In the past few days we've been talking about the ME, AIDS, etc, etc. But the most important issue has escaped us. I've been following it over the past few days, very intensely. I know our Greek friends have also looked over it with apprehension.
The ailing Ecevit continues to try to hold power as his party collapses. Cem, the popular foriegn minister just left to join the new party consisting of Ecevit's party members that want him to go. The economic minister was about to jump ship as well, but was convinced to stay on because of the IMF loans Turkey must pay off.
We can only hope this ends well and the White Party doesn't win control in the next elections, whenever they may be.
A government on the brink
Jul 12th 2002
From The Economist Global Agenda
Turkey is the International Monetary Fund’s biggest borrower, an applicant to join the European Union, the only Muslim country in the NATO defence pact and a key strategic partner of the United States. Now its government is collapsing
THE one accusation that cannot be made against Bulent Ecevit, Turkey's ailing and besieged prime minister, is that he is a quitter. The 77-year-old premier has clung to power all week as cabinet ministers and party comrades have deserted him and coalition partners have threatened to do the same.
The three-party coalition government led by Mr Ecevit was thrown into chaos at the beginning of the week by the resignation of his key right-hand man, deputy prime minister Husamettin Ozkan. A wave of resignations followed, with seven ministers and 40 members of Mr Ecevit's parliamentary party deserting him.
What has allowed Mr Ecevit to cling to office all week is the fact that there are few palatable political options facing Turkey. Early elections might let a pro-Islamic party, currently the country’s most popular party, into government. This is a prospect which dismays not only Turkey’s western allies, but also its secular generals. With the existing government coalition falling apart, delaying elections promises only continuing paralysis and endless squabbling at a time when the government faces pressing economic and political decisions. The resignations have dealt a blow to Turkey’s struggling economy, with the value of the Turkish currency hitting record lows against the American dollar.
On Thursday July 11th, Turkey’s political crisis deepened further when Ismail Cem, the respected foreign minister, resigned. He was followed a few hours later by Kemal Dervis, the economy minister, but Mr Dervis was then persuaded to withdraw his resignation, at least for the moment. Mr Dervis plays a key role, managing the government's relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and he seems to have returned to the government solely to stop the financial markets from panicking. Mr Cem announced to a press conference that he is forming a new pro-western political party with Mr Ozkan and Mr Dervis. Mr Ecevit promptly replied that Mr Dervis had promised not to join the new grouping.
The crisis has been sparked by Mr Ecevit's refusal to name a successor or to step aside. He has spent more than two months in bed under the care of his autocratic wife, Rahsan, and his afflictions range from a spinal disorder via cracked ribs and a thrombosis to loss of appetite. Despite this, he has clung mulishly to power, refusing repeated calls for him to step down and insisting instead that he must remain in charge until April 2004, when parliamentary elections are due. In so doing, he is putting at risk not only a crucial economic-recovery programme being overseen by the IMF, but the very future of Turkey, a strategic pivot between Europe and the Middle East.
Mr Ecevit’s stubbornness has proved too much even for his closest political allies. Mr Ozkan, widely credited with bridging differences within the coalition, resigned on Monday July 8th, after a row with the prime minister. He was promptly followed by others. The defectors issued a statement claiming that their resignations had been sparked by the “disloyalty” which Mr Ecevit had displayed towards Mr Ozkan, an apparent reference to an earlier agreement to step aside in his favour.
What happens next is difficult to see. The ruling coalition has been an awkward one: Mr Ecevit’s DSP, the centre-right Motherland party and the far-right Nationalist Action Party. Yet until recently it has been among the more stable governments in Turkey’s modern history, pushing through sweeping financial reforms endorsed by the IMF, which lent it $16 billion earlier this year to help it roll over its $200 billion in public debt. The government also seemed ready to face up to a series of tough political decisions. But this success has been threatened by Mr Ecevit’s prolonged ill health and refusal to hand over to a successor.
If early elections are held, polls suggest that none of the parties in the ruling coalition would even get the 10% of votes needed to win seats at all and that Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamic-minded White party would grab the biggest share. That would upset Turkey’s American allies, who distrust his attitude to the West and to Israel. It would also upset Turkey’s fiercely secular generals. Most probably they would block Mr Erdogan’s road to power, and in so doing further tarnish Turkey’s democratic credentials.
On the other hand, patching together a new government will not be easy, and may take time that Turkey can ill afford. Turkey's western partners are now praying for a quick resolution, and would enthusiastically back a new party led by Mr Cem and Mr Ozkan. Mr Ozkan's deal-making skills, it is thought, might be able to hold a new coalition together. Mr Cem, a committed Europhile who is well-liked by the public, would guarantee good relations with the EU. Mr Dervis, who would almost certainly join them, would be able to continue to manage Turkey's relationship with the IMF and foreign banks. He was brought in last year from a job at the World Bank. He is hardworking, honest, personable and a firm backer of the sorts of changes sought both by the EU and the IMF.
