1975: Saigon surrenders

[gsmoove23]

You didn't SHOW me anything but your opinion.

[Q Classic]

gsmoove, scroll up and read my posts. i referenced it with a book you might want to read, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chen Jian, 2001). this book used primary sources from China to arrive at its conclusions--including the part where it says Mao wanted to join the war to spread the revolution.

[gsmoove23]

Q, I think the idea that Mao would have joined the war regardless as unlikely, although I won't dispute that he may have wanted to join it. He certainly joined the war with monetary support and the like from the beginning but I think events showed that he was willing to stay out of it if the US didn't approach to near the border. The fact that he had a large army on the border doesn't say much accept that he could foresee that he might need to use them. Certainly not that he was going to use them either way.

[Q Classic]

other sources:
cnn special

"The first aim of the Volunteers going into Korea was to defend our homes and country, the Motherland. We couldn't allow others to cross the Yalu River and invade us. But also we wanted to help the Korean people."

Narration: As in China's long civil war, Mao believed that greater motivation could defeat an enemy with superior arms.

Interview: Chan Boliang, Chinese People's Volunteers

"Because our war was a just war the enemy could be defeated. Our bravery and our strategy developed during the years of the liberation struggle would help defeat the enemy."

note: the UN never crossed the Yalu.

Both Chen and Zhang agree that, by the time of the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950, the Chinese leadership had long-since concluded that the United States was China's primary enemy and that a military conflict was likely...They note that the prevailing Western interpretation shifted in the 1960s from a belief that China's entry was part of a well- orchestrated Soviet aggression to a view that China's actions were simply a response to a perceived threat posed by US-led forces advancing toward the Chinese border, an interpretation held by most Chinese scholars as well. Chen challenges this view, arguing that because "Beijing's decision to enter the war was based on the belief that the outcome of the Korean crisis was closely related to the new China's vital domestic and international interests . . . there was little possibility that China's entrance into the war could have been averted." Chen also points out that just as the Chinese word for "crisis" (weiji) contains the two characters meaning "danger" and "opportunity," the American intervention in Korea was, from the beginning, both a dangerous threat, confirming Mao's fundamental view of the aggressive nature of US policy in Asia, and an opportunity to confront the United States. The confrontation could reduce the threat to China, enhance China's revolutionary momentum, and strengthen Chinese communist authority domestically and in the region.

In July 1950, soon after the first US reinforcements were deployed to Korea, the Chinese established a substantial military force and logistical stockpiles in the Northeast and began political mobilization in preparation for possible intervention. On 4 August as the North Korean army began its offensive against the Pusan Perimeter, Mao raised the possibility of sending an army of "volunteers" to Korea. Throughout the month of August and into September, the Chinese Politburo debated intervention. According to Chen, Mao was the leading proponent for intervention, but had difficulty mobilizing support so long as North Korea was on the offensive. When the North Korean attack stalled and General MacArthur began a United Nations Command (UNC) counteroffensive with the 15 September Inch'on landing, Mao won the argument. On 2 October, two days after the first Republic of Korea forces crossed the 38th parallel, Mao sent a long telegram to Stalin, informing the Russian leader that China had decided to send an army of "volunteers" into Korea. Five days later, US forces also moved north across the 38th parallel. Although the Chinese leadership momentarily hesitated on 12 October when Stalin appeared to renege on promises to provide support, they made the final decision on 18 October, and the next day the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) under the command of General Peng Dehuai began to cross the Yalu River into Korea.

source taken from mt holyoke

[Q Classic]

fine, believe what you will.

i firmly believe mao would have entered, given the evidence--taken directly from primary chinese sources--suggests that it was a foregone conclusion.

[gsmoove23]

In your quote Mao decides to send chinese "volunteers" into Korea after the NK army is thoroughly trounced, after Inchon. The decision isn't an offensive one. Its made to shore up the NK army which after the UN forces pass the 38th is primarily a guerilla army. Before this he didn't have support in his own government to do so, certainly he wouldn't have if the NK had remained cohesive and he didn't have Soviet support. One aim Mao had for sure was that N Korea survived the war.

Besides, this scholar's view is still contested by a large number of historians, hardly reason for any certainty on the subject.

[Q Classic]

in my quote, the nk's defeat at inchon was the one that finally did sway everyone else in the ccp. mao, who had a substantial say in how things got done at the time, wanted to join, not defensively, but offensively, to crush american imperialism and bring even more momentum to the asian communist revolution.

it is true that this scholar's view is contested. however, since his actually utilizes primary sources directly from china, it is definitely not something one can dismiss.

