Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

The "surge" is a success?

Collapse
X
Collapse
 
  • Page of 28
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts
Previous 1 2 3 4 5 11 28 template Next
  • #1

    The "surge" is a success?

    Lots of indications here in Washington that the surge is being considered a success. In various articles the last week, it starts with "while the surge has been successful..." and then there's a litany of political problems.

    For a month or two, PBS has been running stories about how Anbar Province has been pacified. Yes, this is the same province that was ground zero for the "Sunni Triangle" not so long ago.

    If this is to be successful, Petraeus deserves a victory parade and a fifth star. The officer corps treated Iraq as a radioactive post not six months ago.
    I came upon a barroom full of bad Salon pictures in which men with hats on the backs of their heads were wolfing food from a counter. It was the institution of the "free lunch" I had struck. You paid for a drink and got as much as you wanted to eat. For something less than a rupee a day a man can feed himself sumptuously in San Francisco, even though he be a bankrupt. Remember this if ever you are stranded in these parts. ~ Rudyard Kipling, 1891
    Tags: None
  • #2
    Mission accomplished
    I drank beer. I like beer. I still like beer. ... Do you like beer Senator?
    - Justice Brett Kavanaugh

    Comment

    • #3
      You'll be finished by Christmas, back home by the fire
      So get your Naomi Klein books and move it or I'll seriously bash your faces in! - Supercitizen to stupid students
      Be kind to the nerdiest guy in school. He will be your boss when you've grown up!

      Comment

      • #4
        On a more serious note, if the Iraqi government doesn't get its act together, everything will just fall apart again.
        EViiiiiiL!!! - Mermaid Man

        Comment

        • #5
          Originally posted by Shrapnel12
          On a more serious note, if the Iraqi government doesn't get its act together, everything will just fall apart again.
          Herein lies the problem.

          Did anyone really doubt that The US military could pacify a country if it really tried? (at least temporarily anyway). The real question is what comes next? The only lasting peace can be a political one.
          "I am sick and tired of people who say that if you debate and you disagree with this administration somehow you're not patriotic. We should stand up and say we are Americans and we have a right to debate and disagree with any administration." - Hillary Clinton, 2003

          Comment

          • #6
            Originally posted by PLATO
            Did anyone really doubt that The US military could pacify a country if it really tried?
            Yes. The doubt was pervasive, assuming methods that are currently acceptable.
            I came upon a barroom full of bad Salon pictures in which men with hats on the backs of their heads were wolfing food from a counter. It was the institution of the "free lunch" I had struck. You paid for a drink and got as much as you wanted to eat. For something less than a rupee a day a man can feed himself sumptuously in San Francisco, even though he be a bankrupt. Remember this if ever you are stranded in these parts. ~ Rudyard Kipling, 1891

            Comment

            • #7
              The officer corps treated Iraq as a radioactive post not six months ago.
              I volunteered 7 months ago. Or maybe you mean general officers...
              "The DPRK is still in a state of war with the U.S. It's called a black out." - Che explaining why orbital nightime pictures of NK show few lights. Seriously.

              Comment

              • #8
                What a silly thread. The primary "success" in the surge comes at the cost of bolstering the centrifugal tendencies that are at the root of the problem; that is, the military successes are coming at the cost of the political failure (the latter of which, everyone involved recognizes to be the root of the problem in Iraq, and such thinking is behind the entire logic of the surge). Yeah, AQ in Mesopatamia is going down (and it would've gone down regardless of what we did), but we're arming Sunni Arabs who were insurgents not such a long time ago. The idea that they're going to fall in line behind the Iraqi state is naive. We're creating another militia that is not going to take its marching orders from the central government.

                And even if the Anbar Model were a brilliant idea, it's inherently unexportable to the rest of the country. Unless we are able to install a base of Salafi militants anywhere we want...

                The national reconciliation summit was a spectacular failure, with the Sunnis refusing to go past small talk. Any pretense of a national unity gov't ended, when the National Accord Front pulled out of Maliki's gov't (making the gov't officially entirely Shia and Kurdish). We recently saw the bloodiest attack in Iraq, ever, in the Sinjar bombings that killed well over 200 people. And as we all know, none of the political benchmarks have been met, and few are expected to be met by the time that we have to withdraw some of our troops...
                Last edited by Ramo; August 21, 2007, 11:06.
                "Beware of the man who works hard to learn something, learns it, and finds himself no wiser than before. He is full of murderous resentment of people who are ignorant without having come by their ignorance the hard way. "
                -Bokonon

                Comment

                • #9
                  talk. Any pretense of a national unity gov't ended, when the National Accord Front pulled out of Maliki's gov't (making the gov't officially entirely Shia and Kurdish).
                  A competent, functioning, and motivated national army and police force combined with a period of relative peace may make the Iraqi people less inclined to tolerate the same atmosphere of the past.

                  And I ask again why people think we can't keep up the surge, it is funny that nobody has actually looked into what "breaking the army" means. The age of exaggeration continues...

