Battle for Basra

[Ramo]

According to independent reports, only one militia is being confronted - JAM.

I don't think anyone has solid data for that, but as a general rule, the army is disproportionately Shia and somewhat segregated. In fact, the Awakening Councils that we've been supporting are in the process of going on strike due to Maliki's refusal place more than a small percentage of them in the army.

[Ramo]

A Kuwaiti paper:

The problem facing the government in its battle for control of Basra, which it has said will be "decisive", is that a large number of people in the army and the police are not carrying out orders to fight. Instead they are planning to return home, given their lack of desire to get into this fight.

Several notables in the governate have told AlQabas that the government forces, having entered into what amounts to street-fighting for Basra neighborhoods, will lose this fight unless these local forces are reinforced by large additional forces from elsewhere, because their opponents in the Mahdi Army and other organizations have appropriate weapons in sufficient quantity, and have experience in urban fighting. The lack of fighting spirit on the government side is owing to a lot of causes, among them the existence of tribal links between the army and police on the one side, and the armed militias on the other.

Also, the provincial council and the governor have come to an almost unified position of opposition to this [central government] operation, because they feel that the Prime Minister infringed on their jurisdiction as an elected local council. [In particular] they think the Prime Minister's meeting with the heads of the army and the police in the governate, without involving them, was a derogation of their status and an infringement on their legal authority.

http://arablinks.blogspot.com/2008/03/government-forces-in-basra-not-fighting.html

Backing up ISCI here seems like a terrible idea. I never thought that we had a real dog in the fight between the two major militias, and this seems like a guarantor for generating ill-will among the Shia masses. But what else can Petraeus do if asked for support from the elected Iraqi gov't? Another reason why this entire project is absurd...

[East Street Trader]

Well, I do not know whether the Kuwaiti paper is right but intuition suggests that it would be incredibly difficult (impossible really) to create in Iraq a military body owing allegiance to the government of the country and to that government alone.

You can only create such a thing as that once the allegiance of the population itself is to the state. In the shorthand we have for these things, once there is a nation state.

Which no one has ever said exists in Iraq.

Or even the pre-conditions which make the emergence of such a thing at all likely.

Anyway, I live a very long way away from Iraq and know nothing at all of what goes on there. Maybe the trick of creating a force loyal only to the government has been pulled off somehow.

I guess the current situation will soon enough provide some insight into that.

[Zkribbler]

The problem facing the government in its battle for control of Basra, which it has said will be "decisive", is that a large number of people in the army and the police are not carrying out orders to fight. Instead they are planning to return home, given their lack of desire to get into this fight.

National Public Radio (NPR)'s stringers are reporting that members of the Iraqi armed forces and police have taken off their uniforms and joined the Mahdi Army. Plus, the militias have been going door-to-door forcing young men to join up. Now, the government forces are outnumbered and outgunned. Plus, one of the two oil lines that runs through Basra has been blown up.

Government spokes state these stories are not true and that the battle is going well.

[Winston]

And this country is where civilisation originated. Seems like they really blew that one..

[Wezil]

So, we aren't celebrating anymore? What a difference a couple pages made.

[Winston]

Oh, we can celebrate all right. We should just be careful not to invite any Iraqis along.

[Zkribbler]

Originally posted by Winston
And this country is where civilisation originated. Seems like they really blew that one..

Well there, plus the river valleys of the Nile, Indus and Hwang Ho.

(I'd like to research pottery, please.)

[Ramo]

So, we've got an agreement, sort of. Is this the end?

Kevin Drum summarized the situation well:

WHAT'S GOING ON IN BASRA?....CHAPTER XLII....Here's the latest entry in the "What's going on in Basra?" sweepstakes. Earlier today Muqtada al-Sadr's headquarters in Najaf released a statement, and Erica Goode of the New York Times provides the backstory:

The substance of the nine-point statement, released by Mr. Sadr on Sunday afternoon, was hammered out in elaborate negotiations over the past few days with senior Iraqi officials, some of whom traveled to Iran to meet with Mr. Sadr, according to several officials involved in the negotiations.

....Iraqi forces, backed up by American war planes and ground troops, have been in a stalemate with Shiite militias affiliated with Mr. Sadr in Basra for the past six days, in a military operation that has stirred harsh criticism of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.

....Many Iraqi politicians say that Mr. Maliki's political capital has been severely depleted by the campaign and that he is now in the curious position of having to turn to Mr. Sadr, a longtime rival and now his opponent in battle, for a solution to the crisis.

In the statement, Mr. Sadr told militia members "to end all military actions in Basra and in all the provinces" and "to cooperate with the government to achieve security."

But he also made demands, including an amnesty for fighters in the Mahdi Army militia and the release of all imprisoned members of the Sadrist movement who have not been convicted of crimes. While the government has occasionally made small-scale releases of Sadrists, it has resisted earlier demands for more sweeping action.

