WW2 - the Axis in the Mediterrenean

[Ned]

LoTM, had Germany not DOWed the US, we would probably never have gotten into a shooting war in Europe. FDR didn't even have the votes right after Pearl Harbor. (In fact, it is not clear that FDR ever wanted to do anything more than just supply the UK and Russia.) I don't see him changing people's minds if, one or two years later, Germany is finally set to invade the UK (assuming no war on the USSR and no diversion to Africa). By then, the war with Japan would still be ongoing and hot. America would be forced to fight on two fronts.

And, what would we do? Rush troops to the UK? Probably. But we would be facing a very strong Germany with no USSR keeping its main forces tied up. Very large American losses of life could be expected, something the US is very unwilling to commit to, every other thing being equal.

In the end, Germany dominates Western Europe and the USSR the rest. Those two are more likely to go to war than for Germany to attack the US, IMHO. Certainly Germany cannot go to war against the US with the USSR sitting there. The converse is somewhat true as well. If they attack the USSR, we enter the war, supply Russia and repeat what happened in the actual war with a few nuances.

[Ecthy]

I find the lack of manners with which people treat each other on this site appalling. I just don't see why you guys cannot refute Ned without ridiculing him. Especially eary on in conversations when his points are of a general nature.

He does emphasize points that you might not emphasize, that's not something ridiculous though, it might just be wrong.

[Ned]

Originally posted by Ecthy
I find the lack of manners with which people treat each other on this site appalling. I just don't see why you guys cannot refute Ned without ridiculing him. Especially eary on in conversations when his points are of a general nature.

He does emphasize points that you might not emphasize, that's not something ridiculous though, it might just be wrong.

Thanks, Ecthy.

[Fake Boris]

Sorry to have left alone this thread I started. I can come back to it, now that my exams are over.

A few preliminary disclaimers —

My knowledge of WW2 comes primarily from the following sources:

a) The big Chronicles Edition WW2 book (yup, that one with lots of pictures). It's actually quite nice, with lots of maps and statistics, and a week-by-week chronology of the war. It was practically my pillow book throughout all my teenage years, I read it countless times over.
b) Philippe Masson's book, 'Histoire de l'armée allemande 1939-1945'.
c) The classic of classics : Keegan's history of WW2
d) Playing war games : pretzel ones like Panzer General, but also serious stuff like Avalon's Hill Advanced Third Reich and Korsun Pocket.
e) A biography of Rommel written in French (don't remember the title).

I unfortunately can't back my claims by quoting any of these books, because I left my bookshelf in Montreal when I moved to France. I will therefore have to rely on Internet sources. I would like to note, however, that I've got a good nose and memory for numbers, and that anything I quote from web pages, I trust it to resemble what memory I have of the exact numbers.

On a related note, it’s worth remembering LOTM that he's missing the driving idea, which is that Germany truly enters the Mediterranean in a concerted and determined strategy, and not as an accidental afterthought due to Mussolini's failures.

***

Thats what so many folks miss. No, it was multiple problems.

Not enough merchies, esp if they have to route them all the way to Alex (after a victory)

Not enough port capacity - UNLESS they take Alex, and the rebuilding of Alex is going to rely on the Libyan ports.

Not enough trucks.

Poor road infrastructure.

Let's examine your claims here.

First, we need to know how much supply is required for a division to operate.

According to http://www.world-war-2.info/statistics/ (complete bottom of the page) :

An American armored division on the offensive expended anywhere between 436 to 832 tons of ammunition per day. Note that the numbers seem to claim 'ammunition' and not 'supply', but still, we're closing. Also, this number is for full-fledged offensives. A unit on pursuit mode (what Rommel was often found being into) requires 90 tons/day.

According to http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb01/MS610.htm though, "a motorized force of one division required 350 tons of supplies a day, including water." Which is plausible — I have no difficulty to believe that American units in general were more generously supplied and thus developed more expensive tastes than German ones. I also recall reading somewhere that a Panzer division on the Eastern front needed 500 tons/day when on the offensive.

So, was port capacity truly insufficient ?

Tripoli: 1500 tons/day
Benghazi: 2700 tons/day (reduced to 700 due to air harassment and administrative difficulties)
Tobruk: 1500 tons/day (reduced to 600 for the same reasons)

(1500+700+600) = 2800 tons/day. In other words, enough to support, under ideal conditions, 8 motorized divisions.
2,800 tons/day * month = 84,000 tons. Now, how much of that capacity was put to good use by the Italian navy ? 72,000. From there, imagine that the Luftwaffe dodges the Battle of Britain altogether and gets sent to the Mediterranean instead. Arguably, so does the RAF. The difference, of course, is that the British don't have any special advantage due to radar and airfield proximity. So the 1:1.5 ration in favor of the RAF during the Battle of Britain turns into the 1:1.5 ratio in favor of the Germans during the French campaign.

At the end of the French campaign, the Germans had 2,500 usable fighters and bombers, compared to Britain's 1200. Count in Italy’s 1200, and the British are undoubtedly overwhelmed.

Germany gains air supremacy over the Mediterranean, and solves the problem of the RAF interdicting harbors and truck columns. Now let's say they take the steps necessary to solve the 'administrative problems' too : port capacity in North Africa passes to 5,900 tons/day. That's plenty enough to send in Rommel's 8,000 trucks and all the fuel they need, along with supplies for, let's be conservative, 2 Panzers and 4 motorized infantry (three times what Rommel had in ’41). That's not even counting the fresh Frankfurters, blessed with the Fuhrer's compliments.

