34 Dead as Baghdad Bombers Hit Red Cross, Police

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat


I'm very consistent. You just have to look deep under the surface.

"Building up the SV military" is exactly the problem. We let the generals in Saigon draft every g**k in the countryside they could lay their hands on, and simply facilitated absorbing VC elements into the ARVN.

MTG is quite right. There have already been problems on the ground with the new Iraqi police - accusations of Baathist sympathizers helping "inside jobs", and much more, of persistent corruption and inefficiency. While the CPA seems to be moving rapidly up the learning curve, and the quality of the police seems to be improving in recent months, the danger of introducing similar problems into an Iraqi army or civil defense force if the formation of such is rushed is quite real. The real hope is that the strategic differences from Viet Nam are enough that things are less rushed - the borders are more easily controlled, US casualties are far lower, the hearst and minds situation is far better (what would Viet Nam have been like if the Montagnards had been 80% of the population?).

Also the political situation is different. As frustrating as the Iraqi Gov Council has been, its still far better (SO FAR!) than the South Viet Namese generals. To the extent that local political leadership can improve the vetting and reliability of local forces, there is a chance Iraq may be different from Viet Nam.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ramo


I wonder what Shrub's (and Bremer's) response will be. It seems like they may crack down on the Shia, thus playing into the hands of the Ba'athists. Hopefully, as Rummy seems to be out of the loop nowadays, Powell may be able to inject a little bit of reason into his actions.

why would they crack down on the Shia, when theres no evidence the Shia have had a hand in the recent violence?

[lord of the mark]

Rumsfeld on training iraqi forces

"Q Is there some concern that you're rushing it too much, particularly in the training?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Always.

Q I mean, can you talk --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Always.

Q And can you talk about that a little more?

SEC. RUMSFELD: And that's a fair issue. It's a risk issue. There are three, four, five risk issues that we're constantly trying to balance. And, you know, in a perfect world, you'd have a year's vetting process before you included anybody. Unfortunately, we're not in a perfect world. So -- so what we do is we vet them to the best we can.


Then, I think that Mr. Kerik said that he thought that it was appropriate to have about eight weeks training, for example, for police; that anything less than that, they're not really up on the step and ready to do the job in terms of values, in terms of experience, in terms of management of difficult situations, in terms of investigations. Some types of police work take a lot more training than others, you know, forensics and the type. So what's been done is that they've taken some people with fewer than eight weeks training in the police, put them out with the understanding they'd bring them back and give them the remaining course, as they're able to feed additional people through the process. And it was a way of getting more people on the street doing things.


The army is the one that takes the longest -- the heaviest equipment. And, of course, that's the least problem. Iraq is not likely to be attacked by armies, navies or air forces externally; it is being attacked internally. And so the army is -- you can accept that it takes a longer period of time.

The border patrol is an immediate problem, and we've got folks that are doing that.

Site protection probably takes the least training, and yet is quite important. But it doesn't require maneuvering, it doesn't require heavy equipment; it requires a presence and -- and of course, I've said it before, but I'll say it again, there have been something between 80 and 85 Iraqis, security people, who have been killed in the last three or four months. So it's not like these people are standing around not doing anything. They're out there doing things."

[Ramo]

I think that they're the most likely suspects if you ignore minor religious details as this administration is apt to do (look at the posts in this thread). And given the recent flare ups between the US and the Sadrists, I wouldn't be suprised if the Shia are blamed.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ramo


Nonetheless, if al-Qaeda were able to pull off something this complicated in Baghdad, I'd expect the gov't to find at least some direct evidence

Have they found any direct evidence tying the carbombings to the Baathists?

I don't care how much assistance Ansar has gotten from al-Qaeda. It simply has nowhere near the amount of resources needed to pull something like this off. Ever since the US invasion, Ansar has essentially been castrated - and it really wasn't all that powerful to start off with. The CS Monitor had a really article on the history of the organization a couple weeks ago:

"Such has been the fate of the majority of Ansar's original members, say these detained militants, which makes them skeptical that the group can be behind many of the current attacks in Iraq. Gharib estimates that of the 600 Ansar members, some 250 were killed, 50 "were officials who ran away," and the rest have been arrested by the PUK, have given themselves up, or are still in semi-hiding in Iran. "This virtually means that Ansar is over, by the numbers," says Gharib. "Anybody saying these [current attacks] are done by Ansar has no information. They can't do it.""

http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1016/p12s01-woiq.html?related

first - the ones who "are in semi-hiding in Iran" have likely come back. Second you assume Ansar is limited to its original members. I think you draw to sharp a line between AQ and Ansar. If AQ recruits someone in Yemen, and that person goes to Iraq, never having been "officially" made a member of AQ, and passes under the control of local Ansar types, reporting to Zarqawi do we call that person AQ? Ansar? does it matter? theyre clearly not baathists.

