Oh this is priceless...

[David Floyd]

Sure it is. There's always the option not to wage aggressive war. Some people are either too stupid or too cowardly to take that option, though.

[Capt Dizle]

Bush seems to want to do Iran and N. Korea after Iraq. Gives pause.

[David Floyd]

What a bastard.

Bush, I mean.

[chequita guevara]

When I siad "our" choices, I mean us plebs, not us as a nation. Since Bush is a spineless moron doing whatever the Cheney-types tell him, and Congress is a a bunch of pineless morons whenever a Republican is in office, not going to war isn't gonna happen.

We had popular opinion against Bush Gulf War I, and a movement as big as the Vietnam anti-war movement in six months. Today the Pres is popular, has the backing of most of the American public (with some minor caveats), and a shattered left.

This war's going to happen. We can't stop it, though that doesn't mean we shouldn't try. Occassionally democracy does actually win.

[Schinkenjoe]

uhm you´re right

[Shi Huangdi]

"That would require the cooperation of Turkey, which is rather reluctant to give it."

they said they would if we forgave their debts...

[MichaeltheGreat]

Prior to Saddamizing I, there were all sorts of reports about how the Abrams tank in particular had trouble operating in the softer, sandier environments inland in Saudi and how the reliability of the tank was abysmal due to air fowling, etc.

There was all sorts of crap floating around in the press about US FUBARs and inability to take on Saddam. All of it wrong. Both abysmal failures and successes would not likely get reported at all, and anything that did would likely be intended that the word get out.

The major problems this time around are logistical, not operational, but I wouldn't give reported events like this exercise any credence. The truth could conceivably be much worse, or much better, but you can just about guarantee whatever it is, ain't this.

[Tingkai]

That article, and how the brass behaved, is a blast.

Ironically, it improves my opinion of the US military by showing that some generals still have imagination, even if the guy is retired.

The weird thing is the Marine general was being innovative while the brass were conventional while proclaiming that they were being innovative.

[David Floyd]

MtG, or anyone else who knows...

From what I have heard (and this is according to my International Relations prof who might or might not be a credible source), the US has the following forces available: 101st and 82nd Airborne, 10th Mountain, 49th Armored, and 28th, 35th, and 40th Infantry Divisions. If he is correct, the only formation listed that is armored or mechanized is the 49th Armored, and that is a National Guard formation. Of the others, the 10th is a light division suited to mountain warfare, the 82nd and 101st are specialized airborne/air assault units, and the other three are reserve infantry units.

This seems to indicate that the US will be fighting a less mobile war than in the first one, and thus will take more casualties.

On the other hand, my prof could be an idiot. My history one certainly is (he thinks Pearl Harbor was the first carrier attack on ships in port), as is my comparative politics one.

[MichaeltheGreat]

IIRC, the current active divisions (not counting reserve formations with division HQs) are:

US Army

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Inf. Div. (Mech)

1st Cavalry Div.

1st Armored Div.

10th Mtn. Div. (LI)

25th Inf. Div. (LI)

82nd Airborne Div.

101st Air Assault Div.

USMC:

1 MarDiv
2 MarDiv

Then some independent brigade and smaller units in both Army and Marines.

Mech Infantry divisions and the 1st Cav carry 5 line battalions of M-1 Abrams, IIRC, the 1st Armored carries an extra one. All carry 5 battalions of Mech Infantry, Engineer battalion, 3 battalions of arty, attack helo squadron, transport helo squadron, recon battalion, etc.

Reserve "divisions" are really just HQ units covering separate subordinate units which don't really train together - it's more tits on a bull stuff than anything else.

10th Mtn and 101st ABD have substantial assets commited in Afghanistan, 2nd Inf is commited in Korea, so major parts of them are out.

The reserve combat formations (as opposed to CS and CSS formations) aren't worth a ****, except perhaps as rear security and occupation forces.

25th is a light fighter outfit in Hawaii, they're jungle fighters, so not usefull in Iraq, although you might see things like their MP units and cav brigade (transport and attack helos) borrowed.

The mobility is there, the problem is that as you move deeper and deeper, the fuel requirements for those mobile formations are pretty huge, and they are grand prize targets. The advantage to attacking out of Saudi would be the huge amount of space in which you could build up and protect your main supply centers, and the flexibility you have in logistics. Attacking out of Kuwait is just the opposit - all your stuff is in a fairly small area, and traffic management, etc. is a *****.

[Dinner]

This recieved alot of press about two weeks ago. The culmination was when Van Riper contacted the media and publicly said the excercise was rigged and had wasted $250 million. The pentigon called him "a disgruntled former general who's attacks were politically motivated". If he was eratic and politically motivated then why was he choicen to lead the opposition to begin with? Could it be that the Bushies are trying to cover up their own incompetence?

[David Floyd]

MtG, yeah, except I don't believe the 2nd Infantry is considered mechanized.

I was just reposting what my prof said, I didn't really believe him regarding those reserve divisions, but I didn't know if anyone had better info on that.

Oh, and I believe there's also a 3rd Marine Division (based in Okinawa, unless that changed in the past few years).

[Dinner]

I agree that Iraq couldn't beat the U.S. but why waste $250 million on an excercise if you are just going to ignore the results of the excercise?

[TheStinger]

Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat
IIRC, the current active divisions (not counting reserve formations with division HQs) are:

US Army

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Inf. Div. (Mech)

1st Cavalry Div.

1st Armored Div.

10th Mtn. Div. (LI)

25th Inf. Div. (LI)

82nd Airborne Div.

101st Air Assault Div.

USMC:

1 MarDiv
2 MarDiv

Then some independent brigade and smaller units in both Army and Marines.

Mech Infantry divisions and the 1st Cav carry 5 line battalions of M-1 Abrams, IIRC, the 1st Armored carries an extra one. All carry 5 battalions of Mech Infantry, Engineer battalion, 3 battalions of arty, attack helo squadron, transport helo squadron, recon battalion, etc.

Reserve "divisions" are really just HQ units covering separate subordinate units which don't really train together - it's more tits on a bull stuff than anything else.

10th Mtn and 101st ABD have substantial assets commited in Afghanistan, 2nd Inf is commited in Korea, so major parts of them are out.

The reserve combat formations (as opposed to CS and CSS formations) aren't worth a ****, except perhaps as rear security and occupation forces.

25th is a light fighter outfit in Hawaii, they're jungle fighters, so not usefull in Iraq, although you might see things like their MP units and cav brigade (transport and attack helos) borrowed.

The mobility is there, the problem is that as you move deeper and deeper, the fuel requirements for those mobile formations are pretty huge, and they are grand prize targets. The advantage to attacking out of Saudi would be the huge amount of space in which you could build up and protect your main supply centers, and the flexibility you have in logistics. Attacking out of Kuwait is just the opposit - all your stuff is in a fairly small area, and traffic management, etc. is a *****.

And by gutting the entire British Army you can have an extra armoured division with tanks that don't work for more than a day or so in the desert and with radios everyone can listen to

[Thucydides]

Don't forget that 1st Infantry Division has a substantial portion of it's force deployed to the Balkans (and they will continue to be deployed until the middle of next year)