WWII Hypothetical: The Mediterranean Strategy

[LoneWolf]

Similes. The last resort of the brainless.

I'm off to bed. I know you, Paki, like most Greeks, don't work, but I've got to get up tomorrow.

[Bereta_Eder]

Sleep well my little lonewolfie and thanks for the amusement

[Main_Brain]

The Oil Reserves in Iraq were unknown at that Time.

[Drake Tungsten]

Then again, any strategy of NOT attacking Russia might have involved a NEAR future Russian attack on Germany, from jump-off positions very close to Germany.

This is the only real argument I can see against the Mediterranean Strategy. Like AH said, however, it was probably possible to defeat British forces in the Med and North Africa with a small portion of the total German army, leaving a significant force to deter any Soviet invasion.

Spain wasn't going to join the war without major Axis victories, and major Axis victories would have greatly minimized the usefullness of the Spanish.

I don't see how you can be so confident in your belief that Spain couldn't be persuaded to help Germany. I'm inclined to agree with this statement by AH...

It is difficult to see however how Franco could have maintained his opposition if Hitler and Mussolini had really pressured him given that Spain was a fascist state and the Axis powers had helped Franco win the civil war.

Hell, even if Franco was particularly intransigent, Hitler still had the threat of a German invasion to hold over his head. For some reason, I think Franco would've given the Germans the transit and basing rights they wanted very quickly if Hitler had really put the screws to him.

Japan has no reason to go to war against the Soviets

A major faction in the Japanese military, backed by the IJA, pushed for a Northern Strategy involving a war against the Soviet Union as an alternative to the Southern Strategy, pushed by the IJN, that was eventually followed. The fact that the Southern Strategy eventually won out does not mean that the Japanese didn't have reasons to attack the Soviet Union.

The invasion of Russia, without first securing the Southern flank, was bound to fail.

I hate it when people act like Barbarossa was doomed from the get go. The Germans had some bad luck and made some mistakes, yet still came perilously close to beating the Soviets in 1941. The invasion was hardly "bound to fail"; change one of any number of variables and you're looking at a great military triumph instead of a blunder.

[Saras]

Not restraining Guderian would have gotten them to Moscow. At least Guderian thinks so

[Drake Tungsten]

Not restraining Guderian would have gotten them to Moscow. At least Guderian thinks so.

There's one of the variables I was hinting at.

[David Floyd]

AH,

The mediterranian strat can be achieved with a fraction of the forces, no more than 20% or as little as 10%, leaving the bulk of German forces to deter possible Soviet aggression.

Hmmm, 20% of the German army. Well, that comes to about 5 panzer divisions and a few dozen infantry divisions. How is this force being supplied? The Italians didn't have enough ships to do this, and the Germans didn't have nearly enough transport aircraft to make up the difference.

And who is in command of this force? Rommel? Remember that he wasn't nearly as good at commanding large bodies of troops.

Drake,

I don't see how you can be so confident in your belief that Spain couldn't be persuaded to help Germany. I'm inclined to agree with this statement by AH...

Spain could easily have been persuaded to militarily join the Axis - AFTER major German victories in the Med. Spain wasn't about to get sucked into the losing side in WW2.

A major faction in the Japanese military, backed by the IJA, pushed for a Northern Strategy involving a war against the Soviet Union as an alternative to the Southern Strategy, pushed by the IJN, that was eventually followed. The fact that the Southern Strategy eventually won out does not mean that the Japanese didn't have reasons to attack the Soviet Union.

Granted, but two things to consider. First, the needs of Japan dictated that the logical course of action was the Southern strategy, and second, even if Japan DID attack the Soviet Far Eastern Front, the disparity in combat power between the two nations was heavily skewed in favor of the Soviet Union, even with most Soviet equipment in the West. Siberia could have become another China, and all of a sudden Japan has two major ground wars and can decisively win neither one, and certainly cannot spare the troops to seize the resources it needs in the Pacific.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by Drake Tungsten
A major faction in the Japanese military, backed by the IJA, pushed for a Northern Strategy involving a war against the Soviet Union as an alternative to the Southern Strategy, pushed by the IJN, that was eventually followed. The fact that the Southern Strategy eventually won out does not mean that the Japanese didn't have reasons to attack the Soviet Union.

