Such smugness, arrogance ...such insufferable moral superiority.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Arrian


Oregon!

Back to the domino theory, I see.

-Arrian

the consequences for Afghanistan following a hasty US departure from Iraq would be mixed. On one hand, reduced US credibility with our friends (really Mr Kharzai, do you want to end up hanging, like Mr Allawi and Mr Talabani?") OTOH lots more material resources available. Probably net, positive for Afghanistan. Except the real problem becomes Pakistan, where reduced US credibility hurts, and there is no option for benefiting from greater material resources. And if Perv distances himself from the US, its hard to see Afghanistan hanging on. At best they make a grand bargain with the pakis and go "taliban-lite"

[MrFun]

THE SKY WILL FALL AND THE EARTH WILL REVERSE ITS ORBIT IF UNITED STATES WITHDRAWS FROM IRAQ!!!!!

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Arrian
Bah. KH is right. It was not hard to figure that, given the Sunni/Shiite split and Saddam's role in skewing the power toward the minority Sunnis over the majority Shiites, given the Iraq's general predisposition to be (at the very least) suspicious of Americans, and given the likelyhood of outside intereference, that Iraq was a hugely ambitious project. Led by a moron.

-Arrian

Er, no. Given how restrained the Shiites were for the first three years, Id say the shiite-sunni split making civil war inevitable was NOT a given. The Shiites slid towards extremism as the result of the Sunni insurgency. While the attempt to create such an insurgency was probably inevitable, that it did as well as it did in 2003, and in 2004, was not. As for outside interference, I find one of the least plausible things about this whole endeavor was US tolerance of that. As for led by a moron, in 2003 Rumsfeld had come off of a very smart campaign in Afghanistan, and it was not at all clear that his allergy to nation-building would trump the importance of winning in Iraq. Indeed, until we get alot more info - Id like to see full memoirs by Rummy, Wolfie, Feith, Rice, Hadley - its still not clear who was the driver behind the force size and related occupation mistakes.

[Ned]

Originally posted by Arrian


No, we don't know for sure. The problem was that even if the risk of world war was low, *if* it happened, such a war would have been catastrophic. If you have a 10% chance of catastrophe, you have to take that seriously. Perhaps more seriously than a 50% chance of a lesser negative result (say, failure in Iraq).

-Arrian

No doubt this is true which is why we did not do what was necessary to win.

WWII turned out the way it did because the Brits, in October 1939, chose to continue the war even though Poland had been conquered by the USSR and Germany. Hitler offered to give up its piece of Poland and all of Czechoslovakia provided there be elections about the Corridor. Britain decided that destroying Germany was more important that freeing Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In contrast, we decided only to save SK in 1951 and SV in 1964 and to avoid the larger conflct with communism. By doing so, we had to lose both conflicts because we chose not to win.

The only reason SK turned out OK is due to its geography and b/c the US did not withdraw its troops.

Iraq has turned out to be another conflict we could not win and cannot win because we were/are unwilling and/or are unable to continue the war into Syria and Iran and perhaps even Saudi Arabia.

[Arrian]

Too much of whats happened is the logical consequence of specific things that happened in the first months of the occupation, things that were NOT probable. Heck, if you were writing fiction, theyd barely even be plausible.

Specific details are one thing, but he was talking pretty generally. Kinda like this:

13-12-2002 13:10

Invading Iraq is, IMO, a bad idea.

However, considering that the US government has painted itself into a corner on the issue where it either eventually nails Saddam or loses face in a big way, the changes of it happening remain pretty good (say 50%).

If it does happen, I don't worry so much about the actual fighting as the aftermath. The only post-invasion plan I see as having a silver lining is an Iraqi Marshall Plan, and that: a) is extremely expensive, b) is time consuming, and c) requires a large number of occupation troops. Given the current administration's dislike of nation-building and the current US economic situation, I don't see the Bush administration going for that type of plan. The war itself would cost a pretty penny too. So I worry that if there is a war, we'll just pick some general, hand him Iraq, and bail.

-Arrian

I was wrong about just handing it over to some general and bailing... at least so far. I was right, however, about the rest.

This was not really a unique analysis in December of 2002. I'm not that smart, nor can I see the future. All it took was a fairly ordinary amount of intelligence and the decision to use it.

-Arrian

[Arrian]

In contrast, we decided only to save SK in 1951 and SV in 1964 and to avoid the larger conflct with communism. By doing so, we had to lose both conflicts because we chose not to win.

We lost one battle, fought to a draw in another, and won the (cold) war.

-Arrian

[Ned]

Arrian, you were more right than wrong in 2002. I applaud you.

[Ned]

Originally posted by Arrian


We lost one battle, fought to a draw in another, and won the (cold) war.

-Arrian

Some might argue that communism collapsed on its own and that we had nothing to do with it.

[Arrian]

The point is that LotM is arguing that one could not have predicted the current situation in Iraq, because of its complexity. I quoted myself from 2002 (hesitantly, because though I know I'm not seeking applause, it certainly might look like I am) to demonstrate that predicting the course of events (such as the bungled occupation/reconstruction and the basic reasons why) was not rocket science.

-Arrian

[Arrian]

Originally posted by Ned


Some might argue that communism collapsed on its own and that we had nothing to do with it.

That they might. And they would be wrong, IMO. As would those triumphant cold warriors among us who would claim all of the credit for the collapse of the USSR and its client states. It was a mix of internal and external pressures.

-Arrian

[Ned]

I think we have a growing consensus here that if we follow the Iraq Report, we will withdraw and leave behind a government that will soon fall. There will be a civil war. The Sunnis will win because they have the old Iraq Army that will suddenly reappear when we withdraw. Saddam will again take charge unless he has been executed. Al Qa'ida will be rewarded with bases and funding.

What next?

It seems quite predictable to me.

[Arrian]

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Arrian


Specific details are one thing, but he was talking pretty generally. Kinda like this:



I was wrong about just handing it over to some general and bailing... at least so far. I was right, however, about the rest.

This was not really a unique analysis in December of 2002. I'm not that smart, nor can I see the future. All it took was a fairly ordinary amount of intelligence and the decision to use it.

-Arrian

You seem to be implying, in retrospect, a need for an Iraqi Marshall plan far more expensive than what we've spent. I dont think, in retrospect, that is the case. Given the actual expenditures on the Iraqi economy, we could have done far better if not for a sequence of specific events, which ive already cited.


but at least your point is that this was predictable with THIS administration, which while I dont agree with it, I think is far closer to the truth than KH's point, as I read it.

[Dinner]

It is good to see you back Ned. This place just wasn't the same without you.

[Zkribbler]

Originally posted by Ned
In contrast, we decided only to save SK in 1951 and SV in 1964 and to avoid the larger conflct with communism. By doing so, we had to lose both conflicts because we chose not to win.

Psst, the Soviet Union has crumbled and China is now a proto-Capitalist state.

We won without fighting a nuclear war.