10 most rightist posters on poly

[DarkCloud]

Dear Agathon,

of course it's on a case by case basis. However instead of looking to new ideas first as liberals do- the conservative tries to shape new plans on the base of old ideas.

The conservative may eventually adopt new ideas- but he won't adopt them in a vaccum and will attempt to shift as minor as possible in an attempt to lower the amount of radical upsetting.

And with that statement, I think we've arrived at an immovable point. You appear to think that the conservative principle does not provide a guide since it's not an absolute absolute.

But by the way YOU define liberal- the conservative principle is ALSO liberal.

And that's our problem.

Originally posted by Agathon

Perhaps I should redefine conservativism again, to become more exact as: "Valuing Tradition, and willing to change gradually so that order is preserved and that society continues to funciton fruitfully."

You still do not seem to me to grasp my argument.

This doesn't make the principle any more useful than before as a guide to action. Assigning any sort of value to gradual change in itself introduces the insane conclusion of the previous argument.

If you say that the whole point of this is "to ensure that society continues fruitfully" everyone will agree with that, even Liberals. But then tradition as a a guide becomes subordinated as a means to ensuring benefit and has no value in and of itself. It opens you up to having to prove that tradition has value, rather than asserting that it does as a matter of principle.

Read my arguments again and see if you get it. Your objections do not in any significant way engage with my actual argument. It's not the definition per se that I am objecting to. I am objecting to its usefulness as a principle that guides action.

Again.

Conservative: "We should value tradition, and be willing to change gradually so that order is preserved and that society continues to function fruitfully."

Liberal: "But that doesn't tell us which traditions we need to make changes to."

Conservative: "Presumably they would be the ones that enable society to continue more fruitfully."

Liberal: "But tradition can't tell us which ones to change, we need an independent standard."

Conservative: "OK - the standard is what makes society run for the best, and I say traditions do for the most part."

Liberal: "Yes, but now you've admitted that it's an open question as to whether any particular tradition makes society run for the best, and that means you have to defend them on utilitarian grounds – you can't defend them just as tradition."

Conservative: "So what?"

Liberal: "Then you can't assume as a matter of principle that tradition is of any use in guiding right action, you have to subject each tradition to a cost benefit analysis to see whether it is worth keeping. Hence, just appealing that something is traditional has absolutely no bearing on whether we should keep it. Therefore tradition is no guide to right action."

Conservative: "But I believe we will be better off sticking mostly to tradition and changing gradually."

Liberal: "So what, you have to defend this belief empirically on a case by case basis. It is no longer a matter of moral principle (if it ever was), rather it is an empirical claim that must be tested on a case by case basis. Articulating the conservative principle as a guide to what we should do is useless, since you have admitted that utility is what matters, and that has to be defended on a case by case basis. In other words appealing to tradition will be of no use against a Liberal reformer, you will need an entirely separate argument. Hence your conservative principle is useless as a guide to right action."

[Provost Harrison]

Don't call him 'dear' for Christ's sake, he'll never let it go...

[Agathon]

Interesting. What sort of situation would force the hand of a conservative in saying radical change would be necessary?

The Great Depression. War. A new and deadly epidemic that needs radical action to stop it.

of course it's on a case by case basis. However instead of looking to new ideas first as liberals do- the conservative tries to shape new plans on the base of old ideas.

The conservative may eventually adopt new ideas- but he won't adopt them in a vaccum and will attempt to shift as minor as possible in an attempt to lower the amount of radical upsetting.

And with that statement, I think we've arrived at an immovable point. You appear to think that the conservative principle does not provide a guide since it's not an absolute absolute.

No. You still don't appear to understand my argument. My position is that both "change as radically as possible" and "change as gradually as possible" are useless as political principles. Liberals don't hold the former, conservatives claim to hold the latter.

If you admit that things should be judged on a case by case basis according to benefit, you've already lost, since that is now your guide to action (and one that will actually work).

