EU is becoming anti-christian in politics

[Kuciwalker]

People can get their morality from their religion (actually, in that case, their morality and their religion are the same thing for all practical purposes). That would be societal influence.

[BlackCat]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker
People can get their morality from their religion (actually, in that case, their morality and their religion are the same thing for all practical purposes). That would be societal influence.

We agree !!! And yet not. I have no problem with religion that changes accordingly with the knowledge that is appearent at any given time and that isn't a given thing for a religion. And if thats the fact, isn't it then more a political body ?

[Ben Kenobi]

Then you have a narrow, impossible, and internally inconsistent view of free will.

No, I believe free will is not something that is physical and that it is not determined by physical things like the structure of your brain.

Why is this internally inconsistant?

Your thoughts are determined by the structure of your mind. Your mind is the thing that makes your thoughts. It obeys certain rules in thinking.

Stop here. Are you saying than a person who gets a brain tumour removed is going to have different thoughts because of the change in his brain structure?

Secondly, how do we know how the brain interacts with your thoughts? Sure, we know doing different tasks uses different portions of the brain, but that's not the same thing as saying that the brain makes the thoughts. The act of thinking may trigger parts of your brain, but then, if this is true, then it is the thoughts that work on the brain, and not vice versa.

This is inherent in the nature of action - any action is determined by natural laws.

Which brings us to the heart of the conflict. If our thoughts are determined by our brain structure, then there is no possibility of having any free will. We do not make the decisions, but rather, our brain structure does. We only make the decisions we do because of our particular chemistry at the time.

Don't you see my point, how determinism and free will contradict each other?

It just is. It's nonsense to say that an action (of anything) wasn't determined by natural laws, because there is nothing else that could have determined it

So because you lack an understanding of how these things work, determinism must be the only correct answer?

That's not a very good argument Skywalker. It should give you pause, that if you do not know the answer, why you are so devoted to determinism in the first place.

I do think there are alternative answers to this question, but all of them require a different conception of how our thoughts work, that brings them out of the realm of nature, and the natural laws therein.

- and SOMETHING had to figure out what was going to happen next. This doesn't change the fact that it is YOUR MIND that does the thinking, and therefore, YOU are responsible for your actions.

We are not merely our mind, nor the structure of our mind, skywalker. If you remove a tumour, then I am still me.

1) no it doesn't

Why not? Follow the analogy to a manufacturer's instruction manual. They should be followed because the manufacturer knows how everything works.

The same is true of God. If he made us, than it is natural, that he will know what will work best for us, far better than we can hope for ourselves.

2) that doesn't establish morality

Sure it does. Of course, I am saying that what is moral, ought also to be what is beneficial for the human condition.

Do you contest this presupposition?

No.

It doesn't matter. The very act of choice implies a mind, therefore, one CANNOT CHOOSE one's own mind. It doesn't matter, because it's YOUR MIND that made the choice. Free will is the ability to make your own decisions. You quite clearly have that ability, therefore you have free will.

So if you have no influence over the structure of your mind, and that structure is what makes the decisions for you, then you do not have free will.

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
No, I believe free will is not something that is physical and that it is not determined by physical things like the structure of your brain.

Why is this internally inconsistant?

Even if it isn't "physical", my statements still apply: every action is either determined, or totally random. (It may be probabilistic, but that's just a variatoin on determinism and it's not really consequential.) Your concept of free will is impossible. It makes no sense. You want undetermined and yet nonrandom actions.

Stop here. Are you saying than a person who gets a brain tumour removed is going to have different thoughts because of the change in his brain structure?

Probably not. It's really irrelevent, though, whether the actual brain thing is doing the thinking. Even if it's some immaterial soul, my statement still applies.

Which brings us to the heart of the conflict. If our thoughts are determined by our brain structure, then there is no possibility of having any free will. We do not make the decisions, but rather, our brain structure does. We only make the decisions we do because of our particular chemistry at the time.

Don't you see my point, how determinism and free will contradict each other?

See above.

So because you lack an understanding of how these things work, determinism must be the only correct answer?

That's not a very good argument Skywalker. It should give you pause, that if you do not know the answer, why you are so devoted to determinism in the first place.

What?!

Everything is either determined, probabilistic (an inconsequential variation on determinism, as I mentioned above), or totally random. I assume we can both leave the totally random option aside, therefore that leaved determined. I never said I didn't understand something, or that I didn't know the answer to a question (in fact, I'm omniscient ).

