Did the Axis have any chance at all in WWII?

[David Floyd]

I urge you to read the entire Tojo document. Japan had "decided" on war in the summer - when the embargo was imposed - if they could not get the U.S. to reverse the embargo. They began moving troops from Northern Indo-China south. They began other maneuvers. They launched their fleet toward Pearl, as you said.

At the same time, they continued to negotiate. The private communiques to their ambassador in the U.S. gave him 'til the 25th to get a deal.

There are two ways to interpret these events. One is that the negotiations were a ploy. The other is that they were genuine. But, even if they were a ploy, nothing changed on Nov. 20 to "deteriorate" the situation from what it had been in the summer. The U.S. had not changed its position, nor made any concessions, nor increased its demands. The oil supply situation did not suddenly deteriorate. Nothing of substance changed from the summer - save for one thing. The disaster before Moscow.

OK, but what you aren't seeing is that the Japanese were committed to an attack long before Operation Typhoon. Elements of their Pearl Harbor fleet were at sea even before negotiations were cut off, and a German victory in Russia would not have changed the fact that they had to have oil.

The US probably would have gone to war if Japan attacked British or Dutch possessions, and so the US fleet had to be eliminated as well as (more importantly) the US position in the Philippines.

Finally, you are assuming much more German-Japanese cooperation than actually existed. If Japan wanted to help Germany, they would have gotten aggressive in Manchuria, reinforcing the Kwangtung army fortifications, in order to pin the Far East Military District's forces in place.

Sikander,

DF's assertion that the Allied landings in North Africa (Torch) stripped critical reserves from Manstein which in his opinion kept him from relieving Stalingrad are IMO fanciful. As difficult as it was for the Axis to deploy those troops to Tunisia, it would have been just as difficult to deliver and supply them deep in Southern Russia over a patched together rail network that was often only one track wide.

I disagree. First off, some of the reserves were taken from the Russian front. Secondly, what was definitely taken from the Russian front was a significant chunk of the Luftwaffe, including over 400 transport aircraft. Manstein's 57th Panzer Corps got to within 45 miles of Stalingrad, and if it could have gotten to 20, 6th Army had plans to breakout, notwithstanding Hitler. A combination of not enough mobile forces and Zhukov's counteroffensive broke Manstein's effort, but without Torch, hundreds more aircraft and thousands of more men would have been available both to bolster Romanian 3rd Army and Manstein's relief force, and to attempt to supply 6th Army in Stalingrad.
Doesn't guarantee success, just gives the Germans a fighting chance.

David has it almost right when he states that the Germans needed more time rather than more force. What they actually needed more than time (which IMO was working in favor of the Soviets) was supply.

True, but with or without more supply, given a bit more time earlier in the year Moscow probably would have fallen. This time can come even from skipping the Balkans campaign (bad idea) or saving Kiev for later (good idea - the million troops in the Ukraine would have been in trouble without the Moscow transportation and communications hub).

[Ned]

The point about the Siberian railway is enough to force me to change my views. Even if that was insufficient to supply Japan with oil, it still does not make the peace negotiations a mere ploy.

I do think, however, that Japan's concessions made in the Nov. 20 note were linked to Moscow. Part of their war plan was to keep the USSR out of the Pacific War. With the events at Moscow, that was no longer guaranteed as a Soviet defeat was no longer inevitable.

Japan should have conceded to all American points. War with the U.S. could not have been won. What were they thinking?

In retrospect, just as Sikander pointed out, Germany did not have the resources to beat the U.K. alone. The attack on the USSR made no sense. The further declaration of War on the U.S. added to their deficit.

Germany should have have tried to negotiate peace soon after the fall of France. They could have traded France for the parts of Poland they wanted.

Ned

[David Floyd]

I do think, however, that Japan's concessions made in the Nov. 20 note were linked to Moscow. Part of their war plan was to keep the USSR out of the Pacific War. With the events at Moscow, that was no longer guaranteed as a Soviet defeat was no longer inevitable.

Hmmm. I still disagree - by the time the "concessions" were made, the Pearl Harbor attack was almost a certainty. To paraphrase a Soviet character in "Red Storm Rising", one does not assemble a large fleet in order to attack, only to call it back.

Japan should have conceded to all American points. War with the U.S. could not have been won. What were they thinking?

Conceding everything to the US was an impossibility because of the Japanese society's fanaticism about "face" - really, pride.
Their current war in China could not have been continued without oil, and that would have resulted in a loss of face. Most Japanese - especially the Army - felt Japan was invincible, so war with the US was nothing to them.

[Az]

"To paraphrase a Soviet character in "Red Storm Rising", one does not assemble a large fleet in order to attack, only to call it back. "

I hope that you don't always base your analisys on Tom Clancy , esp., the Cold War period books.

[David Floyd]

No, I was just making a point - I think that what was said is certainly vlid in that case.

[DarthVeda]

The only way Japan could have defeated the U.S. is to have, before the end of 1942, to have:

1: Sunk the entire U.S. surface fleet.
2: Occupied the Panama Canal (not entirely unfeasible)
3: Occupied the Hawaiian Islands
4: Occupied the entire South Pacific, Including Australia, and in the process capture MacArthur
5: Destroyed the ship tending, fueling, repairing, and constructing capabilities of the West coast by using carrier aircraft.

That would have put them into great position by 1943.

