How the Soviets Really Won WWII :)

[KrazyHorse]

By the way, I have no doubt that with a few mods you could put Merlins in messerschidts. These are piston prop planes, remember. The brits changed the power plant on the spitfire like 3 times IIRC

[notyoueither]

The way the Germans operated, they would have continued making Spitfires.

[Drake Tungsten]

By the way, I have no doubt that with a few mods you could put Merlins in messerschidts.

I'm not so sure. Even if you could, the lack of standardization between UK-produced Messerschmits and German-produced Messerschmitts would make the addition of the UK industrial capacity less valuable than pure numbers would indicate. It would certainly complicate logistics.

[notyoueither]

They also then would have captured heavy bombers, and the facilities to produce them.

[Drake Tungsten]

Apparently Spain flew 109s with Merlin engines after the war.

http://www.richard-seaman.com/Aircraft/AirShows/WanakaWarbirds/Bf109/index.html

I wonder what kind of modifications they had to make, if any.

edit: Richard Seaman...

[chequita guevara]

Hmmm, fantasy model options for me, Nazis Spitfires and Lancasters.

[chequita guevara]

Apparently Spain flew 109s with Merlin engines after the war.

http://www.richard-seaman.com/Aircraft/AirShows/WanakaWarbirds/Bf109/index.html

I wonder what kind of modifications they had to make, if any.

edit: Richard Seaman...

Buchon's looked a little weird for Me109s. BTW, the Israelis flew them.

[KrazyHorse]

Apparently Spain flew 109s with Merlin engines after the war.

That's hilarious.

Richard Seaman...

That too.

[Drake Tungsten]

You had to at least add a chin intake to the Me-109 to use a Merlin in it. Don't know what internal modifications might be needed.

The final variant was the HA-1112-M1L Buchon (literally, "big throat"), which is both a male dove or a pelican in Spanish. It first flew 29 March 1954. The 1112-M1L was equipped with the 1,600 hp Rolls-Royce Merlin 500-45 engine and Rotol propeller. This engine required the addition of a deep chin intake, whence the name Buchón.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hispano_Aviaci%C3%B3n_HA-1112

[chequita guevara]

You had to at least add a chin intake to the Me-109 to use a Merlin in it. Don't know what internal modifications might be needed.

Buchon's had them.

One of the modifications was that it required the engine mounted machine guns to be raised. As you can see below from the Buchon that's been repainted to look like a German vehicle, there are bulges up top of the nose where the guns are. Also looks like the nose mounted cannon is missing.

[Drake Tungsten]

Duh.

[Patroklos]

I don't think that YOU understand the nature of the Burma/India theater. Japan wasn't invading because Britain was there, they were invading because Japan was controlled by an expansionist military junta, dominated by the Imperial Japanese Army, which thought itself to be invincible.

No DF, they were in Burma solely because it was an open front with a world power they were at war with. Thats it. The Japanese were smart enough to pick priorities, they were not expanding for the sake of expanding at the cost of the war.

Furthermore, even if the IJA releases "hundreds of thousands" of soldiers from Burma, they aren't going to the Pacific theater. The Army regarded the Pacific as a naval diversion, and was loathe to release any forces. The initial Japanese amphibious invasions were done on a shoestring, with no significant reserves available, because the IJA didn't believe in the Pacific theater, at least not relative to their (never ending) war on the Asian mainland. Speaking of which, I don't understand why you think an additional 200,000 Japanese soldiers would have made any difference at all in China. Japan already controlled many of the major cities, and consistently defeated the Nationalist Army - they were "winning". Your argument is like saying the US could have won in Vietnam if only we had pumped in more soldiers. You are arguing that military success depends in all cases on numbers, but that ignores the facts.

1.) That’s funny, since the resource problems of Japan were solved by invading Indonesia, not China. It’s also funny since there were already upwards of a million Japanese army personnel throughout the Pacific. Suffice to say while I am sure there was plenty of interservice rivalry, obviously no matter where those significant forces go the absence of a Burma front helps Japan.

2.) DF, the Japanese efforts in China did not resemble Vietnam. I am not sure where you are getting this "perpetual war" idea from. Everywhere Japan attacked they were victorious; they simply stalled when they did not have enough men and material to physically occupy the rest of China, primarily because of distractions like Burma. An Extra 200K soldiers in China and more importantly the lack of the resource drain that was Burma pretty much ensures that there is no strategic bombing of Japan until Okinawa (by enlarging their Chinese holdings where the first US bombers came from), which of course will be much delayed in this timeline.