They did tried to engage the Soviets once, and got the daylights kicked out of them. Their tanks were so outclassed by the Soviet tanks that any offensive was doomed to fail. That's one of the reasons they turned south.

Originally posted by Drake Tungsten
I hate it when people act like Barbarossa was doomed from the get go. The Germans had some bad luck and made some mistakes

Uh, they had some good luck as well.

Originally posted by Drake Tungsten
yet still came perilously close to beating the Soviets in 1941. The invasion was hardly "bound to fail"; change one of any number of variables and you're looking at a great military triumph instead of a blunder.

If you change some of the other variables, the Germans could have lost badly.

The big thing was the German army wasn't prepared for the winter. Yes, the Soviets got lucky with that, but the deficit said a whole bunch about Nazi strategic planning.

[CerberusIV]

The Soviet Union was in no position to attack Germany in 1941/2. The T34 and KV1 tanks barely existed as more than prototypes, the air force had obsolete aircraft and the whole concept of mechanised offensive warfare devised by Tukhachevsky was in the political wilderness. Stalin was desperate not to provoke Hitler.

A push in the Balkans to rescue the Italians, another panzer division for Rommel and the deployment of significant air assets to the Mediterranean would have been enough to drive the Royal Navy out, starve Malta and take Egypt. This would have only taken a fraction of the resources used in Barbarossa. Fleigerkorps X nearly drove the Royal Navy out of the Mediterranean. Additional bomber and reconaissance aircraft under German control could easily have done the job, especially if backed up be a few experienced U-boats.

Hitler's biggest mistake wasn't declaring war on the Soviet Union, it was declaring war on the USA. From that moment on Germany could not hope to produce enough war material to hold off the Allied forces.

[Sandman]

First off, Spain was not going to join the war against Britain, and here's why: Britain will seize Spain's colonies. Equatorial Guinea, the Canary Islands would probably be grabbed without difficulty, with the Canaries making a handy base. Other outlying posessions in the Med would be at risk. Why would Franco trade these lands for Gibraltar, especially when (a) Taking Gibraltar would be a bloodbath and (b) he can probably get Gibraltar if the Axis wins anyway.

Does Italy attack Greece in this scenario? If it does, then everything happens historically, with the Greeks kicking ass, and the Italians having to be bailed out by the Germans. Churchill will probably still attempt to defend Crete, rather than take Tripoli and lock down Africa (always the peripheralist).

Without Spain, this effectively boils down to what happened historically, except with more German land units available, although they still have to reserve most of their army to deter the Soviets.

Adding German units to the Afrika Corps would probably not have had an arithmetic increase in performance, with larger supply lines and all the vulnerability that entails. Notice that smaller forces (first the British, then the Germans) were able to outperform larger ones in the desert. We would probably have seen the same sort of back and forth warfare as seen historically.

I don't buy the idea of the Italian fleet being able to harass in the Atlantic if they locked down the Med either; I don't think that they were equipped for blue-water warfare, and the technology gap would probably have seen them in severe trouble.

Britain is also outproducing Germany in terms of aircraft at this point. With no invasion of the SU, it is considerably less likely that Hitler will be prepared to gear up for total war (remember what happened in WW1).

To sum up, I think what would have happened would be a slightly more intensive conflict, but it would ultimately remain a stalemate, probably preparing the way for a status quo peace some years later.

[lord of the mark]

amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.


Spain wasnt going to cooperate in an attack on Gibraltar for a very simple reason - it would have meant starvation. Spains coastal cities relied on grain imports by sea - which would have been cutoff by a British blockade. Even if Germany could have provided grain as a substitute, the Spanish railway system wasnt capable of carrying it in the quantities required.

[Alexander's Horse]

My God some of you people are so ignorant of the basic facts of the war.

The Germans threw 200 divisions at the Soviet Union in June 1941.

At that time in the Mediterranian the sum total of British forces was like 10 divisions max, probably more like 5 but I'd have to look it up. Of those divisions, about 3 were battle worthy. One of them was Australian.

