Swiss to vote on ending Militia system

[Colonâ„¢]

Germany went to war against a country that possessed superior manpower, industry, natural resources and required vast supply lines to conquer. The only reason they managed to get as far as they did because Soviet military command had been politicised and because they were completely unprepared for a German attack. German military tactics relied on concentrating forces at certain points, punching a hole through the lines, encircling the enemy forces and destroying them. This can be countered by defending in deep, but the Soviet forces were strung all along the burder in preparation of a Soviet attack, which played right into Germany's hands.
However, the USSR was a tad larger than France or Poland, which allowed the Soviet to regroup and adapt several times over. You speak of taking Moscow as some sort of end all but the centre of Soviet arms production was another 1000 miles to the east...

Again, the remarkable thing that happened wasn't that Germany failed to defeat the USSR, it was that they got so far against a superior foe.

If it makes you happy, I'll admit that when one side does everything right while the other does everything wrong, that side will win, but that's just a stupid way of analysing things.

[kentonio]

The Soviet army was large but in no way a match for the experience, overall equipment and tactical superiority of the Germans initially. The Germans absolutely overran the Soviets in the early months. I have no idea what picture you're trying to paint, because it doesn't seem to bear that much relation to reality.

[Colonâ„¢]

I just explained what mistakes led to the early rout of the Soviet armies. Never mind dude.

[kentonio]

Your explanation makes little sense to me. You're describing the Soviets as a superior force which does not match up to reality. They had largely outdated equipment, outdated tactics and were largely unprepared for an invasion by a modern army with the strength of the Germans. I've been talking about singular decisions that shaped the course of the conflict. Your explanation of 'what mistakes led to the early rout of the Soviet armies' appears to be basically that they should have been considerably more modern in their tactics and approach. Sorry, but well duh. You could say exactly the same about the French.

[Elok]

"You stupid cockface, your account of this event, which happened before either of us was even a sperm, is just totally wrong!"

[Colonâ„¢]

...were largely unprepared for an invasion by a modern army with the strength of the Germans...

They were unprepared for ANY kind of invasion. To the point Stalin even refused to put the military in a state of alert when it had become clear that Germany was going to attack. Decimating your military leadership (you are aware of the purges aren't you?) and inserting party hacks all the way down the chain of command also weren't inevitable acts of nature, but the kind of decisions that seem to interest you so much and that directly affected the USSR's performance.

[kentonio]

Decimating your military leadership (you are aware of the purges aren't you?) and inserting party hacks all the way down the chain of command also weren't inevitable acts of nature, but the kind of decisions that seem to interest you so much and that directly affected the USSR's performance.

The purges were part of a deliberate attempt to ensure his grasp on power was absolute. Unlike specific military decisions where you can often get a pretty solid idea of the outcome, you can't really do the same with the purges. You can look at a specific campaign and say with some relative certainty that another 10 divisions would have been enough to ensure a breakthrough (although obviously nothing is ever 100%), but can you say with any kind of certainty that the removal of a particular set of officers several years earlier would have changed the course of Barbarossa? By inserting those 'hacks' you talk about, he also ensured a cast iron loyalty built on fear.

[Patroklos]

Which interference led it to fail?

Seriously, the Germans did a ****ty job of planning the logistics for it from the get go, and they didn't start having frontline troops well supplied until, well, 1944 when the Frontline was touching the German rail network.

The Germans never had a chance to win in the East, but all opposition to it disappeared in the German General Staff because, again, they were drinking their own Kool-aid after France was defeated so easily.

The Germans failed to anticipate a logistics situation based on them not wanting those circumstances to transpire in the first place.

As for decisions that made Barbarrosa fail and led to those circumstances transporting based on Hitlers personal decisions I can point to two in particular:

1.) Bailing out Italy in Greece/Yugoslavia. Doing so was purely for face saving value. This was an entirely unplanned for operation that involved dozens of divisions just months prior to the largest military operation in German history and delayed the start date a month. Not only that, much of that force never returned for Barbarossa as the Balkans required a significant occupation force.

2.) Army group Center was halted and diverted by direct order from Hitler to focus on he capture of Kiev and other Army Group South responsibilities.

