increasingly likely to do so through interest groups seen as more effective and trustworthy than traditional political parties. Voter cynicism plagues news coverage and opinion surveys.

Canada's democratic malaise is readily apparent, but meaningful debate on potential remedies appears to have fallen off the table. It may be that, as one former politician argued, elections really aren't the best time to discuss issues of public policy. Moreover, the issue of democratic reform is a complicated one, and there is no clear consensus.

And Canadian voters, understandably, are much more concerned about waiting lists and tuition fees than they are about parliamentary standing committees and electoral systems.

"More educated than ever before, Canadians expect to be involved in public policy decision-making. They also expect their votes to count for something - one of the drivers behind proposals for electoral reform."

Nevertheless, it appears that democratic reform in Canada is both necessary and inevitable. Across Canada, eager provinces are testing new initiatives - and it appears unlikely that democratic renewal will stop there.

Thomas Axworthy, Chairman of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Queen's University, has pointed out the tactical brilliance of the federal democratic reform plan: "because [Martin's] core supporters in the Liberal caucus had long been dissatisfied with their treatment by Jean Chrétien's PMO."

But Martin's proposals are not the only way Canadians are experimenting with enhancements to our democratic systems.

In British Columbia, where almost two-thirds of voters are dissatisfied with the existing electoral system, major reforms include fixed election dates and a citizens' assembly to examine electoral reform.

If the BC Citizens' Assembly proposes a change to the existing electoral system, their proposal will be put before the province in a binding referendum.

Ontario's new democratic renewal secretariat has also announced fixed election dates. It recently completed the most extensive pre-budget consultations on record. Town Hall Ontario gave the province's citizens the opportunity to develop priorities for the budget and the newly elected McGuinty government.

Canada's provinces have recognized that the present crisis in public confidence poses a threat to the legitimacy of Canadian political institutions. They are especially worried about the future, given the lack of youth participation.

While Martin deserves some credit for taking on this issue, his parliamentary reform plan falls dramatically short, especially when compared to more innovative proposals from other jurisdictions.

After all, indicators of a democratic deficit go beyond the dissatisfaction or alienation of backbench and opposition MPs. The sense of civic disengagement and malaise that characterizes the democratic deficit is attributable to shifts in values held by Canadians.

The issues here are more nuanced than simple cynicism or disinterest. More educated than ever before, Canadians expect to be involved in public policy decision-making. They also expect their votes to count for something - one of the drivers behind proposals for electoral reform.

Paradoxically, political participation declines as empowerment increases. These trends are common across western industrialized democracies: "publics of rich democracies [now] show [even] less confidence in their leaders and political institutions than do their counterparts in developing countries."

Academic Richard Nadeau has demonstrated that Canada's political institutions have not kept pace with the shifting values of Canadians, and are consequently failing to live up to Canadian's heightened expectations: "Interest in politics is on the increase, apathy is declining, the desire to be consulted on important political decisions is more and more rooted, and the desire to participate beyond passive and institutionalize activities like the vote and political party membership is increasingly manifest."

Martin's democratic reform plan is insufficient because it is focused almost exclusively in these passive and institutionalized means of participation. There are, of course, other concerns with Martin's democratic reform agenda. Columnists have argued convincingly that, when push comes to shove, politicians are unlikely to betray partisan loyalties in favour of voting with their conscience.

Concern has also been raised about a widening credibility gap for the Martin administration - an administration that talks a good game on democracy, but increasingly appears willing to sacrifice democratic principles in order to ensure the nomination of star candidates.

But ultimately, even if implemented successfully, the Martin reform plans are unlikely to reduce the democratic deficit, because they are not addressing the problem at its source.

The decline of deference means that Canadians don't want to empower their politicians - they want to be empowered by their politicians.

Other democratic reform initiatives have recognized the need to bring citizens in to the policy development process. Citizens can be engaged in policy development and implementation, through expanded public consultation mechanisms.

By engaging to a greater extent with their home communities, individual political representatives can also begin to address the feelings of alienation many Canadians have from their governments.

Greater proportionality in the electoral system may ensure that the makeup of government more accurately reflects the voting preferences of Canadians.

If Martin is serious about addressing the democratic deficit, his reform plans must reflect Canada's new political reality: an active, engaged, and educated citizenry that is less interested in empowering elites than they are in being empowered to set the course for the Canadian state.

[Dis]

and why don't we have a thread titled: What the rest of the world needs to know about america, but doesn't

first of all not all of us have guns. Very few people do actually. And we do actually produce good beers in our country. and not all of us think Britney Spears is the model for the perfect woman.

[chequita guevara]

Originally posted by Dissident
and why don't we have a thread titled: What the rest of the world needs to know about america, but doesn't

If you think we need one, make one. I felt a need because when looking at Canadaian politics threads, I didn't have a clue as to what was going on.

[notyoueither]

I'm sure things are clearer now.