Battle for Basra

[Riesstiu IV]

Our handling of Iraq is a testament to America's greatness and will be seen as the greatest experiment in democracy by 2010.

[chequita guevara]

Originally posted by snoopy369
If, by some miracle, this is clearly on the path to being wrapped up (Iraqi forces are able to clearly exert control over the whole or nearly the whole of their country, Sadr agrees to join the government legitimately, etc.) by the end of 2008, how is Bush going to be viewed in the future I wonder? He will have accomplished his goal (removing Hussein, stabilizing Iraq), or at least put it on a path towards clearly being accomplished (as opposed to now where it is hard to see it being accomplished). Sure, he didn't play nice, and was not entirely honest; but frankly that's the norm nowadays when it comes to presidents anyway, so I don't think that can really be held against him in the long run.

Would this rehabilitate his image to the point that he would be considered a 'successful' president rather than a 'failed' president by historians?

No, because he destroyed Iraq. That it managed to be able to crawl by the end of his term won't change the fact he should be in a cell at the Hague facing War Crime charges.

Then there's the whole using the Constitution for toilet paper.

[Elok]

Originally posted by snoopy369
Removing Saddam and installing a friendly government,

I don't know how friendly they'll actually be, given the mess we made of reconstruction. And they can't afford to look too cozy with us. If they seem to be our puppets they'll not only lose the respect of the rest of the world, they might be ousted by their own people. Democracies are supposed to answer to their own folk, not some group thousands of miles away.

plus a small permanent presence (the sort of small permanent presence that allows us a convenient base-of-operations if Iran misbehaves, for example),

We already had a presence in the ME. One of OBL's beefs with us is that we've had our troops in Saudi Arabia for years. Iraq is closer, sure, but given the insane range of our weaponry how valuable is that? Patroklos?

and more security on the oil supply (less pressure from an unfriendly dictator on the oil supply, e.g. Hussein deciding not to sell any oil to the US for a while to hurt us, e.g. the 1970s oil crisis)...

We're supposed to be weaning ourselves off the damned fossil fuels, remember? We're probably not going to, and to hell with global warming, but still...it's also going to be some time before the oil in Iraq becomes available, since up till now oil companies have been reluctant to invest, and in the meantime the price of the stuff has gone through the roof.

sounds to me like a decent thing to end up with. Whether it's worth the billions/trillions/etc. we poured into it... who knows, but it certainly gave some value (if it turns out well).

And that's the clincher. We spent a STAGGERING amount on this war, in blood and money. The body count is, as a practical matter, higher than it appears due to the high number of troops partially or completely disabled but not killed (IED shrapnel in the brain). All those invalids add up to a substantial drain on the economy quite apart from the general nastiness of young men spending the rest of their lives with aphasia or paralysis.

As for the bare monetary costs, estimates vary wildly but I've heard several trillion. It sounds like we got a very raw deal, even assuming this pans out and the country doesn't disintegrate/get annexed in whole or part by Iran and Turkey/elect a crazy demagogue who hates us.

[Patroklos]

We already had a presence in the ME. One of OBL's beefs with us is that we've had our troops in Saudi Arabia for years. Iraq is closer, sure, but given the insane range of our weaponry how valuable is that? Patroklos?

A physical base in Iraq is almost worthless in a post American occupation Iraq as far as influence in the ME outside Iraq is concerned.

What are those troops going to do besides physically secure the oil fields from instability? And even that is unnessecary as long as some stable government forms in Iraq, as long as it isn't openly hostile like Iran or Saddam they are going to let oil flow. Who cares if we don't get the physical oil from Iraq as long as someone is, it will all be a wash in the world market.

To be honest, in order for that base to be anything other than a target for Iran to quickly overun in a general ME war or to make it a good jump off point against Iran we would have to station as many troops as we currently have in Iraq there anyway.

We could base ships out of Iraq but it is hardly the ideal place to do so due to the 1.) being at the extreme north of gulf and 2.) being easily blockaded waters. And when I say easy, I mean 10 times easier to blockade than the SOH. We already have an established (and awesome, been there several times) naval base in Manama and another at Jebel Ali, both far better positioned to support forces on the Arabian Gulf.

We could base jets in Iraq but honestly, what target can in Iran can we not already hit from Afghanistan, Bahrain, Turkey, SA, UAE, Qutar, Kuwait, or the bodies of water around there? And all of those are countries who are definetly friendly, not maybe friendly like Iraq would be.

So really, what benefit would a large base in Iraq really provide us? The only thing I can think of is to led assistance and training to Iraq itself similar to what we still do on SK and even in Germany and Japan to a lesser extent. And I haven't heard anyone important say any different.

[Zkribbler]

Good analysis, Pat!

