How the Soviets Really Won WWII :)

[BlackCat]

Someone mentioned that US would always win because they were able to outproduce germany, but is this true ?

If germany got total control from Atlantic to Ural, from North Cape to Egypt - acces to abundant resources, then what ?

Considering what they could produce while being pounded, wonder what they could do not being such.

[BlackCat]

There is a fair bit of truth to this statement. You need to have some commonality as to where the stepping off point from the reality was. Otherwise, people are working from wildly different assumptions as to where and how the German's "won" in europe

Well, I thought that we had evolved into a scenario where germany had invaded BI and secured it That giving the side effect that soviet was beaten back beyond Ural.

[Dr Strangelove]

In reality the Nazis were never even close to being ready to invade England. They simply didn't have enough landing craft. Operation Sealion required the conversion of Rhine barges into landing craft. The problem with converting Rhine barges to landing craft was that Germany needed those barges to keeps its economy going, so there never were enough made available for conversion to carry the amount of equipment needed for an invasion.

Prior to Stalingrad the USSR hadn't received enough allied material aids to make a difference, so really the turning point in the war in the east didn't require allied help except for one facet. The threat of potential allied invasion kept dozens of German divisions deployed defensively in Norway, France and Italy. If Britain had capitualted those divisions might have made a difference on the eastern front.

[BlackCat]

In reality the Nazis were never even close to being ready to invade England. They simply didn't have enough landing craft. Operation Sealion required the conversion of Rhine barges into landing craft. The problem with converting Rhine barges to landing craft was that Germany needed those barges to keeps its economy going, so there never were enough made available for conversion to carry the amount of equipment needed for an invasion.

Prior to Stalingrad the USSR hadn't received enough allied material aids to make a difference, so really the turning point in the war in the east didn't require allied help except for one facet. The threat of potential allied invasion kept dozens of German divisions deployed defensively in Norway, France and Italy. If Britain had capitualted those divisions might have made a difference on the eastern front.

Dammit, don't bring sense into this thread

Large flotillas of JU-52's inserted vast amounts of elite troops in southern england securing harbors and airfields. Transportships carrying panzers would be timed with the conquest of the nesseacary harbours and soon britain was in the hand of the german forces

Now, please return to this reality

[Patroklos]

I was operating under the assumption of a capitulated BI, as that is really the only possible scenario.

[Drake Tungsten]

Prior to Stalingrad the USSR hadn't received enough allied material aids to make a difference, so really the turning point in the war in the east didn't require allied help except for one facet.

Not true.

edit: The U.S. had already delivered the following amounts of Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR by the time the Battle of Stalingrad began. Even more supplies were delivered to the USSR while the battle was taking place.

Trucks and other Vehicles - 215,739 long tons (16% of total delivered before July 1942)
Metals - 429,180 long tons (33%)
Chemicals and Explosives - 60,743 long tons (7%)
Petroleum Products - 298,349 long tons (91%)
Machinery and Equipment - 45,547 long tons (12%)
Food - 308,955 long tons (24%)
Other Supplies - 78,847 (6%)

http://books.google.com/books?id=z3hP33KprskC&pg=PA141&lpg=PA141&dq=lend+lease+to+ussr+first+protocol+period&source=bl&ots=Y9rnTFSD8_&sig=e0MxpoJq-e_J7Y8BZoxE022dSyk&hl=en&ei=rLp4Spm_JqSTtge1kd2WCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2#v=onepage&q=&f=false

[David Floyd]

Patroklos,

You make some reasonable points. Let me see if I can answer them...

1.) No occurrence in the European theatre discussed adds any benefit to the US in the Pacific theatre, but on the other hand adds great advantage to the Japanese once all real industrialized resistance from the British ends. For this reason at the very least the same amount of resources used by the US to defeat Japan will at the very lease be necessary in this alternate and in all probability substantially more.

The British contribution in the Pacific theater was negligible, at least while the war in Europe was still ongoing - and after that point, their contribution was relatively negligible (compared to the US). The one theater where that isn't the case is Burma/India. However, assuming Japan still went after that theater, and assuming the lack of British support gave Japan a material advantage, then that would simply make things worse in the long run for Japan. Think about it - Japan's dwindling resources would have to go to supporting another conquest, leaving less for the rest. And let's face it, the war in China was unwinnable for Japan no matter what, so they weren't going to be freeing up troops there, either.

Granted that it would take equal or greater US resources to defeat Japan, but there would be more resources available, given that there would not be a major invasion of North Africa, Italy, or Europe. One of the biggest bottlenecks on US operations was amphibious troop lift, with multiple theaters competing for those resources (not to mention ground forces). In this scenario, there would initially only be one (although I still think the US could open up ancillary theaters elsewhere, but more on that later). If anything, Japan's conquests would have been rolled back faster in this scenario.

2.) Your B-29 argument is absurd. For one, the plane wasn't introduced until the middle 1944. That means if Britain surrenders/is defeated in 1941, there was never any effective strategic bombing over Germany or Italy and the bulk of German conquests are also intact for economic exploitation for at least three years.

