McCain's VP is...

[Imran Siddiqui]

Originally posted by Kidicious
You mean like giving them a middle class tax cut and national health care?

I think they really have to focus more on the middle class tax cut. They've been moving in that direction (especially on the Obama acceptance speech), but they have to run ads constantly saying Obama's tax plan will save middle class workers MORE money than McCain's.

[Asher]

Originally posted by VJ



Identity politics

Supporting Obama because it's DA COOL and you prove yourself that you aren't a STUPID REDNECK!

reality and political issue substance

1) Somebody already beat you to this, and they did it better
2) Thinking I support Obama because it's cool is amusing. I'm sure it has nothing to do with me being aligned with his ideals far more than McCain's. You have also touched on my inner-most desire to be considered cool by paying attention to US politics. Well played, sir.

[Darius871]

Originally posted by Asher


So you don't have any serious idea. Sounds to me like you didn't think through your argument.

Don't ever expect me to think, or be serious.

Originally posted by Asher
It's not an intellectual thing. Do you think the 70% of the people voting for McCain in Alabama watched the democratic national convention? These people don't want to hear anything contrary to their internalized view of politics and the world.

I don't know why you think it's embarrassing that the dems don't have a 10%+ lead after the DNC given that most republicans didn't watch the damned thing to begin with, so why would that change their mind?

You say that as if 50% of registered voters are Democrat and 50% Republican. In fact as of spring 2008 only 27% identify as Republicans and 36% as Democrats, leaving an unprecedented 37% independent plurality from which that 10% could easily be drawn, and then some. This race, more than any other in recent memory, has been and will continue to be decided entirely by the center.

In other words, the issue isn't died-in-the-wool Republicans ignoring the convention, who would be expected to anyway, but rather failure to appeal to the center that might be inclined to listen if only somebody more directly engaged them. As "persuasive" as the convention might have been, it was still for the most part preaching to the choir. That's not how you win a national election, especially when up against a supposed "maverick."

[Asher]

Care to tell me how many of those independents watched the speech?

Just because they don't identify as republican doesn't mean they watched the speech. That's quite a leap.

[Elok]

Originally posted by Kidicious
You mean like giving them a middle class tax cut and national health care?

I don't know the demographics of the average GOP voter, but I seem to recall most of the Polytubbies from countries with state-provided healthcare saying it sucks some big sweaty donkey balls. They all wind up waiting for-freaking-EVER to see a doctor for anything.

Asher, if you define "idiot" to mean "person who does not entertain opposing points of view," then pretty much every politically active American is an idiot, on either side of the red-blue divide. The Democrat idiots just happened to ossify on a side with generally saner policies. And just to prove that they're idiots too, I bet Oerdin is reading this and thinking, "he said 'democrat' instead of 'democratic'! He's just parroting insults he heard from Rush Limbaugh! I'd better post an angry correction!"

[Darius871]

Originally posted by Asher
Care to tell me how many of those independents watched the speech?

Just because they don't identify as republican doesn't mean they watched the speech. That's quite a leap.

You don't have any more factual basis to suppose most of them didn't watch it either, so it's a moot point.

In any event, you can't deny that everyone but the most die-hard partisans could still derive the gist of the convention from the subsequent press narrative even if they skip the broadcast, not to mention that there's been plenty of publicity surrounding that campaign independent of the convention.

[Asher]

Originally posted by Elok


I don't know the demographics of the average GOP voter, but I seem to recall most of the Polytubbies from countries with state-provided healthcare saying it sucks some big sweaty donkey balls. They all wind up waiting for-freaking-EVER to see a doctor for anything.

Asher, if you define "idiot" to mean "person who does not entertain opposing points of view," then pretty much every politically active American is an idiot, on either side of the red-blue divide. The Democrat idiots just happened to ossify on a side with generally saner policies. And just to prove that they're idiots too, I bet Oerdin is reading this and thinking, "he said 'democrat' instead of 'democratic'! He's just parroting insults he heard from Rush Limbaugh! I'd better post an angry correction!"

Yes, there are idiots on both sides. You'll recall I frequently give Oerdin **** for his political posts as well...