But, you're going to say, the Italian merchant marine was insufficient. This contention is highly dubious.
According to http://www.regiamarina.net/ref/stati..._stats_us.htm, total tonnage sent to Lybia during the course of the war was 2.25m, through 1,210 convoys representing 2,243 merchant ships and 1,913 escorts. This makes for an average of 1860 tons/convoy. Plausible, given the stated 2,800 tons daily capacity of Lybian ports (one would imagine that Rommel getting 72,000 tons a month was during his offensive prowess, and that he wasn’t getting as much in the lull between the ’41 and ’42 offensives). 2,243 ships/1210 convoys amounts approximately to 2 ships per convoy, with each carrying on average 1860/2 = 980 tons of supply. With the conservative estimate of each merchant ship being able to make one Italy-Africa return every two months, we can safely assume that Italy needs at most 61 days * 2 ships = 122 ships to supply Africa with 1860 tons a day. With Malta protected by an Axis garrison and air supremacy, North African harbors can process, say, 5,000 tons/day. 5,000/1860 * 2 * 61 = 324 merchant ships required. You can easily see that Italy’s 2,243 merchant ships involved in convoy operations is complete overkill, with regard to the needs of five or six divisions.

But let’s suppose that you’re still not convinced, that somehow, the mystique of destiny is rolling eternal full hands against the Axis. In the winter of ’42, six German divisions were trapped in the Demyansk pocket, which contained two workable airfields. Hitler, after being told by Goëring that air supply was feasible, instructed his generals to hold ground at all cost. According to the following report : http://www.answers.com/topic/demyansk-pocket, between February 8 and April 21, the pocket received 65,000 tons of supply by air, which amounts to 900 tons/day. The operation tied up all of the Luftwaffe transport assets, and much of its bomber force, and also included some “kamikaze” ground convoys. With another conservative estimate, we can assume, then, that with transport aircraft alone (leaving bombers to combat duty), it’s possible to deliver roughly 500 tons/day through airfields. I would even estimate that the problem is not one of aircraft availability, if we know that Germany fielded roughly 800 Ju-52s by the end of ’40, and that each could carry 5,5 tons of material (assuming one sortie per plane every three day, that would deliver a theoretical capacity of 800 * 5,5/3 = 1466 tons/day).

The conclusion : Rommel, with 5 fully-supplied divisions, and a strong air advantage, would have easily marched on Alexandria. From there, it doesn’t really matter that his supply lines are overstretched, because he can pause and rest for a week or two in Egypt, receive all required supplies by air if needs be, and go on to crush the fleeing British on the other side of Suez, while Italian infantry covers his flanks and Spaniards defend the Moroccan coast.

By now, it should be quite evident that your claims are frivolous, when you accept that Hitler is not invading Russia, and is determined to throw the full German power in order ‘solve’ the British problem first.

Germany has no real experience in ASW, now do they? Also they need to base them somewhere along the Spanish coast, and they dont have any decent bases in Spain, they have to set them up WHILE the blockade is underway.

This doesn’t compute. The Royal Navy never prevented the Germans from building submarine bases along the French coast, so why could they do it along the Spanish one ? I can concede that Spanish infrastructure is limited, but certainly not to the point they can’t deliver steel and concrete to their ports.

As for the submarine threat, it would be extremely short-lived, assuming that the Germans control both Suez and Gibraltar within 6 months of the launch of a Mediterranean offensive.

But yes, not doing a war against the USSR is a big plus for Germany, at least in the short term, and thinking only of the UK. Of course this may mean that Japan, its rear unsecured against Russia, may not attack the ABDC powers, which releases assets for the allies as well.

This doesn’t compute either. The Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact was signed on April 21, 1941, before Barbarossa. Moreover, the Berlin-Tokyo alliance was void of any obligation regarding Russia.

It also means Hitler has to sit around while the USSR rebuilds its armed forces post-purge, while they rebuild the Stalin line along the new border, and well they press him for concessions in the Balkans.

Stalin didn’t consider his country ready for war, and with reason. That’s why he signed a peace with Japan and Germany and intended to uphold it as long as possible, while the Western countries (which he didn’t have in his heart) took the pounding. He was informed of the German buildup along the border, and didn’t do anything about it. Germany was also a big importer of Russian resources, and not a terribly good payer at it… Stalin stood silent. You know that just 2 hours before the launch of Barbarossa, a Soviet grain train had just passed the Polish border on its way to Germany ?

As for the Soviet army recovering from the purges by 1943, I don’t buy into it. The truth is that as long as it wouldn’t be involved in a war, it couldn’t magically create experienced commanders. Also note that all militaries who faced German tactics for the first time were taken by surprise, and suffered a good two years before they could integrate effective counter-measures. There is no reason to believe that by 1943, the Soviet command would have magically understood what France and Britain learned the hard way.

I say that with a strong and concerted Axis push, Gibraltar and Malta fall max within a month of a Spanish DOW.

But that doesnt give them command of the Med yet. They still need to win the war in Egypt and THEN push the UK out of Syria/Palestine.

As I demonstrated earlier, control would have been achieved very quickly, if Germany threw in the necessary forces to ‘punch-out’ British resistance.

Doesn't really matter - if Gibraltar is destroyed, they can use Spanish ports on the Atlantic.

None of which has the facilities Gib has. It will still take some time to get them going, and they will still be vulnerable, and at the end of a long and vulnerable supply line.

Vulnerable supply line ? Like collaborationist Vichy and fascist Franco ? Or are you trying to say that Germany can supply a full Panzer Korps sufficiently to reach Stalingrad and Rostov, but can’t move submarine fuel through allied countries ?

The strength of the push, IE the number of divisions they can move toward Gib, is going to be constrained by their ability to move supplies over the Spanish rail system.

Absurd. An assault on Gibraltar would have involved at most three or four elite infantry divisions, backed by planes based in Southern France.
Just drop the alleged ‘Spanish infrastructure problem’. In no case was Spain in a state worse than Eastern Europe, so if Germany can bring 160 divisions to the gates of Moscow and Stalingrad, they can certainly move five divisions through an allied country.

From what I've read Franco was simply not inclined to enter WW2 under any circumstances. He wanted to rebuild Spain and he simply did not trust Hitler or Mussolini - even thought they did make his victory possible.

According to the Chronicle of World War Two, Hitler tried to persuade Franco to join. Franco asked for Morocco. Hitler thought the cost too great, because he had hoped that Vichy France could be convinced to join the war. In the end, he considered the possibility of the Vichy fleet rallying the fight more interesting than a theoretical Mediterranean strategy.