Rommel almost expelled Britain from Egypt with German 3 divisions and a couple of Italian divisions. What would he have done with 10 German divisions? Or even 5?

[Andrew1999]

Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
My God some of you people are so ignorant of the basic facts of the war.

The Germans threw 200 divisions at the Soviet Union in June 1941.

At that time in the Mediterranian the sum total of British forces was like 10 divisions max, probably more like 5 but I'd have to look it up. Of those divisions, about 3 were battle worthy. One of them was Australian.

Rommel almost expelled Britain from Egypt with German 3 divisions and a couple of Italian divisions. What would he have done with 10 German divisions? Or even 5?

Well, he couldn't get enough supplies (especially gas) across the Med and through Africa for 3 divisions, so I suppose 7 of those 10 would sit in Tripoli and Benghazi and play cards.

[Bosh]

as far as Spain goes:

STRICTLY SECRET! BERLIN, August 8, 1940

Operation: Gibraltar

Conditions for Spain's entry into the war

According to a memorandum presented in June of this year by the Spanish Embassy, the Spanish Government declares itself ready, under certain conditions, to give up its position as a "non-belligerent" state and to enter the war on the side of Germany and Italy. The Spanish Foreign Minister, and also the Minister of the Interior, have up until the last few days repeatedly pointed out this Spanish offer to me, so that it may be assumed that Spain even today will keep its promise made in June.

As conditions for entry into the war, the Spanish Government cites the following:

1. Fulfilment of a set of national territorial demands, Gibraltar, French Morocco, that part of Algeria colonized and predominantly inhabited by Spaniards (Oran), and further the enlargement of Rio de Oro and of the colonies in the Gulf of Guinea;

2. Making available military and other assistance required for carrying on the war.

The memorandum of Admiral Canaris enclosed here [1] gives detailed information regarding the extent of military assistance apparently necessary.

Besides this military assistance, however, economic support of Spain will also be necessary. To this belong, above all else, the delivery of gasoline and, at the beginning of next year, delivery of grain for bread. According to a recent utterance of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs (of the third of this month) Spain, due to its shortage of gasoline, can wage war without our help 1 1/2 months at the most As concerns the grain for bread, the Minister believes that Spain has sufficient supplies until about March of next year. I consider this latter supposition as too optimistic, unless a strict rationing is carried out.

Besides this necessary assistance however, Spain, beginning with entry into the war, will with respect to a number of other commodities as well be exclusively left to the resources of German and Italian aid.

Advantages of the Operation

1. The effect of the declaration of war on England by a new country will be very strong in England and on the entire world; England's prestige and her prospects for victory will receive a new severe blow, while-upon success of the operation-our prestige will be greatly increased.

2. England will no longer be able to carry on trade with Spain thus will receive from there no more ores and above all no more pyrite.

3. Nullification of English property rights in ore and copper mines, et cetera.

4. A victorious execution of the operation will mean the control of the Straits.

Dangers of the Operation for Spain

1. It would be possible that England, after becoming aware of Spain's war preparations would beat Spain to the draw and begin war operations.

2. For this purpose she could attempt to extend the territory of Gibraltar in order thereby to make the attack upon Gibraltar more difficult. England could further occupy the Canary Islands, Tangier and the Spanish colonies, operations which without doubt will result at least in part after the outbreak of war. Spain even considers the Balearic Islands as being threatened.

3. A break between Spain and England can have consequences for Portugal. The English could occupy Lisbon and Lagos or other places in Portugal so that Spain would have a land front. In case of an occupation of Portuguese harbors Salazar is said to have naturally held out to the Spaniards the prospect of military counter-measures, and to have declared himself agreed to a Spanish entry for rendering assistance against England.

4. Outbreak of the war between Spain and England can bring events to a head in North Africa, especially Morocco, where the situation is very tense. Spain distrusts the Resident General Nogues who is said to be ogling with the English. Therefore a cooperative English-French-Moroccan operation against the Spanish zone and Tangier would be possible.

