The democratic revolution marches on...

[Spiffor]

Originally posted by DanS
That's a whole lot of circular argumentation, Spiffor. He used the mob to force new, reasonably fair elections, and to replace fixed elections. The only thing you got on him is #3, about which I would need more info.

There is no conducive evidence that the election was any fairer the second time than the first one. It is very easy to circumvent the international observers' attention once you know their modus operandi.
All the "evidence" we have is western organisations congratulating Ukraine for having elected the West's *****. I'm not inclined to believe them any more than Russian organisations.

#4 is especially important. After his victory, Yushchenko had the choice between trying to re-unite a country that was deeply divided, or to install his caste in power. He installed Timochenko, who is widely loathed in the East for her role in the orange revolution, and generally disliked for the massive gobs of money she made during the abusive privatizations.

There is one good news that came form Ukraine during the scandal. It's not the election of Yushchenko (not that Yanukovych would have been any better mind you). It's the fact that the Parliament will now have more power than before. Maybe the power will stop of being held by a position who has all the opportunities to become corrupt and self-serving.

[PLATO]

Originally posted by Dissident


as long as it's voluntary as I said in my first post.

Iraq did not volunteer to be a democracy.

I disagree. I believe that the Kurdish rebellions of the 80's and the ****e rebellion of the early 90's were screams for freedom. Just because they needed outside help doesn't make in involuntary.

[Dinner]

Even if, for the sack of argument, I accept those changes (though the government continues to claim opporation enduring freedom is the same for Iraq and Afghanistan plus will not account for them seporately) We will still be far, far above your $50 billion figure. Closer to the $100 billion dollar figure.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Elok


Can anyone say, "either-or fallacy?" The French didn't vote to put the King back on the throne after their Revolution; they just let a different tyrant named Bonaparte take over. And it's been a little over a decade since the Cold War "deposed" the USSR. Putin's a lot better than the commies, right?

Uh, yes he is. If we had gone straight from Andropov to Putin, no messsianic hopes around Gorbie and Yeltsin, we'd see him as an important reformer.

[Spiffor]

Plato:

True.

But I think the policies to support democracy in Iraq will end up being more or less similar to the policies regarding other countries.

Now, the war has removed a very brutal dictator, which is pretty good (and which is the one achievement the pro-war people can be really proud of). However, I don't think that war was either necessary nor sufficient to make Iraq democratic in the long run. It rushed the headstart, which saved probably many people from torture. But that's the most important difference it made, IMHO.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Spiffor

I am implying that the Iraqis will probably be very comfortable with a system of the tyranny of the majority, as long as they're in the majority. I'm also implying that the Iraqi institutions are very weak so far, and should there not be US pressure, it's very likely that some guy in power decides to keep it to himself.

Democracy requires a political culture where the power lies in institutions rather than individuals. This culture doesn't come in one day. It will require continuous pressure for some time (and continuous support of the democratic opposition -whatever it is) to have this idea being passed on.

If anything, the fate of most African "democracies" show that a young democracy requires constant attention to become sustainable.

Iraq had some experience of a relatively lawful society under the old monarchy, pre-1959. The Kurds had a more or less liberal society from 1991 on. And the entire wolrd system is more supportive of democracy than in the 1960's when the African states became independent. And the horror of totalitarianism acts as something of an inoculating factor.

I really have more confidence in the Iraqi transition.

[DanS]

Here's a good discussion of the real costs. I think the costs are closer to $50 billion than even $100 billion. I think you would concede that your $150 billion figure isn't realistic, even though you haven't admitted it explicitly yet.

http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=asC2oZAGbhZE&refer=home

A lot of the costs included in the common dreams are christmas tree ornaments. I don't like these either, but they aren't strictly related to Iraq.

[lord of the mark]

Egypt - a small step, but an important one. At least the direction is right.

KSA - ditto. a small step, but in the right direction. Islamists won? Would help if the Saudis would legalize political parties. In any case whose afraid of the big bad Islamists?(those not associated with terror, that is)

Lebanon - this is looking big. But its very early

Palestine - Id be the last to say that the death of the terrorist Jew-killing bastard wasnt important. Im NOT sure thats all that mattered, though.

