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Originally posted by Geronimo
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After winning the election, two different approaches to negotiating with Putin emerged within Trump's inner circle. However, Keith Kellogg, who advocated for a longer process and sought leverage over Russia, was completely sidelined from Kremlin contacts in the last week. Instead, the advocates of a rapid negotiation blitz, without Europe and Ukraine’s involvement, gained the upper hand. Meanwhile, those insisting on effective measures to deter Moscow became the primary targets of Trump’s political attacks.
Trump’s signature hardline negotiation strategy is based on presenting a substantial threat followed by an enticing offer. However, in Riyadh, Trump’s negotiators effectively skipped the first stage and moved straight to the second – without gaining any leverage. As a result, they were forced to lay a series of concessions on the table, addressing almost every point of Putin’s ultimatum, without securing a single public commitment in return.
Experts point out that Trump, despite his reputation as a strong negotiator, has a long track record of failures. The most glaring examples include the deal with the Taliban, which led to the US collapse in Afghanistan, and the completely failed nuclear negotiations with Kim Jong-un. Trump’s latest diplomatic blitz resembles both the Korean and Afghan scenarios simultaneously.
Having gained nothing from Moscow, the Trump administration has already managed to alienate Europe and attack President Zelensky. Moreover, it has effectively revised the US foreign policy strategy that had remained unchanged for 80 years, abandoning the principles of bipartisan consensus and indivisible Euro-Atlantic security. Instead, the new administration prioritises partisan and ideological considerations, focusing its attacks not on geopolitical rivals but on domestic opponents in America and Europe.
Even if Trump's goal is to shift strategic containment efforts toward China, the loss of trust in the US among European allies will undermine efforts to build partnerships in Asia. Additionally, Trump's team's hopes of driving a wedge between Russia and China appear both naïve and unrealistic, given Russia’s economic dependence on Chinese trade. To make such a shift feasible, roughly 30% of Russia’s trade would need to be redirected toward Europe, which is a highly unlikely scenario.
In the end, Trump and his team rely on fictitious threats, projects, and figures that may generate social media popularity but leave no impression on Moscow or Beijing. Even if securing Ukraine’s independence and defending Europe are not Trump’s priorities, nothing suggests that his administration will achieve its own objectives. However, what is certain is that Putin has already secured his gains – an outcome the world will recognise and remember.
Kellogg or blitz?
After Donald Trump finally assumed the presidency, his team quickly realised that the campaign promise to end the conflict in Ukraine in a single day was unattainable. On the contrary, securing a ‘strong’ deal with Putin required the new administration to demonstrate its ability to increase pressure on the Kremlin and exploit its vulnerabilities – weaknesses that had become even more evident after the outgoing Biden administration imposed its final round of sanctions.
The key advocate of this approach within the new administration was Keith Kellogg, who was appointed special envoy for Ukraine and Russia. He argued that resolving the conflict would take more time, around six months, and additional pressure on Moscow. However, several attempts by Trump's team to threaten the Kremlin with the deployment of US troops and large-scale missile deliveries to Ukraine, resource-extraction deals with Kyiv, or restrictions on Russian oil exports proved ineffective. These measures were either practically unfeasible or outright impossible. Any realistic threat to Moscow required both resources and time(→ Re:Russia: The Frenzy of Transactionalism).
Characteristically, in recent weeks, Kellogg has been completely sidelined from Trump’s contacts with the Kremlin. He did not participate in the Trump emissary's blitz visits to Moscow, the negotiations in Riyadh, or even Washington’s engagements with European leaders. Trump's administration also shifted its strategic focus: in the past week, its attacks have not been aimed at the Kremlin but rather at President Zelensky and Ukraine’s European allies – those who insisted on security guarantees and effective deterrence measures against Russia as an essential part of any deal. At the Munich forum, Vice President J.D. Vance made it clear in harsh terms that the US does not intend to consider Europe’s position or interests in negotiations with the Kremlin and does not view it as a strategic partner. Meanwhile, when President Zelensky stated that Ukraine would not agree to a deal made without its participation, Trump responded with accusations that he himself was to blame for Putin's attack on Ukraine.