Finally, had Japan "reinforced" Pacific garrisons with your hundreds of thousands of men, then the US would have just "island hopped" around them.

No DF, they wouldn't have. Think. They were already island hopping in the real timeline, however the very name of the strategy implies you have to take some of the islands. All else being equal, the existance of a previous nonexistant source of hundreds of thousands of free personel means that Japanese garriosons would be much stronger across the board. Stop cherry picking.

They couldn't fortify every island to the point of invincibility, because of the inability to supply such garrisons, and the inability of the islands and atolls to support huge garrisons due to physical size constraints. Japan actually tried this strategy, pumping over 100,000 soldiers into the garrisons at Truk and Rabaul. Such garrisons would have been almost impossible to overcome conventionally, so the US just bypassed them, left them to "wither on the vine".

So now Tarawa and the Siapan have that scale of resources too! Again, you can't just skip ALL of the islands. The US still had to take some and only so many had harbors suitable for their needs. Again, you are deliberately making the Axis act stupidly to justify your short sighted analysis.

Honestly DF, how can you possibly maintain that having one less front and hundreds of thousands of freed up personal is not beneficial to the Japanese? Thats like saying if Germany didn't have an African front it wouldn't have mattered in Russia :crazyeyes:

True, US naval production probably would have remained fairly constant. However, additional army assets would have been extremely welcome in the theater, as would additional amphibious assets. If the US had the LSTs and other landing craft that were busy being built up for Torch, Avalanche, Anzio, and Overlord, as well as the infantry divisions allocated to those theaters, don't you think we could have rolled back the Japanese faster starting in 1943, when the new carrier production became available?

No, because further US landings in the Pacific are contingent on TWO things, the army/marine assets to actually conduct the landings, and the naval assets to defeat the Japanese fleet and cover the landings. Removing one of those bottlenecks, while beneficial, does nothing to remove the other.

Your position would be the same thing as me saying that because the Germans beat the Russians their army is now free to invade America. Well, sure, technically you are correct. However, there is another bottleneck besides the availability of invasion forces that negates whatever benefits that availability provides.

Sorry, now you are being disengenuous. Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies because of a need for two VITAL resources - rubber and oil. Additionally, the Dutch had ALREADY surrendered in 1941 - that is, after the German rolled over them the year before. Japan still invaded DEI in their Pacific offensive. Another fact to think about is that, initially, Vichy French forces resisted Japanese forces in French Indo-China, even though France had already been conquered by Germany. Japan was going to invade the "Southern Resource Area" no matter what, once they committed to war, because the US blockade meant they needed the resources to continue their war in China. And giving up the war in China was politically impossible for the Army regime that effectively controlled Japan at the time.

1.) DF, the Dutch never surrendered during the war and were active participants with the Allies as a government as exile just as much as nations like Poland. You made this up.

2.) Japan invaded the DEI and in the process declared war on the Dutch. However, with Britain out of the war it is beyond the realm of sanity to imagine the Dutch wouldn't have done the same, and unlike Britain Holland was occupied, so we can expect a quite compliant and Axis friendly government administering the DEI. Or in other words, a government friendly to Japan who would not deny the Japanese what they wanted.

3.) French Indo-China was invaded as a gateway south. If the Dutch are compliant resource providers due to any actual surrender (as opposed to the one you made up), there is no reason to get the resources by force. You seem to be under the impression that there was some myopic obsession with China for Japan, so you understand you maintaining that Japan would have invaded French Indochina and Indonesia regardless is not reconcilable right?

That's counterfactual to the point of absolute bull****. The only verifiable fact is that German production INCREASED every year of the war, including into 1945, IN SPITE of the fact that Allied strategic bombing had been ongoing in earnest since 1943. Could Germany have produced more in the absence of such bombing? Well, maybe, but then again, they would have had little need to streamline their production without the impetus of Allied strategic bombing. Additionally, more German production was irrelevant to the outcome of the war, should the US decide to hang in the war. Germany simply cannot develop the ability to outproduce the US before the US develops the ability to destroy Germany.

Yeah, I can't see why being at war with three of the worlds most powerful military nations would not be impetus in and of itself to streamline production.