We are not merely our mind, nor the structure of our mind, skywalker. If you remove a tumour, then I am still me.

Actually, we are our mind. We may not be our brain (I'm willing to accept the existance of an immaterial soul for the time being, as it doesn't matter wrt the debate), but our mind refers to "the thinking part of us".

Why not? Follow the analogy to a manufacturer's instruction manual. They should be followed because the manufacturer knows how everything works.

That assumes we want to use it in the way the manufacturer intended it to be used.

Btw, God's given a pretty bad description of how the universe works. The Bible doens't serve well as a physics textbook

Sure it does. Of course, I am saying that what is moral, ought also to be what is beneficial for the human condition.

Do you contest this presupposition?

Yes. I disagree with your definition of morality, and with what you consider "beneficial for the human condition".

So if you have no influence over the structure of your mind, and that structure is what makes the decisions for you, then you do not have free will.

That structure is you. You make the decision.

[BlackCat]

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi


No, I believe free will is not something that is physical and that it is not determined by physical things like the structure of your brain.

Why is this internally inconsistant?



Stop here. Are you saying than a person who gets a brain tumour removed is going to have different thoughts because of the change in his brain structure?

Yes, that is a very common result of brain surgery.

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
Secondly, how do we know how the brain interacts with your thoughts? Sure, we know doing different tasks uses different portions of the brain, but that's not the same thing as saying that the brain makes the thoughts. The act of thinking may trigger parts of your brain, but then, if this is true, then it is the thoughts that work on the brain, and not vice versa.

What you actually is saying is that the brain isn't in any way involved in thinking !!! What you postulates is that any kind of thinking is done outside the brain and then triggers some parts of the brain when some kind of rationale is deescideded. You could just as wel have said - stop thinking, it isn''t worth the trouble - something outside is at the end enyway telling what to think.

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
Which brings us to the heart of the conflict. If our thoughts are determined by our brain structure, then there is no possibility of having any free will. We do not make the decisions, but rather, our brain structure does. We only make the decisions we do because of our particular chemistry at the time.

Don't you see my point, how determinism and free will contradict each other?

YES. You got the point. Is it that hard a point to accept ? Human beings are a biochemist body with an extremrely complex organisation - especially the brain.

You forget the point that the brain is as complex as it is so there is no contradiction btween determinism and free will.

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi


We are not merely our mind, nor the structure of our mind, skywalker. If you remove a tumour, then I am still me.

NO! If you are lucky, then you still are yourself after such an operation, but there are no guarantee - you migth be a totally other personality after such an opreataion.

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
Why not? Follow the analogy to a manufacturer's instruction manual. They should be followed because the manufacturer knows how everything works.

The same is true of God. If he made us, than it is natural, that he will know what will work best for us, far better than we can hope for ourselves.

If that should be a fact, then god would be a employee at M$. How come that we first got the instruction manual 30.000 years after we needed it ? Was it because god shipped a product out without the acceptance of the quality insurance departmemt ?

[Ben Kenobi]

Moral values do change with time, and with locations.

Moral values are a form of unwritten law (with soft enforcement by all members of society), whose aim is to force the individual behaviour into not being threatening to the whole.

For example, there was a time where having sex with women other than your wife (i.e girlfriends, one night-stands etc.) was immoral, because you'd then make kids you wouldn't support. Nowadays, thanks to contraception, this problem is solved. And most modern societies don't see any moral problem wrt sex without marriage.

How is the problem solved? There are still children who grow up without support, even given the miracles of contraception and abortion.

Secondly, you state that most 'modern' societies don't see any moral problem with premarital sex. Yet, I believe you define a modern society as one that approves of such promiscuous behaviour, hence you beg the question. A better response would be to look at the actual societies, rather than labelling them modern, or otherwise.

If you do this, then you have a much more difficult case. Even you have said that there are moral problems with premarital sex because it may produce children without adequate structures of support. Therefore, you have a moral problem with premarital sex, and hence, it is not the morals which have changed at all.

[Ben Kenobi]

Even if it isn't "physical", my statements still apply: every action is either determined, or totally random. (It may be probabilistic, but that's just a variatoin on determinism and it's not really consequential.)

What is the difference between 'probabilistic' and 'random'?

Determinism is synonymous with chance.

Your concept of free will is impossible. It makes no sense. You want undetermined and yet nonrandom actions.

