Tweet
I have don't have time right now to stick around, but I had to post this editorial from the washington post. It basically reiterates the same point I have made repeatedly on these ME thread during the last months: Sharon is not interested in peace, and has never been. Sharon and Hamas are two sides of the same coin.
Though they may be sworn enemies, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the Hamas terrorist movement have spent the past week engaged in the same exercise -- trying to push Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority over the precipice on which it teeters, without being blamed for the subsequent crash.
Even as it shreds Arafat's international standing with a steady stream of suicide bombs, Hamas protests that its real goal is to defend the Palestinian president against Israel. And even while he bombs Arafat's offices and security headquarters, Sharon insists that he's only trying to inspire his old enemy to take on the terrorists -- whose quarters Israel has left untouched the past seven days.
It's not that either Sharon or Hamas worries about a pro-Arafat backlash -- the old man has lost his last defenders both at home and abroad. But neither wants its fingerprints on the most likely consequence of the chairman's downfall -- the final destruction of the Oslo peace process, that vision of a peaceful negotiated settlement between Israel and a new Palestinian state that is still supported, in theory, by the overwhelming majority of both peoples.
The hawks in Israel and Washington who have been demanding Arafat's ouster usually fail to offer any idea of what would happen afterward. But both Hamas and Sharon have a post-Arafat plan -- one that starts by turning the clock back a decade, before Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization agreed to recognize each other at Oslo. Hamas's idea is to drive Israel from the West Bank and Gaza with suicide bombings, then, after consolidating an Islamic Palestinian regime, mount a war to liquidate Israel altogether. Sharon and those who egg him on want to lead Israelis into a new era of bloody struggle that will consolidate their control over far larger stretches of territory than could ever be obtained in a negotiated deal. If only his people will commit themselves to a few years of old-fashioned Zionist sacrifice, Sharon figures, the next Israeli generation could settle with the Palestinians from a new position of strength.
These are dangerous dreams, and most Israelis and Palestinians know it. So Sharon and Hamas don't talk about them much -- instead, they peddle the short-term goals they know will sell to their audiences at home and abroad. Hamas says it is merely resisting Israel's oppressive occupation of Palestinian territory and avenging its assassination of Palestinian militants -- a position that has won it increasing popularity among both average West Bankers and the al-Jazeera television audience around the region. Sharon, of course, insists that he is merely fighting terrorism, just like the United States in Afghanistan -- never mind that the Bush administration has no plan to settle and annex Afghan territory.
For most of the 1990s, these pitches never worked -- Israelis and Palestinians accepted that their only genuine out lay in a negotiated settlement. They knew it because decades of terrorism and retaliatory violence, and 26 years of full Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, had proven that neither side could ever hope to obtain its maximalist goals. The terrible achievement of Arafat is that in a mere 14 months he has gone from the brink of ending the occupation and its violence to convincing both sides that it is, at least for now, the only choice -- and thereby allowed the maximalist agendas to rise from the dead.
There may be no way to save him and his tattered administration now. Arafat is no more capable of moving decisively against Hamas than he was able to accept the extraordinary peace settlement he could have signed just over a year ago. To do either would require making the kind of irrevocable choice that he has evaded all his life. The best that might be expected are enough half-measures to hold back Hamas -- and Sharon -- and return the situation to a U.S.-sponsored stalemate. The stalemate is terrible, but it has two advantages: It prevents Palestinian extremists from taking power and Israel from fully reoccupying the territories; and it preserves the cadre of Palestinian peacemakers who still cluster around Arafat, desperately hoping to somehow, someday steer their people back to the Oslo deal.
These are sophisticated, passionate civilian politicians who represent the Palestinians' would-be modernizing elite: people such as Nabil Shaath and Saeb Erekat, Sari Nusseibeh and Yasser Abed Rabbo. As a group, they are probably the smartest, most worldly and most pro-Western political elite in the Middle East -- and, ironically, the one with the best chance of creating a genuine Arab democracy some day. History has stuck them with Arafat; they roll their eyes over his frequent flights of fantasy, tear their hair at his inability to lead, but fear for his life. Sharon would have you believe that they would step in if Arafat fell, but they feel differently: His collapse now, they say, would touch off bitter power struggles that -- thanks to the 700 Palestinian deaths during the past year and Israel's relentless military pressure -- the extremists would most likely win.
Far better for the Palestinians that Arafat go quietly, after a period of U.S.-supervised stalemate and reduced tensions, and in a way that preserves the Palestinian Authority and its political class. There would still be turmoil, but chances would be greater that a new leadership would emerge that would embrace the tough choices Arafat has been unable to make. Such an outcome, of course, would mean oblivion for Sharon and for Hamas. That is why they both would like to push Arafat over the brink now, so that he takes the peacemakers with him. Sharon and the terrorists share a secret dream: to clear the field for each other.