Yes, I've already pointed out the timeframe on the introduction of the B-29. I'm fully aware it wasn't available in mass numbers until late in the war. On the other hand, you are mischaracterizing the effect of strategic bombing on German industry - there was very little effect historically, to the extent that Germany's industrial production INCREASED every year of the war, relative to the year before, and was only reduced when German industrial regions like the Ruhr and Saar were cut off or conquered.

Three years of economic exploitation is fine, but that would not have given German anywhere near adequate time to develop a fleet capable of challenging the USN, nor would they have had adequate time to develop workable doctrine for naval aviation and UNREP exercises, which would have been vital to any navy attempting to operate across an ocean (as the USN proved in the Pacific). Furthermore, even assuming a rapid conquest of the Soviet Union (unlikely for many reasons), as che accurately pointed out, German resources would be tied up to no end on garrison and pacification operations in the Soviet Union (and certainly the Middle East, too). The physical possession of the resources of the European continent and the ability to properly exploit said resources are two very different things.

Furthermore, it was INTRODUCED in May 1944, it did not arrive in significant numbers until 1945 and even then only made up a small portion of the US bomber fleet. On top of that, in the actual timeline it was only used in the Pacific theatre, and it this one where it is the only bomber with the range to attack strategic targets in either theatre its numbers will have to be split. There is not enough of these bombers to make any significant strategic impact via trans Atlantic bombing raids using conventional weapons.

Fair enough. I'm not assuming an early end to the war, necessarily. My point is that by August 1945, the US would have had the ability to strike Germany with a weapon to which they had no response - and even if they COULD counter the B-29, the B-36 was around the corner, and was a generation more advanced that any other bomber or countermeasure around.

On top of that, your musings about why there would be no countermeasure to the B-29 are retarded. You are talking about sweeping changes in American strategy and force usage, yet for some inexplicable reason you are requiring Germany to just follow the actual timeline despite have defeated its most immediate enemies in 1941/42. A Germany without an in theater enemy after 42 is a Germany that can refocus its industry and resources in any number of pivotal ways for three years before America is in any position to bomb them let alone invade. Are you honestly going to maintain that the German air force and navy would not receive the lion’s share of that refocusing given the new threat atmosphere? Sure the Germans would be spending a lot of time and resources garrisoning their acquisitions, but that doesn’t require tanks/artillery/etc, all that industrial might is free to be turned to the tasks at hand. Germany can literally call on the combined resources of all of Europe, North Africa, The Middle East (we will get to that) for the sole purpose of defending Europe, which is a far easier thing to do than going on an offensive across the Atlantic. The idea that they would be unable to develop effective high altitude interceptors in that time is naive. Especially since they did just that in reality anyway.

Certainly, Germany would have vastly greater resources, and the opportunity to pursue different research paths and production schedules. I've already addressed the point about Germany not being able to access most of these resources immediately, so what I'll point out is the following:

1)If Germany heavily commits to building a navy, they are wasting their time. They are building a force that will be sunk in less time than it takes the US to locate it when it puts to see. Germany had NO idea of how to build or operate modern naval forces other than submarines. Gaining that type of knowledge and ability takes years - decades, really. The more effort Germany puts into a surface fleet, the better from America's POV.

2)Of course Germany would commit heavily to the Luftwaffe. Indeed, it's very possible that they would develop a reliable aircraft that could regularly intercept strategic bombers at high altitudes - they just barely, maybe, had the capability to threaten the B-29, so it isn't a huge stretch to say they wouldn't expand that capability. But again, if they do this, the war takes a couple more years and ends up even worse for Germany, when the B-36 comes into production (and the US atomic arsenal would number in the dozens, or even lower hundreds).

3.) There isn’t going to be any effective US ground offensive in the Middle East. The idea is absurd on its face. For one, the British forces in the Mediterranean and Egypt are doomed once their sole source of industrial support is gone. While the colonies were good for recruits, certain munitions, food stuffs and raw materials, the bulk of their actual tanks/planes/artillery/everything factory made was still from Britain itself. The instant the home islands are gone the British naval presence in the Mediterranean is over giving the Axis unhindered access to the theater, and even without that factored in the British armies are easy pickings for the Axis once their industrial support is gone. Not to mention that without hundreds of combat division held down deterring a cross channel invasion or fighting the Soviet Army, the Axis are not hurting for men and material of any sort.

The simple fact is that in this scenario North Africa is an Axis victory, and any puppet state in the Middle East will instantly see what that means and either switch sides outright or at the very least declare neutrality.

Possibly, but remember that the Germans would be operating at the end of a very lengthy logistical tether. So would the US, naturally, but the US would also have access to India and very possibly Iran to use as bases, should they decide to contest the theater. I'm not saying that they would, or even that it would be a good idea in this scenario, but political reality might have dictated some action.

Certainly, Germany isn't hurting for manpower - but then again, they wouldn't exactly be able to redeploy 3 million men from the Eastern Front overnight, either. That pacification war would have gone on forever, and was probably just as unwinnable as Japan's war in China.