Determinism is the same as random actions. Don't you understand? This is why you are having so many problems later on.

Sure, the actions may be governed by natural laws, but it's like a pegboard, where you get a distribution depending on the geometry of the pegs.

You'd hardly call such pegs having any semblence of free will, yet the system is deterministic.

A system that does not show such random behaviour is considered non-deterministic.

Probably not. It's really irrelevent, though, whether the actual brain thing is doing the thinking. Even if it's some immaterial soul, my statement still applies.

How is an immaterial soul to be affected by the laws of nature?

Actually, we are our mind. We may not be our brain (I'm willing to accept the existance of an immaterial soul for the time being, as it doesn't matter wrt the debate), but our mind refers to "the thinking part of us".

Then our mind! = our brain, and the structure of the brain. If you are willing to accept the soul, then the two cannot be synonymous.

That assumes we want to use it in the way the manufacturer intended it to be used.

Our wants are irrelevant. We may want to use something in a way other than which the manufacturer intended, which will cause problems for the machine later on. It will become more prone to breakdowns if we choose to go down this route.

Btw, God's given a pretty bad description of how the universe works. The Bible doens't serve well as a physics textbook

Is the bible an instruction module for the universe, or for man? I would suggest the latter, since it was given to men for our benefit.

Yes. I disagree with your definition of morality, and with what you consider "beneficial for the human condition".

Disregarding the contents, do you disagree with the statement that what is moral is what is beneficial for the human condition?

It's a metaethical claim, whereas we may only differ on the normative aspect, ie, what is beneficial for the human condition,

That structure is you. You make the decision.

So again, if a tumour grows and the doctor removes the tumour, am I no longer me?

[Fake Boris]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker
You mean inconsisten with their stated definition of personhood.

Consistency (usually, if you are actually debating in good faith) relates to stated statements, to the extent of course that we are talking about individuals of reasoning ability. Average Joe-Racist from Mobile in 1873 is not even in question here.

Clearly, the subpropositions of a system of beliefs never violate the axioms at their core (because a system of beliefs is defined in terms of those core axioms). It may violate its stated core axioms, but not its actual ones.

By saying this, you forget my other point, which is that the axioms themselves must not contradict each other.

(BTW, if you define a subproposition as a "contingental moral judgment determining the value of a contingental or specific practical action or state of things, drawing from an axiomatic set of values", then you create a problem in logical preseance: axioms being absolute, it would be fallacious to determine them at will from contingencies. Please do not consider this as my main argument though, because the following one is much easier to tackle and admit, while this one opens the door to some dimensions of logics beyong my grasp. )

According to your logic, inconsistency could not exist.

Imagine the following system:

Axiom 1: a=b

Proposition 1: a!=b
Proposition 2: a=b

What is the axiom underlying this system? Needless to say, you are forced to admit that this system is inconsistent.

What's normativity?

From the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Something is said by philosophers to have ‘normativity’ when it entails that some action, attitude or mental state of some other kind is justified, an action one ought to do or a state one ought to be in.

Haven't you read Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, etc?

No. It shouldn't matter, if you're point is actually correct.

Reason is the constitutive idea of modernity, and its existence, assumed either as an a priori (Descartes) or empirical evidence (Hume), is at the root of modernist thinking. The ability to make a meaningful statement, turn it into a promise, and assume its coherency of the basis of 'natural laws' (self-preservation, namely) has been used to justify Social Contracts. It is irrational and useless to add whiteness of skin on top of that.

Let's see if I understand correctly: because it happens to be the most common stated justification in recent century for various moralities [...]

Where did I say that? You think I'd commit such a gross fallacy?

[...] it is somehow more rational?

"than many moral theories", that's for sure! Social contract theories rely on safe empirical evidence to make plausible assumptions. They say that every individual has a 'conatus', and that those (naturally heredited conatuses), when correctly combined with our inherent reasoning ability, should result in a minimal common idea of what is desirable.

Determining what this common idea can be is much more rational than religious methods or semantically gratuitous propositions (for instance: "The grass is orange, therefore I ought to lick my mom's clitoris every full moon night.")

There you go using "should" again. As soon as you start talking about moral obligation, which has an established meaning that is the same for every morality, you are making a synthetic statement.

Well, I was just saying that my axioms go beyond definitions, and that they try to make rules on how definitions could be made. (see my point about contingental statements; in my system, the highest number possible of definitions would be contingental, not axiomatic).

The simpler the rules, the easier it becomes for them to be recognized.

