ID and infinite regression

[Agathon]

I have no idea what a "non-representational view of belief" is supposed to mean, but the complaint is very relevant to what, if anything, one can know of objective reality. And you've still not explained why it matters whether beliefs are part of the physical world or "fairy dust".

If you have no idea what it is supposed to mean, why are you bothering arguing, since you are making yourself look a fool?

It matters because people tend to treat beliefs as mirrors set up to reflect the world. Treating them like anything else in need of explanation such as gases or whatever changes that.

This would seem to have unpleasant implications wrt voices in one's head.

Anyway, if congruence is goal of belief, the truth of the belief "the weight of an electron is 83kg" depends not on properties of the electron, but on the beliefs of those with those with whom I communicate. Correct?

Your belief is caused by the electron, but this is a coherence theory, so non-beliefs cannot justify beliefs (that's another story).

I'd like to see how an electron could justify a belief, since it is patently not a belief itself.

So, the way to defeat skepticism is to redefine truth to congruence with others' beliefs, while abandoning any hope of knowing anything about the inanimate world? If so, that's a victory that looks remarkably much like a surrender.

Only to someone who doesn't understand that your conception of truth has little resemblance to the way the term is actually used. And please don't put words in my mouth. I said nothing about not knowing anything about the world. We know a lot about the world. It's just that the causal relations between the world and our beliefs are irrelevant to justifying them.

I don't think you really understand the implications of what I'm saying anyway. You seem stuck in an antiquated mode of thinking.

[Geronimo]

Originally posted by Agathon

I have no idea what a "non-representational view of belief" is supposed to mean, but the complaint is very relevant to what, if anything, one can know of objective reality. And you've still not explained why it matters whether beliefs are part of the physical world or "fairy dust".

If you have no idea what it is supposed to mean, why are you bothering arguing, since you are making yourself look a fool?

It matters because people tend to treat beliefs as mirrors set up to reflect the world. Treating them like anything else in need of explanation such as gases or whatever changes that.

This would seem to have unpleasant implications wrt voices in one's head.

Anyway, if congruence is goal of belief, the truth of the belief "the weight of an electron is 83kg" depends not on properties of the electron, but on the beliefs of those with those with whom I communicate. Correct?

Your belief is caused by the electron, but this is a coherence theory, so non-beliefs cannot justify beliefs (that's another story).

I'd like to see how an electron could justify a belief, since it is patently not a belief itself.

Part of the reason we are so dismissive of this particular kernal of philosophical insight is that people who rely on the scientific method to build their working model of the universe do not concern themselves with this sort of justification and what's more have no incentive to do so. We don't look to electrons or anything else to justify our beliefs because justification is not truly part of the scientific method. The scientific method functions independant of any such justification.

Admittably, the scientist may take the working model of the universe generated by the scientific method and smugly dismiss as meaninginless any conflicting models of the universe derived by processes other than the scientific method on internet forums, but that isn't truly a philosophical claim any more than placing a bet on the outcome of the hockey season or even a bet on the loss of information entering a black hole would be making philosophical claims. It is simply an expression of confidence in the soundness of the scientific method which does not rely upon or look to formal philosophical analysis to justify that claim. We are not going to become less smug simply because philosophers don't think we have constructed a philosophical justification for ruling out non empirical mechanisms for creating models of the universe.

Originally posted by Agathon

So, the way to defeat skepticism is to redefine truth to congruence with others' beliefs, while abandoning any hope of knowing anything about the inanimate world? If so, that's a victory that looks remarkably much like a surrender.

Only to someone who doesn't understand that your conception of truth has little resemblance to the way the term is actually used. And please don't put words in my mouth. I said nothing about not knowing anything about the world. We know a lot about the world. It's just that the causal relations between the world and our beliefs are irrelevant to justifying them.

I don't think you really understand the implications of what I'm saying anyway. You seem stuck in an antiquated mode of thinking.

It is not truly an "antiquated mode of thinking", because it is a mode of thinking which remains productive and replacing it would in no way increase any sort of productivity. You may be justified instead in calling it an antiquated philosophical claim but I doubt any believers in the scientific method will actually care.

[Agathon]

Part of the reason we are so dismissive of this particular kernal of philosophical insight is that people who rely on the scientific method to build their working model of the universe do not concern themselves with this sort of justification and what's more have no incentive to do so. We don't look to electrons or anything else to justify our beliefs because justification is not truly part of the scientific method. The scientific method functions independant of any such justification.