Finally, no one has addressed how or why Hitler would be neutralized as the head of the German command structure. With Hitler making the decisions, the Eastern Front was probably unwinnable. Stalingrad, for example, still would have happened, with similar results, because events on that front had very little to do, materially speaking, with what might or might not have been going on elsewhere in the war. The destruction of Germany's strongest army - von Paulus's 6th - at Stalingrad, along with the defeat of the Caucasus offensive (those troops had to be withdrawn, or cut off and destroyed), would have set German efforts on the Eastern Front back immeasurably. Manstein did some great things the next year to restore the situation, but unless Hitler plans on firing himself and letting the generals win the war, I don't see how Germany could have won in the East. Certainly, the Soviets wouldn't have conquered Germany without Western support and 2nd fronts in North Africa, Italy, and France, but that wouldn't automatically mean German victory, either.

The point is, I fail to see how Germany could have withdrawn any significant combat power from the Eastern Front, at any point in the near future (near relative to 1942). If you can come up with a scenario, I'm all ears.

4.) Your characterization of the u-boat war is absurd. The Battle of the Atlantic was not won until at least 1943. That was accomplished through technological research, but also through the availability of secure operating bases for both ships and planes from both ends of the convoy chain. Without port facilities and air cover from the British side, the character of that war changes greatly. The allies also relied heavily on being able to require most of the U-boats to have to base operationally out of Germany for the most part, be supported industrially from Germany in whole, and be subject to constant harrying and interdiction via air bombardment at all times to reduce their effectiveness. In this scenario not only can Germany operate its submarines from Atlantic ports en masse, they can also do without any significant threat of interdiction from Allied air power. Lastly, as has been said, America will still have to counter Japan with the same if not more force than it did in the actual timeline. The US fleet is not in the Atlantic in bulk until 1945. That means Germany and Italy have free reign to consolidate their naval position in the Atlantic for at least three years.

Yes, but I've already addressed these points. The U-boats are going to have to range much further - all the way to the North and South American coasts - in order to find targets. Granted, if the US tries a Middle Eastern strategy, that creates additional targets, but then again, that would also require U-boats to range down the coast of Africa - and the US WOULD have been able to base out of South Africa. If the U-boats are operating, interdiction free, from the French Atlantic ports (and British ports, eventually), but have to range 2000 miles further out on a regular basis, to fight an enemy operating less than 500 miles from it's own base, then the U-boats haven't gained much, have they?

Further, once the US and Allies broke Enigma - and that WOULD have happened, given the fact that we demolished almost every other Axis code throughout the war - then it would have been open season on the U-boats.

Lastly, much of the impetus behind the U-boat production was the promise of the ability to close off the Atlantic, starve Britain out of the war, and prevent the US from propping up Britain. If Britain was knocked out of the war, those conditions would be irrelevant. Why would Germany continue to expand U-boat production if they had no real need to do so? It doesn't make sense? Even if they did, though, I still don't see any way that the Battle of the Atlantic was winnable for the Germans.

5.) In this scenario Spain and Portugal join the Axis without a doubt.

So? Odds are, Germany would spend more resources propping up their economy and military than Germany could have hope to recover in benefit from the two. The only reason Germany wanted Spain to join the Axis anyway was to be able to take out Gibraltor, but that wouldn't be relevant in this case.

6.) Your characterization of the Germany nuclear effort is a joke. The German effort was largely abandoned because with a two front war not going its way since 1942 and collapsing entirely since 1944, they simply had more immediate priorities. Once again, a Germany free of any real threat after 1942 has untold resources to allocate as it will, the nuclear program neglected in the real timeline being a prime option.

Sorry, but you drastically misunderstand the challenges facing a German nuclear program. Not only did Germany never produce a critical nuclear reactor, but post-war interviews determined that German nuclear scientists - Heisenberg included - did not have the proper conception of how to build a bomb. Heisenberg, for example, overestimated the amount of U-235 necessary to build an atomic device by several orders of magnitude. Germany just did not have the scientific know-how to compete with the US in atomic weaponry, and that wasn't going to change in the 1940s.

Add to that that by the 1950s, Germany probably doesn’t need bombers to deliver its nukes. Without German rocketry know how, the US is woefully uncompetitive in the rocketry field.

Granted, except that Germany wouldn't have had nukes in the 1950s, because even worst-casing the situation, American B-36s would have absolutely destroyed Germany by that point (assuming B-29s weren't able to do so).

7.) I am not sure where you are pulling this “carrier fighters protecting the bombers” thing from, but it is ridiculous. The amount of organization required for carriers to marry up with bombers flying from North America and then effectively escort them is mind boggling and not possible in that era. It is furthermore stupid because carrier aircraft at that time did not have the range required to accomplish what you are suggesting. The carriers were just too small then and the fighters did not carry the fuel necessary for such things as a consequence.

