This just in: North Korea to End armistice!

[Q Classic]

ned, if it is only the US, SK and Japan at risk, should at the very least SK and Japan have some say in the events unfolding?

the US has the least to lose, all the fancy schmancy toys notwithstanding. the SKoreans have their lives, their country, their economy, their families to lose. Japan has their lives, their economy, and their country at risk.

Who should be calling the shots? Not the US. or rather, not just the US.

as for the rest of that history: granted, i suppose a split korea couldn't be avoided. but this is all after the japanese occupation--something which could have been avoided in the first place if teddy hadn't been so condescending.

[Ned]

Q Cubed, Of course SK and Japan must be consulted. I believe Powell is doing just that this week. I am also amused that the NK's only want to talk to the US and do not want to include Japan and SK in the discussions. (I believe this is correct.) Thus it seem that it is the North that is trying to drive a wedge between the three of us.

[Q Classic]

SK and Japan must be consulted?

why shouldn't they call the shots?

[DanS]

It's not that simple. In short, we all call the shots. That's why the US wants multilateral talks. But the US is the ultimate guarantor of SK and Japanese nuclear and conventional security, and there must not be a situation where either SK or Japan are signing checks that we have to cash.

The SK being equidistant from the US and NK in policy is a ridiculous position. Amazing that Roh is actually falling into that rhetorical trap.

[Q Classic]

Naturally, DanS, we all should call the shots.

But that's not what has happened in the past. This "multilateralism" you speak of hasn't been present on the korean peninsula nor in east asia until very recently. The US has a long way to go before it convinces both Japan and SKorea that it really is interested in working out a solution with their input; especially since in the past, the US has taken on a "Daddy" role, who "always knew best"~ particularly with the end of the korean war, with the demilitarization of japan (although its demilitarization did make a lot of asians happy), with criminal american troops not being tried in the countries of their crimes by the native courts, with the skorean military answering to an american general rather than a korean one...

a lot of convincing, a lot of fancy footwork must be done.

the sk policy is fully understandable, if a bit unfortunate. it is appeasement; but skorea is deathly afraid of a situation not unlike the current us-iraq one. frankly, i think it's a case of nimby. if you recall, bush started early on with his bellicose language to iraq, similar to his behavior with nkorea now, and skorea, for some odd reason, likes its democracy and doesn't like having artillery shells raining down on its capital city.

you have to realize with foreign policy, just as much importance is placed upon appearances as in actualities. and quite simply, it doesn't appear as if bush is really interested in listening to korean or japanese input--which is only going to cause more headaches for him later, both from his allies and from nkorea.

[Urban Ranger]

Interestingly, the US is going to resume food aid to the DPRK.

[DanS]

The US has a long way to go before it convinces both Japan and SKorea that it really is interested in working out a solution with their input; especially since in the past, the US has taken on a "Daddy" role, who "always knew best"

The fact remains that SK would like to lead in this situation but it just can't. The power structure in the region means that SK actions are backed up by an American security umbrella (when SK talks, our gauntleted fist is on the table).

So the US leads and SK and Japan can't stray too far off. This doesn't have to be a "daddy" situation, but it's tough to keep form when the SK seems to have an inadvisable policy from the US standpoint. We've never really been good at appeasement and we're not too keen on practicing it.

which is only going to cause more headaches for him later, both from his allies and from nkorea

We've not only got to get our allies on board, but also China and Russia have to be on board as well. Anything less than that would only get us back to the Agreed Framework, which was a dog.

[Q Classic]

The fact remains that SK would like to lead in this situation but it just can't. The power structure in the region means that SK actions are backed up by an American security umbrella (when SK talks, our gauntleted fist is on the table).

while the us security umbrella does protect skorea to an extend, why can skorea not lead? after all, they are dealing with their relatives. they are the ones with the most to lose. they are the ones who are most directly in the line of fire.

So the US leads and SK and Japan can't stray too far off. This doesn't have to be a "daddy" situation, but it's tough to keep form when the SK seems to have an inadvisable policy from the US standpoint. We've never really been good at appeasement.

so because the us has the military strength, it gets to make most of the decisions? perhaps this is what should happen, from the american standpoint. we are, after all, contributing the most to their defence, and we are, after all, allowing them to lead protected and free lives with our power.
how is this not a "daddy" situation?
both japan and skorea are maturing, if not mature already, democracies. they are the ones with the most at stake. thus, it follows, they should lead, while the united states, with its strength and power, should follow, and advise.

appeasement isn't a good tactic, and it bodes ill for korea's future reunification. the us, however, should not bluntly tell skorea that it's wrong, and summarily try to pressure skorea into following its lead in the form of "consultations", but rather convince skorea that appeasement holds harsh risks for its future. treat it as an equal in diplomacy, and i'm quite sure a new stage of relations in east asia will blossom.

and in this post-cold war age, ex-enemies, or so-called "strategic competitors" can be allies. i was including china and russia as our allies in the region.