Then what business do you have making ill-informed comments about Descartes? And why is it that so many scientists seem wedded to his bizarre theory of mind? That is the tragedy of the whole business: too many people in science are good at what they do, but make astonishingly ignorant comments when it comes to questions about knowledge and belief and so on.

Admittably, the scientist may take the working model of the universe generated by the scientific method and smugly dismiss as meaninginless any conflicting models of the universe derived by processes other than the scientific method on internet forums, but that isn't truly a philosophical claim any more than placing a bet on the outcome of the hockey season or even a bet on the loss of information entering a black hole would be making philosophical claims. It is simply an expression of confidence in the soundness of the scientific method which does not rely upon or look to formal philosophical analysis to justify that claim. We are not going to become less smug simply because philosophers don't think we have constructed a philosophical justification for ruling out non empirical mechanisms for creating models of the universe

It doesn't matter what scientists think about this. They make use of non-empirical mechanisms for creating models of the universe every day. The fact that they believe that they don't is evidence of their own ignorance.

For example, if more science students actually studied the origin of the subject they would realize that some of the assumptions they unthinkingly make were simply not made by ancient peoples for example. There's no point in calling these people stupid or criticizing them for not paying attention to empirical data, because they simply didn't have the conceptual armoury to do so - it was literally unthinkable for them. Although he exaggerates and his main thesis is in my opinion incorrect, this is one thing that Kuhn is somewhat correct about.

Similarly, if history is any guide, today's scientists will look like idiotic fools in a few hundred years for much the same reason: taking for granted as features of reality things which are really the result of our concept mongering activities. A naive belief in empiricism is one of these.

It is not truly an "antiquated mode of thinking", because it is a mode of thinking which remains productive and replacing it would in no way increase any sort of productivity. You may be justified instead in calling it an antiquated philosophical claim but I doubt any believers in the scientific method will actually care.

This is like saying that belief in the mercy of the gods is a thinking that remains productive in many tribal societies. That doesn't stop it from being wrong. And in fact you are simply mistaken - the belief in naive empiricism has had very bad consequences. For one it makes a particularly puerile form of relativism easier to accept, and it also denigrates other areas of language such as ethics by trying to insist that these conform to the scientific model. In this respect they are the sophists of today.

[Geronimo]

Originally posted by Agathon

Part of the reason we are so dismissive of this particular kernal of philosophical insight is that people who rely on the scientific method to build their working model of the universe do not concern themselves with this sort of justification and what's more have no incentive to do so. We don't look to electrons or anything else to justify our beliefs because justification is not truly part of the scientific method. The scientific method functions independant of any such justification.

Then what business do you have making ill-informed comments about Descartes? And why is it that so many scientists seem wedded to his bizarre theory of mind? That is the tragedy of the whole business: too many people in science are good at what they do, but make astonishingly ignorant comments when it comes to questions about knowledge and belief and so on.

Admittably, the scientist may take the working model of the universe generated by the scientific method and smugly dismiss as meaninginless any conflicting models of the universe derived by processes other than the scientific method on internet forums, but that isn't truly a philosophical claim any more than placing a bet on the outcome of the hockey season or even a bet on the loss of information entering a black hole would be making philosophical claims. It is simply an expression of confidence in the soundness of the scientific method which does not rely upon or look to formal philosophical analysis to justify that claim. We are not going to become less smug simply because philosophers don't think we have constructed a philosophical justification for ruling out non empirical mechanisms for creating models of the universe

It doesn't matter what scientists think about this. They make use of non-empirical mechanisms for creating models of the universe every day. The fact that they believe that they don't is evidence of their own ignorance.

I don't know any scientist who assumes everything they think and do in their lives follows the scientific method. Rather they believe that a belief arrived at through a line of investigation other than the scientific method is intrinsically less useful than data collected through the scientific method or than even predictions based on theories that have been arrived at and examined through the scientific method.

Originally posted by Agathon
For example, if more science students actually studied the origin of the subject they would realize that some of the assumptions they unthinkingly make were simply not made by ancient peoples for example. There's no point in calling these people stupid or criticizing them for not paying attention to empirical data, because they simply didn't have the conceptual armoury to do so - it was literally unthinkable for them. Although he exaggerates and his main thesis is in my opinion incorrect, this is one thing that Kuhn is somewhat correct about.