[Fake Boris]

Now, since you are proposing a what if, will you please provide specific dates for the time line?

For your information, the German High Command, hoping on Franco to join the Axis, had devised a plan for the capture of Gibraltar, which included deployment of mobile force in Portugal in order to prevent a British landing there. The plan was never put to use.
Here is a link to the document : http://www.gibnet.com/texts/hitler.htm. Again, this is Internet stuff, but I recall reading in Masson’s book that such a plan indeed existed.

So, here is my timeline :

June 1940 — Germany has got a modern force of 2,500 aircraft, Britain 1,200. They field 10 Panzer divisions, 8 motorized infantry (but 10 by September), 2 Fallschirmäger (deployed in Norway), 3 Alpine, and 140 static infantry (160 by Barbarossa) — in other words, unlimited supply of foot soldiers, given the strategic requirements.

Britain has got 40 divisions in the homeland, plus the Homeguard, and a lot of troops scattered in the Empire (can’t be arsed to look for numbers, shouldn’t be needed anyway).

End of June — Germany conducts talks with Vichy, and begins courting Franco. The following deal is reached : Vichy will surrender Morocco to Germany at an undisclosed date (secrecy is required to prevent a British landing there). The Reich annexes Alsace, but lets France keep Lorraine. Overall, Vichy is not wholly alienated by the deal : sure, they lose Morocco, but the war indemnities are lower than expected, and they keep the very symbolic region of Lorraine. Germany, for obvious reasons, informs neither Italy or France of its real intentions regarding Morocco. That will remain Franco’s and Hitler’s secret garden.

July, beginning : Germany prepares for its Mediterranean push. Coastal batteries are discretely sent to Spanish Morocco. Plans are made for a concerted and simultaneous invasion of the Balkans, Malta, and Gibraltar. Goëring pays lip service to air harassment of Britain, as a distraction. Hitler agrees with Mussolini of some invasion plans, while trying as much as possible not to hurt his pride. The deal with Franco should be kept secret to the last moment (Italy is transparent to British intelligence). Italy launches half-assed offensives in Africa.

July, end : Germany has got 3 Alpine, 3 motorized, 3 Panzers, and a dozen static infantry waiting for action on the French-Spanish border. Rommel is sent to Africa with 3 Panzers and 3 motorized. He’s told to wait until he’s got all the trucks and supplies he needs until he launches his offensive, because Hitler wants a devastating first blow. Italy deploys in Albania. Germany keeps 40 static divisions to pacify France, and begins redeploying the remaining 90 on the Eastern Front. Paratroopers and planes are sent to Southern Italy.

August 4th : German mobile units enter Spain, trying as much as possible to conceal their presence (perhaps by taking Spanish uniforms ?). Alpine units are sent south. Franco plans a deployment of his professional army to critical places : Canaries, Morocco, and ports. German U-boots set up a trap around Gibraltar.

Mid-August : Invasion begins. A massive air bombardment on Gibraltar is being conducted, while German Alpine troops begin to move towards the base. Hopefully, the British are caught by surprise ; fleeing ships are ambushed by U-Boots. Gibraltar falls. German mobile units quickly blitz to Portugal, and inform Salazar that Lisbon’s sovereignty will be preserved, as long as he doesn’t interfere with the Germans trying to prevent a British landing.
German foot infantry crosses the Spanish border ; they will most likely be on garrison duty for the next few months, if not years.
Meanwhile, Germany readies a spearhead of 4 Panzers and 4 motorized at the Yugoslavian border.
A few days later : Paradrop on Malta.

Beginning of September : Rommel goes on the offensive in Lybia. Germany, aided by Italy, attacks Yugoslavia, then Greece. The redeployment of static infantry in Poland goes on.

End of October : Yugoslavia and Greece have fallen. Paradrop on Crete. Panicked by Rommel’s advance in Egypt, the British, aided by the Free French, seize Vichy’s possessions in the ME. Germany assures Vichy that they will be handed back to them in a few months.

November : Rommel reaches Suez ; Britain faces a tough choice : move its fleet away, or risk getting trapped in the Mediterranean ? German paratroopers are decorated and sent on a well-deserved permission to Germany.

January 1941 : Germany begins transfer of Morocco to Spain. AfrikaKorps drives the British back to Iraq, hopefully with working port facilities in Haifa or Beirut. If not, it might take a month or two before Rommel can rebuild strength and go on to Iraq. Britain is in disarray ; Italian colonial troops benefit. Roosevelt prepares the American public for war. Germany rushes sea transport production.

Spring : Japan smells the blood and ‘Pearl Harbors’ America before they’re ready. With Iraq under attack, and Africa collapsing, it’s only a matter of time before Japan KOs India. With the British driven out of the Far East, how will America counter-attack Japan ?

Summer : Germany’s threatening… Britain is facing a multi-front war, its economy is in paralysis ; American help is virtually nil. Will Hitler gamble in the balance everything he’s got for a Sealion, losses be damned ? If ever Britain falls, then Russia is a piece of cake, and the promised millennial Reich becomes a reality.

[Ned]

Oncle, I am puzzled why Rommel's supply lines stretched all the way back to Tunsia if he had all those intermediate ports available for resupply?

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ned
LoTM, in your opinion, did the Japanese have any choice but to got to war against America, the British and the Dutch or pull out of China as ordered by FDR?

the choice was to reach an accommodation over China where they were committing fairly obvious aggression, as seen by the entire international community, other than the other Axis states.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ecthy
I find the lack of manners with which people treat each other on this site appalling. I just don't see why you guys cannot refute Ned without ridiculing him. Especially eary on in conversations when his points are of a general nature.

He does emphasize points that you might not emphasize, that's not something ridiculous though, it might just be wrong.

His playing fast and loose with sources, his tendency to quote nazi apologist sites, his assertion of things out of his behind as fact, etc, all make it very trying to have a calm discussion with him.

[Ecthy]

At the beginning of this thread he did nothing of thta yet received a lot of ridicule. Oncle Boris couldn't reply a single time without posting laughing smilies in a row. It's just extremely stupid behaviour.