Without those two events the Battle of Moscow most certainly would have occurred a month earlier at least, but probably much earlier than that. If you know anything about the weather timetable of that fall and winter the importance of that should be clear.


BTW Colon's arguement falls apart under cursory examination as everything he says about the Soviets was largely true of the French/British in 1940. Having the strongest hand off the deal is very helpful, it does not ensure a win.

[Colonâ„¢]

The purges were part of a deliberate attempt to ensure his grasp on power was absolute. Unlike specific military decisions where you can often get a pretty solid idea of the outcome, you can't really do the same with the purges. You can look at a specific campaign and say with some relative certainty that another 10 divisions would have been enough to ensure a breakthrough (although obviously nothing is ever 100%), but can you say with any kind of certainty that the removal of a particular set of officers several years earlier would have changed the course of Barbarossa? By inserting those 'hacks' you talk about, he also ensured a cast iron loyalty built on fear.

Curious then, that if the purges had been helpful, that Stalin eventually reversed his decision and removed the commissars again. It merely took a year of military calamities.

[Colonâ„¢]

BTW Colon's arguement falls apart under cursory examination as everything he says about the Soviets was largely true of the French/British in 1940. Having the strongest hand off the deal is very helpful, it does not ensure a win.

Then you don't understand my argument. I never said the French and the British didn't make serious mistakes as well. It's just that the USSR was simply a tad larger and able to recover from those mistakes.

[kentonio]

Curious then, that if the purges had been helpful, that Stalin eventually reversed his decision and removed the commissars again. It merely took a year of military calamities.

I'm not saying it was a good decision, I'm saying that it was a broad enough decision for the outcome to be basically not determinable. You can't realistically say that without the purges that Barbarossa would have initially turned out significantly differently.

[kentonio]

dp

[Colonâ„¢]

You can very safely say that if the Soviet army had competent leadership and if they'd prepared for the eventuality of a German attack things would have turned out very differently.

Look man, there's plenty of documentation out there about Stalin's mistakes. I don't need to start copy/pasting.

[kentonio]

You can very safely say that if the Soviet army had competent leadership and if they'd prepared for the eventuality of a German attack things would have turned out very differently.

So not just the purge but also Stalin ordering a completely different strategic approach. Which might also have changed things even with the purge. Or might not in either case.

Look man, there's plenty of documentation out there about Stalin's mistakes. I don't need to start copy/pasting.

Enough to fill a library full of books, but then again no-ones arguing with you on that.

[Lonestar]

The Soviet army was large but in no way a match for the experience,

What "experience" did the German Rank and File have that the Soviets didn't? Even with the purge there were still many thousands of field officers in the Red Army that had fought during WW1 and the Revolution, not to mention those that fought against various uprisings, border conflicts(such as with Poland), and the Winter War.

overall equipment

"over all equipment superiority"?

Like what? The Mauser was a smoother bolt-action gun than the Nugget, but neither the K98 or Gew98 were particularly better as a service rifle. Hell, I've taken apart a M1903(which is so close to a Mauser the US was sued by the Mauser company) and I own a Nugget. If anything, a Nugget is easier to manufacture.

Tanks? The BT series performed admirably against their counterparts in the Spanish Civil War. Trucks? They had about as many as the Germans did. MGs? Now we're getting somewhere. Planes? Now we're getting somewhere, but the LW was not, perhaps, so good that they could ignore the size disparity. Half-tracks?

You got me. The Reds had no halftracks.

and tactical superiority of the Germans initially.

Ding ding ding.

This, right here, is the only spot the Germans did uniformly well against all foes throughout the war. And this was because of the emphasis they placed on education and training. Even as Berlin was being stormed OCS for new German officers was a year long, compared to 90 day wonders produced by the American OCS, for instance.

The Germans absolutely overran the Soviets in the early months. I have no idea what picture you're trying to paint, because it doesn't seem to bear that much relation to reality.

Actually, no they didn't.

They failed miserably at their objectives. They did better than they should have, by all rights, but they weren't able to bring the Russkis to surrender or come to a stopping point(say, seizing Moscow) before winter started...which is something the German leadership had been banking on pretty heavily.