[Geronimo]

Originally posted by snoopy369
If, by some miracle, this is clearly on the path to being wrapped up (Iraqi forces are able to clearly exert control over the whole or nearly the whole of their country, Sadr agrees to join the government legitimately, etc.) by the end of 2008, how is Bush going to be viewed in the future I wonder? He will have accomplished his goal (removing Hussein, stabilizing Iraq), or at least put it on a path towards clearly being accomplished (as opposed to now where it is hard to see it being accomplished). Sure, he didn't play nice, and was not entirely honest; but frankly that's the norm nowadays when it comes to presidents anyway, so I don't think that can really be held against him in the long run.

Would this rehabilitate his image to the point that he would be considered a 'successful' president rather than a 'failed' president by historians?

Given the lack of WMD even were everything to play out as perfectly as possible from here on out this whole enterprise will still have been a colossal boondoggle.

[unscratchedfoot]

This is the exact same thread I started yesterday. It seems the dark side has Ming in its grip.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by snoopy369
If, by some miracle, this is clearly on the path to being wrapped up (Iraqi forces are able to clearly exert control over the whole or nearly the whole of their country, Sadr agrees to join the government legitimately, etc.) by the end of 2008, how is Bush going to be viewed in the future I wonder? He will have accomplished his goal (removing Hussein, stabilizing Iraq), or at least put it on a path towards clearly being accomplished (as opposed to now where it is hard to see it being accomplished). Sure, he didn't play nice, and was not entirely honest; but frankly that's the norm nowadays when it comes to presidents anyway, so I don't think that can really be held against him in the long run.

Would this rehabilitate his image to the point that he would be considered a 'successful' president rather than a 'failed' president by historians?

So at least half a million people died so that Bush could install another authoritarian government to replace the previous one. In addition there are hundreds of thousands of refugees, if not more, and international relations may well take decades to recover from this recklessness, as well as the complete lack of trust that many people now feel for their government.

It would have been cheaper to have bribed Saddam Hussein. He certainly would have been up for it.

It's been evident for some time what is going to happen. The US has had its arse kicked in Iraq, and has had to resort to bribing the people who were their enemies (and who could "never" be compromised with). They are hoping to pay them off for long enough to withdraw and claim some sort of victory now that the public are bored of the whole thing. It's really kind of funny.

The only decent outcome to this would see Bush and Blair spending the rest of their lives in PMITA prison for war crimes. That is unlikely, and so is testament to how low we have sunk. At least the next time terrorists attack the US, no one else will give a ****. Well, except for authoritarians like Patroklos, DinoDoc and the other Polytards who've surrendered their consciences to their glorious leaders.

About the only good thing to come out of this is that a few more people have seen through the bull**** about our "democracy", and that a few more than that now know the truth about the US.

[MOBIUS]

I think you're being rather cruel to Patroklos and DinoDoc, even they have seen through the bull**** of Iraq even if they might not want to admit it too loudly...

[Patroklos]

except for authoritarians

I can't quite understand why you keep forgeting you're a communist.

Stay on message please.

[Ramo]

Let's be clear about what's happening. Maliki is backing the militia of his crucial Parliamentary allies to marginalize a significantly more popular force in advance of the provincial elections. SIIC recently vetoed the elections legislation (which was expected to benefit the Sadrists considerably); it's reasonable to assume that this operation was the price of elections going forward. Yay to the wonderful Iraqi democracy.

[Patroklos]

[Ramo]

Great summary from Anthony Cordesman:

Much of the current coverage of the fighting in the south assumes that Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sadr militia are the "spoilers," or bad guys, and that the government forces are the legitimate side and bringing order. This can be a dangerous oversimplification. There is no question that many elements of the JAM have been guilty of sectarian cleansing, and that the Sadr movement in general is hostile to the US and is seeking to enhance Muqtada al-Sadr's political power. There is also no doubt that the extreme rogue elements in the JAM have continued acts of violence in spite of the ceasefire, and that some have ties to Iran. No one should romanticize the Sadr movement, understate the risks it presents, or ignore the actions of the extreme elements of the JAM.

But no one should romanticize Maliki, Al Dawa, or the Hakim faction/ISCI. The current fighting is as much a power struggle for control of the south, and the Shi'ite parts of Baghdad and the rest of the country, as an effort to establish central government authority and legitimate rule.

The nature of this power struggle was all too clear during a recent visit to Iraq. ISCI had de facto control over the Shi'ite governorates in the south, and was steadily expanding its influence and sometimes control over the Iraqi police. It was clearly positioning itself for power struggle with Sadr and for any elections to come. It also was positioning itself to support Hakim's call for a nine governorate Shi'ite federation -- a call that it had clear Iranian support.