Now since their hold on the Panama canal would be unteniable, they would have to sabotage it in the following ways: sink numerous vessels in its straights (that would have to be raised later to allow passage), and then damage and/or destroy the locks and physical parts of the canal. Then they would have to abandon panama (again, unteniable).

By this point I'm fairly certain that the U.S. would abandon it's Germany-first policy, preventing landings in Italy and badly delaying D-Day. Another factor in taking out the Panama is that the U.S. would be unable to deploy new submarines to the West Coast fight, giving the Japanese a key advantage lost IRL in logistics.

Now here's where the strategy gets a little fuzy. Japan would have to have found some way of convincing the U.S. that the war was not worth continuing beyond this point. Here's one idea:

1: Occupation of Vancouver Island and subsiquent buildup of Air Forces in the Area would allow them to run raids on all of the West Coast. Also the occupation of the Islands of the puget sound.

By now it can be assumed that the U.S. is putting all efforts into West Coast defense.

2: Keeping the Puget safe with artillery, aircraft, and preferably, lots of mines, the Japanese could then use their air force to pulverize more of the west coast.

At this point the Japanese can sit back and force a peace settlement through attrition (ie complete and utter naval superiority in the Pacific could smash any American attempts to do anything about it). Despite the magnificent American industrial output, without a Navy to pave the way for the men and bombers, there is nothing that can be done. And the U.S. is certainly incapable of materializing a fleet out of thin air.

The question remains: how much more enduring is the American taste for blood than it's taste for a peace settlement? I can't really say. Perhaps the Americans would settle and have a cold war in the Pacific for generations. Perhaps they would sign a cease-fire so that they could attend to Germany and return to Japan at a later date.

[Az]

No, I was just making a point - I think that what was said is certainly vlid in that case.

Darth Veda: I mostly agree , with some reservations.

1: Occupation of Vancouver Island and subsiquent buildup of Air Forces in the Area would allow them to run raids on all of the West Coast. Also the occupation of the Islands of the puget sound.

totally unfeasable. how would they transport land based aircraft there ? this is just one point , that allows the US to destroy any such attempt. with more industrial output, and land based fighters (which are IIRC ,with larger range , than the carrier-based ones ) the US would quickly establish airial control over the region. (maybe the japs could attack the coastal population centers , and scare the americans, using the battleships)

anyhow , assuming SU and brits would win the European war, the SU could attack China , and subsequently Japan.

[Ned]

Darth, Good post.

David, If we knew all that about the Japanese character, then knew that placing an embargo on them would lead to open warfare.

It is a wonder we were not more prepared.

However, why did we embargo Japan in the first place knowing it would drive them to war against us?

Did Roosevelt plan all this?

Ned

[Garth Vader]

Darth, interesting post!


Germany should have have tried to negotiate peace soon after the fall of France. They could have traded France for the parts of Poland they wanted.


IIRC, they did. Churchill wouldn't agree to anything. Hitler probably didn't offer much, but Churchill made it clear he wouldn't stand for anything except Germanys surrender.

[Ned]

Originally posted by Garth Vader
Darth, interesting post!


Germany should have have tried to negotiate peace soon after the fall of France. They could have traded France for the parts of Poland they wanted.


IIRC, they did. Churchill wouldn't agree to anything. Hitler probably didn't offer much, but Churchill made it clear he wouldn't stand for anything except Germanys surrender.

Garth, I am very surprised the British position was so hard immediately after the fall of France. The mere idea that Germany would surrender at that point is simply preposterous.

Ned

[David Floyd]

David, If we knew all that about the Japanese character, then knew that placing an embargo on them would lead to open warfare.

Maybe they did know or suspect as much, or maybe at the time they weren't aware as much as we are now. *shrug*

It is a wonder we were not more prepared.

Not really - FDR most likely wanted us to be attacked.

However, why did we embargo Japan in the first place knowing it would drive them to war against us?

The US public wanted us to give help to China.

Did Roosevelt plan all this?

Who knows? It's very possible - FDR was basically a bastard.

[Ned]

Originally posted by David Floyd

Who knows? It's very possible - FDR was basically a bastard.

Really?

Ned

[David Floyd]

Yes, I think so.

[Ned]

David, I recall in another thread that you thought that FDR was wrong to engage in the acts that brought on WWII in the Pacific. Today you say you are not sure that Roosevelt actually knew that his actions would cause a war.

Two questions:

Given the uncertainty of that the embargo would cause a war, are you still against the embargo? After all, it was intended to stop Japan's aggression in China and SE Asia.

If the answer to the above is no, what, in your opinion, should the U.S. have done to oppose Japanese aggression, if anything?

Ned

[David Floyd]

David, I recall in another thread that you thought that FDR was wrong to engage in the acts that brought on WWII in the Pacific. Today you say you are not sure that Roosevelt actually knew that his actions would cause a war.

There is no firm evidence as to his INTENT, which was what I was saying.

Given the uncertainty of that the embargo would cause a war, are you still against the embargo?

Yes, absolutely opposed as it restricted the ability of US companies to do business with whom they chose.

If the answer to the above is no, what, in your opinion, should the U.S. have done to oppose Japanese aggression, if anything?

Strong diplomatic protests - as for DOING something, no, nothing should have been done (I have the same opinion, incidentally of Hitler's moves in Europe - moving into the Rhineland, for example, was nothing more than reocupying rightful German territory stripped by an immoral treaty forced by the victors).