[DanS]

while the us security umbrella does protect skorea to an extend, why can skorea not lead?

Because it's the US that cashes the checks. The power structure in the region would demand a massive reworking if SK chose otherwise. SK could choose to work for a reunification of the peninsula, which would give them an opportunity to become a free agent. But right now, there are too many agreements in place. And Roh's policies seem to indicate that he is not going for reunification any time soon.

after all, they are dealing with their relatives. they are the ones with the most to lose. they are the ones who are most directly in the line of fire.

This is all true.

so because the us has the military strength, it gets to make most of the decisions

No, but some decisions carry more weight than others.

both japan and skorea are maturing, if not mature already, democracies. they are the ones with the most at stake. thus, it follows, they should lead, while the united states, with its strength and power, should follow, and advise.

The US has the nuclear football and we've made it clear that a nuke attack on SK or Japan would result in a nuclear retaliation from the US. And a conventional attack on SK would result in the full force of American military might putting a hurting on NK. Ultimately, we are not going to have SK or Japan lead us into directions that we don't choose to go.

i was including china and russia as our allies in the region.

China?

Let's agree on "friends". Somebody we can do business with...

[Rogan Josh]

Can we really blame NK?

First the US declares them part of an 'axis of evil' together with Afghanistan and Iraq. Then they invade Afghanistan and leave the place in complete ruin and chaos. Now they are about to invade Iraq and what do you think they will do to Saddam if they catch him? So who is next on the list?

It seems to me that NK feels threatened by the US. Don't you think that is reasonable. Unlike the other members of the 'Axis of Evil' NK may have a chance f fighting the US should they attack. Why are we so surprised that they are doing everything to bolster their military they possibly can?

And why not add the US violation of the test ban treaty to the list....

I am not saying that I would support NK in any way, but your supposed surprise at their actions is a little hard to swallow!

[Arrian]

Can we really blame NK?

Yes.

-Arrian

[DinoDoc]

Originally posted by Rogan Josh
Can we really blame NK?

They make it hard not to.

[Alinestra Covelia]

Let's look beyond the unhelpful (but nonetheless rather popular) anti-US rhetoric for a start. The formation of North Korea has been unilaterally blamed on the activities of the US. This is inaccurate and unobjective. The US worked to support the South Koreans in direct and parallel opposition to the Soviet buildup of the North Korean regime. The Soviet Union shoulders at least half of the blame, and depending on how far back you look into history, Japanese colonialism also contributed much to the underlying sense of rebellion and nationalism in North Korea. If you really want to go delving into ancient history, you might consider the not inconsiderable time that Korea spent as a Chinese vassal as an indicator of the current sense of its defensive national image.

Secondly, the question of "Who Fired First?" vis a vis the Korean War is still far from clear and to be honest, largely irrelevant. What we do know is that when the fighting was finished, China and North Korea had lost upwards of 1 million soldiers, and the combined force of American and UN military were unable to ultimately push back further than the 38th Parallel.

America's entry into the war should be viewed largely in terms of realpolitik - containment of a satellite of a powerful and ideologically opposed state (the USSR and China). Likewise, China's motivations can very readily be ascribed to protection of a buffer state against the satellite of a powerful rival state (America, at the time perceived as a serious and implacable ideological rival).

As far as the present day situation is concerned, do not forget that Kim Jong Il as recently as October last year attempted to institute sweeping economic reforms. So although we are talking about a regime that is currently trying to convince the world of its capacity for widespread destruction, we are also talking about a regime that made very real and solid steps towards a more constructive approach. Those who dismiss Kim as a mere "lunatic" would do well to remember the hopes of economists all over the world late last year, when a hybrid capitalist market in N Korea was being touted as a possibility.

Currently, North Korea insists on speaking with America alone. This is not going to be enough to solve its problems. China is at present the only country that supplies official aid to the North, and that with considerable hesitation and reservations.

In order to solve the situation, all nations that would be affected directly need to be brought into consideration. This means Russia (survivor of the Soviet leadership that established Kim's regime in the first place), China, South Korea, and Japan as well as America.

