German atrocities in WWII, systematic or just like everyone else?

[Ned]

Originally posted by Dr Strangelove


Well, it would hardly have been appropriate for the Luftwaffe to have targeted German civilians now would it?

If you meant that the British instituted bombing of German cities before the Germans commenced bombing of Allied cities, then I'd like to know which German citiy was bombed before Warsaw, Danzig, Posnan or Cracow? These raids were carried out in September of 1939, and they were terror bombings as civilian areas were deliberately targetted. I don't believe that the RAF was in position to bomb Germany until the Polish campaign was well over. The Germans began bombing civilain populations as soon as the western campaign began also. They made no apology about their tactics. They intentionally bombed cities to the rear of the lines of fighting in order to spread confusion and hamper the enemy's ability to move troops towards the front and also to demoralize populations. This bombing of civilians was a part of their military doctrine, and they did it everywhere their armies went, Poland, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, the Balkans, Great Britain, Russia, and North Africa. Please do remember that Poland, France, Holland and Belgium were Allies of Great Britain, and therefore Great Britain was justified in treating attacks upon its allies as attacks upon itself. Therefore, when germany began bombing Poland it opened itself to reprisals in kind.

Point made.

However, Hitler apparently treated the Brits differently at first -- probably because he knew they could retaliate in kind. His forebearance was a form of MAD at work even then.

But, as history shows, the switch in tactics of the Luftwaffe from bombing the RAF to bombing London and other cities may have cost Germany the war. (Although, this was just the first of many costly blunders by Hitler.)

[Mr. Harley]

Ned, if my memory serves me correctly, the halt of strategic bombing operations against Japan during that time may have been due to engine fires. It seems the B29 was rushed into production (compare it to everyone else's bombers, and it is a full generation ahead, at least) and the engine, which was ciritical, had some really serious teething problems. The rear row of pistons ran too hot a had a marked tendency to catch on fire.

The extended range, lack of radar coverage (to see where you crashed) and the large open water expanses covered, combined with the mechanical problems combined to cause the US to lose not only more bomers, but also the crews, due to mechanical failure than to Japanese fighters. With the invasion of Okinawa in the final planning stages, it all came together to produce the temporary halt.

There was a serious shortage of incendiary production, especially magnesium based (one shortage that promted the switch to napalm). Actually it was a system wide slowdown that included replacements for infranty and HE as well, it seems a serious of premature assumptions that not only were we winning, but we could start to convert production off of a wartime footing had been made. The lack of HE almost cost us the Ardennes.

The analysis of German civilian bombing is right on the mark, thank god for Herman Goering (he did more damage to Nazi strategic bomber plans than the entire allied war effort). However, the Nazi's had held off from bombing civilian British targets first of all they were almost as pure as the Nazis (this is documented thinking among those involved in that type of determination, please it's utterly ridiculous and was applied inconistantly and as often as a justification, but it's true), secondly they were hoping for a negotiated peace, and lastly from a purely practical standpoint they knew the Brits had a modern bomber force.

The Nazis didn't realize that what the RAF actually had was much worse than they thought, but they also didn't realize that the Lancaster coming into production was quite so good, so it balances out. The Nazis never had the proper tools to engage in effective strategic bombing, but their record shows that they didn't hestitate to target civilian targets among mud people (just about everyone who wasn't properly Aryan). Coventry was deliberate, but at the same time it was the Brits that started that *** for tat, and the Nazis were retaliating. The British anti-city campaign from the very first was much more effective than the Nazi efforts, BeBro is correct in his analysis of what the Nazis had available.

The Luftwaffe had been conceived from the start as a tactical air force, and did fairly well initially, and probably would have continued to do well if Goering and Udet hadn't f****d up, depending on how your figure it, between two to five years of technological development. Liddel-Hart had been instrumental in the development of the bomber strategy of the RAF, which included the deliberate destruction of industrial and CIVILIAN centers. As a result the Brits had the best nighttime area bombing platforms of the war until the B29 came along and was modified slightly. The Brits started it between those two sides, and continued to escalate. It was also what their bomber force had been designed around.

As Molly has helped document, the US went the route of precision daytime bombing, which frankly failed with one important exception, oil production. The problem is that the US bomber commander who pushed going after petrol in Europe kept getting overruled, and it wasn't until postwar analysis that it was discovered he was right. So the US borrowed from the Brits, and also had the reason? justification? concerning the Japanese decentralizing production. This time it worked, much better than the British effort. It was also the most horrific air campaign ever embarked on, which is why I will always work in a mention of "Grave of the Fireflies" (Hotaru no Haka), one of the best anti-war movies made, which shows the consequences of the firebombing of Kobe.