[DarkCloud]

ben kenobi- I notice that you are making similar arguments to those that I earlier made against Agathon- I'd encourage you to read the earlier posts between the two of us so that Agathon doesn't have to waste time repeating himself.
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And provost- I was addressing him- much as I would in a letter
-
Agathon-

Well how about this example: since I agree with liberal (almost-libertarian) principles and personal freedoms, then I wouldn't be a conservative in terms of political beliefs- but in the way that I believe is the best to arrive at those beliefs- I think that the change should be done gradually so as to upset society and cause as little strife/unrest as possible. I believe in changing situations, since psychological factors such as war are constantly altering the human experience.

Therefore, what would you define myself as? A liberal? A Conservative?
-

True conservatives understand that change is needed when social situations warrant it. They believe in change when necessary to preserve order.

True liberals (as you define them) appear to believe that change is needed when social situations warrant it. They believe in change when necessary to improve humanity's lot through giving them greater individual freedoms.

How about that definition?

Conservatives have the society's best interests at hand whereas Liberals have the individual's best interests at hand.

Both are needed in a society. The liberal needs to check that the Conservative is serving each individual- and the Conservative needs to ensure that the society as a whole benefits from change.

Good enough?

[Drake Tungsten]

If that was the case, could you explain to me why all those "robber pirates" were killing, burning, and pillaging along SE Chinese coastal areas for hundreds of yeas?

Because they're pirates? I guess I'm not suprised that Japanese pirates would, you know, act like pirates. Not surprised that the Chinese pirates who plied those waters also acted like pirates.

[Drake Tungsten]

Originally posted by molly bloom
Which rather ignores the basic geography of East Asia and Japan's proximity to Korea- China's client state. Annexing Korea and supplanting Russia in Manchuria were rather more 'nefarious' schemes than the French annexing Annam or the British leasing parts of treaty ports- something which the Chinese recognised, even if you don't seem to.

In fact, Li Hung-chang relied on the Western powers to temper Japan's aggressiveness and possible future depredations- as witnessed by an unlikely coalition of Germany, France and Russia 'requesting' Japan's withdrawal from the strategically important Liaotung peninsula.

And why was the Liaotung peninsula so important ? Because it was vital to land and sea routes between Korea and Beijing.

In 1896 this well founded fear of Japan's schemes prompted a secret treaty between Russia and China (despite Russia's colonization of the Amur and Ili lands and acquisition of Vladivostok and its Pacific maritime province) in which each bound the other to defend themselves against Japan.

http://www.russojapanesewar.com/clark18.html

The Chinese regarded Korea as their most strategically placed vassal state, with access to the Pechili Bay, and thence on to Beijing.

I've even quoted Li Hung-chang on this before, but I'll do so again:

" Although the various powers are strong, they are still seventy thousand li away from us, whereas Japan is as near as in the courtyard, as on the threshold, and is prying into our emptiness and solitude (i.e. weakness of our defensive measures). Undoubtedly she will become China's permanent and great anxiety."

Li Hung-chang to Tzu'-hsi, quoted in Teng and Fairbank, 'China's Response' .

How surprising a Chinese general should grasp something you don't seem to.

And of course he was proved right- because the indemnity the Chinese paid (increased when Japan relinquished Liaotung) was spent on an armaments programme, and Formosa/Taiwan was developed as a defensive outpost in the south.

All this writing and what did you prove? That Japan was a bigger long-term threat to China than the Western powers, based on its geographic proximity? Wow, thanks for taking so much time to demonstrate the obvious.

You have failed, however, to show how Japan's plans in Asia before the end of WWI were any more "nefarious" than those of the Western powers. The fact that Japan had obvious geographic advantages in the imperialistic contests in East Asia has nothing to do with whether their strategic plans were any more villainous and evil than those pursued by England, Russia, Germany, France, America and the like.

I'll give you an A for effort, though, particularly this gem.

Annexing Korea and supplanting Russia in Manchuria were rather more 'nefarious' schemes than the French annexing Annam or the British leasing parts of treaty ports- something which the Chinese recognised, even if you don't seem to.

So replacing Russia in Manchuria is more "nefarious" than Russia's occupation of it in the first place?