I wasn't talking about carrier aircraft escorting bombers. I was talking about 20+ carrier groups being able to park off the coast and dominate the air around them. This isn't a war winner by any means, just an example of how the US could have maintained operations against Germany (although in this example, obviously not until 1945). Let me be clear - the only war winner for either side in this scenario was atomic weapons paired with an effective delivery system. The US had the capability to produce both, while Germany had the capability to produce only one (and arguably, neither).

You can argue all day long about why the US could or couldn't have found a way to effectively engage Germany, but until you can get around atomic weapons mated with a delivery system (either the B-29 or the B-36), you have to concede that the only possible outcome was a US victory, assuming we stayed in the war.

[David Floyd]

Prior to Stalingrad the USSR hadn't received enough allied material aids to make a difference, so really the turning point in the war in the east didn't require allied help except for one facet. The threat of potential allied invasion kept dozens of German divisions deployed defensively in Norway, France and Italy. If Britain had capitualted those divisions might have made a difference on the eastern front.

True, possibly. But then again, w/ the exception of some units in Africa, most of the divisions in the West were not of the same quality as units in the East. They might have made a difference, but I don't know about that. Also, keep in mind that Germany still would have had to garrison its conquests, and if they wanted to support an invasion of the Middle East, would have had to substantially reinforce Panzerarmee Afrika.

[Flubber]

I was operating under the assumption of a capitulated BI, as that is really the only possible scenario.

BUt the question as to how and when would be important would it not ? What changed to make the BI capitulate and what other impacts would it have? Or is the assumption that the BI just said "screw it" and stopped fighting?

Because in any scenario other than that wehre the BI could capitulate, don't you have to assume that the Axis have to expend additional resources to cause the capitulation (losing additional aircraft, redirecting resources etc etc).

I ask because the question of whether the RN continues to fight would be a big one when we are talking about U-boats and control of the Atlantic-- Sop are you assuming simply that the Brits call a truce leaving the germans in control of Europe?

[BlackCat]

I wasn't talking about carrier aircraft escorting bombers. I was talking about 20+ carrier groups being able to park off the coast and dominate the air around them.

No offense, but this is where you fail. Those carrier groups would be sunken one by one. First of all, thy would never dominate the air - quite contrary. They would be fighting an overwhelming enemy. Secondly, while germany didn't have that many heavy ships, it doesn't really matter - they have the uboats and the air forces to knock out your carrier groups. It's a simple matter of attrition - germany can produce aircrafts and deploy them faster than US can build carriers.

Even if those 20+ carrier groups are working as a single group, they can't win unless they are a part of an invasion that succeds.

[chequita guevara]

Not sure basing in South America is an option. Most of those countries were neo-colonies of the Germans in the interwar years. Germany was their chief source of capital and their main market. Economically, they'd have more reason to ally with the Nazis. Ideologically, they'd have more reason to ally with the Nazis. Very likely, they'd have been closed to the Americans, possibly even have German forces on hand. South Africa would very likely go Axis. It almost did in the real world. Several countries in the Middle East had strong pro-German sentiments: Iraq, Iran, etc.

Still, after a few years of building up, the U.S. is more than capable of landing in Morocco and using that country as a staging ground for the invasion of Europe. Even if the first invasion is a failure, the Americans learn from their mistakes and try again.

[Patroklos]

[QUOTE=David Floyd;5652688]Patroklos,

You make some reasonable points. Let me see if I can answer them...

The British contribution in the Pacific theater was negligible, at least while the war in Europe was still ongoing - and after that point, their contribution was relatively negligible (compared to the US). The one theater where that isn't the case is Burma/India. However, assuming Japan still went after that theater, and assuming the lack of British support gave Japan a material advantage, then that would simply make things worse in the long run for Japan. Think about it - Japan's dwindling resources would have to go to supporting another conquest, leaving less for the rest. And let's face it, the war in China was unwinnable for Japan no matter what, so they weren't going to be freeing up troops there, either.

Your characterization of British involvement in the Pacific is disengenous. The industrial support for the majority of the Australian and New Zealand effort was still sourced from Britain. Furthermore, your characterization of the Burma conflict is false. Japan was taking Burma as an avenue to invade India. If Britian is out of the war (and thus her colonies either out too or impotent) this is no longer a primarly theatre, there are literally hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops free to reduce China or further fortify the Pacific island holdings. Not to mention the release of hundreds of airframes and various logisitics assets.

To be blunt, Britain out of the way in 41 coumpounds the problems of the Americans quite a bit.

Granted that it would take equal or greater US resources to defeat Japan, but there would be more resources available, given that there would not be a major invasion of North Africa, Italy, or Europe. One of the biggest bottlenecks on US operations was amphibious troop lift, with multiple theaters competing for those resources (not to mention ground forces). In this scenario, there would initially only be one (although I still think the US could open up ancillary theaters elsewhere, but more on that later). If anything, Japan's conquests would have been rolled back faster in this scenario.