See above, "should" and "right" and "wrong" have meanings that are defined the same for every morality. The dispute is over the connection between those words and various actions, not inherent to the meaning of the terms themselves. If you redefine "should" to mean those various actions you think people should do, then it's now a fundamentally useless term, because when you say "should" all you're actually saying is "the class of actions that I think people ought to do".

I just don't see where you're heading. How is it that I redefined the word "should"?

Self-preservation is "true"?

Probably. At least, it was considered as such by epistemological standards back then.

(As to the second part of your argument, i.e. that practical actions don't have any effect on the actual beliefs, it is stronger but still quite weak. For instance, if one had, say, the belief that no one ever lies and that he lied himself, you'd have a strong case of claiming this belief to be self-contradictory, albeit not, I grant you, in a purely non-empirical, non-observational manner).

Just because someone is a hypocrite (follows a morality other than the stated one) doesn't actually indict the morality that person actually follows.

This is true but it has no relevancy with what I said. I was talking about a factual belief proven false by the own actions of its holder, not a prescriptive one.

Ah, so it means the same thing as empirical?

I think I misused the term in one of my sentences. The correct way to say it would be that empirical evidence can be called evidence, when it conforms to epistemological standards.

Your favorite philosopher, Mill, relies exactly on this.

1) Empirically, everyone wants to be happy and has a strong sense of self-preservation
2) Happiness and preservation can be threatened when different moralities collide
3) If people are to follow a moral code consistent with their desires and their reasoning ability, they will want it to be as universal as possible (as to avoid the danger posed by no. 2)
4) For a moral code to be as universal as possible, it has to rely on strong empirical evidence and try to derive conclusions from in the manner that has the highest potention for normativity (thus, logically, using the rules of what are sound arguments)
5) Thus, a good moral code will define as useful what, in its observed practical consequences, goes in accordance with no. 1

All of which already assumes a moral first principle, i.e. that it is good for a moral code to be universal (and if good is defined as universal, then it's a meaningless statement), and that a universal moral code is inherently superior somehow.

Not at all. It you accept that a moral code determines what is desirable, then it's a good idea to look at what people want at a fundamental level, and from then try to make the most reasonable possible assumption as to what they should want.
Again, using my distinction between absolute statements (axioms) and contingental ones (propositions), it is clear that the universality of a moral code is made desirable by no. 2, and is not an arbitrary statement.


btw, I've read his Utilitarianism and I disagree with it, not only on the basis of moral relativity but also because I am not a utilitarian. I do, however, agree in large part with the claim that most moralities are utilitarian (not just consequentialist) at the core or at least partially so.

Because lots of people claim that a morality is absolute, and then use that as evidence to advance another moral claim, with which I disagree, therefore I must of necessity question the claim of absolute morality.

In practice, it doesn't make any difference whether you are a relativist or not. The mere fact that you can disagree some statements to be false means that you assume some to be true. Why do you debate moral questions anyway?

You're missing the other part of my argument, you keep insisting upon them as separate points when they both state they are BOTH necessary conditions. First, that it not ban something based on it being "sinful" (the quotation marks there because I'm stretching the meaning of the term slightly to include things believed by an atheist; were that atheist religious but held the same moral beliefs, he would use the term sin.), and second, that the position (or the practical implementation of it) be one that could be consistently held by an atheist.

What? You should try to reformulate this in an understandable sentence.

How do you know that something is being banned because it is sinful? Do you think that judiciary decisions about say, gay marriage, are free of the judges' religious bias, even though the judge will obviously invoke legal arguments?

See above - whether or not their reasons are religious, it isn't about preventing sin and it isn't something that couldn't be reasonably held by an atheist.

Your turn. What is the difference between something that can be reasonably held by an atheist and something that can't? On what basis?

Their reasons don't really matter in that case. (Obviously their argument does, but the fact that they believe this because of religion doesn't mean we must believe it from the same source. They can convince us with our own premises.)

Of course reasons matter! Again, how can you know that an idea is not religious if you don't even try to look at the possible reasons for it?

[Ben Kenobi]

Yes, that is a very common result of brain surgery.

How then can a patient consent to brain surgery, if the surgery will result in losing their existence? I'd argue the opposite, that the surgery improves their functioning without changing their identity.

