JS Mill, free speech, and creationism/global warming

[Jon Miller]

I don't know if you guys are talking about the same things. In my experience, these sort of things are more important for providing a basis for discussion then for any revolutionary insight.


JM

[lord of the mark]

A scientific revolution occurs, according to Kuhn, when scientists encounter anomalies which cannot be explained by the universally accepted paradigm within which scientific progress has thereto been made. The paradigm, in Kuhn's view, is not simply the current theory, but the entire worldview in which it exists, and all of the implications which come with it. There are anomalies for all paradigms, Kuhn maintained, that are brushed away as acceptable levels of error, or simply ignored and not dealt with (a principal argument Kuhn uses to reject Karl Popper's model of falsifiability as the key force involved in scientific change). Rather, according to Kuhn, anomalies have various levels of significance to the practitioners of science at the time. To put it in the context of early 20th century physics, some scientists found the problems with calculating Mercury's perihelion more troubling than the Michelson-Morley experiment results, and some the other way around. Kuhn's model of scientific change differs here, and in many places, from that of the logical positivists in that it puts an enhanced emphasis on the individual humans involved as scientists, rather than abstracting science into a purely logical or philosophical venture.

When enough significant anomalies have accrued against a current paradigm, the scientific discipline is thrown into a state of crisis, according to Kuhn. During this crisis, new ideas, perhaps ones previously discarded, are tried. Eventually a new paradigm is formed, which gains its own new followers, and an intellectual "battle" takes place between the followers of the new paradigm and the hold-outs of the old paradigm. Again, for early 20th century physics, the transition between the Maxwellian electromagnetic worldview and the Einsteinian Relativistic worldview was not instantaneous nor calm, and instead involved a protracted set of "attacks," both with empirical data as well as rhetorical or philosophical arguments, by both sides, with the Einsteinian theory winning out in the long-run. Again, the weighing of evidence and importance of new data was fit through the human sieve: some scientists found the simplicity of Einstein's equations to be most compelling, while some found them more complicated than the notion of Maxwell's aether which they banished. Some found Eddington's photographs of light bending around the sun to be compelling, some questioned their accuracy and meaning. Sometimes the convincing force is just time itself and the human toll it takes, Kuhn said, using a quote from Max Planck: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."

After a given discipline has changed from one paradigm to another, this is called, in Kuhn's terminology, a scientific revolution or a paradigm shift. It is often this final conclusion, the result of the long process, that is meant when the term paradigm shift is used colloquially: simply the (often radical) change of worldview, without reference to the specificities of Kuhn's historical argument.

A common misinterpretation of Kuhnian paradigms is the belief that the discovery of paradigm shifts and the dynamic nature of science (with its many opportunities for subjective judgments by scientists) is a case for relativism: the view that all kinds of belief systems are equal, such that magic, religious concepts or pseudoscience would be of equal working value to true science. Kuhn vehemently denies this interpretation and states that when a scientific paradigm is replaced by a new one, albeit through a complex social process, the new one is always better, not just different.

[Nostromo]

Nostromo will correct me, but its like THE major work on philosophy/history of science the last 50 years. Beyond familiarity with actual scientific practice(which youve obviously got), its probably the most important thing to know to participate in meta-science arguements like this. Not only to question your own views, KH, but also cause some of the people you will disagree with will cite Kuhn, often incorrectly, and youd be better armed seeing what he actually did say.

Yes, its a very influential book. But Kuhn's account of science is too simplistic. "Science" is a lot more complex than that. No one today as the chutzpah to talk about science in general, they talk about this or that part of science.

[Jon Miller]

I think that Quantum Mechanics is a better example then that then Special Relativity. And I don't think (but know little) that GR would fall under it at all.

Jon Miller

[Nostromo]

No, I don't. The philosophy of science is not a particularly appealing subject to me. It's like reading about the philosophy of meat packing when you work at a butcher's. You know pretty much everything they're saying...

Its more like saying: eh, I live in Canada and I read the newspapers, I don't need to read about its history or its sociology.

[KrazyHorse]

was not instantaneous nor calm, and instead involved a protracted set of "attacks," both with empirical data as well as rhetorical or philosophical arguments, by both sides, with the Einsteinian theory winning out in the long-run

It was still virtually overnight. GR was proposed in 1915. By the 1920s it was widely accepted.

I don't mean that a single paper did it. Nobody who's published or spent a while reading journals could possibly think that.

Scientists are individuals, and individuals are bull-headed and make mistakes. The community of scientists is far less fallible.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by KrazyHorse
Because I don't like people from 45 years ago telling me how things work today.

In fact, I think his work is probably obsolete itself...

Id be the last to suggest that you NOT look at more recent work in the phil of science. But from what I can gather, most such work is still largely either a reaction to Kuhn, or a development of Kuhn. AFAICT It would be far easier to make sense of contemporary debates on phil of science if you read him. And of course you could compare your own experience to what he says. Thats good empiricism. That would be particularly valuable Im sure.

I dunno, youre starting to sound like a fundie whos afraid to read Darwin.

Cmon. Ive read Nietsche. Be a man, you can read Kuhn, and your faith will be the stronger for it

[KrazyHorse]

Originally posted by nostromo


Its more like saying: eh, I live in Canada and I read the newspapers, I don't need to read about its history or its sociology.