The output of US shipyards would not be effected by the lack if ground operations in Europe. America still needs to defeat the Japanese Navy and in the actual timeline American shipyards were operating at capacity the entirety of the war. You are correct that it would free quite a bit of airpower and army assets, unfortunetly they are not particularly useful for the first couple years of the Japanese war.

BTW, with a British surrender in 1941 we can also assume a Dutch surrender at the same time. You may find that Japan has no need to be at war with either the Commonwealth or the Dutch, meaning they have no need to invade Indonesia or Burma. Think for a second what impact that has on Japanese fleet concentration relative to America circa 1941.

Yes, I've already pointed out the timeframe on the introduction of the B-29. I'm fully aware it wasn't available in mass numbers until late in the war. On the other hand, you are mischaracterizing the effect of strategic bombing on German industry - there was very little effect historically, to the extent that Germany's industrial production INCREASED every year of the war, relative to the year before, and was only reduced when German industrial regions like the Ruhr and Saar were cut off or conquered.

Why this complete BS concerning strategic bombing persists I will never know. It is one of them most obtuse arguements that can possibly be made yet it persists regardless

Whether or not German arms production increased or not is irrelevant when gauging the success of the strategic bombing campaign because you are using the irrelevant benchmark of pre war production and to guage all measurements. Consider two things.

1.) At the outbreak of war all sides began sqeezing as much productivity as possible out of their arms industry as possible.

2.) At the same time they were converting their civilian industry over to armaments.

Both of the above will have dramatic impact on the production levels of a nation's arms and munitions. What if strategic bombing negates one of the above? Does overall arms production increase? Yes. Has stragetic bombing succeeded in reducing production from what it would have been? Yes.

Thats the question you have to ask yourself: Without stategic bombing would German production been far greater than without stragegic bombing? The answer is obvious.

Three years of economic exploitation is fine, but that would not have given German anywhere near adequate time to develop a fleet capable of challenging the USN, nor would they have had adequate time to develop workable doctrine for naval aviation and UNREP exercises, which would have been vital to any navy attempting to operate across an ocean (as the USN proved in the Pacific)

You need to break out of your own preconcieved notions and take a more objective look at things. For some reason you are imagining that an Atlantic war would look like a Pacific war, that German has any motivation whatsoever to engage in open ocean warfare via surface of aviation, and that they have any motivation whatsoever to attempt a cross Atlantic invasion itself.

There are two very different things that need to be accomplished by each side in this scenario. America needs to achieve undisputed sea superiority AND mount a cross Atlantic invasion against an occupied, fortified, rested, otherwise unthreated and victorious Axis war machine with interior lines of communication without a significant base of operations within two thousand miles.

All the Germans have to do is deny them.

Which one sounds easier to you?

As has been told to you already, this is NOT the Pacific. You need to take into account the very significant differences between the two theaters. This is not a case of attacking isolated outposts with no hope of resuppy. There is no point on the European continent (or African) that America can attack that Germany will 1.) Not have air superiority 2.) Not have unhindered lines of communication too and 3.) can be in any way cut off by American naval might (I know you are going to say "Hey, what about the Med!!!, but think about what going through the straights would involve at this point).

Think for one second about how close a thing D-Day was. Then think about the fact that 1.) they had a fortified industrialized home base in theater only a couple dozen miles from the target. 2.) They had all the resources of Britain and the commonwealth at their disposal. Full German combat divisions (as opposed to garrison forces) were occupied in Italy and more importantly Russia 3.) the Allies enjoyed air superiority. 4.) There was no warning of an attack. None of those things are the case in your scenario.

Furthermore, even assuming a rapid conquest of the Soviet Union (unlikely for many reasons), as che accurately pointed out, German resources would be tied up to no end on garrison and pacification operations in the Soviet Union (and certainly the Middle East, too).

Germany was busy doing this in the actual timeline anyway, and was doing it when the various resistance groups had the moral boosting knowledge that both the Soviet Union and Britian had the upper hand. Do you think resistance efforts become greater or less once their major hopes or liberation (and material support) are gone. No doubt there will be a great many resources devoted to garrisoning certain areas, but in reality if Britain and Russia are out of the war by 1945 when America can even contemplate invasion at all (1950 is a more realisitic date for actually trying), it is more probably that most of Europe will look like Iron Curtain era Eastern Europe, the peoples or the area for the most part resigned to their fate and themselves puppet states of a fascist flavor. In any case, you don't need armored divisions to garrison areas, the bulk of the conventional Axis war machine will be available for normal combat operations.

The physical possession of the resources of the European continent and the ability to properly exploit said resources are two very different things.

It could only get easier for Germany in this scenario than it was in real life. This a a straw you are grasping at, there is no reason to assume Germany would not be able to exploit these resources, especially since they did just that under far worse conditions in real life.

Fair enough. I'm not assuming an early end to the war, necessarily. My point is that by August 1945, the US would have had the ability to strike Germany with a weapon to which they had no response - and even if they COULD counter the B-29, the B-36 was around the corner, and was a generation more advanced that any other bomber or countermeasure around.