What avenues lie open? War is as always a last resort. Any unilateral action on the part of America will not only push the North into potentially catastrophic reactions, but will also alienate America from East Asia, perhaps permanently (especially if the North chooses to bomb one or more Asian cities in the process). Unilateral aid is also a dicey business - the North has proven unreliable in its reactions and observers are right to fear giving signs of "rewarding bad behavior".

Ideally, America would communicate with the aforementioned nations and help to assemble a negotiating package that will show the North that nuclear threats will alienate the North from all its neighbors. This will require the cooperation of China, which has so far been largely silent, and South Korea, which is currently in mixed minds about rapprochement with the North.

Ideally, diplomatic dialogue from Russia, China, and South Korea should emphasize to the North that economic reforms will be supported and encouraged by the surrounding countries. Military posturing, on the other hand, will not. The real problem here is that none of these countries is confident enough to take the first step towards reconciliation, and America's anti-nuclear stance will only sound like a thinly veiled threat if it does not garner support from the region.

Bush's less-than-stellar foreign policy has been responsible for much of the anti-American sentiment in South Korea and China, but the administration is taking steps in the right direction by sending Powell to discuss the US' stance. Hopefully, by toning down the military rhetoric and stressing the very real economic support that will attend improved relations, the coalition of surrounding nations can help put North Korea back on the track that it was seeking on its own prior to last winter.

This will require some considerable sacrifices amongst the said nations.

America will have to look beyond the popular stereotypes and soundbites and be prepared to get its hands dirty with diplomatic and economic commitments. Also, the performance of America as regards Iraq will have dramatic repercussions on how the North views it. If America continues to prove itself unable to work with other nations (regardless of which side is actually to blame for this friction) the North will be less likely to side with a nation so distrusted by others. If America can win the support of China (or better still, support China as it brings a deal to the bargaining table) then that will conversely have a profound effect on the authenticity of whatever is offered.

China for its part will have to wrestle with the ideological imperatives of putting pressure on a regime that is its official ally, even though this alliance exists solely by way a defunct social philosophy (and one that China's own leaders have largely abandoned). China will also have to examine carefully the reasons behind its pointed derailing of North Korea's planned special economic zone (by arresting the Chinese national who was hand picked to manage it by Kim's leadership back in late 2002). Economic reform is an experiment that Kim Jong-Il seemed all too willing to try before it blew up in his face. Now, it will be harder to persuade him to attempt a reprieve - but such a prospect must be preferable to seeing him threaten to use nuclear weapons and destabilize the region. Such a prospect must also be more appetizing to Kim's own leadership than the continued embarrassment of losing their people across the poorly guarded Sino-Korean border.

Japan and South Korea, once symbolically united by the paired hosting of the World Cup, now have vastly different views of North Korea. That Japan's historical treatment of the North and other nations was less than honorable is not in doubt. That Japan's current relationship with Asian nations is very strong is also obvious. However, the Prime Minister's continued reluctance to foreswear Japan's historical ties to past atrocities (eg apologist schoolbooks, shrine visits) continues to be a sore point not only for the North, but also Korea and China. Economic forces dictate that Japan cannot disregard the sensibilities of its neighbors, but conservatism and patriotism have caused unnecessary international friction with the reward of ephemeral approval ratings at home.

South Korea has understandably the most complex relationship. Many voters saw entire families killed in battles against the North. Equally and opposingly, many voters still have entire families who live in the North. The present gestures of President Roh towards reconciliation are preferable to continued isolation, but they run the risk of over-effusiveness - caused in part by America's unpopular hostility to the North, and in part by an overestimation of Kim Jong Il's solidarity with the average South Korean. South Korea has the most to lose in any regional conflagration, but also has arguably the greatest claim to the North's diplomatic ear. A combined effort with the North's two closest neighbors may be able to effect a reversal yet.

Ultimately, the solution lies along a thin line between hardline obstructionism and solicitous ingratiation. In order to make the peninsula a safer place, the North must be presented with dialogue from all relevant states (no other arrangement can satisfy China/Russia/South Korea/Japan, let alone North Korea). Then it must be presented with a clear set of economic, political, and military reforms. Finally, it must be shown real and compelling economic rewards of cooperation - rewards that would be (as trade ultimately becomes) bilateral.

Japan, China, and South Korea themselves are examples of nations once locked in bitter conflict. Fifty years on, their relationship is such that although nationalist feelings may emerge every so often, military conflict is no longer a viable option.

Economic interdependence has a very profound and lasting sobering effect on even the most unpopular and isolated regimes. North Korea should prove no different, provided of course that it survives this current crisis.

In the event that it does not, prepare for some serious problems on a scale that would best be avoided at all costs.