I know he does the stuff you describe, I just don't think it'S a reason to treat him like that no matter what he does.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Oncle Boris
Sorry to have left alone this thread I started. I can come back to it, now that my exams are over.

A few preliminary disclaimers —

My knowledge of WW2 comes primarily from the following sources:

a) The big Chronicles Edition WW2 book (yup, that one with lots of pictures). It's actually quite nice, with lots of maps and statistics, and a week-by-week chronology of the war. It was practically my pillow book throughout all my teenage years, I read it countless times over.
b) Philippe Masson's book, 'Histoire de l'armée allemande 1939-1945'.
c) The classic of classics : Keegan's history of WW2
d) Playing war games : pretzel ones like Panzer General, but also serious stuff like Avalon's Hill Advanced Third Reich and Korsun Pocket.
e) A biography of Rommel written in French (don't remember the title).

I unfortunately can't back my claims by quoting any of these books, because I left my bookshelf in Montreal when I moved to France. I will therefore have to rely on Internet sources. I would like to note, however, that I've got a good nose and memory for numbers, and that anything I quote from web pages, I trust it to resemble what memory I have of the exact numbers.

On a related note, it’s worth remembering LOTM that he's missing the driving idea, which is that Germany truly enters the Mediterranean in a concerted and determined strategy, and not as an accidental afterthought due to Mussolini's failures.

***

Thats what so many folks miss. No, it was multiple problems.

Not enough merchies, esp if they have to route them all the way to Alex (after a victory)

Not enough port capacity - UNLESS they take Alex, and the rebuilding of Alex is going to rely on the Libyan ports.

Not enough trucks.

Poor road infrastructure.

Let's examine your claims here.

First, we need to know how much supply is required for a division to operate.

According to http://www.world-war-2.info/statistics/ (complete bottom of the page) :

An American armored division on the offensive expended anywhere between 436 to 832 tons of ammunition per day. Note that the numbers seem to claim 'ammunition' and not 'supply', but still, we're closing. Also, this number is for full-fledged offensives. A unit on pursuit mode (what Rommel was often found being into) requires 90 tons/day.

According to http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb01/MS610.htm though, "a motorized force of one division required 350 tons of supplies a day, including water." Which is plausible — I have no difficulty to believe that American units in general were more generously supplied and thus developed more expensive tastes than German ones. I also recall reading somewhere that a Panzer division on the Eastern front needed 500 tons/day when on the offensive.

So, was port capacity truly insufficient ?

Tripoli: 1500 tons/day
Benghazi: 2700 tons/day (reduced to 700 due to air harassment and administrative difficulties)
Tobruk: 1500 tons/day (reduced to 600 for the same reasons)

(1500+700+600) = 2800 tons/day. In other words, enough to support, under ideal conditions, 8 motorized divisions.
2,800 tons/day * month = 84,000 tons. Now, how much of that capacity was put to good use by the Italian navy ? 72,000. From there, imagine that the Luftwaffe dodges the Battle of Britain altogether and gets sent to the Mediterranean instead. Arguably, so does the RAF. The difference, of course, is that the British don't have any special advantage due to radar and airfield proximity. So the 1:1.5 ration in favor of the RAF during the Battle of Britain turns into the 1:1.5 ratio in favor of the Germans during the French campaign.

1. if the Germans are attack at, or past Alex, the Brits certainly do have radar and airfield advantages.

2. The problems at the minor Libyan ports were not easily solvable. They hadnt solved them by 1942, despite a much larger force of Italian infantry, and hence greater need to do so.


3. Rommel could not have restarted a couple of weeks after reaching Alex. He would have needed to completely restock, replace tank treads, etc. I also dont believe that the brits would have left the airfields intact. Nor that the Germans would have managed the air supply, over a much longer distance than in Russia. Where are they flying from? Remember, in 1940 the Germans arent in Greece or Yugoslavia.

What are the air miles from southern Italy to Alex? what is the range of a fully loaded German transport? o they take their own fuel for the return flight? Theres no fuel in Alex, except what the axis manages to truck in from the Libyan ports.


I dont know all the details off the top of my head.

One of the definitive works on the topic is Martin Crevalds "Supplying War" which has a chapter on the Libyan campaign. Its also been discussed in detail on SHWI.

[lord of the mark]

[QUOTE] Originally posted by Oncle Boris

The conclusion : Rommel, with 5 fully-supplied divisions, and a strong air advantage, would have easily marched on Alexandria. From there, it doesn’t really matter that his supply lines are overstretched, because he can pause and rest for a week or two in Egypt, receive all required supplies by air if needs be, and go on to crush the fleeing British on the other side of Suez, while Italian infantry covers his flanks and Spaniards defend the Moroccan coast.

1. Why would the brits wait and be crushed? They would delay him at the Canal, then retreat to Palestine, then if necessary retreat via Syria or Jordan to Iraq.

2. How many Italian infantry? They need supplies as well. You cant just supply Rommels divs.

3. Spanish troops will defend Morocco no better than the French did, but that doesnt matter, Torch isnt happening yet anyway.

By now, it should be quite evident that your claims are frivolous, when you accept that Hitler is not invading Russia, and is determined to throw the full German power in order ‘solve’ the British problem first.

call names if you like. Youve minimized the port problems, neglected all the fuel to move the fuel for the trucks (dont ask me for numbers, its all in Crevald) and have assumed an air resupply that the Germans never managed over a long distance.

You also assumed the Germans roll all sevens and the brits act stupid as Rommel tries to move east from Alex.

Germany has no real experience in ASW, now do they? Also they need to base them somewhere along the Spanish coast, and they dont have any decent bases in Spain, they have to set them up WHILE the blockade is underway.

This doesn’t compute. The Royal Navy never prevented the Germans from building submarine bases along the French coast, so why could they do it along the Spanish one ? I can concede that Spanish infrastructure is limited, but certainly not to the point they can’t deliver steel and concrete to their ports.[/q]


Why not? Theyre hardly going to be able to supply the port cities with grain to avert starvation, or to supply their troops approaching Gib.

