Reference how the Nazis acted when they occupied an area (versus the Wehrmacht) here is a study from 1952 by the US army). It confirms what the posters have been discussing about how garrisoning the Soviet Union would have eaten up German personnel.
Reference logistics, it's not just supplies. You have the problem, and I just lost the link, of the huge variation in vehicle models that the Germans had. One example - of course it's going to be extreme - given was a Panzer Grenadier division, in 1944 I believe, that had 96 different vehicles. Both the US and Soviets had many fewer types, and also tried to guarantee standardization between models whenever possible. The German logistical system for spare parts had become a nightmare.
The supply side of logistics was a major problem. The article I took that from was published from a symposium at the US War College (I love half-price books, a really nice used book chain in Ohio and some other states). The Nazis and Japanese both tened to view logistics as the realm for second-string generals, with the result that many of the combat generals had minimal experience with the actual workings and limitations of logistics.
The US between the wars had been the opposite - no matter who you were, you got rotated into almost every staff position. Thus most US Generals had familiarity with training, logistics, and sometimes even construction as well as command. I once read an interesting commentary that critisized Rommel for making poor use of what he received logistically. It was by a Brit, and it was an interesting viewpoint. He apparently had it well documented, and the gist of it was that Rommel really didn't do that good a job stretching the supplies he received. Of course it was a comparison to the British desert comanders before the US supplies kicked in, so there was a little bias there.
Reference the Nazi pause during the invasion of France - look at the maps. www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/blitz/ It's been well documented they had to pause because tanks and other vehicles were simply wearing out. If the French and British armies had not already been routed, that could have been a disaster. In fact one of the things the German tank commanders commented on that they wanted, in 1944, were tanks that could keep running after 100 kilometeres like the Americans. The victory against the French meant that the Wehrmacht did not examine seriously the major problems that had cropped up. If those had been dealt with, then the Russian Campain of 1941 may have gone differently.
Reference logistics, it's not just supplies. You have the problem, and I just lost the link, of the huge variation in vehicle models that the Germans had. One example - of course it's going to be extreme - given was a Panzer Grenadier division, in 1944 I believe, that had 96 different vehicles. Both the US and Soviets had many fewer types, and also tried to guarantee standardization between models whenever possible. The German logistical system for spare parts had become a nightmare.
The supply side of logistics was a major problem. The article I took that from was published from a symposium at the US War College (I love half-price books, a really nice used book chain in Ohio and some other states). The Nazis and Japanese both tened to view logistics as the realm for second-string generals, with the result that many of the combat generals had minimal experience with the actual workings and limitations of logistics.
The US between the wars had been the opposite - no matter who you were, you got rotated into almost every staff position. Thus most US Generals had familiarity with training, logistics, and sometimes even construction as well as command. I once read an interesting commentary that critisized Rommel for making poor use of what he received logistically. It was by a Brit, and it was an interesting viewpoint. He apparently had it well documented, and the gist of it was that Rommel really didn't do that good a job stretching the supplies he received. Of course it was a comparison to the British desert comanders before the US supplies kicked in, so there was a little bias there.
Reference the Nazi pause during the invasion of France - look at the maps. www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/blitz/ It's been well documented they had to pause because tanks and other vehicles were simply wearing out. If the French and British armies had not already been routed, that could have been a disaster. In fact one of the things the German tank commanders commented on that they wanted, in 1944, were tanks that could keep running after 100 kilometeres like the Americans. The victory against the French meant that the Wehrmacht did not examine seriously the major problems that had cropped up. If those had been dealt with, then the Russian Campain of 1941 may have gone differently.
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