My logic in this regard is sound DF, the hypothesis that strategic bombing had no effect is preposterous on its face and has been abandoned by anyone with a shred of intellectual honesty.

To reiterate the fact that German production increased in spite of stategic bombing is irrelevant when assessing what it would have been without stategic bombing. You are again cherry picking to suit your own preconcieved notions.

[quote]If it's so obvious, give me a quantifiable answer.

Hold on one second, let me spit out a doctoral thesis real quick

Yet another hand wave from you DF, this does not bode well for you. I ask again. All things being equal, is your production more with your factories being bombed or less with your factories being bombed? The answer is again obvious, your refusal to answer it makes the answer even more obvious.

[Patroklos]

You're right, except for one thing. All the Germans THINK they have to do is deny the Americans access to the Atlantic. Ultimately, it doesn't matter. US atomic weapons decide the issue, at the latest, by 1948-1949, delivered by the B-36. Yes, the US may TRY to conduct combat operations into North Africa or the MidEast. If they do, they are probably doomed to failure - although that also depends on the power of resistance of the Soviet Union. Even assuming everything goes right for the Germans, though, they are still destroyed by the late 1940s, should the US have the will to seek such an outcome.

Thats funny DF, because despite their lack of nuclear weapons and them being in a FAR worse position than Germany in 1945 in this scenario, the US did not consider the defeat of the Soviet Union to be anything close to a sure thing.

Reality contradicts you.

Come on, I know we disagree, but surely you don't think I'm so stupid as to assume a viable USN presence in an Axis-dominated Med. Come on now. I understand the theaters are different. I also still maintain that the U-boat threat was very beatable, in much the same way it was beaten historically, although without British assistance. Once the U-boats are defeated, the USN WILL be able to redeploy in overwhelming force to the Atlantic, and WILL be able to conduct operations against the European coastline in RELATIVE safety. Yes, the USN will probably take losses, but no, the Luftwaffe will NOT be able to effectively concentrate to destroy 20 American carrier groups, especially given the fact that the German Navy would be nowhere to be found.

Do you understand how self contradicting your statement above is? Besides the fact that you are assuming a US negation of German submarine warfare without any justification whatsoever, you are then going to assume that the US will be able to concentrate their far inferior naval air forces in both numbers and capability for decisive victories in Europe, but for some reason the Luftwaffe (and allies) who enjoy unrestricted access to resources, interior lines of communication, numerical superiority of at least 10:1, far more capable aircraft in every way, and unsinkable and innumerable operating bases can't do the same? Why?

Obviously, if the U-boats aren't defeated, the USN won't be deployed across the Atlantic, but again, this is ultimately irrelevant, if the US chooses to make it so (again, atomic destruction delivered by either the B-29 in 1945-46, or the B-36 in 1948-49).

I have no illusion that the USN won't destroy a great many U-boats, you should yourself refrain from the illusion that the Germans will not destroy a great many warships/fleet train vessels. Remember, all the Germans have to do is make it too difficult to successfully carry out an invasion; the US has to completely clear the seas and skies of all opponents. The bars are not even remotely the same.

Again I must ask you, to avoid your continued hand waving, if US nuclear victory was such a sure thing why did the consider defeat by the Soviets such a real threat when they Soviets themselves didn't even test their first nuke until 1949, and didn't have anything remotely deliverable in relevant numbers until the late 50s?

Sorry, but no. Soviet partisans were operating in 1941, when it appeared the Germany was headed for an overwhelming victory. Dutch, Belgian, and French resistance forces operated throughout the war in the face of overwhelming opposition.

Some partisans, sure, but in 1941 there were by far not only more Russians ambivalent to what dictatorial entity controlled them, but also Russians (Ukrainians, etc.) actively aiding Germany. It was only after the Germans own behavior reversed their welcome and there was an actual hope of liberation as an alternative that partisan activity really heated up. However, there is no reason to believe that any partisan activity after the defeat of the Soviets would be any worse than it was during the actual hot war, rather there is every reason to believe it would be significantly less. However, assuming it was the same then the Germans use as many forces as they were to combat it in real life, and that still leaves millions of front line troops with nothing to do.

Out of curiosity, do you honestly think partisans would be a significant problem in areas of likely created states of Ukraine and the Baltic States? Sure they would still be puppets, but in all likelihood most of those peoples would be quite content to live in their covert puppet state as opposed to an overtly oppressive Soviet SSR.