As for the submarine threat, it would be extremely short-lived, assuming that the Germans control both Suez and Gibraltar within 6 months of the launch of a Mediterranean offensive.

Why? The Subs will operate from Britain, not from the Med. That is until the Brits have taken the Azores.

But yes, not doing a war against the USSR is a big plus for Germany, at least in the short term, and thinking only of the UK. Of course this may mean that Japan, its rear unsecured against Russia, may not attack the ABDC powers, which releases assets for the allies as well.

This doesn’t compute either. The Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact was signed on April 21, 1941, before Barbarossa. Moreover, the Berlin-Tokyo alliance was void of any obligation regarding Russia.

Irrelevant. Will the Japanese rely on a piece of paper, signed by Stalin of all people, to protect their rear?
And the Berlin Tokyo treaty is a red herring.

It also means Hitler has to sit around while the USSR rebuilds its armed forces post-purge, while they rebuild the Stalin line along the new border, and well they press him for concessions in the Balkans.

Stalin didn’t consider his country ready for war, and with reason. That’s why he signed a peace with Japan and Germany and intended to uphold it as long as possible, while the Western countries (which he didn’t have in his heart) took the pounding. He was informed of the German buildup along the border, and didn’t do anything about it. Germany was also a big importer of Russian resources, and not a terribly good payer at it… Stalin stood silent. You know that just 2 hours before the launch of Barbarossa, a Soviet grain train had just passed the Polish border on its way to Germany ?

As for the Soviet army recovering from the purges by 1943, I don’t buy into it. The truth is that as long as it wouldn’t be involved in a war, it couldn’t magically create experienced commanders.

They could gradually move up better commanders, as every peace time army does. IIUC its widely held that the Soviet officer corps was better in 1941 than it would have been in 1939, and less good than it would have been in 1943.

Also note that all militaries who faced German tactics for the first time were taken by surprise, and suffered a good two years before they could integrate effective counter-measures. There is no reason to believe that by 1943, the Soviet command would have magically understood what France and Britain learned the hard way.

The Soviet armies were developing strong counter measures by 1942, in fact by late 1941, IIUC. In any case, their weaknesses were not only based on suprise.

I say that with a strong and concerted Axis push, Gibraltar and Malta fall max within a month of a Spanish DOW.

But that doesnt give them command of the Med yet. They still need to win the war in Egypt and THEN push the UK out of Syria/Palestine.

As I demonstrated earlier, control would have been achieved very quickly, if Germany threw in the necessary forces to ‘punch-out’ British resistance.

I dont think you demonstrated that at all. I think its going to take Rommel some time to move east from Alex, and that the Brits will delay him steadily.

Doesn't really matter - if Gibraltar is destroyed, they can use Spanish ports on the Atlantic.

None of which has the facilities Gib has. It will still take some time to get them going, and they will still be vulnerable, and at the end of a long and vulnerable supply line.

Vulnerable supply line ? Like collaborationist Vichy and fascist Franco ? Or are you trying to say that Germany can supply a full Panzer Korps sufficiently to reach Stalingrad and Rostov, but can’t move submarine fuel through allied countries ?

Spain is A. Ideal partisan country with its rough terrain B. Has partisan warfare in its blood, and very recent experience with partisan warfare. C. Every incentive to drive the Germans out, given that their population will be starving. D. An abysmal rail network.

The strength of the push, IE the number of divisions they can move toward Gib, is going to be constrained by their ability to move supplies over the Spanish rail system.

Absurd. An assault on Gibraltar would have involved at most three or four elite infantry divisions, backed by planes based in Southern France.

Id have to check Krevald or SHWI for that.

Just drop the alleged ‘Spanish infrastructure problem’. In no case was Spain in a state worse than Eastern Europe, so if Germany can bring 160 divisions to the gates of Moscow and Stalingrad, they can certainly move five divisions through an allied country.

Yes, Im afraid it was. The German General Staff themselves recognized that.

[lord of the mark]

A quote from SHWI. I will try to highlight what i think most relevant


"The logistical problems in Spain were numerous (and I may well miss
some as I enumerate them, but the ones I remember will be more than
enough to show what the problems *were* in the *real world* as opposed
to the worthless charlatanry that is "The Hitler Options.")


1) Railways in Spain run mostly from the ports to the hinterlands.
There is, relatively speaking, very little capacity to ship materiel
and troops N-S or NE-SW (i.e. from the Franco-Spanish border to Gib).


Franco knew this -- and knew the consequences (see #2, below).


The Germans knew it, and worked out what they could supply in Spain.


Their calculations were that they could, if they used the *entire*
capacity of the Spanish rail net (and there were consequences to this
that they did not consider), they could manage to get a Sturm
(Assault) Division or two down to Gib plus another couple of Infantry
Divisions and a limited amount of heavy artillery. Say five divisions
total.


This would be supported, perhaps, by half a Luftflotte of aircraft.
Perhaps.


This was the most they could get there (and not quickly, either) and
the most that they could *supply* once they *were* there ... unless
they supplied them by sea.


Now, yes, the garrison of Gibraltar was relatively small in 1939-40,
but the capacity of the Spanish Rail net to get troops down south fast
in quantity was not enough ... so we can assume, quite reasonably,
that the allies, with control of the Atlantic, will get reinforcements
there.


So the Germans have to attack one of the most heavily fortified areas
in the world with no more than 50,000 men, *across a spit of sand
around 1000 yards wide*


Now, in WW1 both sides found that, IIRC, *four* machineguns could
defend a section of the front line 1000 yards wide and kill anyone
advancing faster than they could advance.


There is no cover on this spit of land -- and plenty of cover for the
defenders.


And you aren't gonna get 50,000 men on it all at once, either. Maybe a
reinforced Battalion ... perhaps 1500 men max.


Doesn't look too good for the attackers.


Yes, their artillery (in the Sturm Divisions and a limited amount of
nondivisional artillery), would be causing some problems ... but the
*British* have artillery, too. And they can support the position by
naval gunfire (which can be defended by Carrier CAP and ground based
CAP from the captured Spanish Morocco on the other side of the straits
... the obvious move for the defenders).