You have yet to come up with this magic weapon. As has been pointed out to you the B-29 is not the invulnerable weapon you imagine it is. You understand that only 3,000 were ever built, right? You understand that the B-29 was vulnerable to cheap Japanese fighters (they used to ram the bombers), why the hell are you pretending they would be safe from far more capable and advanced German ones? Not to mention the B-29 was vulnerable to flak.

This part of your agruement is just getting ridiculous. The B-29 concept was only accepted and developed in ernest in 1940. If America can design and a bomber of that type in four years, why the hell can't German once its changed stragetic situation becomes blindingly clear? And the question isn't why they can't, they obviously could of, the real question is why the hell wouldn't they? But that isn't really the question. The real question is can't/wouldn't they devolope the obvious intercepter requirements for a defense of Europe? Is it your position that it was simply beyond them? That they are retarded? that they are just going to mindnumbingly plod along with four years of real timeline development instead of realizing the implications of the changes we are discussing for the purposes of this scenario?

Certainly, Germany would have vastly greater resources, and the opportunity to pursue different research paths and production schedules. I've already addressed the point about Germany not being able to access most of these resources immediately, so what I'll point out is the following:

You didn't address this point, you hand waved it.

1)If Germany heavily commits to building a navy, they are wasting their time. They are building a force that will be sunk in less time than it takes the US to locate it when it puts to see. Germany had NO idea of how to build or operate modern naval forces other than submarines. Gaining that type of knowledge and ability takes years - decades, really. The more effort Germany puts into a surface fleet, the better from America's POV.

1.) Stop pretending Germany is America. The goals and positions or each are vastly different, yet you continue to insust Germany must fight the same way America is.

2.) Your characterization of German surface combatants is false. There is nothing to suggest that German surface combatants were in any way inferior to their Allied counterparts in any class. In fact there is much that points to the opposite. The inferiority of the Axis surface fleet is not in quality, but in quantity.

3.) The only naval sphere Germany (and Italy) were greatly inferior as in carriers, which for the purposes of the Axis is really not that big a deal. This is also counter balanced to a large degree by the unquestioned German superiority in both numbers and quality of submarines.

2)Of course Germany would commit heavily to the Luftwaffe. Indeed, it's very possible that they would develop a reliable aircraft that could regularly intercept strategic bombers at high altitudes - they just barely, maybe, had the capability to threaten the B-29, so it isn't a huge stretch to say they wouldn't expand that capability. But again, if they do this, the war takes a couple more years and ends up even worse for Germany, when the B-36 comes into production (and the US atomic arsenal would number in the dozens, or even lower hundreds).

1.) There is no "maybe" about it, they did. The Japanese did. This B-29 invulnerability is a figment of your imagination.

2.) So for some reason the Americans continue to develope bigger and better bombers, but the Germans forget to develope fast, higher flying intercepters? :crazyeyes"

3.) The US nuclear arsenel did not number in the dozens until into the 1950s. It was one of the great fears post WWII that the Soviets would invade before we had a chance to have an adequate nuclear response.

Possibly, but remember that the Germans would be operating at the end of a very lengthy logistical tether. So would the US, naturally, but the US would also have access to India and very possibly Iran to use as bases, should they decide to contest the theater. I'm not saying that they would, or even that it would be a good idea in this scenario, but political reality might have dictated some action.

1.) What long logistics tether. You keep saying "Germany" but the logistics train actually starts in Italy. They have undisputed control of the Med and now the Black Sea. In all reality Turkey is a member of the alliance now. The logistics trale to Palestine is no more strenuous than the one to Tobruk.

2.) How is America going to get access through Iran when there is that whole Japanese empire in the way? And what good would access to India do them for the purposes of the Middle East.

Certainly, Germany isn't hurting for manpower - but then again, they wouldn't exactly be able to redeploy 3 million men from the Eastern Front overnight, either. That pacification war would have gone on forever, and was probably just as unwinnable as Japan's war in China.

1.) I wasn't aware that years constituted overnight. There is no sane reason to doubt that the Axis could more more than enough forces form the Eastern Front to any other theater within a matter of months. There is no reason to doubt this because they did this constantly in the actual war where they were losing as opposed to winning like in this scenario.

2.) Please stop pretending any pacification war is going to somehow be equally or more devestating than the conventional war itself. Once the Soviet Union capitulates, there is really little reason for the partisans to continue fighting. In fact the mere realization that the Soviet union did capitulate will probably totally mind **** most of them.

No matter what happens, hundreds of German and Axis divisions are freed up for other duties along with their logistics and material support.

Finally, no one has addressed how or why Hitler would be neutralized as the head of the German command structure. With Hitler making the decisions, the Eastern Front was probably unwinnable. Stalingrad, for example, still would have happened, with similar results, because events on that front had very little to do, materially speaking, with what might or might not have been going on elsewhere in the war. The destruction of Germany's strongest army - von Paulus's 6th - at Stalingrad, along with the defeat of the Caucasus offensive (those troops had to be withdrawn, or cut off and destroyed), would have set German efforts on the Eastern Front back immeasurably. Manstein did some great things the next year to restore the situation, but unless Hitler plans on firing himself and letting the generals win the war, I don't see how Germany could have won in the East. Certainly, the Soviets wouldn't have conquered Germany without Western support and 2nd fronts in North Africa, Italy, and France, but that wouldn't automatically mean German victory, either.