Following the talks in Riyadh, Trump's representatives had little to say about their logic and outcome, but insisted that President Trump intends to act quickly. Mike Waltz stated this to Reuters, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in an interview with the same agency, attempted to moderate the message, noting that the meeting was merely the first step in a long and complex process aimed at achieving a just and lasting resolution to the war. However, there is reason to believe that, as with Kellogg, the proponents of a rapid blitz will remain closer to Trump than those advocating for longer and more measured strategies.
Phase two instead of phase one
Trump's signature hardline negotiation strategies typically involve two phases: a 'significant threat' followed by an 'attractive offer' presented against the backdrop of that threat. In this case, however, the first phase turned out to be a bluff – one that Moscow recognised as such. Nevertheless, Trump did not abandon his blitz approach. Instead, his administration effectively skipped the first phase (creating a credible threat) and moved straight to the second (offering concessions).
The array of concessions presented by Trump’s team to Putin is striking and continues to expand daily. Even before negotiations began, Trump had already justified Putin’s invasion, suggested that Ukraine should abandon its claims to the territories seized by Russia, and categorically ruled out the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO. De facto, he accepted Putin’s premise that Ukraine’s fate should be decided by 'great powers' without the involvement of either Ukraine itself or what Trump’s team dismisses as an 'incapable' Europe. (Notably, this aligns with Moscow’s formal demand that neither Europeans, Ukrainians, nor Special Envoy Kellogg participate in the negotiations.) Finally, Trump appears to have agreed to Putin’s demand that Ukrainian elections take place before any agreement is signed – an election aimed at replacing Zelensky as president.
In Riyadh, what effectively took place was the complete diplomatic rehabilitation of the Kremlin and the dismissal of European and previous US administration grievances against it as insignificant. Moscow was promised not only the lifting of sanctions but also American investments in its oil sector and the development of Arctic energy fields.
Trump’s team has been systematically fulfilling Putin’s 'ultimatum' point by point, leaving little room for additional concessions or incentives. Yet, Moscow has not issued a single public statement indicating any reciprocal steps. Moreover, during the negotiations in Saudi Arabia’s capital, the Kremlin made it clear that it would categorically not tolerate any foreign troops in Ukraine. Despite this, no final agreement was reached on a Trump-Putin meeting, with Putin stating that additional preparations were necessary and that it was too early to discuss a timeline. Meanwhile, a coalition of Western intelligence agencies issued a warning that, according to their assessments, the Kremlin has not altered its original strategic objectives, which include the complete subjugation of Ukraine, and views the negotiation process as a beneficial pause that allows it to further strengthen its position.
A parade of amateurs
Trump has cultivated a reputation as a tough negotiator – an image he himself appears to believe in more than anyone else. He does have one notable success to his name: the Abraham Accords between Israel and several Arab nations. However, even this agreement remains incomplete and largely unimplemented. In contrast, Trump’s record of diplomatic failures is significantly longer, writes Middle East expert Mikhail Korostikov in Carnegie Politika. The most striking of these examples were, first, negotiations with the Taliban behind the backs of the US military and the pro-American Afghan government, which ultimately led to the chaotic withdrawal of US forces at the start of Biden’s presidency And second, negotiations with Kim Jong-un over North Korea's nuclear programme.
Korostikov notes that Trump’s approach to North Korea bears a striking resemblance to his current blitz diplomacy with Moscow. Back then, Trump first bombarded Pyongyang with verbal threats, then placed faith in vague North Korean promises of concessions, and ultimately sought to entice Kim Jong-un with gestures of goodwill and high-profile bilateral summits. However, after extracting political benefits from his meetings with Trump and basking in the cascade of diplomatic niceties, the North Korean leader resumed nuclear tests and expanded his weapons programme. Trump has a bold willingness to take on seemingly intractable conflicts, but his enthusiasm has a critical flaw – his reluctance to engage with details and his tendency to quickly lose interest when a quick fix proves elusive, writes Korostikov. His Kremlin blitz is dangerously reminiscent of both the North Korean and Afghan scenarios.