Well, the gov't is an Arab nationalist one... Why should it matter if they're pro-gov't? And I think you overstate the Islamist rebellion - the gov't clearly has the upper hand.

Because the govt has been cooperating with the US, and so anyone coming to Iraq to bomb US allies would necessarily be anti-govt.

The govt may well have the upper hand - IN YEMEN. That would be why the Islamists are heading to Iraq - thats a battlefield they can win on. Ditto for AQ types coming from Saudi.

Look at it this way: Half of the population is Shia, and probably at least half of the population is nationalist. The probability of this person being part of al-Qaeda can't be more than 1/4.

The probability of someone randomly selected in Yemen being antinationalist and Sunni is 1/4 (based on your numbers) thats correct. But this is not someone selected at random - its someone who traveled to Iraq to attack US allies/ Given that most arab nationalists in Yemen are pro-govt and the govt is pro-US, and given that there is no evidence of Shia moving into Iraq to attack targets associated with the US, the odds that the individual is a Sunni Islamist are very high - at least 90% I'd say. (youve never studied conditional probability, have you?)

Nonetheless, secular nationalists like the Ba'athists would be more likely to launch a major attack on the start of Ramadan than Sunni Islamists like al-Qaeda.

Perhaps, but less likely to engage in coordinated attacks, a little less likely to target NGO's, much less likely to use suicidal techniques, somewhat less likely to use diversionary tactics, and at least somewhat less likely to use Plastic explosives rather than items from the old Iraqi arsenals.

We're not ignoring al-Qaeda. The idea that we're using disproportionate resources in dealing with the Ba'athists is totally absurd. To wit; look at how badly we've manhandled Ansar.

When i said "ignoring Al qaeeda" I meant as part of this dicsussion. Sorry for my poor wording.

And again, Ansar is a very different thing from al-Qaeda.

I really dont believe that. I believe that the lines seperating these organizations are far from hard and fast, they have a tendency to morph quickly, they have many individuals who belong to one or more groups, who found new groups when its convenient,etc.

Sure, al-Qaeda may be a more effective organization than the Ba'athist resistance given the number of people in them, but they're not gods. If they really are committing these sorts of resources to Iraq, I'd expect to at least see some hard evidence.

Ive never having been part of a counter insurgency or counter terrorist effort on the ground. I therefore have no grounds for judging how hard it would be to gather hard evidence. Do you have such experience? In the absence of any such basis, i cannot consider the absence of publicly displayed hard evidence as meaningful one or the other - I can only use what is available in press accounts, and that leans, I still think, to at least a 75% chance that this was an AQ activity.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ramo
I think that they're the most likely suspects if you ignore minor religious details as this administration is apt to do (look at the posts in this thread).

I dont know what you're referring to. Certainly the admin has been focuses on the shiite-sunni distinction since months before the war began, and has been counting on it to make the occupation easier. That doesnt mean that they believe Shiite-sunni fundi cooperation is impossible - it ISNT, as the cooperation between Hezbollah and Hamas shows. But the situation in Iraq is different.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat



As far as the Big Bad Wolfie being under fire, I don't consider being on the opposite end of a building hit in a one-off terrorist attack to qualify him for a medal.

I didnt suggest he get a medal, nor the thousands of others in the Pentagon or the WTC that day. I was taking issue with the "chicken hawk" motif that suggests that to make security policy, you have to have been in the military. That somehow General Zinni's opion on Iraq should have been privileged over Wolfies. When (in my humble, civilian capacity) Wolfie had a far superior view of the overall strategic issues than Zinni did.

BTW, how the hell do you know the attack on the Pentagon is a one-off? The WTC was attacked TWICE, once in 1993, and again in 2001. Do you think the baddies wouldnt attack the Pentagon again if they could manage it?

