Turkey busts Iranian weapons transfer to Syria / Hezbullah

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ramo

The other leverage is to setup an alternative govt under (probably) Allawi, with the support of his secularist coalition, of the Sunni Arabs, of a few Shiite independents, AND of the Kurds. Looking at parliamentary arithmetic in Baghdad, the KDP and PUK are crucial to that. They are the swing vote.

The problem is that, absent serious external pressure, the Kurds have basically no incentive to do that. Since they're getting basically what they want wrt autonomy and probably Kirkuk, but these issues would immediately come to a head under such a coalition since Arab Nationalism is their raison d'etre and Sunni Arabs would be the big losers if the Kurds get their way in Kirkuk. I don't see the Kurds abandoning SCIRI/Da'wa without a shakeup in Parliament.

1. From what I can gather, the Shiites and Kurds are not in complete agreement on the oil issue, with Shiites favoring a larger role of the Iraqi National Oil company.

2. A Kurdish-Sunni coalition would certainly require a compromise over Kirkuk. I guess Im not seeing the potential Sunni-Allawi coalition as being based on Arab nationalism (which has to lose, since it alienates both Shiites and Kurds) so much as its based on an opposition to Shiite fundamentalism (which both Sunnis and secularists have in common) on opposition to Iranian influence, and most of all, on a belief that the Maliki govts path isnt leading to stability, economic growth, etc. It appears to me that the Kurds are quite aware of how much they have to lose if the situation deteriorates further, especially if that leads to a fairly quick American withdrawl.

Now of course the Sunni Arabs dont want to lose Kirkuk. But they also have a lot to lose if the current situation deteriorates - is it worth giving up Kirkuk to get back on the inside in Baghdad? And the Saudis, who have a lot of interest in improving the Sunni position in national Iraqi politics, and presumably a much lesser interest in Kirkuk, may attempt to influence the Iraqi Sunni Arabs to compromise, at the same time the US does so wrt to the Kurds.

[Ramo]

1. That seem to me a relatively minor issue. That's the Da'wa/SCIRI divide coming in play (the Kurds favoring the latter POV).

2. There's some evidence that the Kurds don't object all that much to Iranian influence to the extent of soliciting Iranian aid. Sunni Arab militants are percieved as the greater evil. See the embassy incident in Irbil. In the long-term, Maliki isn't good for Kurdish interests, but no one in Iraq is operating on long-term concerns.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ramo
2. There's some evidence that the Kurds don't object all that much to Iranian influence to the extent of soliciting Iranian aid. Sunni Arab militants are percieved as the greater evil. See the embassy incident in Irbil. In the long-term, Maliki isn't good for Kurdish interests, but no one in Iraq is operating on long-term concerns.

See the OP. The relationship of the Kurds to Iran is by no means simple, and its difficult to judge by individual incidents (especially when there may be more to the incidents than meets the eye) Historically they have looked to Iran for help against Baathism. Ditto theyve looked to Israel for help against Baathism. They will look to anyone to help with their interests, which is what small peoples tend to do. Thats why they are the swing vote. The question is, what can the Sunni-Allawi alignment, the Saudis and Jordanians, and the USA offer them, compared to what Iran and those elements in the UIA most loyal to Maliki can offer them?

[Ancyrean]

Originally posted by molly bloom


Are you back from Indonesia, Ancyrean ?

Hi Molly

Yes, I'm back in Ankara for around a year and a half. I'll be leaving for Bangkok for a year in September again, though.

[Ancyrean]

Originally posted by VetLegion
I think the number is larger. 100 000 is a mid-size neighbourhood in a city. It is my feeling that support is larger. I don't have any sources to back it up, though.

Maybe you're right, but it's definitely way short of what would be called a mass movement, of the sort that makes an entire people rise. Without that kind of support, they are marginal at best.

You can say, who knows maybe they will gain support in time and I would say, fair enough. However, they have bloody enough a reputation among Kurds in Turkey, and probably elsewhere, to make this a realistic prospect.

Furthermore, the way they run their outfit is appaling in terms of its ruthlessness and low regard for human life, even of their own. There are frequent desertations from the PKK with insider horror stories. One can say, well you can't make a revolution with a velvet glove; but then again, with this kind of thuggery, people won't be lining up in droves too.

I'm not saying they're romantic. They kill people after all. However I'm saying that NOBODY will give the Kurds a state if they don't carve it out with weapons. It's simple.

