ID and infinite regression

[Geronimo]

Originally posted by Agathon


The fact that there is no clear cut distinction between what counts as empirical and non-empirical confirmation makes a mockery of your assertion. You simply don't know what you are talking about. You can't pass off an 18th century philosophical position in the 21st century without being laughed at.

What counts as empirical data is internal to our belief set. External events can cause beliefs, but that is different from justifying them (a cause is not a reason). And beliefs do not face confirmation or disconfirmation on their own, but as part of large interdependent sets.

And this matters in what way? What possible value is such insight to provide apart from being laughed at by a more pragmatic audience rather than being laughed at by philosophers?

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Geronimo

And this matters in what way? What possible value is such insight to provide apart from being laughed at by a more pragmatic audience rather than being laughed at by philosophers?

So you've chickened out. Great...

It matters because people who say that we should rely on experience rather than pure reason are simply wrong, since the distinction is illusory.

Funny you should mention pragmatism, since the dissolution of that particular belief is one of the great acheivements of 20th Century American Pragmatism.

In 100 years the belief you described will be as thought as silly as we now think 17th Century rationalism was.

[Agathon]

The idea that there is a distinction between statements that are true because of the way the world is, and statements that are true because of the content or meaning of concepts (so called analytic truths) is required to support any form of empiricist justificatory project.

However, if you think about it, no non-circular explanation of the latter can be given. The reason is that the distinction itself is broken.

People tend to think that there are distinct and isolatable factual and linguistic contributions to the truth value of propositions that are about the world.

Case: "The cat is on the mat".

The meaning of this term determines a possible state of affairs in the world (meaning fixes the limit of possibility to yay or nay). The proposition is still meaningful even if that state of affairs does not obtain (if it wasn't, there couldn't be any false belief - a problem the Greek philosophers talked about a lot). However it can't be true or false without the world being some determinate way. Hence both meaning and fact are necessary for a proposition to have a truth value.

Empiricism needs this distinction because it needs to be able to fix the role of the world in determining the truth or falsehood of our beliefs. If this can't be done, then it follows that truths can't be simply divided into statements of empirical fact, and statements that rely on relations to other statements for their truth. Empiricists want to parcel out the statements that are true because of the way the world is from the ones that are true because of our "conceptual scheme" or are "truths of reason".

But it can't be done for a very simple reason. Any theory is always undetermined by the evidence. Much as you can draw an infinite number of curves through any dots on a page, you can always find an infinite number of theories that fit our observations.

So you can't appeal to observation to justify the truth of a proposition - it is in the end a matter of choice, not of evidence. Both the conspiracy theory and our ordinary beliefs fit the facts, even though both claim different things. You cannot appeal to evidence to dismiss a good conspiracy theory.

Remember that the traditional picture required that meaning determines what is to count if a statement is to be true or false (it limits the possibilities). But if underdetermination is true, then meaning does not do this, since we can hold any statement true provided we make enough revisions to our other beliefs (this is in essence what conspiracy theories do).

So it is simply not the case that meaning limits the possibilties to yay or nay, which is then determined by observation. In other words meaning is not determinate. It is determinate over groups of propositions, but not single ones. This is called semantic holism. In every case where we are prompted to revise our beliefs, we always have the possibility of choice as to where to revise -- the world does not constrain us to do it in one particular way. There are an infinite number of possible theories that can account for our observations, and no way of appealing to experience to tell us which is the "true" one.

One might object that there are a special class of sentences, so called "observation sentences" that are direct reports of fact and which do not suffer from this problem. That's a dead duck too. Observation sentences are as theory laden as any other sentences we might endorse, and this means they suffer from the same problem. In any case traditional skepticism is solely motivated by the indeterminacy of observation sentences, and we know how intractable that problem is.

What this means is that the naive view of our beliefs facing off against the world is mistaken. In fact that is a complete misunderstanding of what beliefs are, but that's another story.