Im sorry, i consider just about everyone who lives in the DC and NY metro areas a combat veteran, even if we didnt "eat sand" for months. Did all the decorated veterans manage to prevent 9/11? Did they take AQ seriously before then? Wasnt it some of those decorated veterans who insisted on leaving Saddam in power in 1991? Who created an atmosphere so hostile to US intervention on the ground anywhere, that the political pressure to defeat the Serbs using air assets onlu was intense? Wasnt it that chain of events - leaving Saddam in power, running from Somalia, using air power only in Kosovo - what convinced AQ that the US was a paper tiger?

Im sorry, i dont think much of the approach of the "realists" to foreign policy these last 14 years. And as far as i can see the military leadership has been very much part of the "realist" consensus.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat


In case you take it personally, you should check on my treatment of lefty chicken chokers when it comes to things like troops exposing themselves to greater risk in the name of avoiding collateral damage, etc. Voters aren't policy makers, whoever it is, once you vote 'em in, you're along for the ride for the next two, four or six years.

We can influence policy by demostrating, lobbying, etc. How much so depends on the admin. In an admin as internally divided as this one, i the impact of public opinion is subtantial.

So I think you can, in that sense consider me a policy maker. So I ask, you again, am I a chicken hawk, cause i have opinions on foreign policy that differ from those of the uniformed military?

[lord of the mark]

to follow up with ramos

Ive found the following


"Plastic explosives previously have been found among the munitions believed left over from Saddam's rule. Coalition forces have seized large caches of weapons, including blocks of plastic explosives last week in a government building in Saddam's hometown of Tikrit. A raid last month in Tikrit uncovered 1,000 pounds of plastic explosives."

That plus the possibility that the Baathists are learning AQ techniques, causes me to reduce the probability that AQ is behind the attacks to only about 50%.

[Ned]

MtG, I am not sure I understand you. Are you objecting to the concept of Vietnamization or just its execution. If you are objecting to the concept, what is your alternative?

Cut and run?

Is that the exit strategy you advocate?

Or do you oppose an exit strategy?

Your posts are very unclear on what you favor.

[Ned]

There is a moving about Vietnam called "A Bright Shining Lie." The movie protrays the carreer of a person named Vann (I believe) who spent ten or eleven years in Vietnam. He began as a US Army advisor to an ARVN battalion, and ended up commanding the entire ARVN force during the US pullout. While he was in command, the ARVN were doing quite well. Then he died in a helicopter crash. After that, the ARVN became ineffective. (The movie implied that Vann was a real person and the events were accurately protrayed.)

The implication was that the main reason the ARVN failed was lack of competent leadership, not unreliable grunts.

[MichaeltheGreat]

Originally posted by lord of the mark



We can influence policy by demostrating, lobbying, etc. How much so depends on the admin. In an admin as internally divided as this one, i the impact of public opinion is subtantial.

So I think you can, in that sense consider me a policy maker. So I ask, you again, am I a chicken hawk, cause i have opinions on foreign policy that differ from those of the uniformed military?

Do you want to be one?

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat


Do you want to be one?

I think the whole concept is misguided.

[MichaeltheGreat]

Originally posted by Ned
The implication was that the main reason the ARVN failed was lack of competent leadership, not unreliable grunts.

Given the number of E4 to E9 US Army personnel I've known who've worked directly with ARVN units, I see absolutely no reason to doubt their statements, and the battlefield "achievements" of the ARVN are also consistent in that regard.

There is no leader ever made in a modern army (which is much more dependent on staff work and independent action of subordinate units than in Lee's and Napoleon's day) who can singlehandedly transform a poor force into a competent one, let alone have that competent force suddenly melt back to being a poor force once the leader is gone.

[Chemical Ollie]

Originally posted by Ned


USSR's Afghanistan and Vietnam were very similar...

Actually not. In Vietnam, the enemy still had a massive regular army you were never able to defeat, apart from the partisan or terrorist attacks behind your lines. The USSR easily occupied Afghanistan, but never met a massive regular army, but then suffered from endless guerilla attacks until they finally had it.

But I kinda agree to your solution if you can get it to work. Let the locals take over as soon as possible, and support them with air support rather than ground troops.