1975: Saigon surrenders

[TCO]

The 22nd Amendment:

Amendment XXII - Presidential term limits. Ratified 2/27/1951. History

1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President, when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.

[Ned]

Originally posted by Zkribbler


That was inaccurate of me. Sorry.

There were of course Communists in the South that opposed the Diem regime. And it was those guys who formed the Viet Cong.

There was also a huge portion of the population in the South that was Buddist, was neutralists and pacifist. I don't know whether you're old enough to remember the horrific incidents of Buddists monks burning themselves to death in protest of the Viet Cong-Diem regime conflict.

Diem took the position that those who were not for him were against him, and his regime began oppressing the Buddists, which pushed them into the Viet Cong camp.

Yeah, I do remember the Buddists burning themselves. Diem was then overthrown, probably justifiably. But that was the beginning of the end of legitimate goverment in SV.

1954 was the crucial year where the critical mistakes were made. The French were surrounded at Dienbienphu. They begged for American air support and help. Our carriers and marines were there and could have helped. Nixon was in favor. Churchill and General Ridgeway were against. So we stayed out. The Frendh lost and then left. Had we instead helped our "ally" the French, well, history might be quite different.

I wonder what Churchill said to Eisenhower? I wonder what Ridgeway said. Could it be that they feared Chinese intervention?

The problem of course, was that we had been heavily against colonnialism. Helping the French would have been against this basic policy. I think this is why, in the end, we did not help the French.

[Panag]

Originally posted by Ned


Yeah, I do remember the Buddists burning themselves. Diem was then overthrown, probably justifiably. But that was the beginning of the end of legitimate goverment in SV.

1954 was the crucial year where the critical mistakes were made. The French were surrounded at Dienbienphu. They begged for American air support and help. Our carriers and marines were there and could have helped. Nixon was in favor. Churchill and General Ridgeway were against. So we stayed out. The Frendh lost and then left. Had we instead helped our "ally" the French, well, history might be quite different.

I wonder what Churchill said to Eisenhower? I wonder what Ridgeway said. Could it be that they feared Chinese intervention?

The problem of course, was that we had been heavily against colonnialism. Helping the French would have been against this basic policy. I think this is why, in the end, we did not help the French.

hi ,

actually Korea was in between , ....

have a nice day

[Dinner]

Originally posted by Joseph
I said the Military part of Vietnam was a victory for us. Think of this, we won all of the major fire fights but lost the war. The only way that can happen, is if someone will not let you win the war. The US Government part of the war was a disaster. Johnson first and then the Congress when you were there.

As one caviot concerning the US losing the war. South Vietnam didn't fall until 2.5 years after the last US combat troop left the country. If you're not a combatant in a war then it is very hard to claim you lost the fight.

[gsmoove23]

Originally posted by Joseph
At the time, only we had the bomb, and we should have used it.
And before you say the Soviet had the bomb think. The Russian had to used their in their test and was building the next one, but had not finnish it yet.

Sorry, the first Soviet test was July 1949, announced in September. Considering a few years before the US went from exploding its first in May of 45 to dropping the bomb in Japan in July I think it would have been quite reasonable to think it was a possibility in 1950. The idea that people on this thread would have been willing to use nuclear weapons willy nilly just because we were the sole nuclear powers is pretty disgusting. Especially, considering this wasn't clearly a case of the security of our nation being compromised but had to do with fiddling in the affairs of a nation far away.

[gsmoove23]

Originally posted by Joseph
I Think the North started the war, by invading the South and then and only then did the US sent Troops, Planes, and Ships.
Wrong again, Johnson escalated the war in 65.

I think you know what I meant by Truman starting the war, as in authorizing a significant US presence in the conflict.

Kennedy also escalated the war during his presidency, but thank you for helping to illustrate my point about Democratic presidents.

[Joseph]

Originally posted by gsmoove23


Sorry, the first Soviet test was July 1949, announced in September. Considering a few years before the US went from exploding its first in May of 45 to dropping the bomb in Japan in July I think it would have been quite reasonable to think it was a possibility in 1950. The idea that people on this thread would have been willing to use nuclear weapons willy nilly just because we were the sole nuclear powers is pretty disgusting. Especially, considering this wasn't clearly a case of the security of our nation being compromised but had to do with fiddling in the affairs of a nation far away.

If I was the President in 1950/1 and saw a Million Chinese Soldiers on the border, you bet I would have used it. One Million soldiers gone in an instance.
Another thing, 20 years from now, I may no longer be here, but a lot of you young guys will be. I believed very strongly that one day we will have to face the Chinese. They may not be strong enough in my life time, but will be very strong in your life time, and they will be trouble one day.
China is concern about us for sure, but also about India. China and India has this little thing about borders. They both claim the same territory, and one day that is going to a major problem.
China today is about 1,300,000 million and India is about 850,000 million and is expected to pass China about 2010 to 2015.
India is now as China building up it's military with modern weapons.