The Polish Home Army revolted in 1944, and initially kicked the Germans out of Warsaw, not because they had a guarantee of Soviet support, but because they had nothing left to lose.

The Polish Home Army? DF, you have quite an imagination. No army "revolted," it was simply a resistance movement that blew its load on an ill conceived plot to liberate itself before the Soviets got there. And I say that not figuratively, the whole thing was designed to last only a few days UNTIL THE SOVIETS GOT THERE. The whole think hinged on the expectation that the advancing Soviets would be able to capitalize on their uprising to cement whatever gains they could hold onto. This is a perfect illustration of my point DF.

I think resistance becomes even greater when hope fades, because the resistance forces have nothing left to lose. If they sit on the sidelines, they'll be hunted down and killed. If they attack, they'll still be killed, but at least this way they'll be killed in combat instead of in concentration camps.

There are certainly fatalists out there DF, but in reality if there is no hope of support or relief or independently defeating the enemy, most are actually going to accept their fate to a degree. Places like Poland who are facing extermination may resist because in that case they have no hope in either resistance of acceptance, but that is not the case in places like France or Holland or Greece or portions of Russia. At worst they would simply be marginally independent in a puppet state, and you will note this is exactly what happened to Eastern Europe via the Soviet Union in the actual timeline. It all depends on just how sadistic the Germans treat them, and not all areas were inevitably going to suffer the fate of Poland, and a good bit of the non Holocaust related sadism was prompted by the war itself, which is now nonexistent in this scenario.

I think you greatly misunderstand what a total German conquest would look like. Surely you don't assume the Wehrmacht in Vladivostok, for example, or uninterrupted German control of Caucasus oil sources or Ural/Don industrial regions. Indeed, we are more likely to see a rump Soviet state, with a nebulous border somewhere West of the Ural Mountains, fighting a generally undeclared war with Germany.

If the Soviets capitulate I expect a whole host of puppet states to be created, all fascist and allied to Germany of course.

The second Germany significantly reduces their combat power - including, especially, their mobile response options - on the Eastern Front, then the Soviets will jump right back into action. The Soviets weren't stupid. They understood that Germany couldn't conquer the Soviet Union, and the only reason they even considered a negotiated peace at any point in the war is because they thought the Western Allies were going to screw them. Stalin - or any successor to Stalin - would not acquiesce to a perpetually weak Soviet Union, especially not with the United States still actively in the war, and actively doing everything possible to arm the rump Soviet state.

If the Soviets capitulate they do so because they have absolutely no choice. There would be no real question of a Soviet rump state magically rearming and rejoining the fight using nothing but the Far East as the source of their reawakening.

Easier, sure. But the point was, Germany is NOT going to be able to outproduce the US in a manner sufficient to stave off atomic destruction. It just won't happen.

Germany does not have to out produce America, as their war aims at this point are orders of magnitude easier than those of America.

The B-29 was not invulnerable. That said, don't bring up Japanese fighters as an example. When Curt LeMay suggested stripping ALL of the defensive machine guns from the B-29s, and flying firebombing missions from an altitude of under 5000 feet, it was widely assumed that the B-29s would take disastrous casualties. This did not happen. Yes, some suicide attacks occured, but don't try to imply that "cheap Japanese fighters" did a damn thing to stem the B-29 attacks.

I didn't say it stemmed the attacks. What it proves is that the B-29 was indeed vulnerable to even crappy fighters. The fact that the B-29s did not take disastrous loses has little to do with the potential not being there, but rather with the Japanese not having the ability to capitalize on it. There was a reason that LeMay had his bombers fly that way, and it was because carpet bombing from 40K feet is useless. Face it DF, the B-29 would be susceptible to attack from not only the German airframes we know can get to it at is max altitude, but in all reality a host of more conventional airframes. This is not even considering what ever the Germans come up with in their years of free time.

[quote]However, the only German aircraft actually produced in quantity during the war that had the even theoretical ability to intercept the B-29, was the Me-262.[quote]

That was the only aircraft produced in quantity [b]in the actual timeline[b]. In THIS timeline, the German's have untouched industrial capacity not busy doing much else for several years. You need to realize that while the industrial outlook for America changes little in this scenario (them having been untouched in the real timeline as well), the industrial outlook for Germany is many times better.