How much Iraq effect? No one knows. And probably never will. Its not like we can rerun history and vary one factor. Its probably a number of things - fear of AQ (IE the local elites got the same idea as the neocons) direct pressure (US policy, but not Iraq) some Iraq as showing US power, and some Iraq as model and contagion. But i cant prove the last. I would point out that IF the mideast were breaking out in an antiUS revolutions, if terror acts were happening right and left, it would be attributed to the Iraq war by many. Including perhaps some who are sure that Iraq has had no impact on spreading democracy.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Spiffor

I am implying that the Iraqis will probably be very comfortable with a system of the tyranny of the majority, as long as they're in the majority.

as would many people, even in very established democracies. Part of whats necessary is realizing you wont always be in a majority, and realizing that the crosscutting groups in society mean shifting coalitions. The Iraqis already seem fairly far along on this.

[GePap]

There have been no democratic revolutions to speak off in the last 5 years. There have been events that might lead to more democratization, but that is a different thing.

I think this is an interesting moment, and we should compare what is going on today to what went on from 1990 to 1995. That was another huge wave of democratization, actually one which was far more dramatic and revolutionary than this one, which swept from Asia to Latin America.

If we look back at those times 10 years ago, and then look to today, we see that democracy has been a mixed bag- in some places it has backtracked, in others it remains teneous, and even where it is clear military takeovers are not going to happen any time soon support for democracy is not particulalrly high, since democratic regimes have not been able to change conditions dramatically.


As for the inevitable Bush comment- There are to aspects of the Bush policy in Iraq:

1. The theoretical notion of trying to create a democratic experiement.
2. The actual handling of the experiment.

The Bush admin. can be given good notes for #1.

It has failed utterly and completely in #2, and it is a shame they continue to make such an utter mess of it.
Lets not forget, the Jan. Elections were Al Sistani's eelctions, NOT Bush's. Thought no admin. has given a better name to flip flopping than this one, cause most worhtwhile activites and actions by the administration have been flops from previous stands.

[DanS]

He installed Timochenko, who is widely loathed in the East for her role in the orange revolution, and generally disliked for the massive gobs of money she made during the abusive privatizations.

It seems you labor under the misimpression that the orange revolution was undemocratic. I don't know how you can believe this.

I think this is an interesting moment, and we should compare what is going on today to what went on from 1990 to 1995. That was another huge wave of democratization, actually one which was far more dramatic and revolutionary than this one, which swept from Asia to Latin America.

I view what is happening now as part of the post-Soviet revolutions.

As for backtracking, I agree that it's a mixed bag.

As for Sistani and Bush, I don't know why you want to make it Sistani v. Bush.

[Spiffor]

Originally posted by lord of the mark
Iraq had some experience of a relatively lawful society under the old monarchy, pre-1959. The Kurds had a more or less liberal society from 1991 on.

That's indeed an argument. But should it be true that half the Sunnis support the rebellion on the grounds that they want their priviledges back, I think there is still much to do for an Iraqi democracy to be stable. So far, it's a minority that is violent, and that uses paramilitary means. In the future, it may be the majority that becomes abusive, and backs this abuse with violence. Only that the violence will be made by lawful forces.

And the entire wolrd system is more supportive of democracy than in the 1960's when the African states became independent.

Actually, the democratic wave in Africa happened in the early 1990's, when the fall of the USSR allowed to loosen the political control over them. The democratic wave in Africa happened in an international environment failry similar to today's. While a few democratic transitions seem to have succeeded (Mali), many hopes have been destroyed, because the elected leaders only cared for their ethnical groups, because the resources of the country were plundered by whomever group was in power, and because the linkage between politics and money made it so that, if you wanted to be rich, you had to be in power. That's the main reason why almost all countries with rich natural resources became ripe with guerillas, which were no less self-serving than the loyalists.

If anything, the disappointing African experience tells us that a stable democracy requires constant support, if it doesn't wish to crumble. A similar lesson can be drawn from former Soviet Republics. This lesson better be not forgotten during the democratization of the ME.