[Ned]

I don't think Truman was worried about Soviet nukes so much as he was worried about 1) a full scale conventional war with China that could escalate into a war in 2) Europe with the Russians. In either case, the US has to mobilize. As someone here said earlier, Truman believed if he did that, reinstitute conscription, he would not be re-elected.

As it turned out, his weak, half-war approach to Korea was what cost him his popularity and any chance of re-election. The same thing happened to Johnson 16 years later.

In the words of Joe Lieberman last night, no Democrat is going to get elected president in 2004 who is weak on defense. The lessons of history for US politician is that American will sacrafice a lot for victory, but not for defeat.

Hopefully, the Democrat party has learned something from Iraq. It failed to learn anything from Korea, Vietnam, and Gulf War I.

[gsmoove23]

Ned, the war in Korea cost him his popularity, not the fact that it was weak but the fact that people just didn't like the war. Eisenhower won his election with the promise he would end it. The fact that you call Truman's war approach weak just shows that you don't understand what our aims were or should have been. It wasn't to unify Korea but to protect South Korea from a war of aggression.

[Ned]

Originally posted by gsmoove23
Ned, the war in Korea cost him his popularity, not the fact that it was weak but the fact that people just didn't like the war. Eisenhower won his election with the promise he would end it. The fact that you call Truman's war approach weak just shows that you don't understand what our aims were or should have been. It wasn't to unify Korea but to protect South Korea from a war of aggression.

When MacArthur made his fairwell address in Congress, Truman's fate and legacy were sealed. His legacy was that of an appeaser. His fate was to be the most unpopular president in our nation's history. Like Johnson who quit the race in '68, he would not run again in 1952 even though everyone expected him to in 1950.

In war there is no substitute for victory.


April 19, 1951

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker and distinguished members of the Congress:

I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride - humility in the wake of those great architects of our history who have stood here before me, pride in the reflection that this home of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised.

Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race.

I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan considerations. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected.

I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.

I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country.

The issues are global, and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of another is to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.

There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism.

If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his efforts. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.

Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia...

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision, from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I say, it proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary --

(1) The intensification of our economic blockade against China.
(2) The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.

(3) Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal area and of Manchuria.

(4) Removal of restrictions on the forces of the republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and to bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some six hundred thousand men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply-line advantages were in balance with the supply-line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential.

I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.

Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes.

Indeed, on the second day of September, 1945, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:


"Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were found in so far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful.
"Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blocks out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, our Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence, an improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past two thousand years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh."


But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there is no substitute for victory.

There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement had led to more than a sham peace.

Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer.

Some may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China. Others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a worldwide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.

Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific."

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.

It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.

I am closing my fifty-two years of military service. When I joined the army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams.

The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barracks ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that old soldiers never die; they just fade away.

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Good-by.

[Joseph]

Quite a speech.

[Ned]

Joseph, A wonderful speech!

One can see that there has been a determined effort for fifty years to resuscitate Truman's legacy and to deride MacArthur's. But, simply reading this speech tells us that the history of the last 50 years would have been dramatically different had Truman not been president.

But Truman set a disasterous precedent that Johson followed a decade later in Vietnam. Johnson too refused to answer the question (Goldwater posed), "Is your objective in Vietnam victory?"

We could have won Vietnam? Not in a 1,000 years the way Johnson was fighting it.

[Joseph]

Originally posted by Ned
Joseph, A wonderful speech!

One can see that there has been a determined effort for fifty years to resuscitate Truman's legacy and to deride MacArthur's. But, simply reading this speech tells us that the history of the last 50 years would have been dramatically different had Truman not been president.

But Truman set a disasterous precedent that Johson followed a decade later in Vietnam. Johnson too refused to answer the question (Goldwater posed), "Is your objective in Vietnam victory?"

We could have won Vietnam? Not in a 1,000 years the way Johnson was fighting it.

I agree 100%

[gsmoove23]

I wonder what McArthur felt the aim of the war was? Was it to protect S. Korea or unify Korea? My distinct impression was it was the former. So why after the N. Korean army is largely destroyed was it necessary to pursue them all the way up to the Yalu and beyond? The entrance of China into the war was due to this overstepping of bounds. MacArthur whines about how he didn't want to commit ground forces but the natural conclusions of his proposals would be just that as the chinese would escalate as well.

Ned, calling Truman an appeaser is just ridiculous since he went into S Korea in the first place and used the bomb in Japan. I know you like the word but its completely inapropriate in this case.

[Q Classic]

gsmoove, i've shown you multiple times that china's entrance into the war was NOT because macarthur was overstepping his bounds, but because Mao WANTED TO JOIN.