Actually it's a good idea to call those ancient peoples stupid and to criticize them for not paying attention to empirical data when confronted by people who reject data or theories derived from the scientific method solely on the basis that it conflicts with beliefs of those ancient peoples. Also it gives the scientist a warm fuzzy feeling of superiority

Originally posted by Agathon
Similarly, if history is any guide, today's scientists will look like idiotic fools in a few hundred years for much the same reason: taking for granted as features of reality things which are really the result of our concept mongering activities. A naive belief in empiricism is one of these.

They'll look like idiotic fools if their failure to properly follow the scientific method caused them to pursue theories that proved useless. But not otherwise. Show me where history would suggest the contrary? One or two examples to discuss will suffice.

Originally posted by Agathon

It is not truly an "antiquated mode of thinking", because it is a mode of thinking which remains productive and replacing it would in no way increase any sort of productivity. You may be justified instead in calling it an antiquated philosophical claim but I doubt any believers in the scientific method will actually care.

This is like saying that belief in the mercy of the gods is a thinking that remains productive in many tribal societies. That doesn't stop it from being wrong. And in fact you are simply mistaken - the belief in naive empiricism has had very bad consequences. For one it makes a particularly puerile form of relativism easier to accept, and it also denigrates other areas of language such as ethics by trying to insist that these conform to the scientific model. In this respect they are the sophists of today.

I think all of your objections are resolved simply by leaving the scientific method purely for the use of building a descriptive model of the universe that is as reliable as possible. Ethics for example is no more related to the scientific method than the decision of which beer to purchase.

[Winston]

I never thought I'd say this, but I think I like Agathon better when he just sticks to posting his usual nonsense.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by Agathon
Case: "The cat is on the mat".

Is this a fact or a proposition?

A fact corresponds to an actual event in the real world. You take a picture of a cat sitting on a mat, and that would be a fact. A fact has no truth value attached to it. It simply is.

A proposition, OTOH, can be true or false.

[Last Conformist]

Originally posted by Agathon

I have no idea what a "non-representational view of belief" is supposed to mean, but the complaint is very relevant to what, if anything, one can know of objective reality. And you've still not explained why it matters whether beliefs are part of the physical world or "fairy dust".

If you have no idea what it is supposed to mean, why are you bothering arguing, since you are making yourself look a fool?

Because that, despite your rather haughty attitude, I find the subject interesting.

It matters because people tend to treat beliefs as mirrors set up to reflect the world. Treating them like anything else in need of explanation such as gases or whatever changes that.

Maybe so. You've quite failed to demonstrate how.

This would seem to have unpleasant implications wrt voices in one's head.

Anyway, if congruence is goal of belief, the truth of the belief "the weight of an electron is 83kg" depends not on properties of the electron, but on the beliefs of those with those with whom I communicate. Correct?

Your belief is caused by the electron, but this is a coherence theory, so non-beliefs cannot justify beliefs (that's another story).

I'd like to see how an electron could justify a belief, since it is patently not a belief itself.

This would seem to make the justification of beliefs rather irrelevant. What one'd like to know, after all, isn't whether a belief is justified according to some philosophical framework, but whether one's belief is in accordance with the nature of the electron.

So, the way to defeat skepticism is to redefine truth to congruence with others' beliefs, while abandoning any hope of knowing anything about the inanimate world? If so, that's a victory that looks remarkably much like a surrender.

Only to someone who doesn't understand that your conception of truth has little resemblance to the way the term is actually used. And please don't put words in my mouth. I said nothing about not knowing anything about the world. We know a lot about the world. It's just that the causal relations between the world and our beliefs are irrelevant to justifying them.

You claim we know alot about the world, but you refuse to address how we can know anything about it.

I don't think you really understand the implications of what I'm saying anyway. You seem stuck in an antiquated mode of thinking.

Gratuitous insults are always appreciated.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by Agathon
The idea that there is a distinction between statements that are true because of the way the world is, and statements that are true because of the content or meaning of concepts (so called analytic truths) is required to support any form of empiricist justificatory project.

How would you answer the criticism that such a divide (analytic vs synthetic truths) is ill-founded, a la Quine?

What about an extreme form of empiricism, maintaining that all knowledge comes from experience alone?