But there could still be one big obstacle in the way of such a neat resolution: Devlet Bahceli, the Nationalist leader and also a deputy prime minister. His party was the second largest in parliament. He helped spark the current crisis when he threatened to pull out of the ruling coalition. He has refused to agree to any deal which the government might strike with the opposition to end the death penalty, something that has been demanded by the EU as the price of membership. It would also spare the neck of Abdullah Ocalan, the captured Kurdish rebel leader. Mr Bahceli, who has aspirations to lead the government himself, is now head of the largest party in parliament. If Turkey’s non-executive president, Necdet Sezer, now asked Mr Bahceli to head a new coalition, the IMF and EU would be appalled. Mr Bahceli’s party is ultra-nationalist (some call it neo-fascist) and its forebear, in the 1970s and 1980s, was engaged in street violence and racketeering. Mr Bahceli is still inclined to make populist promises that would scupper the IMF’s efforts to put Turkey’s budget back into shape and inveighs against easing bans on Kurdish-language education and broadcasting.
These, along with abolition of the death penalty and ending torture in police cells and prisons, are among the demands made by the EU before it will name a date for starting negotiations on Turkish membership. The government last month decided to lift the state of emergency in two mainly Kurdish provinces in the south-east, leaving only Diyarbakir and Sirnak, which is on the Iraqi border, under such rule. But parents across Turkey are still being prosecuted for giving their children Kurdish names, and publications fined for using the letter W, part of the Kurdish alphabet but not the Turkish one, on the ground that such things encourage ethnic separatism.
An accord in Cyprus remains out of reach, which increases the risk that the EU will admit what would, in practice, be only the Greek-run bit of the island on its own—and that Turkey’s own hopes of EU membership would be swamped by nationalist and Islamist sentiment. Turkey, as one EU diplomat puts it, might then go down “the Uzbek road”, becoming nothing more than “an aircraft-carrier for the Americans” from which to harry Iraq and Iran. That need not happen. The great majority of Turks, and indeed Turkish Cypriots, want to join the EU. That may mean some arm-twisting of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish-Cypriot leader but that, in turn, requires a Turkish government confident that it can remain in power.
All members of the ruling, and now crumbling, coalition have reasons to avoid an early election, which could bring electoral ruin to each of them. But whether they can agree a new government, and one that can continue to push through painful economic and political changes, remains to be seen. One thing seems certain: they do not have much time left. Turkey needs to keep borrowing to finance its debt, and if there are two things that lenders hate, they are a collapsing currency and endless uncertainty.
Jul 12th 2002
From The Economist Global Agenda
Turkey is the International Monetary Fund’s biggest borrower, an applicant to join the European Union, the only Muslim country in the NATO defence pact and a key strategic partner of the United States. Now its government is collapsing
THE one accusation that cannot be made against Bulent Ecevit, Turkey's ailing and besieged prime minister, is that he is a quitter. The 77-year-old premier has clung to power all week as cabinet ministers and party comrades have deserted him and coalition partners have threatened to do the same.
The three-party coalition government led by Mr Ecevit was thrown into chaos at the beginning of the week by the resignation of his key right-hand man, deputy prime minister Husamettin Ozkan. A wave of resignations followed, with seven ministers and 40 members of Mr Ecevit's parliamentary party deserting him.
What has allowed Mr Ecevit to cling to office all week is the fact that there are few palatable political options facing Turkey. Early elections might let a pro-Islamic party, currently the country’s most popular party, into government. This is a prospect which dismays not only Turkey’s western allies, but also its secular generals. With the existing government coalition falling apart, delaying elections promises only continuing paralysis and endless squabbling at a time when the government faces pressing economic and political decisions. The resignations have dealt a blow to Turkey’s struggling economy, with the value of the Turkish currency hitting record lows against the American dollar.
On Thursday July 11th, Turkey’s political crisis deepened further when Ismail Cem, the respected foreign minister, resigned. He was followed a few hours later by Kemal Dervis, the economy minister, but Mr Dervis was then persuaded to withdraw his resignation, at least for the moment. Mr Dervis plays a key role, managing the government's relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and he seems to have returned to the government solely to stop the financial markets from panicking. Mr Cem announced to a press conference that he is forming a new pro-western political party with Mr Ozkan and Mr Dervis. Mr Ecevit promptly replied that Mr Dervis had promised not to join the new grouping.
The crisis has been sparked by Mr Ecevit's refusal to name a successor or to step aside. He has spent more than two months in bed under the care of his autocratic wife, Rahsan, and his afflictions range from a spinal disorder via cracked ribs and a thrombosis to loss of appetite. Despite this, he has clung mulishly to power, refusing repeated calls for him to step down and insisting instead that he must remain in charge until April 2004, when parliamentary elections are due. In so doing, he is putting at risk not only a crucial economic-recovery programme being overseen by the IMF, but the very future of Turkey, a strategic pivot between Europe and the Middle East.