The US teams we talked to also made it clear that these appointments by the central government had no real popular base. If local and provincial elections were held with open lists, it was likely that ISCI and Dawa would lose most elections because they are seen as having failed to bring development and government services. [The other reason why they'd lose power is that other groups, such as the Sadrists, boycotted the earlier provincial elections. -Ramo]

There was no real debate over how bad the overall governance of the south was at the provincial level, how poor the flow of capital was from the central government in Baghdad, and how poor government-related services were even in Shi'ite areas. As recent ABC polls show, incompetence and corruption are not sectarian. The south may be more secure, but Shi'ites only receive marginally better treatment from the central government than Sunnis.

Members of the US team differed over how much the Sadrists had a populist base and broad support among the poor Shi'ite Iraqis in the south, and how well the Sadrists could do in any provincial and local elections, although most felt Sadr still had a broad base of support in Baghdad. One of the key uncertainties that emerged during visits to the south was over how elections would shape up when there were no real political parties operating with local leaders, and in a framework of past national elections that only allowed Iraqis to vote for entire lists (most with many totally unfamiliar names) for the main parties and that made no allowance for the direct election of members of the COR that represented a given area or district. Optimists hope for a populist upswell; realists foresee an uncertain mess.

There were also differences over how much Sadr was waiting out the effort to defeat Al Qa'ida before allowing the JAM to become active again, and how much he was repositioning himself to strengthen his political and religious position for a more normal political life. In practice, he may be doing both, may be as confused by the uncertain nature of Iraqi politics and security as everyone else, and may be dealing with a movement so fractured and diverse that effective control of even its mainstream is difficult to impossible.

It was also clear that Basra was a special case. The British position had essentially eroded to the point of hiding in the airport. There was a fair amount of bluster about joint planning, training, and patrols, but little evidence of substance. Moreover, the power struggle in Basra differed sharply from the struggle in the other Shi'ite provinces. Basra was essentially divided up among Shi'ite party mafias, each of which had its own form of extortion and corruption. They sometimes fought and feuded, but had a crude modus vivendi at the expense of the rest of the nation. Basra also had far more Iranian penetration in both the civil and security sectors than the other Shi'ite governorates. However, it was clear that Iran and the Al Quds force continued to be equal opportunity supporters of all the Shi'ite militias, and that Iran effectively was ensuring that it would support the winner, regardless of who the winner was.

This does not mean that the central government should not reassert control of Basra. It is not peaceful, it is a significant prize as a port and the key to Iraq's oil exports, and gang rule is no substitute for legitimate government. But it is far from clear that what is happening is now directed at serving the nation's interest versus that of ISCI and Al Dawa in the power struggle to come. It is equally far from clear that the transfer of security responsibility to Iraqi forces in the south is not being used by Maliki, Al Dawa, and ISCI to cement control over the Shi'ite regions at Sadr's expense and at the expense of any potential local political leaders and movements. Certainly, the fact that these efforts come after ISCI's removal of its objections to the Provincial Powers Act may not be entirely coincidental.

Is the end result going to be good or bad? It is very difficult to tell. If the JAM and Sadr turn on the US, or if the current ISCI/Dawa power grab fails, then Shi'ite on Shi'ite violence could become far more severe. It is also far from clear that if the two religious-exile parties win, this is going to serve the cause of political accommodation or legitimate local and provincial government. It seems far more likely that even the best case outcome is going be one that favors Iraqracy over democracy.

http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/news/politics/blog/2008/03/expert_current_iraq_fighting_n.html

[Ramo]

This is getting pretty interesting.

I wonder how Fadhila's going to play their hand here. Like ISCI (aka SIIC, formerly SCIRI) and Sadr (JAM, the Current), they have their own militia. They probably have the strongest electoral base in the region, and control the Governorship of Basra. Said Guv just failed in negotiating a settlement due to intransigence from Maliki. Fadhila presumably has something to gain from the marginalization of Sadr - but only to the extent that ISCI doesn't disproportionately gain. They, incidentally, are also Sadrists, but like Muqty's dad a lot more than Muqty.

On the federalism issue, there are some interesting cleavages. Da'wa and JAM are proponents of a strong federal gov't; ISCI and Fadhila are opponents. Maliki's motives have to at least partially be seen in this light. Fadhila can't be too happy about Da'wa consolidating control federally and ISCI consolidating control locally.

[East Street Trader]

I would be interested to know the make up of the Iraqi armed forces sent to confront the militias in Basra.

And, I suppose, how Iraqi armed forces are organised generally.

By which I mean is each unit made up of some Shi'ite, some Sunni, some Kurds - or does one or other predominate in each unit (or in the forces overall perhaps). And what is the Shi'ite, Sunni or Kurd element in the forces sent to Basra?

The implication in some of the articles quoted is that the forces sent are predominantly or wholly Shi'ite.