                  We recently saw the bloodiest attack in Iraq, ever, in the Sinjar bombings that killed well over 200 people.
                  Which means nothing.
                  "The DPRK is still in a state of war with the U.S. It's called a black out." - Che explaining why orbital nightime pictures of NK show few lights. Seriously.

                  Comment

                  • #10
                    Did anyone really doubt that The US military could pacify a country if it really tried? (at least temporarily anyway).
                    Calling Iraq pacified is pushing the bounds of sanity... The best that can be really said is that violence is back to about pre-surge levels (and many attribute that to the fact that it's Summer, a time when violence usually goes down).
                    "Beware of the man who works hard to learn something, learns it, and finds himself no wiser than before. He is full of murderous resentment of people who are ignorant without having come by their ignorance the hard way. "
                    -Bokonon

                    Comment

                    • #11
                      A competent, functioning, and motivated national army and police force combined with a period of relative peace may make the Iraqi people less inclined to tolerate the same atmosphere of the past.

                      Right. That's exactly what there is.....

                      You can have your own pet theory about the army and police magically saving everything, but no one gives it any credence.

                      And I ask again why people think we can't keep up the surge, it is 'funny that nobody has actually looked into what "breaking the army" means. The age of exaggeration continues...
                      The entire Pentagon brass believes that the Surge needs to end by about April. The age of bald assertions continues...

                      Which means nothing.
                      That's totally ridiculous. Civilian causalities - which mind you are only just back to pre-surge levels, not low by any reasonable measure - mean nothing? The lack of it was supposed to provide a breathing space for national reconciliation. Obviously neither is happening.
                      "Beware of the man who works hard to learn something, learns it, and finds himself no wiser than before. He is full of murderous resentment of people who are ignorant without having come by their ignorance the hard way. "
                      -Bokonon

                      Comment

                      • #12
                        Lots of indications here in Washington that the surge is being considered a success
                        As always, it depends on how you define success. For instance, the surge was aimed at improving security for a fairly brief period of time in order that the Iraqi government could work some things out during a period of (relative) calm.

                        Therefore, if the violence decreased (AT ALL) you can claim the surge worked as intended, and blame any further problems on the failures of the Iraqi government. "We bought them time and they squandered it" or somesuch. Then declare sortofvictory and start drawing down.

                        I don't think that's gonna fool too many people. But I've been wrong before.

                        -Arrian
                        grog want tank...Grog Want Tank... GROG WANT TANK!

                        The trick isn't to break some eggs to make an omelette, it's convincing the eggs to break themselves in order to aspire to omelettehood.

                        Comment

                        • #13
                          Incidentally, here's an opinion piece that's a hell of a lot closer to the mark than that O'Hanlon and Pollack nonsense:

                          The War as We Saw It
                          By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY

                          Baghdad

                          VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

                          The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.

                          A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

                          As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

                          Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

                          However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

                          In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

                          Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

                          Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.

                          The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.

                          Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.

                          Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.

                          At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.

                          In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”

                          In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.

                          Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.

                          We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.
                          nytimes.com
                          http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/opinion/19jayamaha.html?_r=2&pagewanted=print
                          "Beware of the man who works hard to learn something, learns it, and finds himself no wiser than before. He is full of murderous resentment of people who are ignorant without having come by their ignorance the hard way. "
                          -Bokonon

                          Comment

                          • #14
                            The entire Pentagon brass believes that the Surge needs to end by about April.
                            Oh, so now you listen to what the Pentagon says

                            Again, why don't you investigate what that actually means. Your cherry picking in this regard is astonishing.

                            You can have your own pet theory about the army and police magically saving everything
                            Oddly enough, thats not what I said. Please try not to pretend we haven't had this discussion before. But yeah, I can't understand why a funtioning and capable Iraqi military and police would not be a boon to stability or all types.

                            Try not to get lost in your own rhetoric.

                            That's totally ridiculous. Civilian causalities - which mind you are only just back to pre-surge levels, not low by any reasonable measure - mean nothing? The lack of it was supposed to provide a breathing space for national reconciliation. Obviously neither is happening.
                            Do you think the insurgents didn't have the capability to do this for the last three years? Do you think they couldn't do it again?

                            Fact is some faction saw the progress and decided to media whitewash it by flash banging the public with a singluar, symbolic, display of power.

                            Not that you needed it, but at least now you can say "Oh my god, everyone look, all of Iraq is aflame."

                            Kind of like how all the nations bridges are about to collapse.
                            "The DPRK is still in a state of war with the U.S. It's called a black out." - Che explaining why orbital nightime pictures of NK show few lights. Seriously.

                            Comment

                            • #15


                              Iraqi control of Iraq, as of December 2006.Care to guess what the map looks like now Ramo? Of course that means nothing right?

                              The weeds are where it matters, just like here.
                              "The DPRK is still in a state of war with the U.S. It's called a black out." - Che explaining why orbital nightime pictures of NK show few lights. Seriously.

                              Comment

                              Previous 1 2 3 4 5 11 28 template Next
                              Working...
                              X