Originally posted by MOBIUS
“In general, in the first ten days of October nothing unexpected (for me) happened: the enemy left part of the city of Ugledar, which became too difficult for them to defend (due to the bypass of the northern flank). Again the enemy retreated on his own, without being defeated or surrounded.
…
There is very little time left before the autumn thaw begins and, it seems, the summer-autumn campaign can be considered over. We can summarize some results (although, perhaps, the Ukrainians could come up with something else before the season of “autumn thunderstorms”):
1) in general, the campaign was a “draw” from the military point of view. The Russian Armed Forces were unable to create the so-called "buffer zone" in the Kharkov region and break through the enemy's defenses there. It was not possible to capture even the immediate target of the offensive, the city of Volchansk, and create a stable bridgehead around it to threaten Kharkov. On the other hand, during the summer we managed to advance the front in the direction of Donetsk by 20-25 km and (in some places) deeper, clearing a fairly large area from the enemy. In turn, the Ukrainian Armed Forces invaded the Kursk region, capturing Sudzha (a village-regional center), which “nullified” all our successes and created a vast new area of armed confrontation. Thus, “our gains” are Ugledar and about 40 more settlements, while our “losses” are one and a half districts of the Kursk region occupied by the enemy. It looks like a “tactical draw”.
2) However, this “draw” is only “apparent”. In fact, we (Russia) suffered a strategic military failure this summer/autumn. WE DID NOT REALIZE the plan for a large-scale offensive on Kharkov, for which we had been preparing forces, equipment and reserves for a year. And then we “missed” a not too strong, but very painful blow with the transfer of ground operations to our territory. But THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WE LOST TIME. Which is now both for us and for the so-called “Ukraine” (which, as a result, won it) “worth its weight in gold”. The enemy had time to prepare additional forces and reserves and demonstrated the impossibility of defeating them with the “set of tools” that Russia can use within the Northern Military District without switching to a full-scale war and full mobilization to achieve victory. That is: the enemy achieved his goals during the summer-autumn campaign: 1) repelled our offensive with small territorial losses; 2) launched a strong counterattack; 3) kept unused reserves to continue active defensive and offensive operations; 4) sustained in its population and army the belief in victory and the willingness to endure hardships in the hope of it. But we (Russia) did not achieve our goals at all: 1) our attack on Kharkov was “blocked” with very insignificant territorial successes; 2) our offensive in the Donetsk People’s Republic only “shifted” the enemy front, but did not even come close to crushing it; 3) our reserves were spent on repelling the enemy invasion of the Kursk region (which was never completely repelled after 2 months of heavy fighting); 4) what to do now with the enemy army and the war in general – in the framework of the continuation of the special military operation is not entirely clear…”
Also, with NK sending troops to Ukraine, there's high chances of SK sending equipment and ammunition.
Who had proxy Korean war in Europe on their bingo card for this year?
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