[Dinner]

It's pretty clear Truman, like Johnson, felt he could fub his way through a war without dealing with the core issues. I still find it hard to believe that we could be at war with the Chinese and Truman would still refuse to allow our soldiers to fire back at enemies who were just across the border.

If a war is worth fighting then you follow the enemy were ever he goes and you prosue it to the bitter end. If it isn't worth fighting... then don't fight at all.

[gsmoove23]

The primary stupidity in the war was the "be home by Christmas" mentality, follow the enemy right up to the Yalu instead of falling back to defensive positions between Pyongyang and Wonsan for the winter. The NK army had already been largely defeated and there was no reason to push straight to the border. What more was there to accomplish?

[Ned]

gsmoove, we had the same mentality about Vietnam in '64. We believed we could defeat the North in a matters of months, that our troops would be home for Christmas.

Never happened. Instead, we got another Korea.

Johnson should have forseen that his popularity, once almost astronomical, would go into the ashcan because that is exactly what happened to Truman.

Q Cubed, thanks for the quotations. What is clear is that the history books on Korea are wrong to the extent that they say that Chinese intervention had anything to do with MacArthur or the US move across the 38th parallel. The decision was made after Inchon and was communicated to Moscow before US forces moved into the North.

[Joseph]

Originally posted by gsmoove23
Q, I think the idea that Mao would have joined the war regardless as unlikely, although I won't dispute that he may have wanted to join it. He certainly joined the war with monetary support and the like from the beginning but I think events showed that he was willing to stay out of it if the US didn't approach to near the border. The fact that he had a large army on the border doesn't say much accept that he could foresee that he might need to use them. Certainly not that he was going to use them either way.

Gsmoove23, It not so much as Mao wanted it, but Josef wanted it, and told Mao to do it. Read some history if you want to debate history. The Histroy Channel did a story on Korea War some months back and with the new open files of the KGB found paper about the Korea War. Russia did not want to confront the USA by it self in Korea. China was willing if Russia stood behind them. Josef wanted to test American to see if we were able to stand tall. If we would have fallen in Korea, Josef was thinking first about Berlin and then the rest of Germany, after that who knows were he would have venture.

[Ned]

Joseph, This makes a lot of sense. The USSR largely left Eisenhower alone - detente it was later called during Nixon's time. But when Kennedy showed weakness at the Bay of Pigs, the Soviets really came after him: escallating in IndoChina, erecting the Berlin wall and sending missles to Cuba.

I still think that the Chinese would have stayed out of Korea if we told them in not so uncertain terms that if they invaded, we would support a counter invasion by the ROC.

In 1958, Eisenhower told the Chinese clearly that there would be war if they invaded Quemoy or Matsu. The Chinese did not invade.

There is a lot in Eisenhower's speech concerning appeasement and how war can be avoided only by not appeasing aggressors. It is a good read.

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/ps24.htm

[gsmoove23]

This is bs, first off the soviets made it quite clear that China would largely be on its own if they entered into Korea which was one of the reasons China hesitated in entering. Now I'm sure the Soviets were quite happy to allow the chinese and americans to go at it as long as the soviets sat on the sidelines and I'm sure there are plenty of Kremlin documents that say this but Stalin was hardly in the position to dictate policy to Mao and Mao was hardly disposed to taking orders. BS plain and simple.

As for Quemoy, thanks for bringing it up I didn't know much about it, interesting reading. You bring it up saying Eisenhower's non-appeasement stance made the difference but ignore how much of a different scenario it was. The first major engagement UN forces had with Chinese was well into the north of N Korean territory, looking for all the world that the Chinese were entering the war to protect the NKorean government from annihilation and to protect their national security by keeping hostile forces away from their borders. China had much firmer ground to stand on in this situation as opposed to Quemoy where they would be the prime actors in a war of aggression. They also had the memory of the Korean War where the US was willing to send its men to die halfway across the world to halt communist aggression in a country that had little to do with US citizens. Eisenhower hardly stood down the chinese in that situation based on his grit alone.

[Ned]

gsmoove, what do you make of the UN SC resolution of Jan. 31, 1951 to take the matter of Korea off its agenda?

http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/072/09/IMG/NR007209.pdf?OpenElement

[gsmoove23]

Your link is screwy, I can't find anything on it but a login screen. Can you post the gist of it here?