Mr Ecevit’s stubbornness has proved too much even for his closest political allies. Mr Ozkan, widely credited with bridging differences within the coalition, resigned on Monday July 8th, after a row with the prime minister. He was promptly followed by others. The defectors issued a statement claiming that their resignations had been sparked by the “disloyalty” which Mr Ecevit had displayed towards Mr Ozkan, an apparent reference to an earlier agreement to step aside in his favour.
What happens next is difficult to see. The ruling coalition has been an awkward one: Mr Ecevit’s DSP, the centre-right Motherland party and the far-right Nationalist Action Party. Yet until recently it has been among the more stable governments in Turkey’s modern history, pushing through sweeping financial reforms endorsed by the IMF, which lent it $16 billion earlier this year to help it roll over its $200 billion in public debt. The government also seemed ready to face up to a series of tough political decisions. But this success has been threatened by Mr Ecevit’s prolonged ill health and refusal to hand over to a successor.
If early elections are held, polls suggest that none of the parties in the ruling coalition would even get the 10% of votes needed to win seats at all and that Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamic-minded White party would grab the biggest share. That would upset Turkey’s American allies, who distrust his attitude to the West and to Israel. It would also upset Turkey’s fiercely secular generals. Most probably they would block Mr Erdogan’s road to power, and in so doing further tarnish Turkey’s democratic credentials.
On the other hand, patching together a new government will not be easy, and may take time that Turkey can ill afford. Turkey's western partners are now praying for a quick resolution, and would enthusiastically back a new party led by Mr Cem and Mr Ozkan. Mr Ozkan's deal-making skills, it is thought, might be able to hold a new coalition together. Mr Cem, a committed Europhile who is well-liked by the public, would guarantee good relations with the EU. Mr Dervis, who would almost certainly join them, would be able to continue to manage Turkey's relationship with the IMF and foreign banks. He was brought in last year from a job at the World Bank. He is hardworking, honest, personable and a firm backer of the sorts of changes sought both by the EU and the IMF.
But there could still be one big obstacle in the way of such a neat resolution: Devlet Bahceli, the Nationalist leader and also a deputy prime minister. His party was the second largest in parliament. He helped spark the current crisis when he threatened to pull out of the ruling coalition. He has refused to agree to any deal which the government might strike with the opposition to end the death penalty, something that has been demanded by the EU as the price of membership. It would also spare the neck of Abdullah Ocalan, the captured Kurdish rebel leader. Mr Bahceli, who has aspirations to lead the government himself, is now head of the largest party in parliament. If Turkey’s non-executive president, Necdet Sezer, now asked Mr Bahceli to head a new coalition, the IMF and EU would be appalled. Mr Bahceli’s party is ultra-nationalist (some call it neo-fascist) and its forebear, in the 1970s and 1980s, was engaged in street violence and racketeering. Mr Bahceli is still inclined to make populist promises that would scupper the IMF’s efforts to put Turkey’s budget back into shape and inveighs against easing bans on Kurdish-language education and broadcasting.
These, along with abolition of the death penalty and ending torture in police cells and prisons, are among the demands made by the EU before it will name a date for starting negotiations on Turkish membership. The government last month decided to lift the state of emergency in two mainly Kurdish provinces in the south-east, leaving only Diyarbakir and Sirnak, which is on the Iraqi border, under such rule. But parents across Turkey are still being prosecuted for giving their children Kurdish names, and publications fined for using the letter W, part of the Kurdish alphabet but not the Turkish one, on the ground that such things encourage ethnic separatism.
An accord in Cyprus remains out of reach, which increases the risk that the EU will admit what would, in practice, be only the Greek-run bit of the island on its own—and that Turkey’s own hopes of EU membership would be swamped by nationalist and Islamist sentiment. Turkey, as one EU diplomat puts it, might then go down “the Uzbek road”, becoming nothing more than “an aircraft-carrier for the Americans” from which to harry Iraq and Iran. That need not happen. The great majority of Turks, and indeed Turkish Cypriots, want to join the EU. That may mean some arm-twisting of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish-Cypriot leader but that, in turn, requires a Turkish government confident that it can remain in power.
All members of the ruling, and now crumbling, coalition have reasons to avoid an early election, which could bring electoral ruin to each of them. But whether they can agree a new government, and one that can continue to push through painful economic and political changes, remains to be seen. One thing seems certain: they do not have much time left. Turkey needs to keep borrowing to finance its debt, and if there are two things that lenders hate, they are a collapsing currency and endless uncertainty.
The ailing Ecevit continues to try to hold power as his party collapses. Cem, the popular foriegn minister just left to join the new party consisting of Ecevit's party members that want him to go. The economic minister was about to jump ship as well, but was convinced to stay on because of the IMF loans Turkey must pay off.
We can only hope this ends well and the White Party doesn't win control in the next elections, whenever they may be.
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