Not really. In becoming a physicist I also learned its history. It's taught fairly linearly, with copious use of the arguments for and against each major theory which arose.

I don't know how other subjects are taught.

[Jon Miller]

I think where we are at now is that Philosophy isn't current... It is more hsitory.

JM

[KrazyHorse]

Originally posted by lord of the mark


Id be the last to suggest that you NOT look at more recent work in the phil of science. But from what I can gather, most such work is still largely either a reaction to Kuhn, or a development of Kuhn. AFAICT It would be far easier to make sense of contemporary debates on phil of science if you read him. And of course you could compare your own experience to what he says. Thats good empiricism. That would be particularly valuable Im sure.

I dunno, youre starting to sound like a fundie whos afraid to read Darwin.

Cmon. Ive read Nietsche. Be a man, you can read Kuhn, and your faith will be the stronger for it

The last tme I made the mistake of trying to read philosophy I was likely to find silly I ended up throwing Atlas Shrugged halfway across the room and cursing the ***** Ayn Rand...

[Nostromo]

Originally posted by KrazyHorse
Kuhn's work was, I think, obvious to a lot of physicists by his time. It had never been articulated before because the events which led to it arose in the early 20th century, and it was the middle of the 20th century before anybody had any perspective on it.

I can name, off the top of my head, half a dozen "paradigm shifts" which occurred in that time frame. At this point, anybody receiving a physics education (which is generally taught historically, from Newton onwards) has almost no choice but to realise that fundamental shifts in viewpoint happen virtually overnight.

It was probably a good idea to articulate this idea, but I think it was simply one whose time had come. The time and the source of this "paradigm shift" are completely unsurprising to me...

Kuhn thinks otherwise. He writes in the first paragraph of "the Structure" that when he was a graduate student in theoretical physics, he was exposed for the first time to the history of science:

To my complete surprise, that exposure to out-of-date scientific theory and practice radically undermined some of my basic conceptions about the nature of science and the reasons for its special success.

[Arrian]

I liked Atlas Shrugged. In my defense, I was 16...

-Arrian

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by KrazyHorse


The last tme I made the mistake of trying to read philosophy I was likely to find silly I ended up throwing Atlas Shrugged halfway across the room and cursing the ***** Ayn Rand...

You think all philosophy is like Ayn Rand!

[Arrian]

Agathon really didn't help.

-Arrian

[Nostromo]

Originally posted by lord of the mark
A scientific revolution occurs, according to Kuhn, when scientists encounter anomalies which cannot be explained by the universally accepted paradigm within which scientific progress has thereto been made. The paradigm, in Kuhn's view, is not simply the current theory, but the entire worldview in which it exists, and all of the implications which come with it. There are anomalies for all paradigms, Kuhn maintained, that are brushed away as acceptable levels of error, or simply ignored and not dealt with (a principal argument Kuhn uses to reject Karl Popper's model of falsifiability as the key force involved in scientific change). Rather, according to Kuhn, anomalies have various levels of significance to the practitioners of science at the time. To put it in the context of early 20th century physics, some scientists found the problems with calculating Mercury's perihelion more troubling than the Michelson-Morley experiment results, and some the other way around. Kuhn's model of scientific change differs here, and in many places, from that of the logical positivists in that it puts an enhanced emphasis on the individual humans involved as scientists, rather than abstracting science into a purely logical or philosophical venture.

When enough significant anomalies have accrued against a current paradigm, the scientific discipline is thrown into a state of crisis, according to Kuhn. During this crisis, new ideas, perhaps ones previously discarded, are tried. Eventually a new paradigm is formed, which gains its own new followers, and an intellectual "battle" takes place between the followers of the new paradigm and the hold-outs of the old paradigm. Again, for early 20th century physics, the transition between the Maxwellian electromagnetic worldview and the Einsteinian Relativistic worldview was not instantaneous nor calm, and instead involved a protracted set of "attacks," both with empirical data as well as rhetorical or philosophical arguments, by both sides, with the Einsteinian theory winning out in the long-run. Again, the weighing of evidence and importance of new data was fit through the human sieve: some scientists found the simplicity of Einstein's equations to be most compelling, while some found them more complicated than the notion of Maxwell's aether which they banished. Some found Eddington's photographs of light bending around the sun to be compelling, some questioned their accuracy and meaning. Sometimes the convincing force is just time itself and the human toll it takes, Kuhn said, using a quote from Max Planck: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."

After a given discipline has changed from one paradigm to another, this is called, in Kuhn's terminology, a scientific revolution or a paradigm shift. It is often this final conclusion, the result of the long process, that is meant when the term paradigm shift is used colloquially: simply the (often radical) change of worldview, without reference to the specificities of Kuhn's historical argument.

A common misinterpretation of Kuhnian paradigms is the belief that the discovery of paradigm shifts and the dynamic nature of science (with its many opportunities for subjective judgments by scientists) is a case for relativism: the view that all kinds of belief systems are equal, such that magic, religious concepts or pseudoscience would be of equal working value to true science. Kuhn vehemently denies this interpretation and states that when a scientific paradigm is replaced by a new one, albeit through a complex social process, the new one is always better, not just different.

Good summary