What you actually is saying is that the brain isn't in any way involved in thinking !!! What you postulates is that any kind of thinking is done outside the brain and then triggers some parts of the brain when some kind of rationale is deescideded. You could just as wel have said - stop thinking, it isn''t worth the trouble - something outside is at the end enyway telling what to think.

I'm saying that the brain, like a CPU processes the instructions, and is essentially part of the process.

The instructions to your brain, come from you, and from you alone. If you choose not to do anything, then your brain will not have any say.

Secondly, you are assuming that this term 'outside' makes any sense at all to something that is not materialistic. If it doesn't exist in space, then to say this is 'outside' of the brain makes no sense.

YES. You got the point. Is it that hard a point to accept ? Human beings are a biochemist body with an extremrely complex organisation - especially the brain.

You forget the point that the brain is as complex as it is so there is no contradiction btween determinism and free will.

If the chemicals make the decision, then I should just stop thinking altogether, and the result would not make any difference.

Determinism = randomness which is contradictory to any form of free will.

NO! If you are lucky, then you still are yourself after such an operation, but there are no guarantee - you migth be a totally other personality after such an opreataion.

My personality changes every day.

Some days I am very acerbic, others I am much more complementary. Sometimes I can be joyous, and others very sad.

Yet I am still me. Who I am encompasses all of these changes. For the person in brain surgery, you are restoring function that has been lost for a long time.

If that should be a fact, then god would be a employee at M$. How come that we first got the instruction manual 30.000 years after we needed it ?

That presumes, that each manufacturer did not ship the manual with the product. That's why we have a conscience, to serve us as an instruction manual. Later on, God saw fit to add additional instructions to supplement the ones that came with us.

Secondly, this is a small business. There is only one owner, and one employee, and they are the same person.

Finally, why 30K years? Science says man has been around for millions of years.

[Kuciwalker]

Oncle: please stop editing out parts of your quotes of me. It makes it more difficult to respond because I have to keep scrolling or switching between windows

Originally posted by Oncle Boris
Consistency (usually, if you are actually debating in good faith) relates to stated statements, to the extent of course that we are talking about individuals of reasoning ability. Average Joe-Racist from Mobile in 1873 is not even in question here.

Someone may never state his or her internal beliefs openly, but they can still be valid or invalid.

I can think of statements and determine their consistency, despite the fact that I never spoke them aloud.

By saying this, you forget my other point, which is that the axioms themselves must not contradict each other.

No, I'm ignoring it, because you haven't even begun to try and claim that about the RCC.

According to your logic, inconsistency could not exist.

Imagine the following system:

Axiom 1: a=b

Proposition 1: a!=b
Proposition 2: a=b

What is the axiom underlying this system? Needless to say, you are forced to admit that this system is inconsistent.

No. The individual has drawn inconsistent conclusions from the axiom of the system.

Reason is the constitutive idea of modernity, and its existence, assumed either as an a priori (Descartes) or empirical evidence (Hume), is at the root of modernist thinking. The ability to make a meaningful statement, turn it into a promise, and assume its coherency of the basis of 'natural laws' (self-preservation, namely) has been used to justify Social Contracts. It is irrational and useless to add whiteness of skin on top of that.

Where did I say that? You think I'd commit such a gross fallacy?

Yes

"Reason is the constitutive idea of modernity, and its existence, assumed either as an a priori (Descartes) or empirical evidence (Hume), is at the root of modernist thinking," seems to imply that.

"than many moral theories", that's for sure! Social contract theories rely on safe empirical evidence to make plausible assumptions. They say that every individual has a 'conatus', and that those (naturally heredited conatuses), when correctly combined with our inherent reasoning ability, should result in a minimal common idea of what is desirable.

Determining what this common idea can be is much more rational than religious methods or semantically gratuitous propositions (for instance: "The grass is orange, therefore I ought to lick my mom's clitoris every full moon night.")

Ah! So it's not a moral theory at all. It is simply a tool for the utilitarian to determine what the goal is. Or are you simply assuming, out of the blue, that utilitarianism is right?

I just don't see where you're heading. How is it that I redefined the word "should"?

Either you are making a completely unevidenced assumption (that, say, utilitarianism is right), or you are actually changing the meaning of the word "right" to mean "what is utilitarian".

Probably. At least, it was considered as such by epistemological standards back then.

"Self-preservation is true" makes no more sense than "apples are true".

This is true but it has no relevancy with what I said. I was talking about a factual belief proven false by the own actions of its holder, not a prescriptive one.

I wasn't talking about factual beliefs though.