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Urban Ranger


Is this a fact or a proposition?

A fact corresponds to an actual event in the real world. You take a picture of a cat sitting on a mat, and that would be a fact. A fact has no truth value attached to it. It simply is.

A proposition, OTOH, can be true or false.

The problem is that we have no way of determining about how such facts figure in our reasoning. Facts can of course cause our beliefs, but that is different from justifying them. We know this because drinking beer can make me believe that I am seeing pink elephants. However it isn't true that there are pink elephants in the vicinity.

Only a belief can stand in inferential relations to other beliefs. That means that for purposes of justification we are stuck within the circle of belief.

Empiricists have tried to get around this via the myth of the given. The idea that there are certain cognitive episodes called sense data that provide a foundation for all our other beliefs.

The problem with this view is that it doesn't work for two broad reasons. The first is the one I already stated: only beliefs can stand in inferential relations to beliefs. We cannot get outside our circle of belief to check its correspondence with the world, since even if we could the result would simply be more beliefs, so we would be back where we started. So we say that such knowledge must be belief + a justification. Then is the justification another belief or not? If it isn't we can't know it, if it is we are back where we started.

The second reason is underdetermination. This is what drives both sceptical arguments and conspiracy theories. There is always going to be an infinite number of theories which fit the "evidence". If there were pure episodes of empirical knowledge then underdetermination would be impossible. But the intractablility of sceptical arguments show us that it isn't. Meaning and evidence are not sufficient to determine the truth.

The way out of this is to stop thinking of belief as modern philosophers did and most people still do, and look at how the concept of belief actually functions. It turns out that belief and meaning are interdependent concepts that we use to effect communication. That's what they are for.

There is no matter of fact about what your or I believe. When we interpret someone, there are always an infinite number of translations of their utterances we could give. Of course we don't do this, since we stick to the familiar for reasons of utility and familiarity, but that doesn't change the fact that everyone who attempts to interpret anyone else must hold that person's beliefs to be largely true - otherwise they couldn't interpret them at all. Is is simply in the nature of beliefs that most of them be true.

It's a waste of time worrying about correspondence. Even facts are suspect - there are objects and events in the world, but facts are a metaphysical creation. It's also a waste of time worrying about our private experiences vs reality since beliefs are public property. The concepts of belief and meaning operate objectively - because language is a means for people to communicate with each other, and we couldn't do that unless we could observe peoples' publicly scrutable behaviour and interpet them based on that. But that is just what we do.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Last Conformist

Because that, despite your rather haughty attitude, I find the subject interesting.

Why bother, since you don't seem to understand it?

Maybe so. You've quite failed to demonstrate how.

I showed how so above. You just engaged in denial without any substantive argument. It's no argument to repeat the slogans that are being questioned, as you did.

This would seem to make the justification of beliefs rather irrelevant. What one'd like to know, after all, isn't whether a belief is justified according to some philosophical framework, but whether one's belief is in accordance with the nature of the electron.

Then please explain how something that is not a belief can justify a belief without resorting to the disproven myth of the given, and allowing for underdetermination.

It would be a waste of time to worry about such things as electrons anyway. If history is any guide, no one will believe in them in 200 years time.

You claim we know alot about the world, but you refuse to address how we can know anything about it.

How is demonstrating that our beliefs must be, by virtue of what they are, mostly true failing to show this? I have provided a conception of belief that actually accords with what people use the concept for. You are trying to pretend it is something else.

Gratuitous insults are always appreciated.

In this case it is a statement of the obvious. Try attacking the actual argument instead of engaging in simple denial. The argument is that belief isn't what you think it is. Retorting with slogans based on your questionable concept of belief is not argument.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Urban Ranger

How would you answer the criticism that such a divide (analytic vs synthetic truths) is ill-founded, a la Quine?

By saying that this is in fact the same argument. The underdetermination thesis should have given that away.

What about an extreme form of empiricism, maintaining that all knowledge comes from experience alone?

Can't be done. It requires the analytic/synthetic distinction since the synthetic propositions are what are supposed to do this. People often think that the consequences of Quine's argument pertain solely to analyticity, when the fact is that they pertain to the distinction.

If underdetermination is true, there can't be knowledge that comes from experience alone, since it would make no sense of how we could articulate a theory.

[Last Conformist]

Originally posted by Agathon


Why bother, since you don't seem to understand it?