I just happen to think there are more idiot Republican supporters than Democratic supporters. There are smart Republicans -- the really rich ones -- that are Republican because it serves their interests. Then there's the rest, the hick republicans who vote out of "USA USA USA" desires...

[PLATO]

Originally posted by Imran Siddiqui


I think they really have to focus more on the middle class tax cut. They've been moving in that direction (especially on the Obama acceptance speech), but they have to run ads constantly saying Obama's tax plan will save middle class workers MORE money than McCain's.

What middle class?

That vanishing breed that is mostly being pushed to poverty with the few notable exceptions that make it to the rich upper class?

Once Obama is in there will be no lower class as we know it today. We will all have energy efficient cars (which the government will help us pay for) run by fuels that are inexahustable (which the government will fund the research), while working at high paying non-outsourceable jobs (which the government will create) with full affordable healthcare. Overtime it will get even better as the government pays for college educations for all our children. What is lower class today will be what is middle class today.

This is the message that we need to concentrate on. Most voters don't have any federal tax liability anyway. Even though the upper 5% pays 90% of the taxes today, it is clearly their burden to pay more. Why should they have a big fat yacht while my kid has to pay for his own college?

It is time to put the era of personal responsibility behind us and let the government do its job. This is the message that Obama really needs to get to the people.

[Elok]

Plato, that sarcasm is overwrought and wasn't too funny the first time.

Originally posted by Asher
Yes, there are idiots on both sides. You'll recall I frequently give Oerdin **** for his political posts as well...

I just happen to think there are more idiot Republican supporters than Democratic supporters. There are smart Republicans -- the really rich ones -- that are Republican because it serves their interests. Then there's the rest, the hick republicans who vote out of "USA USA USA" desires...

In which case the Democrats really ought to be having more sex to outbreed the competition, no? Otherwise they're just acting in what Sartre called "bad faith," blaming their own failure to act on others. Hump, you lefty swine! Hump for your country!

[Asher]

I'd just read an article recently that described how the Republicans are dying off and being replaced by Democrats...

[Darius871]

Originally posted by Asher
I'd just read an article recently that described how the Republicans are dying off and being replaced by Democrats...

Funny, I'd read a depressing article showing the exact opposite with actual statistics to prove it:

But the data on young Americans tell a different story. Simply put, liberals have a big baby problem: They're not having enough of them, they haven't for a long time, and their pool of potential new voters is suffering as a result. According to the 2004 General Social Survey, if you picked 100 unrelated politically liberal adults at random, you would find that they had, between them, 147 children. If you picked 100 conservatives, you would find 208 kids. That's a "fertility gap" of 41%. Given that about 80% of people with an identifiable party preference grow up to vote the same way as their parents, this gap translates into lots more little Republicans than little Democrats to vote in future elections. Over the past 30 years this gap has not been below 20%--explaining, to a large extent, the current ineffectiveness of liberal youth voter campaigns today.

Alarmingly for the Democrats, the gap is widening at a bit more than half a percentage point per year, meaning that today's problem is nothing compared to what the future will most likely hold. Consider future presidential elections in a swing state (like Ohio), and assume that the current patterns in fertility continue. A state that was split 50-50 between left and right in 2004 will tilt right by 2012, 54% to 46%. By 2020, it will be certifiably right-wing, 59% to 41%. A state that is currently 55-45 in favor of liberals (like California) will be 54-46 in favor of conservatives by 2020--and all for no other reason than babies.

http://www.apolyton.net/forums/showt...00#post4560700

In the past few years, there has been a great deal of discussion regarding the relationship between fertility rates and political ideology. The annual General Social Survey conducted in 2004 reveals that any 100 politically liberal adults only have 147 children between them on average, while every 100 conservative adults have 208 children on average. This accounts for what Arthur Brooks of Syracuse University has called a 41% “fertility gap” in the American right’s favor that has not been below 20% in the past 30 years and has continually widened by over .5% each year, which he concludes will lead to a widespread shift to the right side of the political spectrum in the next half-century (Brooks, 2006).

