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There were two articles on www.strategypage.com (most stuff is from gung-ho military guys - so be aware) last summer that were pretty interesting. I'll link them here and edit in a couple of snipets:
...the shaky nature of his fear-driven regime makes Iraqi WMD use, or threats of use, problematic after an American invasion starts.
Saddam's security forces would then have major incentives to shoot him, to produce a better outcome for themselves. Fear of Saddam would decrease, fear of us grow, and the chances of Saddam's assassination increase, at exponential rates after the invasion starts. The Iraqis learned to think of us as supermen during Desert Storm, with the Taliban's recent demise reminding them. There is no reasonable expectation of Iraqi survival once a U.S. invasion begins, even if Iraq then uses WMD.
Saddam's best chance of survival is therefore deterrence of invasion...
The Saudi regime has major problems at home such that we might not be able to keep them in power much longer even if we wanted to (its domestic problems are what drives its funding of terrorism), and it certainly can't stay in power if the U.S. government attempts to bring it down through overt (blockade) or covert means.
Interesting scenarios to consider, though clearly just that.
...the shaky nature of his fear-driven regime makes Iraqi WMD use, or threats of use, problematic after an American invasion starts.
Saddam's security forces would then have major incentives to shoot him, to produce a better outcome for themselves. Fear of Saddam would decrease, fear of us grow, and the chances of Saddam's assassination increase, at exponential rates after the invasion starts. The Iraqis learned to think of us as supermen during Desert Storm, with the Taliban's recent demise reminding them. There is no reasonable expectation of Iraqi survival once a U.S. invasion begins, even if Iraq then uses WMD.
Saddam's best chance of survival is therefore deterrence of invasion...
The Saudi regime has major problems at home such that we might not be able to keep them in power much longer even if we wanted to (its domestic problems are what drives its funding of terrorism), and it certainly can't stay in power if the U.S. government attempts to bring it down through overt (blockade) or covert means.
Interesting scenarios to consider, though clearly just that.
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