I think I misused the term in one of my sentences. The correct way to say it would be that empirical evidence can be called evidence, when it conforms to epistemological standards.

Oh, so epistemology is the study of what is valid empirical evidence? Sort of like the study of scientific method??

Your favorite philosopher, Mill, relies exactly on this.

1) Empirically, everyone wants to be happy and has a strong sense of self-preservation
2) Happiness and preservation can be threatened when different moralities collide
3) If people are to follow a moral code consistent with their desires and their reasoning ability, they will want it to be as universal as possible (as to avoid the danger posed by no. 2)
4) For a moral code to be as universal as possible, it has to rely on strong empirical evidence and try to derive conclusions from in the manner that has the highest potention for normativity (thus, logically, using the rules of what are sound arguments)
5) Thus, a good moral code will define as useful what, in its observed practical consequences, goes in accordance with no. 1

Not at all. It you accept that a moral code determines what is desirable, then it's a good idea to look at what people want at a fundamental level, and from then try to make the most reasonable possible assumption as to what they should want.

Are using should in that last sentence in the moral sense, or in the predictive sense (i.e., "you shouldn't kill people" or "the weather should be partly cloudy today")?

[q]Again, using my distinction between absolute statements (axioms) and contingental ones (propositions), it is clear that the universality of a moral code is made desirable by no. 2, and is not an arbitrary statement.[q]

You mean that a universal moral code will be desired by more people.

In practice, it doesn't make any difference whether you are a relativist or not. The mere fact that you can disagree some statements to be false means that you assume some to be true. Why do you debate moral questions anyway?

Because I have personal moral beliefs, just like it's possible to debate which band is better and because part of those moral beliefs (or compulsions, may be a better sense of what I'm saying) means that I should impose parts of them on others. Plus it's fun

And finally, because when two people share essentially the same axioms, you can debate the correct conclusions from those axioms. Most people have pretty similar axioms.

What? You should try to reformulate this in an understandable sentence.

I have two criteria for whether or not something conflicts with separation of church and state.

1) It's not being banned because it is sinful, or at least, that it is possible to justify on other grounds - the intent of the legislators is irrelevent, IMO. "Sinful" isn't necessarily religious - basically it means you can't have victimless crimes, though that isn't precisely correct. I'm pretty sure you understand what I'm saying, though.

2) The position could consistantly be held by an atheist.

The RCC's position on abortion meets both criteria.

How do you know that something is being banned because it is sinful? Do you think that judiciary decisions about say, gay marriage, are free of the judges' religious bias, even though the judge will obviously invoke legal arguments?

See above wrt intent of legislators.

Your turn. What is the difference between something that can be reasonably held by an atheist and something that can't? On what basis?

If everything that passes my first criterion can be consistently held by an atheist, then that criterion is all that's necessary. I included the second one because I'm unsure that the first is sufficient.

Of course reasons matter! Again, how can you know that an idea is not religious if you don't even try to look at the possible reasons for it?

Because it's irrelevent to any practical theory of government what the intent of the legislators is, just the resulting legislation.

[BlackCat]

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi


How then can a patient consent to brain surgery, if the surgery will result in losing their existence? I'd argue the opposite, that the surgery improves their functioning without changing their identity.

Well, the alternative maybe death. i might also have been too harsh getting to my point - brain surgery may chance you and probably will in greater or minor way. I am on the other side quite certain that the possibillity of any kind of improvement is very low - if that was a fact then brain sugery would be a standard procedure.

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
I'm saying that the brain, like a CPU processes the instructions, and is essentially part of the process.

The instructions to your brain, come from you, and from you alone. If you choose not to do anything, then your brain will not have any say.

Secondly, you are assuming that this term 'outside' makes any sense at all to something that is not materialistic. If it doesn't exist in space, then to say this is 'outside' of the brain makes no sense.

What you really is saying is that there are two versions of you - one that is your brain and one that is somewhere else and that its the latter that tells your brain how it shall react ? Since it's possible to change peoples behavoiour meddling with their brains you got a problem.

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
If the chemicals make the decision, then I should just stop thinking altogether, and the result would not make any difference. '

Why ? It's the randomness of the biological chemistry that makes you and your possibllity to make those choises you make - not some godlike entity that controls every aspect of your actual situation.

[Kuciwalker]

IMO, sentience is simply an emergent property of matter.