Maybe a more serious threat to China, but hardly more nefarious.

Also...

In fact, Li Hung-chang relied on the Western powers to temper Japan's aggressiveness and possible future depredations- as witnessed by an unlikely coalition of Germany, France and Russia 'requesting' Japan's withdrawal from the strategically important Liaotung peninsula.

Did you fail to notice which Western power wasn't involved in forcing Japan to give up the Liaotung peninsula? I'll give you a hint; it's the same country that allied with Japan to prevent a similar alliance from deterring Japan from war with Russia in 1905. And the same country that happily used the IJN to protect its interests in Asia during WWI and signed off on Japanese rights in Shandong and Manchuria at Versailles.

This brings up a question; if you're arguing that the Western powers were instrumental in keeping an aggressive Japan from ravaging China, doesn't Britain's efforts to aid Japan and undermine those Western powers give them some culpability for Japan's later actions? In other words, aren't you proving Ned's point for him?

[molly bloom]

Originally posted by Drake Tungsten

Did you fail to notice which Western power wasn't involved in forcing Japan to give up the Liaotung peninsula? I'll give you a hint; it's the same country that allied with Japan to prevent a similar alliance from deterring Japan from war with Russia in 1905. And the same country that happily used the IJN to protect its interests in Asia during WWI and signed off on Japanese rights in Shandong and Manchuria at Versailles.

All that writing and what did you prove ? That the British Empire didn't force Japan to give up a temporary territorial gain it made in China. Hoop-de-doo, someone must be glad for such little triumphs.

Japan's role in 'protecting' British interests in the East Asia was minimal- but of course it suits you to act as though Singapore and Hong Kong were about to be invaded by Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary and Turkey. From where, one wonders ? Kiaochow ?

As I've stated before, it didn't require Japan's aid to capture German colonies in New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomons or the Bismarck Archipelago.

Wow, thanks for taking so much time to demonstrate the obvious.

Well clearly, sometimes even the obvious doesn't suffice for you. It was obvious you couldn't tell how the conflict over the Ryukyuan sailors had indicated a change in Japan's attitude towards China- previously they had been content to use the islands as means of conducting trade with China and acquiring information on China.

After Perry's fleet visits and Japan begins to modernize, the relationship with China changes- Japan asserts that the Ryukyuan Islanders killed in Taiwan are Japanese citizens and demands compensation from China.

The last Chinese cefeng mission sent to Ryukyu to recognise the ascendance of King Sho Tai arrived in 1866.

See, the Chinese still believed that they were the ones to whom the Ryukyuans owed tribute- despite the Japanese presence in the islands.

Perry had originally pushed for access to five Japanese ports, including Naha. Japanese negotiators responded to this by saying that since Ryukyu was a distant country neither the Emperor nor his government had any rights to confer access.

Looks like even the Japanese were confused at times.

Then in 1874 the Japanese are finally bold enough to invade Formosa/Taiwan- why not rely on diplomacy ? No one forced them to invade another Chinese vassal state's territory.

In fact they invaded as diplomatic talks were taking place.

http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/wildhorse/chap1-6.html

And who took China's side ?

Although, in defiance of British and American pressure, Japan deployed troops to Taiwan and took punitive action against the Aborigines involved in the Mutan Village Incident, and although the Ch'ing government deployed 10,000 troops to Taiwan to counter them, there occurred no direct conflict between Ch'ing and Japanese troops.

Remarking critically on this outcome, British ambassador to Japan Harry S. Parkes stated, "The proposition that a victim of invasion should have to pay reparations is incomprehensible! Japan certainly has no right to receive any compensation."

And what had changed ?