So we're looking at something *really* *really* bloody. Not even close
to a sure thing. In fact, the odds are on the *allied* side.


And, push comes to shove, when they've bled the Germans dry, they can
abandon it, as they now own the south side of the straits anyway.


2) To do #1 took up the *entire* capacity of the Spanish rail net.
Problem is, Spain relied on imported food to prevent starvation -- the
effects of the Civil War were still being felt.


That food had to come in on ship -- on the sufferance of the allies --
and then be transported inland by rail. The Spanish road net was,
generously, primitive and simply not up to handling any significant
movement of men, material, or food.


Problem is, the Germans are using the WHOLE Spanish rail capacity to
move men and supplies down south to Gibraltar.


See the problem?


Even if the allies allow the food needed *into* Spain -- which they
won't -- then the Spanish can't move food *and* troops.


So what happens?


The Spanish people starve.


And, since the Civil War had only ended in 1939 I think we can see
where this is going to lead ... the Republicans, who are being treated
with great and ongoing brutality by the Nationalists, will be prime
targets for the allies to supply into a guerilla uprising.


The word "guerilla" is a *Spanish* word, and refers to the sort of
fighting, brutal, nasty, vicious, fighting, that gutted Napoleon's
army of occupation in the Peninsula.


Spain has a long Atlantic Coastline.


Portugal is Britain's oldest ally (since the 1300's).


Shipping in weapons and training cadres will be child's play.


And Franco's goons will soon find what it is like to be playing
Napoleon to the Republic's Wellington.


See, remember the limited rail net capacity?


That can barely supply five divisions at Gib?


That means that there are not going to be significant numbers of
German troops available to *assist* the Nationalists. And, of course,
the supply situation will be made worse because of the terrain and the
fact that all those lovely isolated railway bridges, tunnels, and
cuttings will be prime targets for the guerillas.


So don't even think that those 5 divisions will ever *get* to Gib, or,
if they do, that they will ever have the supplies to even *attempt* an
attack on Gib.


3) The Italian Option. Sure, you're thinking, not a problem ... don't
need no railways ... use the Italian Navy and the Italian Merchant
Marine.


Reality Check. The Italian navy proved again and again that it was
simply no match at all for the RN.


So what happens if the Italians actually send out their navy to
somehow convoy through supplies or an assault?


Do I hear RN:1 ... Italians: 0?


We can pretty much guarantee that, to a greater or lesser degree, the
Italian Surface fleet ceases to exist quite rapidly, and at a much
lesser loss to the RN (a sustainable one, as it was set up to allow
for this sort of confrontation).


It also means that the Italian Merchant Marine, which did not have
sufficient capacity to supply North Africa and its possessions in
Albania and the Dodecanese *as it was* can't undertake offensive ops
there. Not even effective *defensive* ops, for that matter.


Result?


North Africa falls to the British.


And, of course, the Italian Merchant Marine is gutted by the RN and
RAF in its attemps to support German ops in Spain ... and can't do
much there anyway.


And, even if the Germans and Italians *do* manage, somehow, to take
Gib, Spanish Morocco is now *British* Morocco, and the straits are
*still* closed ... not that there's any worry about the Italian Navy
breaking out and joining up with the German Navy as the Italian
Surface Fleet is now at the bottom of the Med.


And as for Subs, well, Italian subs did operate in the Atlantic, and
were basically useless.



>If Gibralter does fall in 1940 or thereabouts, then it might nudge
>Hitler away from Sealion, which we all know he was iffy about anyway,


If by "iffy" you mean "only possible with massive handwaving by
specially selected Alien Space Bats", then, yes.

And logistic constraints of time and space mean that the operations in
Spain cannot commence before 1941 -- which puts paid to Barbarossa.



>and towards Admiral Raeder's "Operation Sphinx". This was a plan to
>drive the British out of the Med. and take the oil resources of the
>Middle East.


Problem is, the Eastern Med is now an allied lake because *all* of
Italian North Africa is now Allied occupied ... and probably all of
French North Africa, too.

And the Italians don't have either a Navy or a Merchant Marine left
that can do the job, or, if they have, then neither is big enough to
do the job.


Sorry to puncture your balloon. "

[Fake Boris]

History of the Millenial Reich, for Ned

Story of the Reich :

1945 : Britain’s former empire is split between Vichy, Spain, Japan and Italy. The UK is now a minor world power. Its once-famous fleet has rallied America. Germany begins enslavement of Jews and Slavs to be put to work in its industry. Russian industries and fertile lands become latifundia for Nazi oligarchs. Brutal repression of Slavs. A new cold war develops between America and Germany ; but both are contained by the threat of MAD.

1946 : To Mussolini’s displeasure, Hitler is crowned Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Italian ambassador in Berlin is recalled. Berlin retaliates with a boycott on Italian Parmesan and wines. Orwell drops work on the 1984 manuscript.

1948 : ‘Panem et Circensem’. German citizens enjoy a flow of cheap goods produced by Russian slaves. They like gladiatorial fights of the newly subdued race. Standards of living increase ; Hitler orders the construction of gigantic temples and ‘Arcs de Triomphe’ to the glory of the Reich. Impious books are burnt ; strong political repression forces intellectual to shut the **** up.
Meanwhile, Axis vassals are striving.

1949: Goëring is officially gay and drug addicted. No one gives a ****. Friedrich Nietzsche is made the ‘Official Prophet of Nazism’. His books are truncated and edited, and the original versions put out of circulation. Young student caught decrying ‘Talmudification’ of the Nazi ideology is sentenced to death.

1958 : revolts against Vichy in Africa. Hitler agrees to lease Laval military equipment, if Vichy will change its name to the ‘French Vice-Royalty of the Holy Germanic Roman Empire’. Laval agrees and crushes rebellions. Liberal press in Marseille decries the feudalizing move ; Laval has their assets seized.

1962 : Steel and Coal Union between Germany, Spain, and Vichy. Mussolini’s senile ego is too wounded for him to sign the treaty, but he will be dying soon.

1963 : Hitler dies. He is replaced by Speer. Endeavours subtle ‘de-Hitlerization’.