[Ned]

Shawn, what you say about the Nazi's not bombing Brit civilians because of their racial purity is interesting because the pattern of Hitler appears to be the pattern of Roosevelt if it is true that Roosevelt did not bomb the Germans civilians but did authorize the intentional targeting of Japanese civilians.

[Mr. Harley]

Ned, you and Molly have a good point. That's why I didn't counter her assertions about US racism towards the Japanese, in fact it was one of the major factors, and the Japanese perception of it, further distorted by Japanese leaders for their nationalistic purposes, that helped contribute to WW2 in the Pacific theatre. I would like to see some of those surveys mentioned earlier, simply because I'm always suspicious of surveys. However, the internment policies in the US towards Japanese-Americans, and what was written to justify them provide prima facia evidence supporting the racism, and that I've studied to a moderate degree.

Even more curious is the fact that much of the initial writings drawn on in Germany that led to the Nazi racial programs came out of the US, and that the Nazis actually based some of their initial laws, for example those on marraige, off of those already extant in the US Southern states (miscegnation statutes). There is a very curious history, but I don't want to steer the thread into another bywater.

[BeBMan]

Originally posted by Ned
So, in truth, Dr. Strangelove, the Brits were the ones who first deliberately targeted German civilians in WWII.

Well, first, the Brits probably didn´t realise the bombs were dropped accidentally, and second, I am not sure if the RAF bombed civilian targets as answer - I simply don´t know it.

However, the Doctor has a point that unfortunately the Luftwaffe has bombed other civilian targets before.....

[Patroklos]

So Serb, you found any books that support your side yet?

I will understand if your trip to the library will take awhile, as what your looking for doesn't exist, and also because you have proven over and over again that you can not read or analyze numbers.

But you take your sweat time, I am very interested in what authors you will try and manipulate.

[Sikander]

Originally posted by molly bloom

Shawnmmcc- the B-29 which only came into full use in 1944 was the first superbomber the U.S.A. had which was capable of hitting Japanese targets from as afar away as Szechuan in China.

The U.S. attacked mainland Japanese targets when it could have attacked oil/petroleum production in the East Indies. It did so for psychological as much as strategical reasons.

Actually, there was no reason to attack the oil fields by the time we were able to do so, and good reasons not to do so. Leaving them intact meant that the Japanese were going to continue to use a lot of their naval and air resources protecting them even as their already devestated and dwindling merchant fleet risked exposure to allied submarine attacks as they tried to move the oil to Japan to be refined. This continued dispersal of enemy resources was a prime factor in the speed with which the Japanese were rolled up from numerous directions piecemeal in the last year of the war. They waited too long and were left to defend statically positions that were thousands of miles apart.

Originally posted by molly bloom

By March 1945, the economic life of Japan had ceased, yet the U.S. carried on bombing Japanese cities. Resolve for bombing civilian targets was clearly not wearing thin in the Pacific- many in the U.S. military felt that targeting Japan's cities was payback for Hong Kong, Manila, Shanghai and Singapore - and Pearl Harbour, of course.

The resolve for 'precision bombing' of military/industrial targets was what had worn thin, on its proving inadequate at hampering Japan's war effort. In 1943, military analysts in the U.S. concluded that mass air attacks on Japanese urban targets using incendiary bombs was the solution- note, no distinction between industrial and 'civilian' targets.

Tests on models in America (at Dugway Proving ground, in Utah) had shown that bombing Japan's cities in which industrial areas and flimsy wooden civilian housing were sited cheek by jowl, would prove effective only if incendiaries were used in order to consume all in a general conflagration.

How does one target an industrial heartland without killing civilians? It is after all civilians who work in manufacturing centres, in factories, and mills, and cement works, and docks and loading bays. How do you destroy sixteen square miles of Tokyo without killing civilians?

Some of this was just bureacratic inertia, and a some of the criticism of it was motivated in part by turf battles between the various services. Sure people hated the Japanese, some of them to a murderous extent. But most just wanted to end the war quickly and the best way they knew how to go about that was to keep up relentless pressure.