There nonetheless remained some ambiguity as to who was the final beneficiary in this incident. As the result of the Beijing conference which resolved the incident, there appeared in the final treaty such language as, "Taiwan savages did harm to Japanese nationals" and acknowledgement that the aim of Japan's expeditionary force was "to protect and obtain justice for its people." This, together with the fact that the consolation money paid by the Ch'ing government was disbursed to the families of the deceased through the auspices of the Japanese government, was tantamount to the Ch'ing government's admission that the Ryukyu Islander castaways could be considered as Japanese citizens. Hence, Japan's sovereignty over the Ryukyus gradually came to be recognized by the International community, while, conversely, the theoretical basis for Ch'ing Dynasty China's claim of traditional sovereignty over the Ryukyus became weakened. Given these circumstances, Japan had of course broken the dominion relationship between the Ryukyus and Ch'ing Dynasty China, giving a major impetus to Japan's policy of merger with the Ryukyus.

What did it foretell ?

The Mutan Village Incident brought with it a hint to the Ch'ing government that the Ch'ing Empire had already lost its stature as the lead character on the East Asian international stage, while at the same time planting the seeds for a longer-term grudge-bearing enmity between Japan and China.

http://www.etaiwannews.com/History/2001/06/11/992228808.htm

It also seems that you can't tell the difference betwen Russia and China- an Anglo-Japanese defensive alliance isn't aimed at China, or even meant to be a spur for Japan to invade or aggrandize itself at the expense of Chinese territory.

Should Imperial Russia decide (in concert) with France and Germany to force Japan to give up territorial gains I'm not sure what you expect the British to have done- or how this is viewed as being the British setting Japan against China. And again, an Anglo-Japanese alliance doesn't force Japan to go to war against Russia, to remain in Manchuria, or to attack China from Manchuria.

What a bizarre notion.

As for the British 'signing off' on Japanese rights in Shantung- I'm sorry, which American President was it that signed off on them as the price of having Japan in his League of Nations ?

So now, you presumably not only expect Britain to have reneged on treaty obligations with Japan, you want it to turf the Japanese out of former German colonies which Japan had conquered, and come into conflict with America.

Even more bizarre.

Even at the time of this allegedly 'nefarious' Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Japanese were simultaneously seeking an agreement with Russia. What did the Japanese get out of the Anglo-Japanese treaty ?

A recognition of what was already a fact, and had been since the Treaty of Shimonoseki- that they had supplanted the Chinese in Korea (that strategic Chinese vassal state, third on the list of Japanese conquests at China's expense) .

Wow. Oh, and also that France would be kept neutral if (as seemed highly unlikely even to the Japanese) there was to be war with Russia.

No anti-Chinese provisions, I notice.

C for effort.

[Ben Kenobi]

Ah, please forgive me then DarkCloud, it's not often I repeat another's argument, because rarely do I agree with someone else here.

[Drake Tungsten]

It was obvious you couldn't tell how the conflict over the Ryukyuan sailors had indicated a change in Japan's attitude towards China- previously they had been content to use the islands as means of conducting trade with China and acquiring information on China.

The conflict over the Ryukyuan sailors had little to do with a change in Japan's attitude towards China and almost everything to do with internal political changes in Japan. I guess I'll have to explain it to you.

During the Tokugawa period, trade between Japan and other nations, China included, was severely restricted. In such an environment, it was useful for the Satsuma-han to maintain the fiction that the recently conquered Ryukyu kingdom was still an independent state. Doing so and maintaining the tributary relationship the Ryukyus had with China would open up to Satsuma an extremely valuable source of illicit trade with China, made even more valuable by the fact that the rest of Japan was restricted from trading with China for the most part.

Fast forward to 1868. The Satsuma-han, along with their allies in Choshu, have just overthrown the Tokugawa bakufu. With it falls the trade restrictions that had made the Ryukyu charade valuable in the first place. The leaders of Satsuma, Okubo Toshimichi and Saigo Takamori in particular, now play a predominant role in the newly created Meiji government.

Divisions appear, however. Saigo and his conservative allies dislike the fate of the samurai in this new world. They've lost their preeminent position in society, being replaced by a Western-style bureaucracy and conscript army. Many are unemployed and unable to compete with members of other, previously lesser segments of society who rise quickly to replace them in the new system. The samurai are in danger of dying out.