I find it intensely amusing to be told by a philosopher I should not try to understand something because I do not understand it.

Maybe so. You've quite failed to demonstrate how.

I showed how so above. You just engaged in denial without any substantive argument. It's no argument to repeat the slogans that are being questioned, as you did.

You said (paraphrasing) if we think beliefs are part of the material world, we can study their causation and nature by natural science, and it's thus not a problem for philosophy. That's no explanation at all. It just brings us back to if and how we can know we can trust our results.

This would seem to make the justification of beliefs rather irrelevant. What one'd like to know, after all, isn't whether a belief is justified according to some philosophical framework, but whether one's belief is in accordance with the nature of the electron.

Then please explain how something that is not a belief can justify a belief without resorting to the disproven myth of the given, and allowing for underdetermination.

Whether I can do that is 100% irrelevant to whether your idea of justification of belief is relevant or interesting. There is no guarantee that there is a relevant or interesting justification of belief.

It would be a waste of time to worry about such things as electrons anyway. If history is any guide, no one will believe in them in 200 years time.

I wouldn't bet on that. People still believe in Newtonian gravity (as a limit case), 300+ years on.

You claim we know alot about the world, but you refuse to address how we can know anything about it.

How is demonstrating that our beliefs must be, by virtue of what they are, mostly true failing to show this?

Because you redefined truth to mean congruence with others' beliefs. We could all have the same ideas that are out of accord with the world.

Your hypthetical omniscient being doesn't help - there's no guarantee he could communicate with us. Maybe everything we say would unintelligible nonsense to him.

I have provided a conception of belief that actually accords with what people use the concept for. You are trying to pretend it is something else.

Gratuitous insults are always appreciated.

In this case it is a statement of the obvious. Try attacking the actual argument instead of engaging in simple denial. The argument is that belief isn't what you think it is. Retorting with slogans based on your questionable concept of belief is not argument.

Whether belief is what I think is pretty much irrelevant to whether your system makes sense or is useful.


I maybe should clarify what I meant by "we're stuck being empiricists or crazy". It's simply this - quite regardless of whether there is a such thing as an observational given, an experimentalist has to take his measurements as given in order to be able to do anything.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Last Conformist

I find it intensely amusing to be told by a philosopher I should not try to understand something because I do not understand it.

Good for you. Now try harder. You are failing badly so far.

You said (paraphrasing) if we think beliefs are part of the material world, we can study their causation and nature by natural science, and it's thus not a problem for philosophy. That's no explanation at all. It just brings us back to if and how we can know we can trust our results.

It is an explanation. A naturalistic explanation. That's why it is called naturalized epistemology. The question of justification is separate from the question of explanation, and justification is guaranteed for groups of beliefs via semantic holism. Do I have to repeat myself again?

Whether I can do that is 100% irrelevant to whether your idea of justification of belief is relevant or interesting. There is no guarantee that there is a relevant or interesting justification of belief.

Jesus Christ... you are the one complaining... the alternatives to coherence don't work for the reason I stated. Added to that, the holist explanation works. You are just denying rather than arguing.

I wouldn't bet on that. People still believe in Newtonian gravity (as a limit case), 300+ years on.

But not in the same way.

Because you redefined truth to mean congruence with others' beliefs. We could all have the same ideas that are out of accord with the world.

I didn't redefine anything. You have misunderstood the argument. Truth is both accordance with others beliefs and is about the world. There is no stark difference as you seem to think, without arguing for I might add.

I have provided a reason for thinking belief and meaning are as I say. You have provided nothing substantive in response other than reiterating the old view that is in question.

The idea that beliefs are somehow set over against the world rather than being part of it is the one I reject. I said so at the beginning. Now you think it is possible for everyone to have beliefs that are out of accord with the world. You are again smuggling in the view that I rejected earlier on. It is impossible for anyone to have mostly false beliefs due to the nature of belief.

Your hypthetical omniscient being doesn't help - there's no guarantee he could communicate with us. Maybe everything we say would unintelligible nonsense to him.

There are no untranslatable languages either. That is a well-known consequence of the interpretative stance I have sketched.

Whether belief is what I think is pretty much irrelevant to whether your system makes sense or is useful.

No it isn't. You are just in denial again. It is wholly relevant. The point of the argument is that a misunderstanding of what belief is leads us into your position.