[DuncanK]

AC,

Interesting post. I don't think there is much chance of economic or political reforms in NK. Kim Jong Il will not give up one bit of power. He seems to care very little about the people in his country, only for his own power. I think that military reforms are all that we could hope for with diplomatic efforts. We might be able to convince him to dismanlte some of his army or his nuclear weapons programs. Of course if the economy would completely implode in NK, that would be great.

[Q Classic]

Secondly, the question of "Who Fired First?" vis a vis the Korean War is still far from clear and to be honest, largely irrelevant. What we do know is that when the fighting was finished, China and North Korea had lost upwards of 1 million soldiers, and the combined force of American and UN military were unable to ultimately push back further than the 38th Parallel.

the north koreans fired first. their invasion occured on a sunday morning with multiple entry points both above and under ground.
south korea's military at that time was so disorganized that it most likely couldn't sh*t straight, let alone shoot.

As far as the present day situation is concerned, do not forget that Kim Jong Il as recently as October last year attempted to institute sweeping economic reforms. So although we are talking about a regime that is currently trying to convince the world of its capacity for widespread destruction, we are also talking about a regime that made very real and solid steps towards a more constructive approach. Those who dismiss Kim as a mere "lunatic" would do well to remember the hopes of economists all over the world late last year, when a hybrid capitalist market in N Korea was being touted as a possibility.

these "reforms" were done, at best, in a half-assed manner. largely unsuccessful, they have only succeeded in driving up the monetary cost of basic necessities without actually providing any economic gain. also, they've attempted to create a few "free economic zones", most notably around sinuiju. they unfortunately hired a chinese national who has since been arrested in china for criminal activities.
some reforms.

Bush's less-than-stellar foreign policy has been responsible for much of the anti-American sentiment in South Korea

this is somewhat true and also somewhat not. bush's foreign policy certainly hasn't helped; breaking off talks with north korea because it was a clintonian policy, then turning around (almost) full circle to where we are now has only weakened bush's position.
most of the anti-american sentiment, i believe, lies not with bush's rather moronic diplomacy and more with the state of the alliance between skorea and the us.
if those two girls hadn't been run over by those american troops, there would be less anti-ami sentiment.
if those two troops who ran over the girls had been tried in a korean court, there would be less anti-ami sentiment.
if those two troops had been convicted, there would be even less anti-ami sentiment.

as for the rest of ac's post, i agree with much of it.

=====

Because it's the US that cashes the checks. The power structure in the region would demand a massive reworking if SK chose otherwise. SK could choose to work for a reunification of the peninsula, which would give them an opportunity to become a free agent. But right now, there are too many agreements in place. And Roh's policies seem to indicate that he is not going for reunification any time soon.

you're right, the power structure would change. for one, the 600k+4million skorean troops would no longer be under the control of an american general. the korean military would also possibly buy more home-grown military hardware, as well as some non-american materiel; the recent rafale stink is only one example.
it is true that the us did cash the checks early on, and even until recently. but as korea's economy grows stronger, its military strength has grown proportionally as well. the us is no longer cashing all of the checks in the defense of south korea. indeed, the only two checks that the us is now, or could now be cashing are these: the nuclear umbrella, and the spilling of american blood (which invariably leads to further american involvement).

No, but some decisions carry more weight than others

i still don't see how this is anything but a condescending "daddy knows best" situation.

The US has the nuclear football and we've made it clear that a nuke attack on SK or Japan would result in a nuclear retaliation from the US. And a conventional attack on SK would result in the full force of American military might putting a hurting on NK. Ultimately, we are not going to have SK or Japan lead us into directions that we don't choose to go.

the only reason why skorea and japan haven't developed nuclear arms themselves (they certainly have the technology...) is because of the us umbrella. if the us were to withdraw it, both nations would undoubtedly want to develop their own.
as for a conventional attack by nkorea, if skorea were the defeated party, it would undoubtedly be a pyrrhic victory for nkorea. skorea is not only better armed, better trained, but also defended to the teeth. highways and major roads are built with tank traps; urban areas are easily defensible, with plazas that have chokepoints and defensive barriers. add to that at least 44 million people who seem to like democracy quite a bit, and are willing to fight for it... nkorea most likely will not try a conventional attack.
in all actuality, skorea and japan are the ones with the most to lose. ultimately and ideally, it should be skorea who calls most of the shots, with the backing japan and the us. the us does not have to follow in korea's lead, but it would certainly help if it did.

China? Let's agree on "friends". Somebody we can do business with...

"the enemy of my enemy is my friend/ally."
or, as the yiddish toast says: "I drink to the health of the enemies of my enemies."