So, Saigo and other conservatives plan an attack on Korea. They plan it as a way to provide employment for the samurai, a chance for them to regain their place in society and to preserve their military heritage. They wait until Okubu and Kido Koin (the other great reformist leader, from Choshu) leave the country in 1873 to make the decision for war. The reformers return to Japan in time to avert the attack on Korea, however, and the decision to avoid war splits the government. Saigo and Tosa samurai Itagaki Taisuke both resign from the government. These heroes of the Meiji Restoration go on to provide leadership for the opposition to the new system from those disaffected by it. This opposition would eventually explode into the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, the last stand of the samurai, led by Saigo and a severe test for the young Meiji government.

It is in this political climate that the Taiwan Expedition happened. The reformists had come out of the 1873 Crisis as the victors, but they still had formidable conservative opponents to reckon with. In an attempt to mollify the elements in Japanese politics who had wanted an attack on Korea, they authorize an expedition to Taiwan. They choose Taiwan because it is a smaller and less dangerous undertaking than an expedition to Korea. It also runs little risk of angering the Western powers, which the still unmodernized Japan can ill afford. The reformists hope to institute a policy of reform at home and peace abroad and would not engage in any military action that would jeopardize this.

So, a small expedition is sent to Taiwan. It achieves its stated goal of punishing the aborigines who killed the Ryukyuan sailors. It fails, however, in an additional goal of setting up small colonies on the eastern coast of Taiwan and fails even greater in its true goal of placating disaffected samurai elements in Japanese society. It also leads to the recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyus, acknowledging the de facto state of affairs and ending a charade that had not been of use to Satsuma since the end of the Tokugawa.

In short, the Taiwan Expedition was not a sign of reversal of fortunes between Japan and China. That would only happen in 1895, after 20 years of intense modernization in Japan. It was also not an indicator of a suddenly changed attitudes toward China within Japan itself. That would also wait until later, when Japan became an equal of the Western powers and gained the ability to join in the imperialistic divvying up of East Asia's formerly predominant power.

No, the Taiwan Expedition was not particularly important at all, which is why its almost forgotten. It was a half-hearted and ultimately doomed attempt by leaders bent on modernization to appease their conservative opposition, no more, no less. It and the Satsuma Rebellion were the last gasps of the samurai and should be viewed as such, throwbacks to a disappearing age, not the first steps on the path to Japan's modern future.

Anyway, I hope that explanation was sufficient.

[Drake Tungsten]

Japan's role in 'protecting' British interests in the East Asia was minimal

Really?

How did the Imperial Japanese Navy cooperate with the Royal Navy during the First World War? Although the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 did not require it, Japan declared it would support Britain in the war against Germany and sent an ultimatum to Berlin demanding withdrawal of German warships from Japanese and Chinese waters. Japan helped establish control of the Pacific and Indian Oceans early in the war by seizing the German fortress and naval base of Tsingtao and Germany’s colonies in the Pacific (the Carolines, Marshalls, and most of the Mariana islands); Japanese naval forces also aided Great Britain in driving German warships from the Pacific. At the outbreak of the war, Vice Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee commanded six cruisers of the German Far Eastern Squadron at Ponape in the Carolines; the Japanese declaration of war compelled him to lead most of his force east to South America and the battles of Coronel and the Falklands. The Japanese navy maintained allied control of Far Eastern and Indian waters throughout the war, assuming responsibility for patrolling them when demands on British naval forces exceeded resources, and in 1917 freeing American naval forces for service in Europe. Japanese forces provided escorts for convoying troops and war materials to the European theater of operations from the British dominions in the Far East. Japan built warships for allied nations and sold merchant shipping to the allies during the war when their shipyards, already working at maximum effort, could not meet such needs. Finally, Japan rendered direct naval assistance in the Mediterranean Sea in 1917 and 1918 when the allied navies faced the prospect of abandoning that sea in the face of the Central Powers’ increasingly successful submarine operations.

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2000/winter/art3-w00.htm

As I've stated before, it didn't require Japan's aid to capture German colonies in New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomons or the Bismarck Archipelago.