The Me-262 could have intercepted the B-29, but only at the very upper limit of its operational ceiling, which greatly reduces its' combat effectiveness. Furthermore, as has been pointed out, the Me-262 had very short "legs", and was an overall maintenance nightmare for the Germans. You claim that the Germans would have been able to solve this problem. My response is simply that you are making assumptions that aren't necessarily justified. All we can factually speak to are the weapons actually produced by either side. You can assume magical superweapons, and magical efforts to improve the effectiveness of German high altitude interceptors, but you can't "show me the money", so to speak.

1.) You are right, the Me-262 would have been operating at the limit of its capability. Of course, so would the B-29. As you pointed out the B-29 is very unlikely to have actually operated at its ceiling limit in reality.

2.) The Me-262 was indeed a maintenance nightmare. Probably only rivaled by the B-29

3.) Again, you are pretending that America and Germany are analogous when it comes to speculating industrial outcomes. They are not, so stop doing it. America in this scenario is pretty much the America of the actual timeline. The Germany of this scenario, however, is drastically different from the Germany or real life. So while there is good reason to assume America will look the same for the most part, there is no valid reason to assume Germany will even remotely follow the decisions (strategic, industrial, scientific, political) of the real timeline. This gives us far more leeway to speculate on the German side.

[Patroklos]

Furthermore, even if I grant you this point, but counter with the soon forthcoming B-36, you can only counter that argument with more assumptions about magical German abilities to counter the B-36, without actually telling me what they had on the drawing board. Remember that you can't produce a new aircraft or technology overnight. I have no doubt the Germans could have, eventually, countered any weapon the US deployed, but that isn't the standard. The question is, could they have done so in time? History suggests not.

I have not assumed anything magical. There is nothing unreasonable about assuming that given radically different requirements and radically different opportunities the Germans would pursue radically different choices that are sane. Having no threat other than naval and air, it is a safe assumption that their efforts would have been focused there.

Unless you think there is some technical challenge too great for Germany to design countermeasures to high altitude bombers, there is no reason to assume they wouldn't. Russia built them when needed; Germany would build them when needed.

You tell me what Germany had on the drawing board in 1942-1943, that had a reasonable chance of mass production by 1946, that could have countered the B-36. You're the one giving the Germans hand-wavium abilities, so back up your bull****, please.

Why would it matter what Germany had on the drawing board in 1942-43 in the real time frame when the circumstances that prompted what was on that drawing board were altered radically in 1941-42? That drawing board would reflect thos radicaly altered circumstances, not the now assumed nonexistent actual timeline ones.

America is a bit different in that her requirements don't really change all that much. Germany's however, do.

Not at all. I was simply responding to the point that Germany would contribute additional resources to the Kriegsmarine, by pointing out the irrelevancy of that statement in any case.

You have been doing just that (assuming similar objectives) and I am not the only one to notice this. You make a blanket statement than any investment in naval armaments is automatically wasted. That is because you are not being imaginative in determining where those investments would be.

Congratulations. German super-battleships could - ARGUABLY - sink any US battleship afloat. Well guess what? So could the Yamato and Musashi. Look where that got the Imperial Japanese Navy.

The point wasn't that German should build surface combatants, but rather that your understanding of German naval technology is lacking. Specifically, Germany was a peer competitor in general naval technology.

Except that carriers dominated the naval conflict, whether it was fleet carriers in the Pacific, or CVEs in the Atlantic. Sorry, but no.

Carriers dominated fleet combat. They were mightily useful against submarines too, however they were not invincible. Again, you do understand why the Soviets picked the naval strategy they did, right? You understand that that strategy was a severe threat to the US just trying to ferry forces to a friendly shore let alone amphibiously invade a hostile one right. Japan also had a full and capable stable of fleet carriers, that didn’t stop the Us from sinking hundreds of thousands of tons of Japanese economic and military goods WITH SUBMARINES!

You are again a victim of your inability to recognize the wildly diverging objectives of each side.

The Japanese did it through suicide attacks. That's something the Germans were quite unlikely to resort to on a large scale, and if you disagree, you profoundly misunderstand the difference between the German and Japanese cultures.

Thats not the point DF. The point is that if you can ram something, you can shoot at it too.

All we can definitively look to is what was a)on the drawing boards, and b)likely to be produced. Given those constraints, the Germans had NOTHING with which to counter the B-36, and relatively little with which to counter the B-29.