I tend to think their best chance of getting an independent state is through deftness and trickery in Northern Iraq, of the kind they are displaying now (PUK and KDP and their leverage in Iraq etc.). Resorting to weapons makes sense there if Iraq remains weak until they prepare the ground for such an action. That means, IMO; get Kirkuk, bear out the Sunni reaction, make sure they have enough an arms buildup, act more and more independently from Baghdad, invent a good reason for declaring terminal alienation from Baghdad, and then rise up.

Elsewhere, resorting to weapons will only make it worse for those doing so. Kurds in Turkey have the best of conditions compared to others, despite the sarcasm this comment might generate. It's bound to improve, not deteriorate, if Turkey's European track stays on track. That, of course, is a totally different topic .

[Ramo]

Dunno, lotm, what anyone has to offer to the Kurds for them to shelve their most important political priorities. The only possible option I can see is a huge Egypt-style co-option program.

[Ancyrean]

Originally posted by Oerdin
Only 20% of the Turkish population is Kurdish so that makes around 14.2 million Kurds in Turkey though they are mainly grouped in the southeast where they are the majority. In the end it I suspect the Kurds will not stop until they get their own state so eventually Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria are going to have to give up due to ever larger and endless unconventional warfare.

Turkey is exactly the wrong country to hope for this eventuality. PKK has been around since 1984, and there's absolutely no sign neither in the public or the establishment that it's not worth fighting it.

I have to add an important detail here. The PKK renounced its seperatist aims after their leader, Abdullah Öcalan (sp. Oedjalan) was captured in 1999. They are now claiming to fight for increased autonomy, cultural rights etc. That's a big step for such an organisation, but they have a serious credibility issue, for obvious reasons.

There's also a political party in Turkish politics with close affiliation with the PKK. It's currently called the "Democratic Society Party", after being closed many times over the past decade and repoening itself under a different name each time. They insist they renounce violence, but say "their base isthe same with that of the PKK", shower praise on Öcalan. Unfortunately for those who believe in dialogue, PKK's continued attacks only have effect to undermine what scrap of credibility these people have as reliable players for any "political" solution.

[VetLegion]

Low intensity conflict in Turkey makes sense from the point of view of those who wish some part of Turkey to one day be a part of Kurdish state. They can't win in the classical sense but it prevents full assimilation and keeps hatred going. Everybody who is killed has relatives, on both sides.

The reason I don't take claims of assimilation seriously is because I've seen it fall apart here. It takes decades to build trust, friendship, human connections. In my oppinion the best indicator of assimilation is intermarrying. That's the last barrier. You can speak the same language, go to same schools and live in the same street, but assimilation is only when you're ready to let your kid marry his. And even then it takes just a few weeks of nationalist frenzy to break all that, tearing families apart and putting brother against brother.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ramo
Dunno, lotm, what anyone has to offer to the Kurds for them to shelve their most important political priorities. The only possible option I can see is a huge Egypt-style co-option program.

They dont have their most important political priorities, and its not at clear to me that the Maliki govt can deliver them. And its not clear to me that a wise Sunni-Allawi coalition wouldnt offer them a substantial part of their priorities.

Egypt was a firm ally of the USA's main adversary, and coopting them was a huge deal. I dont see the US-Kurdish relationship as looking like that - do you really think the KDP/PUK are to Iran as Egypt was to the USSR? Yes, Im quite aware that the KDP/PUK worked with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. They also worked with the Shah, as leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran are quite aware. And with Mossad. And IIUC, during the mid-90s, with the CIA and with Allawi. Sure they dont want to alienate Iran unnecessarily, but I hardly think having them shift from their alliance of convenience with SCIRI/Dawa is that huge an act of cooptation. Im not saying the switch will be pulled off, just its not that far fetched.

http://www.aina.org/news/20070311132437.htm

[Ancyrean]

Originally posted by Ramo
Dunno, lotm, what anyone has to offer to the Kurds for them to shelve their most important political priorities. The only possible option I can see is a huge Egypt-style co-option program.

LOTM, Ramo:

Kurds in Northern Iraq feel that they have never been so close to independence in their entire history. Barzani, for one, often and publicly said in the past 3-4 years, that their ultimate and undeniable aim is to get independence, that they can wait a little more if they have to get there.

As victims of decades of Saddam's oppression, Kurds in Northern Iraq are, understandably, sharply attuned to relationships of power. They see clearly that many people need their cooperation for many things, so they offer it only in return for incremental gains which would in time make independence seem inevitable.