The strategic bombing campaign in Germany in hindsight was a failure, but even it managed to force the Germans (well, ok Goering) to send up the last of their fighter force against the better judgement of the Luftwaffe in early 1944, which made allied worries about maintaining air superiority over France in the early stages of Overlord evaporate with the last gasp of the Luftwaffe. The bombing of Japan in 1945 (with the exception of the atomic bombs) certainly caused the Japanese to react and divert resources to deal with the problem that would have been used for other purposes. But the Japanese were in no position to do much of anything by 1945 but bleed and starve, a situation that was coming into focus for the allies faster than the resolve of the political elite in Japan was melting. So on the one hand I agree that it was unnecessary to bomb Japan in 1945 in order to defeat the Japanese armed forces, I don't consider it simply an act of vengeance. A lot of people honestly felt it necessary, some wildly advocated it, and some (often senior officers from other services) criticized it from fairly early on.

I find myself (for quite some time now) opposed to the strategic bombing campaigns of WW2, and perhaps incongruently in favor of the atomic bombings within the context of the decision to use strategic bombing with little to no regard for civilian casualties. The atom bombs ended the war at the fraction of the human costs thus far associated with the conventional strategic bombing campaign. I won't argue with success in this instance.

[Alexander's Horse]

Originally posted by Sikander


The strategic bombing campaign in Germany in hindsight was a failure,

In terms of its stated objectives perhaps but it was very effective in other ways - like bringing the war home to Germany and tying down the Luftwaffe.

[molly bloom]

Originally posted by Ned
So, in truth, Dr. Strangelove, the Brits were the ones who first deliberately targeted German civilians in WWII.

Also, Roosevelt repeatedly called for each side to not target civilians. It is hard to imagine Roosevelt authorizing deliberate attacks on civilians. Even though we participated in the raids on Hamburg, Cologne and Dresden, our targets were infrastructure, not people.

This is why I find what happened in Japan to be puzzle as it is inconsistent with Roosevelt's policy. I note that there was a bombing halt after the first few raids. Then Roosevelt dies. Then the attacks resume.

This suggests to me that LeMay's initial firebombing attacks were not authorized at the highest levels.

You know, Ned, your willingness to paint the British people as mass killers is beginning to grate.
You seem over-eager to snatch at any piece of isolated information which helps bolster your futile argument of presenting the American forces in World War II as Percy Pure Hearts who wouldn’t dream of killing ‘innocent’ civilians.

We’re not talking about U.S.A.A.F. crew members walking up to individual women and children and men and killing them point-blank with pistols- they dropped bombs and incendiaries from thousands of feet high, without any certainty as to where those bombs would fall.

You ignore the American bombing raid on Dresden after the initial firestorm, and claim without any evidence that somehow it was a ‘precise, daylight raid’ focusing on non-civilian targets. I’m intrigued as to how precise you think anyone could be from thousands of feet up with smoke and ash and human fat laden soot suspended in the air, dropping yet more incendiaries and bombs on a blackened target.

The incendiary device used by the Americans in Europe and the Pacific theatres of war was an ingenious device, designed, tested and constructed in America- the M-69.

It was a six pound projectile, filled with a slow-burning adhesive form of petroleum called napalm. When set alight, this projectile’s contents had the singular advantage of spraying in all directions, thanks to a useful mechanism within, which on impact would trigger the scattering of the napalm. The napalm also had the helpful attribute of adhering to human flesh and wood, and flowing like a liquid.

How precise do you imagine it would be, in missing non-civilian targets?

At the beginning of 1944, the only land that could be used to launch B-29 attacks against Japan was in mainland China. At this time, well before the economic life of Japan had ceased, well before its shipping losses had dropped below the hundreds of thousands of tonnage, General George C. Kenney urged U.S. air force high command to launch attacks against oil refineries and oil fields and petroleum production facilities in the East Indies- a non-civilian target.

Instead, the decision was taken to begin attacks on Japanese cities in the home islands, on Japanese occupied ports in mainland China- full of those wooden buildings that burn so well with the application of napalm.

In April 1944 (note that date Ned, before the bombing of Dresden) the Joint Chiefs agreed to the MATTERHORN plan for sustained intensive bombing of Japanese cities (those wooden cities so easily destroyed by napalm) by waves of B-29 bombers based in Szechuan province, in Chengtu.

The plan was to attack on not just the productive front, but in deference to Chiang Kai Shek’s wishes AND that of American strategists, to deal a blow at the Japanese national ‘psyche’- through the killing of civilians and the destruction of civilian areas.

When Curtis LeMay took command of the bomber squadrons, he instituted practice missions against poorly defended targets to improve the accuracy of radar bombing. The first mass incendiary attack against a Japanese target was the raid on Hankow in China in December 1944 (note, two months prior to the bombing of Dresden).

When the first wave of bombers dropped their payload, the smoke from incendiary lit fires obscured the city, so that 60% of the bombs did not drop on target. Many of these fell on Chinese civilians.