5. Because of debilitation resulting from the Civil War, Spain is economically unfit to carry through to the end a war lasting more than a few months, if she does not receive economic aid from German and Italian quarters. Aside from gasoline, this, as mentioned above, is true of grain for bread as well.

6. As a result of an intensification of the grave economic situation and eventual starvation and as a result of political and military set-backs (loss of islands, of the colonies) domestic riots could result. This danger I do not consider as very grave at first, since the Army is intact. Should the war be of longer duration however, the situation could become serious.

Difficulties and Dangers for Us

1. For transporting the necessary war material to Spain, only the railroad line Bordeaux-Hendaye-(border)-Irun-San Sebastián-Burgos and so forth and the road running parallel are available. Within the border area occupied by our troops there is only one other passageway over the Pyrenees, namely, at St. Jean Pied de Porc. According to information from General of the Infantry von Both in Biarritz, only passenger cars and light trucks can travel on this pass-road because of its narrow curves. The transporting of all war material must therefore go along the coast where for long stretches, between Bayonne and San Sebastián, the railroad and the road can be observed and fired upon from the sea. A further difficulty exists in the fact that the Spanish railroad has a different gage from the French so that reloadings are necessary and such equipment as railway guns cannot be transported on. Heavy artillery and other [artillery] are therefore confined exclusively to the roads.

2. The claims upon Germany to deliver weapons and supply special troops should meet with no objections. On the other hand, should the war be of longer duration, the economic assistance requested of us could represent a great burden (especially with respect to nutrition).

If the operation is undertaken, it is in any case necessary:

1. To have the preparations go forward in as camouflaged a manner as possible, to make available in Spain supplies of gasoline and war material (ammunition, bombs) which can be unobtrusively transported by railroad and truck, and, not until the last moment, to bring the heavy guns collected in the south of France across the border by fast transit and into the prepared emplacements, while the air arm is absolutely not to make its appearance until the operation begins in earnest.

2. The moment for initiating the preparations and the operation itself must be adjusted to the expected development of things in England itself, in order to avoid a too early entry of Spain into the war, that is to say, a period of war unendurable for Spain, and thus under certain circumstances the beginning of a source of danger for us.

STOHRER (German Ambassador in Spain)

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Boshko
as far as Spain goes:

STRICTLY SECRET! BERLIN, August 8, 1940

Operation: Gibraltar

Conditions for Spain's entry into the war



Besides this military assistance, however, economic support of Spain will also be necessary. To this belong, above all else, the delivery of gasoline and, at the beginning of next year, delivery of grain for bread. According to a recent utterance of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs (of the third of this month) Spain, due to its shortage of gasoline, can wage war without our help 1 1/2 months at the most As concerns the grain for bread, the Minister believes that Spain has sufficient supplies until about March of next year. I consider this latter supposition as too optimistic, unless a strict rationing is carried out.




5. Because of debilitation resulting from the Civil War, Spain is economically unfit to carry through to the end a war lasting more than a few months, if she does not receive economic aid from German and Italian quarters. Aside from gasoline, this, as mentioned above, is true of grain for bread as well.

6. As a result of an intensification of the grave economic situation and eventual starvation and as a result of political and military set-backs (loss of islands, of the colonies) domestic riots could result. This danger I do not consider as very grave at first, since the Army is intact. Should the war be of longer duration however, the situation could become serious.



1. To have the preparations go forward in as camouflaged a manner as possible, to make available in Spain supplies of gasoline and war material (ammunition, bombs) which can be unobtrusively transported by railroad and truck, and, not until the last moment, to bring the heavy guns collected in the south of France across the border by fast transit and into the prepared emplacements, while the air arm is absolutely not to make its appearance until the operation begins in earnest.

2. The moment for initiating the preparations and the operation itself must be adjusted to the expected development of things in England itself, in order to avoid a too early entry of Spain into the war, that is to say, a period of war unendurable for Spain, and thus under certain circumstances the beginning of a source of danger for us.

STOHRER (German Ambassador in Spain)

Spain needed grain/bread. Britain would interdict sea supplies as soon as spain entered the war. Not enough rail capacity to bring it in by land.