Renowned demographer Phillip Longman has come to the same conclusion, citing the fact that fertility rates in “red states” during the 2004 presidential election were 12% higher than in the “blue states.” He also noted that the 17.4% of baby boomer women who had only one child were parents to only 7.8% of the next generation, while the 11% who had four or more children were parents to over 25% of the next generation. This would mean there are a disproportionate amount of children coming from more traditional, patriarchal family structures where mothers are the primary caregivers (Longman, 2006) – households which other research has shown to be more politically conservative (Driedger & Halli, 1997).

http://www.apolyton.net/forums/showt...48#post4613748

[Asher]

You're comparing different things...conservatives having babies and liberals having babies.

The article I'd read compares how the older baby-boomer Republicans are dying off and being replaced by more Liberal democratic youth in terms of percentage of the population.

[Elok]

OTOH, it is kind of funny that belief in evolution may be weeded out by natural selection.

[Kidlicious]

Originally posted by Darius871


Funny, I'd read a depressing article showing the exact opposite with actual statistics to prove it:

Meh, all the kids in red states don't grow up conservative. They go off to big cities and become liberal.

[Darius871]

Originally posted by Kidicious
Meh, all the kids in red states don't grow up conservative. They go off to big cities and become liberal.

But the statistics don't bear that assumption out:

Do Those Who Live Together Vote Together?
A Review of the Political Socialization Literature

Introduction

In the past few years, there has been a great deal of discussion regarding the relationship between fertility rates and political ideology. The annual General Social Survey conducted in 2004 reveals that any 100 politically liberal adults only have 147 children between them on average, while every 100 conservative adults have 208 children on average. This accounts for what Arthur Brooks of Syracuse University has called a 41% “fertility gap” in the American right’s favor that has not been below 20% in the past 30 years and has continually widened by over .5% each year, which he concludes will lead to a widespread shift to the right side of the political spectrum in the next half-century (Brooks, 2006).

Renowned demographer Phillip Longman has come to the same conclusion, citing the fact that fertility rates in “red states” during the 2004 presidential election were 12% higher than in the “blue states.” He also noted that the 17.4% of baby boomer women who had only one child were parents to only 7.8% of the next generation, while the 11% who had four or more children were parents to over 25% of the next generation. This would mean there are a disproportionate amount of children coming from more traditional, patriarchal family structures where mothers are the primary caregivers (Longman, 2006) – households which other research has shown to be more politically conservative (Driedger & Halli, 1997).

To conclude that the higher fertility rates on the American right will produce more conservative voters in coming decades has intuitive appeal, but it is ultimately based on the underlying assumption that children are statistically more likely to adopt their parents’ political partisanship than not. How has this assumption held up to scientific scrutiny? A number of studies over the past half-century have made it an “unspoken political truism” that elements of social context (such as neighborhood or socioeconomic status) shape voting preferences (Burbank 1997), but what about families? This literature review summarizes the findings of scholars who studied the phenomenon of intergenerational “political socialization” over the past half-century.

The heyday of political socialization research (from the late 1950s through the early 1970s) reflected the “behaviorist” zeitgeist in American political science at the time (Wasby, 1966), which eschewed the intangible, qualitative theories of old and insisted that only quantitative measurement of political behavior could hint at objective reality. As such, the study of political socialization was composed mainly of survey and statistical studies, which can be loosely categorized based on their focal points: party affiliation, political attitudes, parental differences, and the continuity of parental influence.

Party Affiliation

Political socialization research at first had a parochial focus on party affiliation, beginning with about a dozen disparate studies which – according to Hyman’s (1959) comprehensive synthesis – showed a strong correlation near 0.9 (on a scale from -1 to 1) between the party preferences of any one parent and his/her 18-year-old child. That same year, McCloskey & Dahlgren (1959) went one step further to compare the party affiliations of actual adults to those of their parents. Even though the study specifically sought a sample least likely to have parent-child concordance (in order to focus on variables among party defectors), they still found that 67.7% of their test subjects displayed concordance, and those subjects who remained personally and geographically close to their parents displayed 77% concordance. Another important variable – the level of political activity among parents – was factored in by a study the next year, which showed a concordance of 75% when parents were “politically active” and a concordance only 4% lower when they were not (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960).