Brett Bruen, a former foreign policy advisor in the Obama administration, described the negotiations in Riyadh as a 'moment of amateur hour' for the US national security apparatus in an interview with Reuters. Representing Moscow were Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Putin’s foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov – two veterans who have collectively held their positions for over 30 years. Across the table, however, sat US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Special Representative Steve Witkoff, all of whom had been in their roles for less than a month. The American delegation lacked experience in high-level international negotiations, had no regional expertise on Ukraine and Russia, and simply did not possess the necessary knowledge, echoes Yale professor and Russia-Ukraine expert Timothy Snyder.
Russia has won a complete victory in the first round, the Kremlin has secured the normalisation of bilateral diplomatic relations that excludes Ukraine and NATO, and sacrificed nothing in return, Democrat Jake Okincloss, who co-chairs the House Ukraine Caucus, told Reuters.
Domestic policy instead of foreign policy
Moscow has publicly expressed satisfaction with the results of the Saudi talks. This was first done by the participants themselves – Lavrov and Ushakov – and then by Putin personally. However, analysts close to the Kremlin have remained cautious in their assessments of the first round, likely reflecting Moscow’s expectation of further concessions. After all, Trump – who has already played all his cards and alienated his allies – needs a deal far more than the Kremlin does. At the same time, the ideologist of Eurasian anti-Western fundamentalism Alexander Dugin said in an interview with the propaganda outlet Radio Sputnik: ‘The radical novelty of the ideological position of today’s United States opens up enormous opportunities for our dialogue... This ideology is strikingly similar to ours, creating entirely new ideological conditions for a meeting between Putin and Trump’.
His impression was drawn from Vice President Vance’s speech in Munich, which effectively served as Trump’s team’s declaration of a fundamental shift in US foreign policy. For the past 80 years, that policy has been based on a foundation of Euro-Atlantic alliances and bipartisan consensus on key international objectives – particularly the principle of indivisible Euro-Atlantic security.
Vance’s speech and the actions of the Trump administration overturn this doctrine. Trump’s team has signaled two key shifts: firstly, it is relinquishing its responsibility for the security of its allies and, secondly, it does not want to deal with the current EU leadership, but would instead welcome the rise of ideologically aligned far-right forces in Europe. This was clearly indicated by Vance's demarche, who refused to meet with German Chancellor Scholz on the margins of the Munich forum opting instead to meet with the leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), a party aiming to strengthen its position in the upcoming elections. In other words, the US Vice President acted not as a representative of the United States as a whole but as a partisan figure, prioritising party interests over national interests – interests that should encompass all Americans, whether they voted for Trump or not.
This revision of fundamental principles is also evident in Trump’s own comments, where he places blame for the war on his ideological opponents while respectfully defending the aggressor’s right – in this case, President Putin, The New York Times writes. ‘This is a shameful reversal of 80 years of American foreign policy. We are now legitimising aggression to create spheres of influence,’ says Kori Schake, a former aide to Republican President George W. Bush Jr. She pointed out that for 45 years, the US government refused to recognise the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states.
In the next election, American voters will make their choice once again, and the presidency may be won by a politician of any ideological persuasion. However, America’s unique global role has historically been defined by the fact that its foreign policy priorities did not shift every four years. Long-term trust was the foundation of its alliances, which were built and strengthened over decades.
The China angle
The Trump administration’s abandonment of alliances with Europe is part of a broader strategy to refocus US foreign policy on countering China. This perspective is explored in a commentary in The Economist, which argues that the US currently lacks the military resources to project sufficient power on both fronts. As a result, Washington believes Europe should bear the burden of its own security. There are rational arguments behind this position, as well as in Washington’s demand for Europe to drastically increase its military spending and capabilities. However, as The Economist notes, military experts and US generals gathered at a defence forum in Honolulu were divided in their assessments. Some argue that the military balance requires the US to prioritise the Pacific theater, while others insist that 'deterrence must be indivisible' – if America loses credibility as an ally in Europe, it will equally damage trust in Asia. The Biden administration worked actively to strengthen its Asian alliance network but never gave the impression that a future president could simply wipe away all previous commitments with a single signature. Trump’s approach stands in stark contrast not only to his predecessors but also to the policies of Russia and China, who are only deepening their alliance while divisions grow within the Euro-Atlantic bloc.