Of course, Japan's entry into the war and Graf Spee's subsequent decision to abandon the Pacific had absolutely nothing to do with that.

After Perry's fleet visits and Japan begins to modernize, the relationship with China changes- Japan asserts that the Ryukyuan Islanders killed in Taiwan are Japanese citizens and demands compensation from China.

See above. Satsuma controls the government now and there's no reason to keep up the charade any more.

See, the Chinese still believed that they were the ones to whom the Ryukyuans owed tribute- despite the Japanese presence in the islands.

Note the year. 1866 is two years before the Tokugawa fell. How many tribute missions did the Ryukyuans send after Satsuma came to power?

Looks like even the Japanese were confused at times.

Of course the Tokugawa bakufu (which is who Perry negotiated with) were confused. Satsuma had been misleading them to the true state of affairs in the Ryukyus for centuries.

Then in 1874 the Japanese are finally bold enough to invade Formosa/Taiwan- why not rely on diplomacy?

The Japanese government wanted a fight; it was needed to mollify the conservative samurai. The killing of the Ryukyuan sailors was just a useful pretext.

Although, in defiance of British and American pressure, Japan deployed troops to Taiwan and took punitive action against the Aborigines involved in the Mutan Village Incident, and although the Ch'ing government deployed 10,000 troops to Taiwan to counter them, there occurred no direct conflict between Ch'ing and Japanese troops.

Wow, so Japanese and Qing forces never even fought each other. Truly an important event Japanese/Chinese relations.

Given these circumstances, Japan had of course broken the dominion relationship between the Ryukyus and Ch'ing Dynasty China, giving a major impetus to Japan's policy of merger with the Ryukyus.

I don't agree with that interpretation. The overthrow of the Tokugawa and its replacement by a regime led by Choshu and Satsuma, the de facto rulers of the Ryukyus, was the true impetus for the absorption of the Ryukyus into the Japanese state. The ending of the sham Ryukyuan monarchy and the breaking of the tributary relationship with China were just results of this change.

It also seems that you can't tell the difference betwen Russia and China- an Anglo-Japanese defensive alliance isn't aimed at China, or even meant to be a spur for Japan to invade or aggrandize itself at the expense of Chinese territory.

Didn't you argue that the Triple Intervention helped protect China from Japan, as it denied the strategic Liaodong Peninsula to Japan? If so, how can you argue that the Anglo-Japanese alliance that allowed Japan to go to war with Russia and achieve supremacy in strategically important Korea and Manchuria didn't hurt China or act as a spur for further Japanese aggression on the mainland? Japan got the foothold in mainland Asia and China denied to it by the Triple Intervention in 1895 thanks to the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Russo-Japanese war.

Originally posted by molly bloom
The Chinese regarded Korea as their most strategically placed vassal state

As well they should have. The threat to China from Japan was much greater once the Japanese beat the Russians and took Korea. Even if Britain didn't mean to, their alliance with Japan definitely hurt China. I believe they just didn't care.

And again, an Anglo-Japanese alliance doesn't force Japan to go to war against Russia, to remain in Manchuria, or to attack China from Manchuria.

No, but it certainly made all that possible. And I find it amusing that you think the British so naive that they didn't know that their alliance with Japan would allow for war between Japan and the Russians. One wonders how the British in your world came to be the most powerful nation on Earth. Dumb luck?

As for the British 'signing off' on Japanese rights in Shantung- I'm sorry, which American President was it that signed off on them as the price of having Japan in his League of Nations ?

So what? What does Wilson's actions have to do with those of the British? I doubt Lloyd George considered the fate of the League of Nations much when affirming his Japanese ally's rights in China.

So now, you presumably not only expect Britain to have reneged on treaty obligations with Japan, you want it to turf the Japanese out of former German colonies which Japan had conquered, and come into conflict with America.

Why would I expect that? The British were perfectly comfortable aiding the Japanese and using them when they were needed. It's only proper that they would recognize the rights of their valuable ally in China. They didn't know what was coming, even if they were partly responsible for it.