Other important studies of party affiliation in the behaviorist era found a .79 correlation for teenagers and parents (Dowse & Hughes, 1971), and nearly 80% parent-child concordance when both parents identified with the same party (Baker 1974). Tedin’s (1974) innovative study design added to the literature that concordance was much higher when the subjects’ own perceptions of their parents’ affiliations proved accurate, and when the subjects’ issue stances matched up with party preference. He also found out that the more salient an issue was for the parent, the higher the parent-child concordance was on that issue (Tedin, 1974). Lampard’s (1997) study found that not only was there 73% party concordance among parent-child pairs who lived in the same household, but even among pairs who lived apart there was 63% concordance. More recently, Oxford’s Economic & Social Research Council (2003) found strong correlations between .75 and .82 (depending on statistical method used) for intra-household party affiliations generally.

Political Attitudes

Dodge’s and Uyeki’s (1962) study of college students innovatively went beyond party affiliation to also measure attitudes on 15 specific issues, and found a party concordance over 70% and issue correlations that averaged at a strong .78. A landmark 1968 study by Jennings & Niemi also included various values and attitudes. While there was party concordance nearing 70% and party defection no higher than 10%, their correlations on values and attitudes were substantially weaker than the issue-stance correlations found by Dodge (Jennings & Niemi, 1968). Subsequent studies similarly found far more party concordance than issue concordance (Styskal & Sullivan, 1975; Niemi, Ross, and Alexander, 1978).

It is notable, however, that Dalton (1980) later applied the 1968 data to a complex LISREL structural equation modeling program which – in lay terms – factors in patterns among each respondent’s indicators before comparing between responders in order to remove mitigating variables. He concluded that their data in fact showed strong correlations of .9 on partisan values and .83 on race issues, and moderately strong correlations of .44 on civic tolerance, .47 on political efficacy, and .5 on political knowledge. (Dalton, 1980)

Parental Differences

While over three quarters of spouses agree on party affiliation (Lampard, 1997) and are almost equally politically active (Glaser, 1959; Straits 1990), several studies looked into parental differences instead of referring to the generic “parent.” An early study of 21-24 year olds found 76% party concordance with mothers, 74% concordance with fathers, and 86% concordance when both parents had the same party affiliation (Maccoby, Matthews, & Morton, 1954). Similar findings were reported by Nogee & Levin (1959), with 72.5% maternal concordance and 70.6% paternal concordance among a sample of college students. While the ~2% differences in both studies were certainly within the margin of error, Jennings & Langton (1969) would conclude in their own study that when the mother and father sided with different parties, the average college student’s partisanship was as much as 15% more likely to be the same as the mother’s. Furthermore, in cases where both parents sided with the same party, parent-child concordance was more likely when the mother was most politically active than when the father was (Jennings & Langton, 1969).

Continuity

Since longitudinal studies of the general public have shown that individual party affiliations are remarkably stable over time (Converse & Markus, 1979), one can infer that affiliations ingrained by parental indoctrination are similarly stable. However, two important studies have analyzed the continuity of parental influence in particular. In the aforementioned 1959 cross-sectional study by Nogee & Levin, at least 65% of college seniors reported their political stance had not changed in the four years living away from their parents, and interestingly over 80% of business majors reported no change. Later Jennings and Niemi (1975) conducted an eight-year longitudinal study that surveyed the same subject dyads in both 1965 and 1973, and they concluded their data “unequivocally” supported the notion that party preferences absorbed in adolescence remain stable in early adulthood.

Other Relevant Research

While not directly concerned with intergenerational concordance, the work of Zuckerman, Kotler-Berkowitz, & Swaine (1998) on the influence of political discussions is relevant. They found that an individual’s party preferences are more strongly correlated to those of people he/she discusses politics with than they are to those of strangers whose self-identification on party preferences or left-right scales are the same. In other words, the old adage “those who talk together vote together” had been empirically verified, and it was also revealed that 76% of respondents discussed politics with a relative more than anyone else. It can be inferred from these separate findings (the strong influence of discussion on one hand and the family’s primacy as an arena for discussion on the other) that family is a major determinant of political behavior.