38% of the incendiaries dropped destroyed perhaps half of the target area. So much for your daylight precision bombing.

I suggest you read ‘Eagle Against the Sun: the American War with Japan’ by Ronald H. Spector and ‘The Undefeated: the Rise, Fall and Rise of Greater Japan’, by Robert Harvey.

You might just learn something.

Your notion that it was the Allies or indeed Great Britain that began unrestricted bombing of civilian targets before the Germans is offensive- it negates the experience of those who died at Guernica, Warsaw and Rotterdam. The Poles were an Allied power, in case you had forgotten. The Dutch were neutral. And if you thought mass bomber raids against British cities could somehow strike only industrial or military targets at night, you're living in dreamland- killing civilians was part of the process.

Oh, and here’s a nice bit of irony to counter your Roosevelt quote (undated I see):

‘[I condemn]....the large number of instances....’ [in which the Japanese had resorted to aerial slaughter] ‘at places near which there were no military establishments or organizations’

‘[I denounce] ....the use of incendiary bombs which inevitably and ruthlessly jeopardize non-military persons and property’

That was U.S. Secretary of State Hull.

from ‘B-29: The Superfortress’ by Carl Berger

This was in response to Japanese raids on China- before Pearl Harbour. In 1940, Americans were scheming to enable China to hit back at Japanese cities by the transfer of heavy bombers to the Nationalists- as mentioned by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau to Ambassador T.V. Soong in DECEMBER 1940.

As Morgenthau put in his diary:

‘Soong is convinced that (bombing Tokyo and other cities) would have a very decided effect on the Japanese population’.

Yeah, like over 83 000 dead in a firestorm, that kind of ‘very decided effect’.

[Tingkai]

Originally posted by Patroklos
So Serb, you found any books that support your side yet?

I will understand if your trip to the library will take awhile, as what your looking for doesn't exist, and also because you have proven over and over again that you can not read or analyze numbers.

But you take your sweat time, I am very interested in what authors you will try and manipulate.

Talk about a hypocrite.

We're still waiting for you to provide evidence of your repeated wild claims. You're been asked several times to back up your claim that the SS were "sometime chivalrous" and the incredibly ridiculous claim that "British colonial troops had the WORST record in killing".

All you have done is provide a bibliography of one website and two books. The website contains no facts to back up your lies. One of the book, Beevor's Berlin, which you say you have yet to finish, shows atrocities committed by both sides, but certainly no evidence of SS chivalry. The third book was written by SS vet. Enough said.

So how about you take care of your own business before you start attacking others.

[molly bloom]

Let's explode Ned's 'precision bombing' bubble:

Strategic bombing:

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

'After the fall of Europe came the Battle of Britain. The major part of the battle (up until about September 1940) was almost entirely tactical: the Luftwaffe aimed to prepare the way for an invasion by ground troops (or else destroy the ability of the RAF to resist and perhaps bring about a negotiated peace on favourable terms). Not realizing how close they had already come to success, the Germans switched away from attacking airfields and strictly military targets to simply bombing cities, in particular London. Many other British cities were hit, including Liverpool, Bristol, Belfast, Cardiff, and Coventry. The ostensible aim was strategic - to destroy ports and industrial installations - but there is no room to doubt that destroying the will of ordinary people to fight was a major factor too, perhaps the major factor.

Gradually, in the face of heavy losses to fighters, anti-aircraft guns, and accidents, the Luftwaffe resorted to night bombing. Targeting had been a problem in daylight; by night it was much more so, and British civilian casualties were heavy. The expected collapse in civilian morale, however, did not eventuate.
Despite causing a great deal of damage and sorely trying the civilian population, the defenses gradually became more formidable, and the need to divert as many squadrons as possible to the Eastern Front saw the Blitz gradually fade away into mere nuisance raids.

The British retaliation

Britain retaliated with its own night strategic bombing campaign, which built up from tiny beginnings in 1940 to truly massive strength by the end of the war. The effects of strategic bombing were very poorly understood at the time and grossly overrated. Particularly in the first two years of so of the campaign, few understood just how little damage was caused and how rapidly the Germans were able to replace lost production - despite the obvious lessons to be learned from England’s own survival of the Blitz.
Mid-way through the air war, it slowly began to be realized that the campaign was having very little effect. Despite an ever-increasing tonnage of bombs dispatched, the inaccuracy of delivery was such that any bomb falling within five miles of the target was deemed a “hit” for statistical purposes, and even by this standard, many bombs missed.