However, the overtly respectful approach to Putin, major concessions, and sweeping promises are being interpreted by Trump-friendly foreign policy commentators as part of his strategy to break the Russia-China alliance. In this context, they frame Secretary Rubio’s remarks about 'identifying extraordinary opportunities' in US-Russia relations 'on geopolitical issues of common interest' and ’unique, potentially historic, economic partnerships.’
Yet, these statements are steeped in the same amateurism that characterises other aspects of Trump’s strategy—especially given the extent of Russia’s economic dependence on China. In 2024, China accounted for 31% of all Russian exports ($129.3 billion out of $417.2 billion, according to the Russian Central Bank and Chinese customs data) and 39% of its imports ($115.5 billion out of $294.5 billion). This means that 35% of Russia’s total foreign trade is tied to China. Changing this reality would require enormous effort and time, and the United States has virtually no leverage in this process. US-Russian economic ties have never been significant. In 2021, the US accounted for just over 4% of Russia’s trade, while Europe was Russia’s primary trading partner before the war. That year, the EU made up 36% of Russia’s trade (€247.8 billion, according to Eurostat ). It was this trade volume that Russia largely redirected toward China (and India, in terms of exports), while trade with Europe shrank to €67.5 billion.
How does Trump’s team expect to convince Europeans to reverse this shift, considering that over the past three years, in close coordination with the previous US administration, they have made enormous efforts to sever these economic ties? And what will be the position of the next US president – or even Trump himself – on this issue in three years?
Much like the discussions about a 'grand bargain' over Ukrainian resources two weeks ago, today’s talk of 'unique economic partnerships' – most likely referring to Arctic energy projects – seems better suited for tweets on X or Truth Social than as serious policy proposals. The same can be said about most of the new administration’s proposals and threats – they are designed for maximum media impact, meant to impress Trump’s base and admirers of his 'brutal' political style in the US and worldwide. But in practical terms, they are largely unworkable – something well understood in both Moscow and Beijing. After all, the myths and fabricated statistics Trump and his team use – whether about US military aid to Ukraine or Zelensky’s approval ratings – were initially created by Russian and Chinese disinformation units. Dealing with a US administration that bases its policies on these very narratives will not be a challenge for Moscow or Beijing.
Even if Trump’s team has no interest in ensuring Ukraine’s independence or defending Europe against the threat Putin has created, nothing so far suggests they will succeed in achieving their goals. What is certain, however, is that Putin has already secured a victory from these developments – a fact that the world will recognise and internalise.​
Trump’s signature hardline negotiation strategy is based on presenting a substantial threat followed by an enticing offer. However, in Riyadh, Trump’s negotiators effectively skipped the first stage and moved straight to the second – without gaining any leverage. As a result, they were forced to lay a series of concessions on the table, addressing almost every point of Putin’s ultimatum, without securing a single public commitment in return.
Experts point out that Trump, despite his reputation as a strong negotiator, has a long track record of failures. The most glaring examples include the deal with the Taliban, which led to the US collapse in Afghanistan, and the completely failed nuclear negotiations with Kim Jong-un. Trump’s latest diplomatic blitz resembles both the Korean and Afghan scenarios simultaneously.
Having gained nothing from Moscow, the Trump administration has already managed to alienate Europe and attack President Zelensky. Moreover, it has effectively revised the US foreign policy strategy that had remained unchanged for 80 years, abandoning the principles of bipartisan consensus and indivisible Euro-Atlantic security. Instead, the new administration prioritises partisan and ideological considerations, focusing its attacks not on geopolitical rivals but on domestic opponents in America and Europe.
Even if Trump's goal is to shift strategic containment efforts toward China, the loss of trust in the US among European allies will undermine efforts to build partnerships in Asia. Additionally, Trump's team's hopes of driving a wedge between Russia and China appear both naïve and unrealistic, given Russia’s economic dependence on Chinese trade. To make such a shift feasible, roughly 30% of Russia’s trade would need to be redirected toward Europe, which is a highly unlikely scenario.
In the end, Trump and his team rely on fictitious threats, projects, and figures that may generate social media popularity but leave no impression on Moscow or Beijing. Even if securing Ukraine’s independence and defending Europe are not Trump’s priorities, nothing suggests that his administration will achieve its own objectives. However, what is certain is that Putin has already secured his gains – an outcome the world will recognise and remember.
Kellogg or blitz?