Conclusion

As the ultra-positivist hegemony of behaviorism in political science faded from the mid-1970s to the present, painstaking empirical research of political socialization largely faded with it (with some exceptions). In any event, the behaviorist epoch has produced such mountains of data on the subject that further inquiry almost seems superfluous. The strong correlations on party affiliation and affiliation continuity are enough to convince most social scientists that parents are a primary politicizing agent, but weak correlations on specific issues mitigate this idea enough to prevent social scientists from treating it like a deterministic iron law. Any conclusions beyond this common sense would require more extensive research.

References

Baker, K. L. (1974) The Acquisition of Partisanship in Germany. American Journal of Political Science 18 (3), 569-582.
Brooks, A. C. (2006) The Fertility Gap. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved September 25, 2006 from http://www.opinionjournal.com/editor...?id=110008831.
Burbank, M. J. (1997) Explaining Contextual Effects on Vote Choice. Political Behavior 19 (2), 113-132.
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). The American Voter. New York: Wiley.
Converse, P. E., & Markus, G. B. (1979) Plus ca change...: The New CPS Election Study Panel. The American Political Science Review 73 (1), 32-49.
Dalton, R. J. (1980) Reassessing Parental Socialization: Indicator Unreliability Versus Generational Transfer. American Political Science Review 74 (2), 421-431.
Dodge, R. W. (1962) Political Affiliation and Imagery Across Two Related Generations. Midwest Journal of Political Science 6 (3), 266-276.
Dowse, R. E. & Hughes, J. (1971). The Family, the School, and the Political Socialization Process. Sociology 5 (1), 21-45.
Driedger, L. & Halli, S. S. Pro Life or Pro Choice: Politics of Career and Homemaking (1997) Population Studies 51 (2), 129-137.
Economic & Social Research Council. (2003). A missing level in the analysis of British voting behavior: the household as context. Retrieved September 25, 2006 from http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/public...Paper%203.pdf.
Hyman, H. (1959) Political Socialization. New York: Free Press.
Glaser, W. A. (1959). The Family and Voter Turnout. The Public Opinion Quarterly 23 (4), 563-570.
Jennings, M. K. & Niemi, R. G. (1968) The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child. The American Political Science Review 62 (1), 169-184.
Jennings, M. K. & Niemi, R. G. (1975) Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: A Longitudinal Study of Two Generations. The American Political Science Review 69 (4), 1316-1335.
Jennings, M. K. & Langton, K. P. (1969). Mothers Versus Fathers: The Formation of Political Orientations Among Young Americans. The Journal of Politics 31 (2), 329-358.
Lampard, R. J. (1997) Party Political Homogamy in Great Britain. European Sociological Review 13 (1), 79-99.
Longman, P. (2006). The Return of Patriarchy. Foreign Policy, Spring 2006, 56-65.
Maccoby, E. E., Matthews, R. E., & Morton, A. S. (1954). Youth and Political Change. The Public Opinion Quarterly 18 (1), 23-39.
McCloskey, H. & Dahlgren, H. E. (1959). The American Political Science Review 53 (3), 757-776.
Niemi, R.G., Ross, R. D., & Alexander, J. (1978) The Similarity of Political Values of Parents and College-Age Youths. The Public Opinion Quarterly 42 (4), 503-520.
Nogee, P. & Levin, M. B. (1959) Some Determinants of Political Attitudes Among College Voters. The Public Opinion Quarterly 22 (4), 449-463.
Straits, B.C. (1990). The Social Context of Voter Turnout. The Public Opinion Quarterly 54 (1), 64-73.
Styskal, R. A., & Sullivan, H. J. (1975) Intergenerational Continuity and Congruence on Political Values. Western Political Quarterly 28 (3), 516-527.
Tedin, K. (1974) The Influence of Parents on the Political Attitudes of Adolescents. The American Political Science Review 68 (4), 1579-1592.
Wasby, S. (1966). The Impact of the Family on Politics: An Essay and Review of the Literature. Family Life Coordinator 15 (1), 3-24.
Zuckerman, A. S., Kotler-Berkowitz, L. A., & Swaine, L. A. (1998). Anchoring political preferences: The structural bases of stable electoral decisions and political attitudes in Britain. European Journal of Political Research 16, 1-37.

http://www.apolyton.net/forums/showt...48#post4613748

We're talking about morans who don't listen, remember?