What did the Japanese get out of the Anglo-Japanese treaty ?

A recognition of what was already a fact, and had been since the Treaty of Shimonoseki- that they had supplanted the Chinese in Korea

Wait, so the Anglo-Japanese treaty's recognition of the de facto state of affairs in Korea was no big deal, but the recognition of the de facto state of affairs in the Ryukyus in 1874 was some groundbreaking change in Sino-Japanese relations?

No anti-Chinese provisions, I notice.

No. The Chinese were just indirect victims of Britain's attempt to counter the Russians with the Japanese.

[molly bloom]

Originally posted by Drake Tungsten

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2000/winter/art3-w00.htm

[

I'm unable to ascertain if you're using that site to defeat Ned's argument for the British being responsible for setting the Japanese against China.

Grey opposed any Japanese participation in the war, fearing that Japan would see an opportunity to expand beyond reasonable bounds

No such reservoir of good will existed between Japan and Great Britain; preexisting tension concerning Japan’s imperial ambitions tested relations throughout the First World War

Japan participated in the war as an ally of Great Britain while simultaneously pursuing an expansionist policy designed to maximize its territorial gains in China and the Pacific islands.

The Japanese clearly entered the war in large part to increase their prestige among the great powers and to expand their holdings in China and the Pacific.

Anything's possible, I suppose.

[Drake Tungsten]

Grey opposed any Japanese participation in the war, fearing that Japan would see an opportunity to expand beyond reasonable bounds

This might be interesting if I hadn't already outlined the tension between Churchill and the Admirality, who enthusiastically sought Japanese participation in the war, and Grey in this very thread. The essay also clearly shows which side won that argument. Here's a hint; it wasn't Grey...

No such reservoir of good will existed between Japan and Great Britain; preexisting tension concerning Japan's imperial ambitions tested relations throughout the First World War

As for this, the tensions must not have been that great, given that Great Britain approved the expansion of Japan's empire after the war. You also neglect to mention the parts of the essay that deal with Japan's exemplary service in the British interest and the goodwill it garnered them. Went a long way towards defusing any pre-existing tensions.

Japan participated in the war as an ally of Great Britain while simultaneously pursuing an expansionist policy designed to maximize its territorial gains in China and the Pacific islands.

The Japanese clearly entered the war in large part to increase their prestige among the great powers and to expand their holdings in China and the Pacific.

Wait, are you saying that a country involved itself in WWI for less than altruistic reasons?! Dear god, that is positively shocking!

Anyway, off to bed...

[Ned]

Agathon is correct, IMHO. Defining one's position as resisting fast change is ridiculous as it put conservatives in France and conservatives in Saudi Arabia in the same camp, although they would have nothing in common whatsoever.

Once upon a time, perhaps 150 years ago, Liberalism was a movement that stood for increasing democracy, liberty and human rights. Changes in those directions were good. But now, those values are the values of the so-called American conservatives while the values of the so-called liberals are for radical change to increased government control over everyone's lives in the name of equality of outcomes, not equal opportunity ---> socialism.

Since conservatism and liberalism are location and time dependent, it tells you nothing at all about what whether a person favors more or less democracy, more or less economic freedom, and more or less government control over personal conduct.

[Odin]

Originally posted by Ned

Once upon a time, perhaps 150 years ago, Liberalism was a movement that stood for increasing democracy, liberty and human rights. Changes in those directions were good. But now, those values are the values of the so-called American conservatives while the values of the so-called liberals are for radical change to increased government control over everyone's lives in the name of equality of outcomes, not equal opportunity ---> socialism.

The Dems are Socialist? God, you're dense Welfare Statism is not equality of outcome; it is setting a lower limit on the outcome so people aren't starving on the street, not making all outcomes the same. And it is the Republicans who want to control people's lives by enforcing fundy christian morality on everybody.

[Ned]

Odin, there is a difference between providing a social safety net and being against the rich, being against the family, being against corporations and free trade. To the extent that Dems favor a social safety net, they share common ground with Republicans. But that is where the sharing of values stops.