1963 : Speer’s first crisis. Pro-Nazi revolt in Brazil. The Reich dispatches a fleet to support the rebellion ; but America imposes a blockade with its own fleet. Nazi hard-liners push for aggressive action. Speer recalls the fleet, and takes the opportunity to replace Hitler’s stooges. He’d rather avoid nuclear annihilation.

1965 : Mussolini dies. Ciano reconciles with Germany, by joining the Steel and Coal Pact.

1966 : Kiev spring. Slavic protest suppressed in blood.

1972 : National humiliation in Germany. America wins the space race ; Speer dismisses the Space and Satellites Minister.

1981 : the new generation of Nazi oligarchs is slowly changing attitude. To make their latifundia more competitive, they understand the necessity of treating the slaves a bit better.

1985 : Slaves riot again ! Jewish laborers protest against interdiction of Gangsta Yiddish rhymin’ by their lords, which they claim help them sustain the hardships of their work. The crowd is quickly dispatched by tanks, but Reichstag eventually passes legislation forcing landowners to respect basic ‘pro-productivity’ measures, in the face of competition by Japan’s Chinese slaves.

1988 : Free trade agreement between the Fascist powers.

1994 : Publication of ‘The German Odyssey’, an ode to the German Ubermensch written by a young lyrical poet. Hitler’s Munich treason is celebrated as genius rivaled only by the ‘Trojan Horse’ scheme. The literary critics of Center-Right publications are dithyrambic.

2007 : Scandal in St. Petersburg ! A German landowner designated as his legitimate heir the bastard son he had from a Slavic chick. The legacy is ruled illegal by a German tribunal.

2021 : Reforms in the German political system. Nazi party officials are now elected. The Fuhrer reserves the right to invalidate any candidate whose views are inappropriate.

2036 : The liberal German elites of Moscow rediscover Dostoïevsky and Puchkin. Some slaves are discretely elevated as preceptors, cooks, gardeners.

2058 : Reformist government grants possibility to ‘Fascist Union’ nationals of receiving ‘Ubermensch’ naturalization, after passing a test ‘Aryanitude’. Conservative minister resigns in protest. Fascist Union seeks to improve relations with America.

2071 : Deadly gladiatorial fights banned by ‘Speer II the Pious’.

2080 : Talks begin of creating a Fascist transnational Passport. In backlash, conservatives drive out the center-left in the following legislative, but they find themselves unable to reach the 2/3 majority to amend the Constitution.

2108 : An increasing number of slaves are being freed by their owners and become grey-zone citizens. The Reichstag passes legislation 231 to 219 to grant them a reduced form of citizenship. German settlers in Ukraine and Poland riot. Berliner students demonstrate in support of the measure.

2199 : Young German philosopher finds a dusty copy of Nietzsche’s Antechrist in his dead grandfather’s roof. Reads it, and shocked by the difference between official Nazi theology and Nietzsche’s original works, writes a vehement pamphlet titled ‘The Antenietzsche’. He compares Hitler to St. Paul, and calls him a priest motivated by bloodlust domination appetites. Nietzsche is compared to Jesus.

2200 : The pamphlet is published on the Internet. The Fuhrer tries to limit its spread, but concealed copies flourish on P2P.

2202 : 687 students caught downloading the Antenietzsche are sentenced to a two-year firm jail sentence.

[Fake Boris]

Portugal is Britain's oldest ally (since the 1300's).

Don't have more time today, but BS. Salazar allowed U-boots to refuel at Portuguese ports.

[lord of the mark]

[QUOTE] Originally posted by Oncle Boris

Now, since you are proposing a what if, will you please provide specific dates for the time line?

For your information, the German High Command, hoping on Franco to join the Axis, had devised a plan for the capture of Gibraltar, which included deployment of mobile force in Portugal in order to prevent a British landing there. The plan was never put to use.
Here is a link to the document : http://www.gibnet.com/texts/hitler.htm. Again, this is Internet stuff, but I recall reading in Masson’s book that such a plan indeed existed.

So, here is my timeline :

June 1940 — Germany has got a modern force of 2,500 aircraft, Britain 1,200. They field 10 Panzer divisions, 8 motorized infantry (but 10 by September), 2 Fallschirmäger (deployed in Norway), 3 Alpine, and 140 static infantry (160 by Barbarossa) — in other words, unlimited supply of foot soldiers, given the strategic requirements.

I wont dispute the availabilty of troops, and will assume all the panzer divs are at perfect readiness, as thats not really the constraint.

Britain has got 40 divisions in the homeland, plus the Homeguard, and a lot of troops scattered in the Empire (can’t be arsed to look for numbers, shouldn’t be needed anyway).

End of June — Germany conducts talks with Vichy, and begins courting Franco. The following deal is reached : Vichy will surrender Morocco to Germany at an undisclosed date (secrecy is required to prevent a British landing there). The Reich annexes Alsace, but lets France keep Lorraine. Overall, Vichy is not wholly alienated by the deal : sure, they lose Morocco, but the war indemnities are lower than expected, and they keep the very symbolic region of Lorraine. Germany, for obvious reasons, informs neither Italy or France of its real intentions regarding Morocco. That will remain Franco’s and Hitler’s secret garden.

They reach a deal for a major French colonial concssion in days after the fall of France, which they could never reach after months. I think you misread the intentions of the Vichy pols.

But of course this is SECRET

July, beginning : Germany prepares for its Mediterranean push. Coastal batteries are discretely sent to Spanish Morocco.

How, pray tell, does one move and set up coastal batteries discretely?

Plans are made for a concerted and simultaneous invasion of the Balkans, Malta, and Gibraltar. Goëring pays lip service to air harassment of Britain, as a distraction. Hitler agrees with Mussolini of some invasion plans, while trying as much as possible not to hurt his pride. The deal with Franco should be kept secret to the last moment (Italy is transparent to British intelligence).

But Spain is completely opaque?

Italy launches half-assed offensives in Africa.