After Donald Trump finally assumed the presidency, his team quickly realised that the campaign promise to end the conflict in Ukraine in a single day was unattainable. On the contrary, securing a ‘strong’ deal with Putin required the new administration to demonstrate its ability to increase pressure on the Kremlin and exploit its vulnerabilities – weaknesses that had become even more evident after the outgoing Biden administration imposed its final round of sanctions.
The key advocate of this approach within the new administration was Keith Kellogg, who was appointed special envoy for Ukraine and Russia. He argued that resolving the conflict would take more time, around six months, and additional pressure on Moscow. However, several attempts by Trump's team to threaten the Kremlin with the deployment of US troops and large-scale missile deliveries to Ukraine, resource-extraction deals with Kyiv, or restrictions on Russian oil exports proved ineffective. These measures were either practically unfeasible or outright impossible. Any realistic threat to Moscow required both resources and time(→ Re:Russia: The Frenzy of Transactionalism).
Characteristically, in recent weeks, Kellogg has been completely sidelined from Trump’s contacts with the Kremlin. He did not participate in the Trump emissary's blitz visits to Moscow, the negotiations in Riyadh, or even Washington’s engagements with European leaders. Trump's administration also shifted its strategic focus: in the past week, its attacks have not been aimed at the Kremlin but rather at President Zelensky and Ukraine’s European allies – those who insisted on security guarantees and effective deterrence measures against Russia as an essential part of any deal. At the Munich forum, Vice President J.D. Vance made it clear in harsh terms that the US does not intend to consider Europe’s position or interests in negotiations with the Kremlin and does not view it as a strategic partner. Meanwhile, when President Zelensky stated that Ukraine would not agree to a deal made without its participation, Trump responded with accusations that he himself was to blame for Putin's attack on Ukraine.
Following the talks in Riyadh, Trump's representatives had little to say about their logic and outcome, but insisted that President Trump intends to act quickly. Mike Waltz stated this to Reuters, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in an interview with the same agency, attempted to moderate the message, noting that the meeting was merely the first step in a long and complex process aimed at achieving a just and lasting resolution to the war. However, there is reason to believe that, as with Kellogg, the proponents of a rapid blitz will remain closer to Trump than those advocating for longer and more measured strategies.
Phase two instead of phase one
Trump's signature hardline negotiation strategies typically involve two phases: a 'significant threat' followed by an 'attractive offer' presented against the backdrop of that threat. In this case, however, the first phase turned out to be a bluff – one that Moscow recognised as such. Nevertheless, Trump did not abandon his blitz approach. Instead, his administration effectively skipped the first phase (creating a credible threat) and moved straight to the second (offering concessions).
The array of concessions presented by Trump’s team to Putin is striking and continues to expand daily. Even before negotiations began, Trump had already justified Putin’s invasion, suggested that Ukraine should abandon its claims to the territories seized by Russia, and categorically ruled out the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO. De facto, he accepted Putin’s premise that Ukraine’s fate should be decided by 'great powers' without the involvement of either Ukraine itself or what Trump’s team dismisses as an 'incapable' Europe. (Notably, this aligns with Moscow’s formal demand that neither Europeans, Ukrainians, nor Special Envoy Kellogg participate in the negotiations.) Finally, Trump appears to have agreed to Putin’s demand that Ukrainian elections take place before any agreement is signed – an election aimed at replacing Zelensky as president.
In Riyadh, what effectively took place was the complete diplomatic rehabilitation of the Kremlin and the dismissal of European and previous US administration grievances against it as insignificant. Moscow was promised not only the lifting of sanctions but also American investments in its oil sector and the development of Arctic energy fields.
Trump’s team has been systematically fulfilling Putin’s 'ultimatum' point by point, leaving little room for additional concessions or incentives. Yet, Moscow has not issued a single public statement indicating any reciprocal steps. Moreover, during the negotiations in Saudi Arabia’s capital, the Kremlin made it clear that it would categorically not tolerate any foreign troops in Ukraine. Despite this, no final agreement was reached on a Trump-Putin meeting, with Putin stating that additional preparations were necessary and that it was too early to discuss a timeline. Meanwhile, a coalition of Western intelligence agencies issued a warning that, according to their assessments, the Kremlin has not altered its original strategic objectives, which include the complete subjugation of Ukraine, and views the negotiation process as a beneficial pause that allows it to further strengthen its position.