Though they may be sworn enemies, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the Hamas terrorist movement have spent the past week engaged in the same exercise -- trying to push Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority over the precipice on which it teeters, without being blamed for the subsequent crash.
Even as it shreds Arafat's international standing with a steady stream of suicide bombs, Hamas protests that its real goal is to defend the Palestinian president against Israel. And even while he bombs Arafat's offices and security headquarters, Sharon insists that he's only trying to inspire his old enemy to take on the terrorists -- whose quarters Israel has left untouched the past seven days.
It's not that either Sharon or Hamas worries about a pro-Arafat backlash -- the old man has lost his last defenders both at home and abroad. But neither wants its fingerprints on the most likely consequence of the chairman's downfall -- the final destruction of the Oslo peace process, that vision of a peaceful negotiated settlement between Israel and a new Palestinian state that is still supported, in theory, by the overwhelming majority of both peoples.
The hawks in Israel and Washington who have been demanding Arafat's ouster usually fail to offer any idea of what would happen afterward. But both Hamas and Sharon have a post-Arafat plan -- one that starts by turning the clock back a decade, before Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization agreed to recognize each other at Oslo. Hamas's idea is to drive Israel from the West Bank and Gaza with suicide bombings, then, after consolidating an Islamic Palestinian regime, mount a war to liquidate Israel altogether. Sharon and those who egg him on want to lead Israelis into a new era of bloody struggle that will consolidate their control over far larger stretches of territory than could ever be obtained in a negotiated deal. If only his people will commit themselves to a few years of old-fashioned Zionist sacrifice, Sharon figures, the next Israeli generation could settle with the Palestinians from a new position of strength.
These are dangerous dreams, and most Israelis and Palestinians know it. So Sharon and Hamas don't talk about them much -- instead, they peddle the short-term goals they know will sell to their audiences at home and abroad. Hamas says it is merely resisting Israel's oppressive occupation of Palestinian territory and avenging its assassination of Palestinian militants -- a position that has won it increasing popularity among both average West Bankers and the al-Jazeera television audience around the region. Sharon, of course, insists that he is merely fighting terrorism, just like the United States in Afghanistan -- never mind that the Bush administration has no plan to settle and annex Afghan territory.
For most of the 1990s, these pitches never worked -- Israelis and Palestinians accepted that their only genuine out lay in a negotiated settlement. They knew it because decades of terrorism and retaliatory violence, and 26 years of full Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, had proven that neither side could ever hope to obtain its maximalist goals. The terrible achievement of Arafat is that in a mere 14 months he has gone from the brink of ending the occupation and its violence to convincing both sides that it is, at least for now, the only choice -- and thereby allowed the maximalist agendas to rise from the dead.
There may be no way to save him and his tattered administration now. Arafat is no more capable of moving decisively against Hamas than he was able to accept the extraordinary peace settlement he could have signed just over a year ago. To do either would require making the kind of irrevocable choice that he has evaded all his life. The best that might be expected are enough half-measures to hold back Hamas -- and Sharon -- and return the situation to a U.S.-sponsored stalemate. The stalemate is terrible, but it has two advantages: It prevents Palestinian extremists from taking power and Israel from fully reoccupying the territories; and it preserves the cadre of Palestinian peacemakers who still cluster around Arafat, desperately hoping to somehow, someday steer their people back to the Oslo deal.
These are sophisticated, passionate civilian politicians who represent the Palestinians' would-be modernizing elite: people such as Nabil Shaath and Saeb Erekat, Sari Nusseibeh and Yasser Abed Rabbo. As a group, they are probably the smartest, most worldly and most pro-Western political elite in the Middle East -- and, ironically, the one with the best chance of creating a genuine Arab democracy some day. History has stuck them with Arafat; they roll their eyes over his frequent flights of fantasy, tear their hair at his inability to lead, but fear for his life. Sharon would have you believe that they would step in if Arafat fell, but they feel differently: His collapse now, they say, would touch off bitter power struggles that -- thanks to the 700 Palestinian deaths during the past year and Israel's relentless military pressure -- the extremists would most likely win.
Far better for the Palestinians that Arafat go quietly, after a period of U.S.-supervised stalemate and reduced tensions, and in a way that preserves the Palestinian Authority and its political class. There would still be turmoil, but chances would be greater that a new leadership would emerge that would embrace the tough choices Arafat has been unable to make. Such an outcome, of course, would mean oblivion for Sharon and for Hamas. That is why they both would like to push Arafat over the brink now, so that he takes the peacemakers with him. Sharon and the terrorists share a secret dream: to clear the field for each other.
Comment