These problems were dealt with in two ways: first the precision targeting of vital facilities (oil production in particular) was abandoned in favour of “area bombing” - a euphemism for simply aiming at entire cities in the hope of killing workers, destroying homes, and breaking civilian morale. Secondly, efforts were made to improve accuracy by crew training, electronic aids, and the creation of a “pathfinder” force to mark targets for the main force.

Until fairly late in the war - about 1944 - the effect on German production was remarkably small and nowhere near enough to justify the colossal diversion of scarce Commonwealth resources.

The effect on German allocation of forces, however, gradually became significant: every extra anti-aircraft battery and night fighter squadron was one less to fight Russian forces on the Eastern Front. Mid-way through the war, the United States Army Air Force arrived to begin its own strategic bombing campaign, which was conducted in daylight.

The American heavy bombers carried much smaller payloads than British aircraft (because of the need for defensive armament) but were generally able to deliver them somewhat more accurately. USAAF leaders firmly held to the claim that they were conducting “precision” bombing of military targets for much of the war, and energetically denied claims that they were simply bombing cities.

In reality, the day bombing was “precision bombing” only in the sense that most bombs fell somewhere in or near the desired city, whereas the night bombing campaign rarely achieved even that.

Nevertheless, the sheer tonnage of explosive delivered by day and by night was eventually sufficient to cause widespread damage, and, more importantly from a military point of view, force Germany to divert resources to counter it. This was to be the real significance of the Allied strategic bombing campaign - resource allocation.

The twin campaigns - the US by day, the Commonwealth by night - built up into massive bombing of German industrial areas, notably the Ruhr, followed by attacks directly on cities such as Hamburg and the more often-criticized bombing of Dresden.'

So Ned, stop repeating 'precision bombing' as if it were some kind of mantra to salve your conscience about the notion, that yes, your uncle might just have killed real people in a real war.

[Alexander's Horse]

Originally posted by molly bloom
Nevertheless, the sheer tonnage of explosive delivered by day and by night was eventually sufficient to cause widespread damage, and, more importantly from a military point of view, force Germany to divert resources to counter it. This was to be the real significance of the Allied strategic bombing campaign - resource allocation.

*huff* That's what I said.

Imagine if all those 88mm anti aircraft guns and fighter aircraft and other miliatary resources had been available to support ground troops.

[Patroklos]

And neither of you have produced any books/websites at all.

I wasn't the one that mentioned the SS veterans book, thought there is nothing wrong with it. It is called a primary source. Serious historians, or smart people in general (ie not you I guess), us them. But I guess he is biased because he was in the SS. And US veterans are too. And Soviet veterans are too. And British veterans are too. And Italian veterans are too. And you and Serb. obviously are. But you know you can always point me to your unbiased source? No? Yeah, I didn't think you would.

The WSSOB backs up my truth very well, as does all the books listed on its bibliography. I understand your confusion as literary academia is obviously not your style.

The Feldgrau website is also impeccable from any academic standard you wish to use, though only as far as any website can be.

Finished Beevor's book, which you obviously haven't read if you maintain your ridiculous claims. I feel no need to reproduce any of its text until YOU provide at least one source of your own.

"British colonial troops had the WORST record in killing" stated as an opinion, as was said. And if you missed this while not reading all the posts, well now you know. Though I don't feel at all bad about stating it as so far ALL of what you said has yet to be sourced. Though some other posters here backed it up more than any agreement you have yet to offer.

"Death by Government," you didn't even mention. Hopefully you decided breaking yourself against that rock is no longer in your interest. That book is really all I needed to relegate you to a ranting buffoon, as the main agreement here is the numbers.

So source wise;

Patroklos - 2 books, 2 websites
Serb - His ass
You - Thin air

Hipocrite who? I guess you were talking to yourself?

[Alexander's Horse]

Originally posted by Patroklos
I wasn't the one that mentioned the SS veterans book, thought there is nothing wrong with it. It is called a primary source. Serious historians, or smart people in general (ie not you I guess), us them.

Serious historians tend to discount memoirs because "old men forget."

WWII memoirs that don't mention the atrocities the auther may have participated in? I wonder why.

[Patroklos]

German production in the last month of the war was actually higher than in the first month. There are several misleading reasons for that, but definetly a testiment to the noneffect of the bombing campaign in that regard.

I don't think bombing cities is ever correct, but at least the Germans were trying something new and had no idea about the effects. As Molly's caption said the British already knew that bombing like that didn't work and still did it.

I like "In hope of killing workers." So they were basically hoping to kill civilians, and doing so intentionally. That is not a legitimate war aim unless you don't mind the stigma attached to it, and obviously we do.