Has anyone heard of the International Interaction Game. I believe is was first published in a book called "War & Peace".
Check out the attached GIF of an Extended Tree form of the International Interaction Game.
It works best under uncertainty. Basically you have to reach an end node to complete the game. Each end node yields a utility payoff, some are higher than others. The value of the expected utility is equal to "Benefit value - Cost Value". Naturally a player wants to get to the node that give the best utility. But at the same time the player has to consider what the other player will choose at the next step.
The other crucial factors are "Preferences" and "Perceptions".
Each player has their own preference of the preferred end result of the game. Every player has a perception of what the other player preferences are. But nobody knows for sure and thus uncertainty and risk kicks in.
For example...
Player A chooses to make a demand. He does not expect player B to acquiesce and fully expects player B to make a counter-demand. Player B does indeed make a counter demand. Player A chose this route because he expects player B to then negotiate.
But then he finds his perceptions on this were incorrect. Instead Player B attacks Player A because Player B atcually thinks that his negotiating powers would not yield a high utility return and he would come out alot worse on the negotiating table. Player B also believes that Player A does not want a war and therefore will capitulate to Player B's demands.
Not the case though. Because Player A has a higher utility associated with the "War Started by B" then to the "A Capitulates to B" so Player A retaliates.
End result WAR. A outcome that neither side wanted by ending getting because the misunderstood the preferences of its opponent.
I think its pretty powerful stuff and could be used along with the "bargaining table" concept.
Ian
Check out the attached GIF of an Extended Tree form of the International Interaction Game.
It works best under uncertainty. Basically you have to reach an end node to complete the game. Each end node yields a utility payoff, some are higher than others. The value of the expected utility is equal to "Benefit value - Cost Value". Naturally a player wants to get to the node that give the best utility. But at the same time the player has to consider what the other player will choose at the next step.
The other crucial factors are "Preferences" and "Perceptions".
Each player has their own preference of the preferred end result of the game. Every player has a perception of what the other player preferences are. But nobody knows for sure and thus uncertainty and risk kicks in.
For example...
Player A chooses to make a demand. He does not expect player B to acquiesce and fully expects player B to make a counter-demand. Player B does indeed make a counter demand. Player A chose this route because he expects player B to then negotiate.
But then he finds his perceptions on this were incorrect. Instead Player B attacks Player A because Player B atcually thinks that his negotiating powers would not yield a high utility return and he would come out alot worse on the negotiating table. Player B also believes that Player A does not want a war and therefore will capitulate to Player B's demands.
Not the case though. Because Player A has a higher utility associated with the "War Started by B" then to the "A Capitulates to B" so Player A retaliates.
End result WAR. A outcome that neither side wanted by ending getting because the misunderstood the preferences of its opponent.
I think its pretty powerful stuff and could be used along with the "bargaining table" concept.
Ian
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