6 years after

[DanS]

Originally posted by KrazyHorse
Damnit, Dan. Stop DanSing

I refuse. It's all in draft.

[KrazyHorse]

Anyhow, your moral argument for inevitability only works if we both allow the antecedent (that the US had a moral obligation to liberate Iraq after GWI) AND that the US would inevitably do the morally correct thing.

I take exception to both of those...

[Arrian]

I hear you on that. Part of me agrees.

The other part figures that when we "man up" we **** things up even more so it's better to disengage as soon as we can. Foreign entanglements and all that.

Though that argument conflicts with the idea that we screwed up in Afganistan/Pakistan by doing precisely that - disengaging once our primary objected was acheived. Would remaining engaged have prevented the Taliban takeover, AQ training camps and therefore 9/11? Unknowable, but it's an argument that I've given some credence to in the past.

Then again, it's possible we could've ignored Afganistan & Pakistan and everything would've been fine had we not fought GWI (or not stayed afterward).

Hmm... let's clarify something. When you say GWI, are you including the decision to leave troops in Saudi Arabia and to enforce a no-fly zone as part of GWI?

-Arrian

[DanS]

Originally posted by KrazyHorse
Because what it sounds like you're saying is:

"We left Iraq in a suspended state after GWI. Not much happened for 12 years, but eventually somebody was going to be dumb enough to go finish it off. Therefore GWII was inevitable"

The containment policy was dead. As you might recall, much of the strategy was based on the United Nations' continued support. But by the end of Clinton, we and the Brits were the only folks pushing it -- and the Brits were wavering. The Europeans wanted to sell industrial hardware, the Russians wanted to sell weaponry. And other interests were pushing maximum oil production from the country no matter the government in Baghdad. The humanitarian groups were savaging us (remember the millions of dead babies because of containment that we kept hearing about?).

We continued to pay dearly for the containment strategy. For instance, we had soldiers in Saudi Arabia, which stoked resentment and was one of the sustaining rationales for 9/11.

It wasn't a steady state policy. It's selective reading of recent history to believe it so. You might believe that something could be cobbled together to replace it, but at the time, there was nothing on the table in this regard.

[KrazyHorse]

We continued to pay dearly for the containment strategy. For instance, we had soldiers in Saudi Arabia, which stoked resentment and was one of the sustaining rationales for 9/11.

While it may have been a rationale, it was not the reason.

The containment policy was dead.

a) I dispute this
b) Even if it was, why do you believe that this inevitably leads the US into GWII?

[DanS]

Originally posted by KrazyHorse
While it may have been a rationale, it was not the reason.

AQ has broad goals, which include revolution in Saudi Arabia. Our base in Saudi Arabia was standing in the way of that as a practical matter. I agree that there were lots of other reasons for AQ thinking it would be a swell idea to take on the US.

b) Even if it was, why do you believe that this inevitably leads the US into GWII?

Who knows where it leads us? It's unpredictable, but we can go into the possibilities. GWII wasn't even the most expensive possible outcome.

[DanS]

Originally posted by Arrian
The other part figures that when we "man up" we **** things up even more so it's better to disengage as soon as we can. Foreign entanglements and all that.

Let's pretend that in GWII we had disengaged after we killed the Husseins. I think that's TCO's position, for instance. Where would be now?

[Darius871]

Originally posted by KrazyHorse

We continued to pay dearly for the containment strategy. For instance, we had soldiers in Saudi Arabia, which stoked resentment and was one of the sustaining rationales for 9/11.

While it may have been a rationale, it was not the reason.

Why not? If you read the entirety of his pre-2001 writings and speeches it is repeated as his primary grievance, leaps and bounds more important to his view than Israel, corrupting influence of American pop culture, etc. (regardless of whether much the broader Islamic movement might have differed with him on priorities, or whether his priorities changed somewhat after 2001).

Just going by his own words I see no problem with the conclusion that had the U.S. never permanently stationed troops in the Arab peninsula, he probably would have devoted his limited resources to taking down the apostate Arab regimes he hated far more than the U.S., plus perhaps the occasional attack on U.S. interests in the region (Kenya, Tanzania, USS Cole, etc.). Unless you buy Bush's they-hate-us-for-our-freedom BS, but I know you don't.

[Fake Boris]

Originally posted by DanS
In my opinion, the cost of GW I and GW II should be combined. Bush the elder committed the US to a course of action that eventually resulted in the combined expenditures.

Talk about spin

[KrazyHorse]

If you read the entirety of his pre-2001 writings and speeches

Whose?

[Darius871]

Bin Laden's, such as his 1998 fatwa among many other statements of his intentions. But only pre-2001, since that's the most relevant to what he would have done; obviously perceptions of our crusade-like reaction to 9/11 would have changed his view quite a bit.

[KrazyHorse]

I think you're placing too much focus on one man.

[KrazyHorse]

I might also note that if you're going to add in 9/11 as a reaction to containment then you probably have to leave it in your counterfactual of a GWI carried to "completion" in Baghdad (as US troops would have been in Arabian peninsula anyways)

[KrazyHorse]

Either way, the statement that GWII was "inevitable" remains ridiculous. There are all sorts of plausible scenarios where GWI does not lead to GWII.

[Darius871]

Originally posted by KrazyHorse
I think you're placing too much focus on one man.

I think you're placing too much focus on the Islamic movement as it exists today, which is well known to be totally decentralized, rather than Bin Laden's organization as it existed before 9/11, with the benefits of a safe harbor and open lines of communication. I should have added Zawahiri whose influence was almost as important in that period, but his priorities were virtually the same: you'll note that he not only contributed to the 1996 fatwa but co-signed the 1998 fatwa as an almost equal partner.

You're not showing me any reason to think that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Mohammed Atta, or anyone else more directly involved in planning the 9/11 operation than Bin Laden and Zawahiri had a significant difference of opinion from such documents. If there is one, I'm all ears.