[The Andy-Man]

I don't think any country ever became a democracy over night, they all had some slow development towards it, or the reveloution didn't change much very quickly.

[GePap]

Right in what, exactly?

Were they right about how hard it would be, how much it would, cost, or the dangers involved?

Absoluetely positively not, they were utterly wrong.

Were they right that a "spark" of democracy would be started?

As Friedman in the NYTimes says, this is something that can go up or down- we are years ahead from a real resolution.

On a case by case basis:

Lebanon: The opposition has made full use of the murder of the ex PM to try to push Syria out- it will be interesting to see what investigators come up with, because if Syria is no implicated, it will make everything a lot harder.
The question is just how much support Syria has in Lebanon- protests can be impressive, BUT lets not forget Venezuela- the opposition got 100,000s in the streets and yet, Chavez won. Just 25,000 on the streets might not be enough. The thing is that Syria is facing pressure on a lot of sides, so maybe they will decide to pull oput faster.
What that will actually mean for Lebanon, who knows.

Palestine: The death of Arafat is obviously the catalyst for change within the PA- its obvious from what went on with the cabinet vote that many Pal. PM's themselves were sick of the Arafat cronies. This I think is the most hopeful since Abbas seems genuine in trying to end the violence as best he can. The next few months and the pull- out from Gaza will tell.

Egypt: wonderful cosmetic change- its nice, as aI said in another thread, to give the choice. That said, the state of emergency is not lifted, meida control is not lifted, so how much of a real choice is it? People are complaining about Putin and "his rollback", but even under the current MKubarak changes Russia would be a dmeocratic wonderland compared to Egypt. More for public consumption than real change.

KSA: another wonderful mainly comestic change- when the monarchy decides to give up absolute rule, call me.

Iraq: The Sistani elections went well, but now the REAL questions come up- first, the role of Islam in the state: I would give better than 50-50 that Iraq is declared, like Afghanistan, an islamic republic. The issue of Federalism, and the degeree of autonomy given to region, particualrly the Kurds, might very well be the great stumbbling block- and while the Iraqi army and police remain weak, all the political parties with militias have kept them, and the Kurds have 100,000 peshmerga to back their demands. It will be the vital question to see if Iraq survives as a strong central state, if it becomes a weak federal state with strong autonomous provinces, or if it collapses into civil war.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Spiffor

That's indeed an argument. But should it be true that half the Sunnis support the rebellion on the grounds that they want their priviledges back, I think there is still much to do for an Iraqi democracy to be stable. So far, it's a minority that is violent, and that uses paramilitary means. In the future, it may be the majority that becomes abusive, and backs this abuse with violence. Only that the violence will be made by lawful forces.

And the entire wolrd system is more supportive of democracy than in the 1960's when the African states became independent.

Actually, the democratic wave in Africa happened in the early 1990's, when the fall of the USSR allowed to loosen the political control over them. The democratic wave in Africa happened in an international environment failry similar to today's. While a few democratic transitions seem to have succeeded (Mali), many hopes have been destroyed, because the elected leaders only cared for their ethnical groups, because the resources of the country were plundered by whomever group was in power, and because the linkage between politics and money made it so that, if you wanted to be rich, you had to be in power. That's the main reason why almost all countries with rich natural resources became ripe with guerillas, which were no less self-serving than the loyalists.

If anything, the disappointing African experience tells us that a stable democracy requires constant support, if it doesn't wish to crumble. A similar lesson can be drawn from former Soviet Republics. This lesson better be not forgotten during the democratization of the ME.

Well south Africa is still a democracy, as is Namibia. Im not as up on Mozambique as I should be. Zimbabwe and Zambia never really made the transition. My sense from southern africa is that democracy IS contagious, without much external pressure, but slowly. west africa has had mixed experiences - ghana and nigeria have done much better than cote d'ivoire, and Uganda was a case study in a liberal but not demo system, which has survived. But im not sure using the 90s as base makes sense - they had post independence experiences that established local political cultures and institutions - Iraq emerging from totalitarianism has more of a tabula rasa than most african states post 1990. It also has higher levels of literacy, urbanization, and more linguistic unity.