None of this is relevant. The position "WELL HITLER WILL **** IT ALL UP" is nothing more than a hand wave.

The point is, I fail to see how Germany could have withdrawn any significant combat power from the Eastern Front, at any point in the near future (near relative to 1942). If you can come up with a scenario, I'm all ears.

The point is, they don't really have too. If Britain is surrendered and the Soviet Union as done the same, there is no threat to Germany. They could keep ever single foot soldier there for years under the worst case scenario before America could even think of invasion.

[Patroklos]

Yes, but I've already addressed these points. The U-boats are going to have to range much further - all the way to the North and South American coasts - in order to find targets. Granted, if the US tries a Middle Eastern strategy, that creates additional targets, but then again, that would also require U-boats to range down the coast of Africa - and the US WOULD have been able to base out of South Africa. If the U-boats are operating, interdiction free, from the French Atlantic ports (and British ports, eventually), but have to range 2000 miles further out on a regular basis, to fight an enemy operating less than 500 miles from it's own base, then the U-boats haven't gained much, have they?

1.) You may be unaware of this, but significant portions of the tonnage sunk by U-boats was off the coasts of North America, the Carribean, and the South Atlantic. The point: U-boats ranged that far as a matter of routine already.

2.) If all the U-boats are trying to do is ward off an invasion, they only have to operate relatively close to Europe.

Further, once the US and Allies broke Enigma - and that WOULD have happened, given the fact that we demolished almost every other Axis code throughout the war - then it would have been open season on the U-boats.

Enigma was brocken by the now capitulated British. It is certainly a possibility that it would have been broken again by someone else, just as much as it is a possibility that the Germans do the same to the Americans in this alternate timeline. The point is, you can't count on it. There were several German enigma machine codes that were never broken by the Allies.

Lastly, much of the impetus behind the U-boat production was the promise of the ability to close off the Atlantic, starve Britain out of the war, and prevent the US from propping up Britain. If Britain was knocked out of the war, those conditions would be irrelevant. Why would Germany continue to expand U-boat production if they had no real need to do so? It doesn't make sense? Even if they did, though, I still don't see any way that the Battle of the Atlantic was winnable for the Germans.

It doesn't make sense to you because you are trying to force an American stragegy onto German circumstances. They would continue to buld U-boats because for the same reason the Soviets build all those sumbarines. They don't need to control the Atlantic themselves, they just need to deny control of it from the Americans sufficiently to make an invasion impossible. This is a MUCH easier goal than achieving unrivaled superiority AND mounting a cross ocean invasion.

So? Odds are, Germany would spend more resources propping up their economy and military than Germany could have hope to recover in benefit from the two. The only reason Germany wanted Spain to join the Axis anyway was to be able to take out Gibraltor, but that wouldn't be relevant in this case.

Really, who propped up Spain's military and economy during the actual WWII? Nobody. What the inclusion of Spain and Portugul does is provide access to millions of recruits good for things like garrisoning duty and also allows Germany to close off the Straits of Gibralter to America.

Sorry, but you drastically misunderstand the challenges facing a German nuclear program. Not only did Germany never produce a critical nuclear reactor, but post-war interviews determined that German nuclear scientists - Heisenberg included - did not have the proper conception of how to build a bomb. Heisenberg, for example, overestimated the amount of U-235 necessary to build an atomic device by several orders of magnitude. Germany just did not have the scientific know-how to compete with the US in atomic weaponry, and that wasn't going to change in the 1940s.

I seem to remember that same arguement being made about the Soviets. And then I remember the same arguement being made about the Chinese. Both were self delusional.

There was no lack of brain power in Germany. I am sure they had quite a bit wrong with their theories, but then again so did the Americans until their non resource deprived and fully funded program dispelled them of them. The German program was never anything but an back burner science project because of circumstances, there is no reason to believe it would have remained that and ever reason not to believe that.

Granted, except that Germany wouldn't have had nukes in the 1950s, because even worst-casing the situation, American B-36s would have absolutely destroyed Germany by that point (assuming B-29s weren't able to do so).

1.) They said the same thing about the Soviets.
2.) There is no possibility of the US destoying German via nukes because they didn't have enough to do it until the 1950s and because like the B-29 the B-39 was not invulnerable. Do you imagine the US thought they would be able to destroy the Soviet Union via nukes in the 1950s? No, and the Axis would be at least as powerful as the Soviet Union and probably more given three less years of destuctive war on the continent.

I am not sure why you think it is impossibe to shoot down bombers, at no point in the Cold War was any US bomber design ever considered invulnerable. Its the who reason for the triad.

I wasn't talking about carrier aircraft escorting bombers. I was talking about 20+ carrier groups being able to park off the coast and dominate the air around them.