[Ben Kenobi]

Well, the alternative maybe death. i might also have been too harsh getting to my point - brain surgery may chance you and probably will in greater or minor way. I am on the other side quite certain that the possibillity of any kind of improvement is very low - if that was a fact then brain sugery would be a standard procedure.

I don't deny that brain surgery, when it works, restores function. What I do deny is that the state of your functioning pertains to your personal identity.

What you are saying, is that there is not much chance for brain surgery to restore function.

What you really is saying is that there are two versions of you - one that is your brain and one that is somewhere else and that its the latter that tells your brain how it shall react ?

What I am saying is that my brain is a part of my body, and not a part of me, anymore than any other part.

Sure, it is more essential than other parts, because many other parts rely upon the brain.

What is me, is the part that is not physical, yet is still connected to the rest of my body. I'm not sure how that works, but it seems to be an emergent property of matter, yet not determined by the matter.

Since it's possible to change peoples behavoiour meddling with their brains you got a problem.

People's behaviour changes, yet their behaviour does not equate with who they are.

Why ? It's the randomness of the biological chemistry that makes you and your possibllity to make those choises you make - not some godlike entity that controls every aspect of your actual situation.

I agree, that if God controlled all my actions, that I would not have free will.

But I disagree, that the argument I have presented here assumes that God is in fact controlling me. My soul if we can call it that, is not a part of God, any more than any other part of my body.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
Determinism is synonymous with chance.

Determinism is the same as random actions.

Nothing can be further from the truth.

Determinism: If A happens, B will.
Probabilistic: If A happens, B may happen, or B may not.
Random: If A happens, something else happen, but nobody knows what it is.

[Proteus_MST]

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi


I don't deny that brain surgery, when it works, restores function. What I do deny is that the state of your functioning pertains to your personal identity.

What you are saying, is that there is not much chance for brain surgery to restore function.

At least the Brain determines the Actions humans take, according to neural Input.
You can see it for examples in Patients with neurodegenerative Disorders, like Parkinson.
People begin to change their Behavior with proceeding stages of their disorder. In later stages of some neurodegenerative Disorders people often even hurt relatives and the ones they like.
Another well known case in Neurobiology of a grave Change of Personality is the Case of Phineas Gage.
He was Foreman in a Railroad Construction Company and often worked with dynamite. One day he was preparating a large charge with a long tamping iron. The Charge went off and the tamping iron flew right through his head, thereby damaging various Regions of his Brain, especially in his frontal Lobe.
Luckily the wounds weren´t lethal, barely missing some important Arteries and Brain Regions and Phineas Gage recovered from the wounds.
But upon Recovery (which was complete, meaning there were no motoric or memory disabilities remaining) it was discovered, that his Personality had absolutely changed.
Before the Accident Phinies was described as dependable, capable, kind, well liked and efficient (which must be the Reason why he became foreman ).
After the Accident his Behavior had significantly changed, he became profane, rude, obstinant, impatient and made several Plans without really carrying them out, which resulted that he was fired and till his death 11 years later wasn´t able to stay in a job for a long time anymore (and also resulted in Gage only being able to get low paying jobs, like Cart Driver or Farmworker)

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
What I am saying is that my brain is a part of my body, and not a part of me, anymore than any other part.

Sure, it is more essential than other parts, because many other parts rely upon the brain.

What is me, is the part that is not physical, yet is still connected to the rest of my body. I'm not sure how that works, but it seems to be an emergent property of matter, yet not determined by the matter.

People's behaviour changes, yet their behaviour does not equate with who they are.

I agree, that if God controlled all my actions, that I would not have free will.

But I disagree, that the argument I have presented here assumes that God is in fact controlling me. My soul if we can call it that, is not a part of God, any more than any other part of my body.

Two Questions arise:
If, as I showed in the case of Phineas Gage, Brain Damages are able to cause grave Changes in your Personality, i.e. in your way of thinking, what is "you"?
(honest question, as (though having a degree in neurobiology) I think that we have some kind of free will and also believe that there is an immortal part of us although rather according to eastern than to christian philosophy)

Second question which only concerns religious Systems which include a jugdement after death is:
Lets assume someone is a very religious Believer in a (say the christian) Religion, who every Sunday goes to mass, doesn´t drink and is faithful to his spouse.
But after a Brain damage his Behavior changes diametrically, he begins to drink alcoholic drinks en masse, leaves his spouse to have regularly changing sexual relationships with several women and till his death shows no signs of religiosity anymore.
How should/would God judge him?