Italics mine. If this is accurate, it suggests that it was Maliki who went to Sadr, not the other way around, and that he did it several days ago. What's more, it was Sadr who laid down the conditions for an end to the violence, not Maliki. This is pretty plainly at odds with the theory that Sadr's statement was a show of weakness, a sign that he was taking more damage than he could stand and was desperate for a truce.

In urban warfare like this it's frequently hard to figure out who's "won" and who's "lost." Often both sides lose. In this case, though, it certainly looks as if Maliki has lost more than Sadr. Both sides have taken casualties, but Sadr doesn't appear to have lost any ground; he's forced Maliki to come to him to ask for terms; he's successfully projected a statesmanlike image throughout; and politically he seems to be in stronger shape than before. Maliki, conversely, appears by all accounts to have launched an ill-timed mission with inadequate troops and then been unable to close the deal. The Iraqi army and the redoubtable Gen. Mohan al-Furayji, the much lauded leader of the regular forces in Basra, are both looking pretty banged up in the bargain too.

This could all change tomorrow, but right now that's about where we stand. It's increasingly hard to see how the Basra offensive ends up being a plus for Maliki and his allies. Including us, unfortunately.

UPDATE: Reed Hundt points out that there's a Tet Offensive quality to the operation in Basra: "Even if the American-backed Maliki-led government establishes some sort of order in Basra, Baghdad and other cities, the battles of the last week must have shaken the American media into a recognition that there's no peace at hand in Iraq, and certainly no widespread support for the Maliki government."

Maybe so. On the other hand, perhaps there's a bright side to this? The failure of a major offensive might finally convince Maliki and his allies that Sadr isn't going away and can't be defeated militarily. That might, in turn, convince them that they need to negotiate seriously with Sadr — and perhaps with the Sunni coalition as well — if they want to maintain any authority at all going forward. I don't have high hopes that this is the lesson Maliki will take away from the Battle of Basra, but you never know.

The basic lesson from the Battle of Basra appears to be the same lesson from the Olmert's Lebanese War. Using technological superiority to crush a strongly-motivated, urban force is an increasingly questionable prospect. Maliki's position was far weaker than Israel's, of course, and that was reflected in the outcome.

Maliki is personally the big loser here. It's hard to see him surviving a vote of no confidence at this point (in the past week, this was avoided only because the governing parties denied Parliament quorum). But who replaces him? Someone in Da'wa untainted by this operation? I don't see Sadr as having the ability to unite with the Sunni opposition, despite his rhetoric. In any case, as Drum mentioned, we're probably going to see a gov't more conciliatory to Sadr than before.

And what happens in October? Again, anything but a bunch of huge Sadrist victories in the South is increasingly implausible.

I think Iran just developed some serious doubts about ISCI, and more funding will go to the choice of Shia street. What would be interesting if Washington joins in on the action. Petraeus was already negotiating with Sadr, quite successfully. But we burned some of those bridges by intervening in the interests of the less popular of the two major Shia militias to benefit them at the ballot box. Reinforcing the idea that we're trying to hitch Egypt-style politics to Iraq wasn't particularly bright (this was the kind of motivation behind 9/11 in the first place, if you recall), but unfortunately is the name of the game in a climate where there are over 130k American troops in Iraq without objectives.

[Zkribbler]

Maliki threw the dice, and they came up snake eyes.

Shia will now gravitate towards Sadr and Iran.
The Sunni Arabs and Kurds will isolate themselves.
Iraqi will be more factionalized.
And we are so scrod.

IMHO, Maliki's offensive was our last chance for victory is Iraq. Our victory chances died on the streets of Basra. The best we can hope for now is not to lose too badly.

[Dinner]

Originally posted by Wezil
Didn't the Brits turn Basra over to the Iraqi gov last fall?

Yes, and it quickly went to ****. Militias controlling the streets and the local police essentially being proxies for different militias.

[Wezil]

Originally posted by Oerdin


Yes, and it quickly went to ****. Militias controlling the streets and the local police essentially being proxies for different militias.

Yes, we are past that now. I was wondering why there were so many posters thinking this was a good thing. A page later and reality appears to have set in (again).

[Zkribbler]

Originally posted by Wezil


Yes, we are past that now. I was wondering why there were so many posters thinking this was a good thing. A page later and reality appears to have set in (again).

Maliki went into Basra with a large force. I assumed that he'd done some calculations and had concluded that he had more than enough troops.

If he could have pulled this off, he'd have begun the uniting of the country necessary for us to claim victory and get the hell out. But with this loss, all we can do is get the hell out.

[Wezil]

The fact he had to go into Basra yet again was the point you were overlooking. Returning to your starting position is hardly a success worth celebrating. Turns out he couldn't even do that.

I share your assessment but I think that point ("get the hell out") was reached a very long time ago.

[Patroklos]

How is Sadr telling his forces not only to give control of its territory to the government, but that anyone attacking government forces is an enemy as well a bad thing?