July, end : Germany has got 3 Alpine, 3 motorized, 3 Panzers, and a dozen static infantry waiting for action on the French-Spanish border. Rommel is sent to Africa with 3 Panzers and 3 motorized. He’s told to wait until he’s got all the trucks and supplies he needs until he launches his offensive, because Hitler wants a devastating first blow.

And the RN sees these units move, and all these supplies, and no German advance, and somehow fails to notice.

Italy deploys in Albania. Germany keeps 40 static divisions to pacify France, and begins redeploying the remaining 90 on the Eastern Front. Paratroopers and planes are sent to Southern Italy.

August 4th : German mobile units enter Spain, trying as much as possible to conceal their presence (perhaps by taking Spanish uniforms ?).

Why not just wear Scottish plaid and infiltrate London? The Spanish RRs are going to be carry tanks south from the French border, you wont be able to hide that (or do you want to wear out the treads moving them by road?) This is absurd. The Spanish RRs will hardly be able to move this force quickly, or supply it, even acting completely in the open. As they stretch to do so, every railway worker in Spain is going to know whats going on.

Alpine units are sent south. Franco plans a deployment of his professional army to critical places : Canaries, Morocco, and ports.

He wants to sacrifice them? He doesnt want troops around when the inevitable insurgency starts in Spain?

German U-boots set up a trap around Gibraltar.

And the RN overlooks them in the most intensively ASW patrolled waters on earth?

Mid-August : Invasion begins. A massive air bombardment on Gibraltar is being conducted,

From southern france, right? Fighter protection?

while German Alpine troops begin to move towards the base.

I think we all need to check the geography of Gib.

Hopefully, the British are caught by surprise ;

Yeah, that will help alot. If only the brits dont maintain a watch on the border, they can be beaten. Why they would fail to, I have no idea. You know, if you catch the British coast watchers by surprise, you a battalion of troops can take London.

fleeing ships are ambushed by U-Boots.

Theyre fleeing cause they ground troops failed to keep a watch. Yeah, right.

Gibraltar falls.

British idiocy sure helps. Not realistic, but it helps.

German mobile units quickly blitz to Portugal,

Thank goodness you didnt need the full 5 divs to take Gibraltar. You only needed 1 div of Alpine troops. That leaves a lot to spare for Portugal.

and inform Salazar that Lisbon’s sovereignty will be preserved, as long as he doesn’t interfere with the Germans trying to prevent a British landing.
German foot infantry crosses the Spanish border ; they will most likely be on garrison duty for the next few months, if not years.

This is instead of, or in addition to the forces that take gib? How will these guys be supplied?

Meanwhile, Germany readies a spearhead of 4 Panzers and 4 motorized at the Yugoslavian border.
A few days later : Paradrop on Malta.

meanwhile, the RAF takes Spanish Morocco. Oh wait, I forgot theyre stopped by the stealth coastal batteries.


[q]Beginning of September : Rommel goes on the offensive in Lybia. Germany, aided by Italy, attacks Yugoslavia, then Greece. The redeployment of static infantry in Poland goes on.

End of October : Yugoslavia and Greece have fallen. Paradrop on Crete. Panicked by Rommel’s advance in Egypt, the British, aided by the Free French, seize Vichy’s possessions in the ME. Germany assures Vichy that they will be handed back to them in a few months.

November : Rommel reaches Suez ; Britain faces a tough choice : move its fleet away, or risk getting trapped in the Mediterranean ?[q/]

Of course theyd move it away. How is that a tough choice?

German paratroopers are decorated and sent on a well-deserved permission to Germany.

adding color to BS doesnt make it less BS.

January 1941 : Germany begins transfer of Morocco to Spain.

Pretty empty, since the Brits have taken Spanish Morocco.

Are the Spanish troops in Morocco going to be supplied by the same Italian merchies that are supplying Rommel?


[q]ArikaKorps drives the British back to Iraq, hopefully with working port facilities in Haifa or Beirut. If not, it might take a month or two before Rommel can rebuild strength and go on to Iraq.[/a]

How long did it take the allies, with far superior resources,and much easier access to rebuild Antwerp? The Germans are moving the resources to rebuild Haifa through Alex? Which hasnt yet been rebuilt? Or via Benghazi, admin problems mysteriously solved? Or by air?

Britain is in disarray ; Italian colonial troops benefit. Roosevelt prepares the American public for war.

Well that it least makes sense. Why not just have him be as stupid as the Brit commander in Gib?

Germany rushes sea transport production.

First, they might want to rush shipyard constructiuon, training shipyard workers, etc.

Spring : Japan smells the blood and ‘Pearl Harbors’ America before they’re ready.

Before the Japanese are ready, you mean? I dont think the IJN was ready to do a Pearl any earlier than they did it. As it is, they were lucky. They took months to gather intell, among other things. In this scenario the US hasnt concentrated its aircraft to avoid sabotage, and fewer are caught on the ground. The IJN may just suffer some serious losses.

With Iraq under attack, and Africa collapsing,

How is africa collapsing. Ethiopia is still easily cut off.

Its only a matter of time before Japan KOs India.

Its at least 6 months till they have taken Burman, no particular reason it should go any faster than in OTL.

And taking India will be just as hard in this scen.

With the British driven out of the Far East, how will America counter-attack Japan ?

Have the Japanse managed to simultaneously take Australia?

Summer : Germany’s threatening… Britain is facing a multi-front war, its economy is in paralysis ; American help is virtually nil.

No reason for US help to be nil, it will be massive. Im also not sure why UKs economy is in paralysis. It didnt depend on the colonies, not even on India, and certainly not on the ME.

Will Hitler gamble in the balance everything he’s got for a Sealion, losses be damned ?

Sealion is no more possible now than in OTL, and if anything less so, with the luftwaffe having lost considerable assets in the ME and Balkans, and the UK having used its respite to build up its defenses.

If ever Britain falls, then Russia is a piece of cake, and the promised millennial Reich becomes a reality.

Britain wont fall, and Russia wouldnt be a piece of cake if it did.

But your pretty far out in fantasy land, with stealth coastal batteries, Gibraltar garrison not bothering to watch the border, let alone the logistical problems.