A parade of amateurs
Trump has cultivated a reputation as a tough negotiator – an image he himself appears to believe in more than anyone else. He does have one notable success to his name: the Abraham Accords between Israel and several Arab nations. However, even this agreement remains incomplete and largely unimplemented. In contrast, Trump’s record of diplomatic failures is significantly longer, writes Middle East expert Mikhail Korostikov in Carnegie Politika. The most striking of these examples were, first, negotiations with the Taliban behind the backs of the US military and the pro-American Afghan government, which ultimately led to the chaotic withdrawal of US forces at the start of Biden’s presidency And second, negotiations with Kim Jong-un over North Korea's nuclear programme.
Korostikov notes that Trump’s approach to North Korea bears a striking resemblance to his current blitz diplomacy with Moscow. Back then, Trump first bombarded Pyongyang with verbal threats, then placed faith in vague North Korean promises of concessions, and ultimately sought to entice Kim Jong-un with gestures of goodwill and high-profile bilateral summits. However, after extracting political benefits from his meetings with Trump and basking in the cascade of diplomatic niceties, the North Korean leader resumed nuclear tests and expanded his weapons programme. Trump has a bold willingness to take on seemingly intractable conflicts, but his enthusiasm has a critical flaw – his reluctance to engage with details and his tendency to quickly lose interest when a quick fix proves elusive, writes Korostikov. His Kremlin blitz is dangerously reminiscent of both the North Korean and Afghan scenarios.
Brett Bruen, a former foreign policy advisor in the Obama administration, described the negotiations in Riyadh as a 'moment of amateur hour' for the US national security apparatus in an interview with Reuters. Representing Moscow were Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Putin’s foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov – two veterans who have collectively held their positions for over 30 years. Across the table, however, sat US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Special Representative Steve Witkoff, all of whom had been in their roles for less than a month. The American delegation lacked experience in high-level international negotiations, had no regional expertise on Ukraine and Russia, and simply did not possess the necessary knowledge, echoes Yale professor and Russia-Ukraine expert Timothy Snyder.
Russia has won a complete victory in the first round, the Kremlin has secured the normalisation of bilateral diplomatic relations that excludes Ukraine and NATO, and sacrificed nothing in return, Democrat Jake Okincloss, who co-chairs the House Ukraine Caucus, told Reuters.
Domestic policy instead of foreign policy
Moscow has publicly expressed satisfaction with the results of the Saudi talks. This was first done by the participants themselves – Lavrov and Ushakov – and then by Putin personally. However, analysts close to the Kremlin have remained cautious in their assessments of the first round, likely reflecting Moscow’s expectation of further concessions. After all, Trump – who has already played all his cards and alienated his allies – needs a deal far more than the Kremlin does. At the same time, the ideologist of Eurasian anti-Western fundamentalism Alexander Dugin said in an interview with the propaganda outlet Radio Sputnik: ‘The radical novelty of the ideological position of today’s United States opens up enormous opportunities for our dialogue... This ideology is strikingly similar to ours, creating entirely new ideological conditions for a meeting between Putin and Trump’.
His impression was drawn from Vice President Vance’s speech in Munich, which effectively served as Trump’s team’s declaration of a fundamental shift in US foreign policy. For the past 80 years, that policy has been based on a foundation of Euro-Atlantic alliances and bipartisan consensus on key international objectives – particularly the principle of indivisible Euro-Atlantic security.
Vance’s speech and the actions of the Trump administration overturn this doctrine. Trump’s team has signaled two key shifts: firstly, it is relinquishing its responsibility for the security of its allies and, secondly, it does not want to deal with the current EU leadership, but would instead welcome the rise of ideologically aligned far-right forces in Europe. This was clearly indicated by Vance's demarche, who refused to meet with German Chancellor Scholz on the margins of the Munich forum opting instead to meet with the leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), a party aiming to strengthen its position in the upcoming elections. In other words, the US Vice President acted not as a representative of the United States as a whole but as a partisan figure, prioritising party interests over national interests – interests that should encompass all Americans, whether they voted for Trump or not.