No DF, that’s all you want people to look at because if people actually take into account the realities of the altered timeline your arguments fall apart. Why would any reasonable person expect that a Germany with such completely different circumstances would in any way follow the same steps?

It only took 2 to force Japan to capitulate. Japan was much more resistance to that possibility that Germany was. It was a cultural thing. It's very easy to imagine a military coup following atomic attacks on Berlin and Nuremburg, for example.

1.) It took two to force a Japan with an utterly destroyed military, losing on every front, starving to death, and with no hope of organized industrial resistance to surrender. How many would it take to force a Germany victorious over two of the worlds most powerful nations, in occupation of an entire continent, in control of the most powerful and undefeated military on the planet, and secure from any rational expectation of invasion?

2.) While the Germans were not suicidal, they were certainly fatalistic. You may remember from you readings that we pretty much had to wrestle the vast majority of the territory of Germany itself from them tooth and nail. I am sure someone from the Soviet perspective might see little difference between the determination of the defenders of Berlin and the Japanese.

3.) There is certainly a possibility of a military coup, for a good number of reasons actually. However, I fail to see how this changes anything unless you think that military leadership will turn around and declare unconditional surrender. Remember, there is no expectation that Germany wants to invade America. Germany would in all reality be all too happy to have peace with the US from the day they beat the UK, you are the one maintaining that they will carry the torch for some reason.

The one to Tobruk was pretty strenuous. Certainly an overland route through Turkey - again, imagination on your part, as the Turks had NO desire to join the war as an Axis ally/vassal - would have proved even more strenuous. Do you have any idea what the roads in the area looked like in 1942?

The one to Tobruk was strenuous only because it was up against constant British surface and submarine warfare as well as well as air attacks from Malta. This is now a non issue. The Med is an Axis lake, a superhighway of munitions and personnel invulnerable to Allied attack. Supplying an army in the middle east through Egypt or Palestine is no big deal.

Having access through Turkey may not help all that much, but it certainly doesn’t hurt.

How is the Japanese Empire in the way? The IJA can't just conquer Burma and India at the snap of a finger - the war in China deprived them of sufficient forces for the task. Furthermore, access to India would provide a bomber and naval base, as well as an overland route to the theater no more strenuous than that of Germany.

There is that little problem of the Japanese controlling INDONESIA (or as speculated above, it being controlled by a German vassal). There is this little bit of water that is very important known as the Straits of Malacca, which is closed to the US under any reasonable circumstances. The only access the US has to the Middle East is around South Africa or around Australia.

I suggest you take a look at a map and realize the expanses that exist between India and say Baghdad. Its thousands of miles. That overland route you speak of goes through places like Pakistan and Afghanistan, which in case you have not been watching the news in the last ten years is basically impassable for all intents and purposes even today.

At the very least America would need access into Persia or Saudi Arabia. Abu Dubai hasn’t build Jebel Ali yet

Most of the time, German redeployments from the Eastern Front were temporary. For example, the remnants of the German forces deployed for Wacht am Rhein and Nordwind were immediately redeployed to the East for the counterattack in Hungary. However, certainly, Germany would have had more conventional forces available. I simply argue that these forces weren't necessarily relevant to the situation, given both logistical constraints and America's long-term ability to nuke Germany back to the stone age.

Which proves my point, not only did they redeploy from the Eastern Front regularly, they would then redeploy back! So why is there any doubt that they could redeploy through a pacified Europe anywhere they choose with relative ease?

This IS relevant. Hitler DID **** it all up, repeatedly. And you still haven't responded to the point that the Stalingard and Caucasus disasters were historically on schedule, unless you magic up other points of divergence that we haven't yet discussed.

Because they weren't on schedule. You are talking about campaigns in 1942-1943. If Britain is taken out in 1941 (and that’s being generous, if they were going to capitulate it would be after a loss of the Battle of Britain, so 1940) then the outcome of Barbarossa is entirely open for change. Russia may be defeated outright in 1941, or by any series of different events in 1942. The point is though that a British capitulation is a game changer, even if Germany still loses it would look nothing like it did in reality.

At what point have I advocated an American invasion of Europe?

This is how this whole discussion started.

Also, I'll respond to the second part of your post later. At this point, I've had too many beers to respond intelligently

We are getting quite long winded.

[Patroklos]

You broke the thread Che