Kirkuk is the cornerstone of this strategy: no Kirkuk, no viable state. So this is the only part of the equation where they would go to hell and back to get right, regardless of any abstractions of "Sunni opposition", or threats of war with any group or the central government. They can't give up now on Kirkuk even if they have to somehow lose terribly in military terms in the end.

I strongly think whatever they seem to do to contribute to the stability of Iraq should be viewed from that perspective. They are not sincere partners for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ancyrean

I strongly think whatever they seem to do to contribute to the stability of Iraq should be viewed from that perspective. They are not sincere partners for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq.

Im not sure any player in Iraq is sincere about wanting anything beyond there own groups interests.

I think the Kurdish leadership is quite aware (even if the average Iraqi Kurd is not) of how vulnerable a landlocked, small, Iraqi Kurdistan would be. There may someday be a region in which its viable, but its questionable if thats today.

The position of the Kurds in Iraq today looks very much like that of Poles in 19th c Austria-Hungary - their long term goal too was independence, but their eagerness to maintain autonomy in Galicia as a kernel of a future Polish state, as well as their preference for Austria soveriegnty vs German or Russian, and their need for central govt support to maintain control of Lvov/Lwow/Lemberg made them an important balancer in AH politics.

[Ancyrean]

Originally posted by VetLegion
Low intensity conflict in Turkey makes sense from the point of view of those who wish some part of Turkey to one day be a part of Kurdish state. They can't win in the classical sense but it prevents full assimilation and keeps hatred going. Everybody who is killed has relatives, on both sides.

The reason I don't take claims of assimilation seriously is because I've seen it fall apart here. It takes decades to build trust, friendship, human connections. In my oppinion the best indicator of assimilation is intermarrying. That's the last barrier. You can speak the same language, go to same schools and live in the same street, but assimilation is only when you're ready to let your kid marry his. And even then it takes just a few weeks of nationalist frenzy to break all that, tearing families apart and putting brother against brother.

The break-up of Yugoslavia and the ensuing cross-hatreds and killings are one of the greatest tragedies of 20th century . The amity and cohabitation of Yugoslav peoples were an undescribable loss. I can understand what you mean about how previously harmonious peoples can fall apart, in the context of Turkish Kurds.

PKK's ultimate aim is to bring this about, to start a chain reaction of both-ways-hatred. That's why I sincerely hope they fail, militarily and otherwise, because, to follow your suggestion, in a recent poll the number of people being relatives due to Turkish-Kurdish marriages was found as 3 million. Also, the picture in Turkey is way more complex than the simplification of "Kurds as a nation". Kurds speak two major and mutually unintelligable languages, belong to Sunni, Alawite and Shafi sects across the language divide, to mention the most significant factors. Fortunately, PKK is utterly incapable of appealing to all these groups across the whole spectrum.

[Ancyrean]

Originally posted by lord of the mark
Im not sure any player in Iraq is sincere about wanting anything beyond there own groups interests.

I think the Kurdish leadership is quite aware (even if the average Iraqi Kurd is not) of how vulnerable a landlocked, small, Iraqi Kurdistan would be. There may someday be a region in which its viable, but its questionable if thats today.

Essentially, you're right. But I sometimes get the impression that they are counting on the fact that once they get independence this or that way, the US will be morally obliged to keep the new entity safe from harm and from prospective occupation by its neighbours. By that reckoning, by a good calculation of the timing, their independence can be made a fait accompli. And if the time is not right now, then conditions should be made better for that moment. Like the move on Kirkuk, like making the most of their swing vote situation etc. However, trying to get a hold on Kirkuk has extra risks, since they would have to deal with the Turkmens in that city, who have the same kind of trust for the Kurds as the Kurds have for the Turks.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ancyrean


Essentially, you're right. But I sometimes get the impression that they are counting on the fact that once they get independence this or that way, the US will be morally obliged to keep the new entity safe from harm and from prospective occupation by its neighbours.

I sincerely hope that Mr Talabani, at least, has a better idea of this big, self-centered, fickle, fundamentally isolationist power than to count on such protection forever. A country that includes folks on the right who think we've more than fulfilled our moral obligations already by overthrowing Saddam, leftists who distrust the Kurds for their friendship with neocons, Israelis, etc, and realists who dislike the words "moral obligation".

[lord of the mark]

Now, to get back on topic, can we here more about what Turkey is doing to stop Iranian weapons shipments?