This revision of fundamental principles is also evident in Trump’s own comments, where he places blame for the war on his ideological opponents while respectfully defending the aggressor’s right – in this case, President Putin, The New York Times writes. ‘This is a shameful reversal of 80 years of American foreign policy. We are now legitimising aggression to create spheres of influence,’ says Kori Schake, a former aide to Republican President George W. Bush Jr. She pointed out that for 45 years, the US government refused to recognise the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states.
In the next election, American voters will make their choice once again, and the presidency may be won by a politician of any ideological persuasion. However, America’s unique global role has historically been defined by the fact that its foreign policy priorities did not shift every four years. Long-term trust was the foundation of its alliances, which were built and strengthened over decades.
The China angle
The Trump administration’s abandonment of alliances with Europe is part of a broader strategy to refocus US foreign policy on countering China. This perspective is explored in a commentary in The Economist, which argues that the US currently lacks the military resources to project sufficient power on both fronts. As a result, Washington believes Europe should bear the burden of its own security. There are rational arguments behind this position, as well as in Washington’s demand for Europe to drastically increase its military spending and capabilities. However, as The Economist notes, military experts and US generals gathered at a defence forum in Honolulu were divided in their assessments. Some argue that the military balance requires the US to prioritise the Pacific theater, while others insist that 'deterrence must be indivisible' – if America loses credibility as an ally in Europe, it will equally damage trust in Asia. The Biden administration worked actively to strengthen its Asian alliance network but never gave the impression that a future president could simply wipe away all previous commitments with a single signature. Trump’s approach stands in stark contrast not only to his predecessors but also to the policies of Russia and China, who are only deepening their alliance while divisions grow within the Euro-Atlantic bloc.
However, the overtly respectful approach to Putin, major concessions, and sweeping promises are being interpreted by Trump-friendly foreign policy commentators as part of his strategy to break the Russia-China alliance. In this context, they frame Secretary Rubio’s remarks about 'identifying extraordinary opportunities' in US-Russia relations 'on geopolitical issues of common interest' and ’unique, potentially historic, economic partnerships.’
Yet, these statements are steeped in the same amateurism that characterises other aspects of Trump’s strategy—especially given the extent of Russia’s economic dependence on China. In 2024, China accounted for 31% of all Russian exports ($129.3 billion out of $417.2 billion, according to the Russian Central Bank and Chinese customs data) and 39% of its imports ($115.5 billion out of $294.5 billion). This means that 35% of Russia’s total foreign trade is tied to China. Changing this reality would require enormous effort and time, and the United States has virtually no leverage in this process. US-Russian economic ties have never been significant. In 2021, the US accounted for just over 4% of Russia’s trade, while Europe was Russia’s primary trading partner before the war. That year, the EU made up 36% of Russia’s trade (€247.8 billion, according to Eurostat ). It was this trade volume that Russia largely redirected toward China (and India, in terms of exports), while trade with Europe shrank to €67.5 billion.
How does Trump’s team expect to convince Europeans to reverse this shift, considering that over the past three years, in close coordination with the previous US administration, they have made enormous efforts to sever these economic ties? And what will be the position of the next US president – or even Trump himself – on this issue in three years?
Much like the discussions about a 'grand bargain' over Ukrainian resources two weeks ago, today’s talk of 'unique economic partnerships' – most likely referring to Arctic energy projects – seems better suited for tweets on X or Truth Social than as serious policy proposals. The same can be said about most of the new administration’s proposals and threats – they are designed for maximum media impact, meant to impress Trump’s base and admirers of his 'brutal' political style in the US and worldwide. But in practical terms, they are largely unworkable – something well understood in both Moscow and Beijing. After all, the myths and fabricated statistics Trump and his team use – whether about US military aid to Ukraine or Zelensky’s approval ratings – were initially created by Russian and Chinese disinformation units. Dealing with a US administration that bases its policies on these very narratives will not be a challenge for Moscow or Beijing.
Even if Trump’s team has no interest in ensuring Ukraine’s independence or defending Europe against the threat Putin has created, nothing so far suggests they will succeed in achieving their goals. What is certain, however, is that Putin has already secured a victory from these developments – a fact that the world will recognise and internalise.​
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