I maybe should clarify what I meant by "we're stuck being empiricists or crazy". It's simply this - quite regardless of whether there is a such thing as an observational given, an experimentalist has to take his measurements as given in order to be able to do anything.

No ****... but it is one thing to regard these measurements as theory independent, and another thing to argue that they aren't. That is what is in dispute here.

[Last Conformist]

Originally posted by Agathon

Originally posted by Last Conformist

I find it intensely amusing to be told by a philosopher I should not try to understand something because I do not understand it.

Good for you. Now try harder. You are failing badly so far.

You said (paraphrasing) if we think beliefs are part of the material world, we can study their causation and nature by natural science, and it's thus not a problem for philosophy. That's no explanation at all. It just brings us back to if and how we can know we can trust our results.

It is an explanation. A naturalistic explanation. That's why it is called naturalized epistemology. The question of justification is separate from the question of explanation, and justification is guaranteed for groups of beliefs via semantic holism. Do I have to repeat myself again?

Repeating that it's an explanation doesn't turn it into one. It is not. You're assuming your conclusion.

Whether I can do that is 100% irrelevant to whether your idea of justification of belief is relevant or interesting. There is no guarantee that there is a relevant or interesting justification of belief.

Jesus Christ... you are the one complaining... the alternatives to coherence don't work for the reason I stated.

If true, this doesn't help you.

Added to that, the holist explanation works. You are just denying rather than arguing.

I wouldn't bet on that. People still believe in Newtonian gravity (as a limit case), 300+ years on.

But not in the same way.

So freaking what? You were saying you didn't think people would believe electrons in a few hundred years, not that our view of them may change. Heck, there isn't even one today's view of electrons, but a number of different interpretations of what they're exactly are.

Because you redefined truth to mean congruence with others' beliefs. We could all have the same ideas that are out of accord with the world.

I didn't redefine anything. You have misunderstood the argument. Truth is both accordance with others beliefs and is about the world. There is no stark difference as you seem to think, without arguing for I might add.

May I remind you of this quote of yours? "There is nothing more to belief and meaning that ensuring congruence. That's what it's for. The concept of truth is also part of this practice." If that doesn't mean truth is about congruence, what the heck does it mean?

I have provided a reason for thinking belief and meaning are as I say. You have provided nothing substantive in response other than reiterating the old view that is in question.

I'm not particularly interested in the nature of truth. As the saying goes, science doesn't deal in truth. What's interesting is if your view is useful for anything.

The idea that beliefs are somehow set over against the world rather than being part of it is the one I reject. I said so at the beginning. Now you think it is possible for everyone to have beliefs that are out of accord with the world. You are again smuggling in the view that I rejected earlier on. It is impossible for anyone to have mostly false beliefs due to the nature of belief.

I still don't get why you think it matter whether beliefs are part of the world or not. It should be patently obvious that being part of the world is no guarantee of being out of accord with some other aspect of the world. If it were, it would be impossible to have any false beliefs if beliefs are part of the world, yet you hold beliefs are part of the world and accept that people can hold false beliefs.

Your hypthetical omniscient being doesn't help - there's no guarantee he could communicate with us. Maybe everything we say would unintelligible nonsense to him.

There are no untranslatable languages either. That is a well-known consequence of the interpretative stance I have sketched.

I have dreary premonition that your definition of "language" is going to imply translatability. So, disappoint me - show how this follows without defining it into the concept of language.

Whether belief is what I think is pretty much irrelevant to whether your system makes sense or is useful.

No it isn't. You are just in denial again. It is wholly relevant. The point of the argument is that a misunderstanding of what belief is leads us into your position.

I'm not quite sure what you think my position is.

I maybe should clarify what I meant by "we're stuck being empiricists or crazy". It's simply this - quite regardless of whether there is a such thing as an observational given, an experimentalist has to take his measurements as given in order to be able to do anything.

No ****... but it is one thing to regard these measurements as theory independent, and another thing to argue that they aren't. That is what is in dispute here.

It's not readily apparent to me how a measurement (as opposed to its interpretation) could be theory dependent, but it doesn't matter either way.

[Spiffor]

Similarly, if history is any guide, today's scientists will look like idiotic fools in a few hundred years for much the same reason: taking for granted as features of reality things which are really the result of our concept mongering activities. A naive belief in empiricism is one of these.