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Originally posted by Naked Gents Rut
Can you explain this? I don't understand why Iran would "start moving backward" if they suspended. Why can't they just pick up where they left off at a later date? Something to do with how the cascades work?
Can you explain this? I don't understand why Iran would "start moving backward" if they suspended. Why can't they just pick up where they left off at a later date? Something to do with how the cascades work?
Read the P5 + 2 statement I linked to earlier. They're offering Iran the suspension of sanctions in return for Iran's suspension of enrichment.
This is better than what I thought had been offered, but may not be enough for Iran to find it worthwhile. The real danger is that by adopting too tough a line we will not discover Iran's true intentions regarding their nuke program. There are 3 major possibilities:
1) It is a negotiating chip. Iran wants economic and diplomatic normalization, a non-aggression agreement, perhaps some sort of concessions regarding Iraq
2) It is a propaganda tool.
3) They really want nuclear weapons. This breaks down into
3a) They want nuclear weapons to deter aggression on the part of Israel and the US
3b) They want nuclear weapons to make things go boom
3b is the least probable of the above possible motivations, and is the obvious doomsday scenario
That said, we would like at all costs to stop them even if their goal is 3a. Iran is an exporter of terrorism, and we would like to retain the option of limited military strikes on Iran to combat this (though I think the value of this option is probably overstated in Israel and some parts of the US). Also, we don't know when the government in Iran will change sufficiently that their motivations mutate to 3b. If Iran wants a nuke and is just playing games to avoid action we need to discover this as soon as possible so we can either decide to attack them or to simply normalize relations and let them go nuclear (this is the scenario where we've decided that we'd rather live with a nuclear Iran than pay the cost of preventing it; my fear is that we've already passed this point)
2 is difficult. We need to pay them enough so that they can retire the nuke program and appear to their own populace to have won. At the same time, we would like other countries who are thinking of starting a nuke program to see us as having won (though I think this consideration is secondary). 2 is the one most likely to cause Iran to act erratically. They will engage in excessive posturing to get maximum value out of things. They might drag things out in order to give the issue lots of air time.
1 is the easiest. They want to negotiate, but also want the best possible deal.
We need to design a negotiating strategy/agreement which:
First priority: reveals Iran's intentions quickly. This argues for a relatively generous offer up front with a short time horizon (backed up with the implied threat of military action?). The military threat cannot be too explicit or else they will not want to cave (especially if they are doing 2).
Second priority: is strongly enforceable. We will need to pay Iran more for this (assuming they want to deal).
Third priority: makes the rest of the world not want to play the same game Iran just has. I doubt this will be possible given the other two priorities.
The real problem is that our negotiating strategy could not distinguish between 1, 2 and 3. We're just waiting as time ticks down, and are not getting any surer what our opposition is planning to do. They've shown patience on the time scale of years, and assuming they're making reasonable progress on their program, have gotten significantly closer to a functional weapon. I don't see what good holding the line will do.
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