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I recently finished reading Berlin Diary by William Shirer, and I contemplated a couple of things.
1) Did Hitler ever really intend to invade and conquer Britain? Or did he merely want to impress Britain enough in order to make it join him in a grand alliance? I believe the latter is a possibility. The lack of decisive intervention at Dunkirk, the lack of a real concerted effort to knock out the R.A.F. in August 1940 (I will return to this in a second), the immediate construction of coastal defences in France and lack of preparation in the ground forces in way of barges, transports, etc. are very odd decisions if you are after an invasion. Surely Britain's refusal of a peace in July didn't shock Hitler that much? Surely he didn't offer it thinking there was no point in diverting resources to Sealion because it was a dead cert this British would accept?
Plainly the R.A.F. wasn't an easy nut to crack. Its strategy of not confronting enemy fighters, and spreading out its forces meant it could not be met in a decisive battle in the air, or on the ground as the Luftwaffe had done to the Poles and French. In spite of this the R.A.F wasn't in brilliant shape in late August, lacking primarily in pilots. Having said this neither was the Luftwaffe.
The OKL and Hitler certainly didn't consider the bombing of London to be key to gaining air superiority. Perhaps the bombings were ordered to yet again demonstrate and impress upon the British the advantages to allying with Britain, as opposed to a mere reprisal. It was however a concession that air superiority would not be sought on the part of the Luftwaffe.
War trials simulated by Sandhurst projected that without air superiority, invading Wehrmacht forces would be delayed at around about the G.H.Q. line by the time the Royal Navy arrived from Scapa Flow to block supplies, and thus thwart the invasion. Perhaps the OKW and Hitler suffered from the same problem Napoleon did in the early 1800s: Lack of key areas of superiority and a lack of willingness to attempt an invasion.
Maybe Hitler didn't have the heart in risking an invasion of England? There are two points to consider here IMO. Firstly it hadn't been done since 1066. There was no prior example of a successful invasion on the scale of an invasion of the South Coast using modern equipment against coastal fortresses, air power, etc. The invasion of France and Benelux learned from the errors of the 1914 invasion, namely a pincer thrust undercutting the Anglo-Belgian defenders from the French, staying to the right of Paris when wheeling round, and it had better ability to keep supply and artillery on pace with the leading troops. Secondly, Hitler plainly had desires of a world dominated by the British and German peoples.
It is the second point that I base this theory on. It is made clear in Mein Kampf that an Anglo-German alliance was desirable. Indeed, it is incredible to think of the power such an alliance would have had if, as Hitler would have ideally seen, it had existed at the turn of the century. The two biggest economies, the biggest army and the biggest navy, the biggest empire and probably the strongest European nation, joining together. The results would have been devestating for any nation or alliance against it, such were the complementary strengths each nation had. The invasion of the USSR in 1941 then, perhaps was not only about lebensraum, destruction of communism, and all the old cliches, but also to isolate Britain and leave it ally-less. Another plan in 1940 was a desperate plot to "inform" the US the Brits planned to destroy a liner, and blame it on the Germans as a second Lusitania, and then sink a ship afterwards and say "We told you so.". The actual sinking failed due to bad timing and luck, but it showed the desire for Germany to isolate Britain.
If there was such a strategy to completely isolate Britain and make it stand alone, it failed, but perhaps this was the goal in the summer of 1940? Not to invade and enslave Britain, but to bring it around to the German way of thinking and create that Grand Alliance Hitler so dreamed of. Potentially it was this short sightedness that in the end, cost Germany the initiative gained in 1940.
Any comments on this theory?
1) Did Hitler ever really intend to invade and conquer Britain? Or did he merely want to impress Britain enough in order to make it join him in a grand alliance? I believe the latter is a possibility. The lack of decisive intervention at Dunkirk, the lack of a real concerted effort to knock out the R.A.F. in August 1940 (I will return to this in a second), the immediate construction of coastal defences in France and lack of preparation in the ground forces in way of barges, transports, etc. are very odd decisions if you are after an invasion. Surely Britain's refusal of a peace in July didn't shock Hitler that much? Surely he didn't offer it thinking there was no point in diverting resources to Sealion because it was a dead cert this British would accept?
Plainly the R.A.F. wasn't an easy nut to crack. Its strategy of not confronting enemy fighters, and spreading out its forces meant it could not be met in a decisive battle in the air, or on the ground as the Luftwaffe had done to the Poles and French. In spite of this the R.A.F wasn't in brilliant shape in late August, lacking primarily in pilots. Having said this neither was the Luftwaffe.
The OKL and Hitler certainly didn't consider the bombing of London to be key to gaining air superiority. Perhaps the bombings were ordered to yet again demonstrate and impress upon the British the advantages to allying with Britain, as opposed to a mere reprisal. It was however a concession that air superiority would not be sought on the part of the Luftwaffe.
War trials simulated by Sandhurst projected that without air superiority, invading Wehrmacht forces would be delayed at around about the G.H.Q. line by the time the Royal Navy arrived from Scapa Flow to block supplies, and thus thwart the invasion. Perhaps the OKW and Hitler suffered from the same problem Napoleon did in the early 1800s: Lack of key areas of superiority and a lack of willingness to attempt an invasion.
Maybe Hitler didn't have the heart in risking an invasion of England? There are two points to consider here IMO. Firstly it hadn't been done since 1066. There was no prior example of a successful invasion on the scale of an invasion of the South Coast using modern equipment against coastal fortresses, air power, etc. The invasion of France and Benelux learned from the errors of the 1914 invasion, namely a pincer thrust undercutting the Anglo-Belgian defenders from the French, staying to the right of Paris when wheeling round, and it had better ability to keep supply and artillery on pace with the leading troops. Secondly, Hitler plainly had desires of a world dominated by the British and German peoples.
It is the second point that I base this theory on. It is made clear in Mein Kampf that an Anglo-German alliance was desirable. Indeed, it is incredible to think of the power such an alliance would have had if, as Hitler would have ideally seen, it had existed at the turn of the century. The two biggest economies, the biggest army and the biggest navy, the biggest empire and probably the strongest European nation, joining together. The results would have been devestating for any nation or alliance against it, such were the complementary strengths each nation had. The invasion of the USSR in 1941 then, perhaps was not only about lebensraum, destruction of communism, and all the old cliches, but also to isolate Britain and leave it ally-less. Another plan in 1940 was a desperate plot to "inform" the US the Brits planned to destroy a liner, and blame it on the Germans as a second Lusitania, and then sink a ship afterwards and say "We told you so.". The actual sinking failed due to bad timing and luck, but it showed the desire for Germany to isolate Britain.
If there was such a strategy to completely isolate Britain and make it stand alone, it failed, but perhaps this was the goal in the summer of 1940? Not to invade and enslave Britain, but to bring it around to the German way of thinking and create that Grand Alliance Hitler so dreamed of. Potentially it was this short sightedness that in the end, cost Germany the initiative gained in 1940.
Any comments on this theory?
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