This is not what would happen. What would happen is that they would park off the coast and be sunk. I don't think you seem to understand the scales we are talking here. 20 carriers will have about 2000 planes, half of which are fighters. At this time wartime powers were operating multiple dozens of thousands of airfames each! Germany would be able to concentrate these anywhere along the coast it wants.

All the US carriers would be good for is denying surface access to the mid Atlantic, which is of no concern to the Germans because they would have no inclination to use it for anything.

This isn't a war winner by any means, just an example of how the US could have maintained operations against Germany (although in this example, obviously not until 1945). Let me be clear - the only war winner for either side in this scenario was atomic weapons paired with an effective delivery system. The US had the capability to produce both, while Germany had the capability to produce only one (and arguably, neither).

So, you position is that the US will just maintain a constant state of warfare for ten years until its magic bullet arrives? Sorry, I don't see any rational US administration doing so. Even if they nuke Europe, all that will do is cause them to sue for peace, WHICH THEY HAVE PROBABLY BEEN TRYING TO DO THE WHOLE TIME. What, you think a few nuked cities are going to convince an alliance dominating a continent with an unscathed conventional force to just surrender unconditionally?

You can argue all day long about why the US could or couldn't have found a way to effectively engage Germany, but until you can get around atomic weapons mated with a delivery system (either the B-29 or the B-36), you have to concede that the only possible outcome was a US victory, assuming we stayed in the war.

I have to do no such thing, because thus far almost nothing you have said makes any sense at any level. Its just a great series of hand wavings.

[Flubber]

No offense, but this is where you fail. Those carrier groups would be sunken one by one. First of all, thy would never dominate the air - quite contrary. They would be fighting an overwhelming enemy. Secondly, while germany didn't have that many heavy ships, it doesn't really matter - they have the uboats and the air forces to knock out your carrier groups. It's a simple matter of attrition - germany can produce aircrafts and deploy them faster than US can build carriers.

Even if those 20+ carrier groups are working as a single group, they can't win unless they are a part of an invasion that succeds.

Just curious since I don't know but what would be the range of the typical US carrier aircraft of the day -- I was wondering beause I was considering Blackcats points about attacking a major landmass with carrier based aircraft.

The carriers would obviously have major disadvantages regarding vulnerability (ONE enemy aircraft seemed able to disable a carrier after all) and a long supply chain. But I was considering whether their mobility could compensate somewhat . It would in no way be certain that the germans would know where a given carrier group was at a given time. I know in the war in the Pacific, detection of opposing carriers would be a struggle . The Germans might "know " that there were 8 US carriers in the Atlantic but at any given time they might have very limited knowledges as to how many of them might show up off of Morocco versus how many might be off of Norway.

But assuming that the Germans could have a far flung net of patrol aircraft and centrally located aircraft , any US advantage from this might be too transitory. There could be interesting games of cat and mouse played though as the US sent carriers in and out of range.

I don't see it as improbable at all that in this scenario the US would be fully capable of making regular nucleur strikes on the German cities, destroying their industrial capacity in away that conventional bombing was unable to do

[Patroklos]

Just curious since I don't know but what would be the range of the typical US carrier aircraft of the day -- I was wondering beause I was considering Blackcats points about attacking a major landmass with carrier based aircraft.

As an example, the Dauntless torpedoe bomber had a range of just over 700 miles.

The carriers would obviously have major disadvantages regarding vulnerability (ONE enemy aircraft seemed able to disable a carrier after all) and a long supply chain. But I was considering whether their mobility could compensate somewhat . It would in no way be certain that the germans would know where a given carrier group was at a given time. I know in the war in the Pacific, detection of opposing carriers would be a struggle . The Germans might "know " that there were 8 US carriers in the Atlantic but at any given time they might have very limited knowledges as to how many of them might show up off of Morocco versus how many might be off of Norway.

It is true that one advantage is that the Americans have the initiative to attack whenever and wherever they want using carrier raid tactics, they can disperse themselves in the mid atlantic out of the range of Axis land based aircraft and only enter that range when they want to concentrate for an attack. However, given that we are talking about a couple thousand aircraft against several dozen thousand aircraft, I think the Axis have the upper hand by far.

Not to mention that land based aircraft are almost always better armed and perform better than sea based aircraft (no compromises for carrier operations) amongst peer competitors.

But assuming that the Germans could have a far flung net of patrol aircraft and centrally located aircraft , any US advantage from this might be too transitory. There could be interesting games of cat and mouse played though as the US sent carriers in and out of range.

And they had just that. Ju-88s and Condors regularly patroled out into the Atlantic to locate convoys and attack them. In fact, as a general rule the RN stayed out of the range of German aircraft when not required in those areas because they were so vulnerable.

I don't see it as improbable at all that in this scenario the US would be fully capable of making regular nucleur strikes on the German cities, destroying their industrial capacity in away that conventional bombing was unable to do

Again, with what? I don't think people are appreciating just how few nukes we had up to the 50s.