So when people complain that Descartes is ignoring "experience" in favour of "fanciful theory building", they are assuming that experience plays a decisive role in our reasoning that it manifestly does not. This might sound like hair splitting, but it has far reaching consequences. In fact, most of the puerile relativism that people endorse is based on this mistake. That might sound odd, since the underdetermination thesis seems to allow relativism on a massive scale. However, once we understand how the concepts of belief and meaning actually work, it turns out that relativism must be false.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by Agathon
The fact that there is no clear cut distinction between what counts as empirical and non-empirical confirmation makes a mockery of your assertion.

Unless you reject the idea of an objective reality you have to accept that there is such a thing as empirical confirmation.

Originally posted by Agathon
What counts as empirical data is internal to our belief set.

Again, unless you deny there is an objective reality, there is such a thing as hard data or hard facts. Afterall, Facts just decribes an objective reality.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Urban Ranger

Unless you reject the idea of an objective reality you have to accept that there is such a thing as empirical confirmation.

No. That doesn't follow. The objective/subjective distinction that you are proposing is itself meaningless. Our beliefs are part of the world - they are identical with brain states - they are not some mysterious things set over in opposition to it.

All you need to get what people want when they talk about objectivity is a guarantee that most of our beliefs must be true. In fact that is the case. It is in the nature of beliefs that most of them must be true. Of course you can't tell individually which ones are true and which aren't, but with holism that doesn't matter - it guarantees that most of them are true.

You are just stuck in the old way of thinking about these concepts.

Again, unless you deny there is an objective reality, there is such a thing as hard data or hard facts. Afterall, Facts just decribes an objective reality.

But there aren't any hard facts, such that they would determine a particular theory as the correct one. Take any belief you like. It is possible to construct a theory consistent with "the evidence" in which it is true. That is why skeptical arguments are so difficult to dispense with using the traditional understanding of belief.

One can construct an ID theory that is perfectly in harmony with the evidence. Of course it will have no predictive power, but then again, merely having predictive power is no guarantee of truth either.

Just as you cannot appeal to the empirical evidence to once and for all dispense with a conspiracy theory, you cannot do so for an ID theory.

[Odin]

Originally posted by Last Conformist
It nonetheless doesn't matter, since we're stuck being empiricists or crazy.

[Geronimo]

Originally posted by Agathon


So you've chickened out. Great...

It matters because people who say that we should rely on experience rather than pure reason are simply wrong, since the distinction is illusory.

Funny you should mention pragmatism, since the dissolution of that particular belief is one of the great acheivements of 20th Century American Pragmatism.

In 100 years the belief you described will be as thought as silly as we now think 17th Century rationalism was.

Do you really want to compare the great acheivements of the 20th Century of pragmatists (the non philosopher kind) to those of philosophers?

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Geronimo

Do you really want to compare the great acheivements of the 20th Century of pragmatists (the non philosopher kind) to those of philosophers?

Since they aren't doing the same thing, that would be like comparing the winners in the high jump with the sprinters.

[Agathon]

It nonetheless doesn't matter, since we're stuck being empiricists or crazy.

In short the answer is no. People who think that are working with an outmoded, and frankly ridiculous, conception of what belief is.

[Last Conformist]

The objective/subjective distinction that you are proposing is itself meaningless. Our beliefs are part of the world - they are identical with brain states - they are not some mysterious things set over in opposition to it.

Enlighten me as to the relationship between the first and the second sentence, please.

All you need to get what people want when they talk about objectivity is a guarantee that most of our beliefs must be true. In fact that is the case. It is in the nature of beliefs that most of them must be true. Of course you can't tell individually which ones are true and which aren't, but with holism that doesn't matter - it guarantees that most of them are true.

And how does this suppose guarantee work?

[self biased]

the turtle moves.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Last Conformist

The objective/subjective distinction that you are proposing is itself meaningless. Our beliefs are part of the world - they are identical with brain states - they are not some mysterious things set over in opposition to it.

Enlighten me as to the relationship between the first and the second sentence, please.

Traditionally people define the objective as that which exists indepdently of our beliefs. The subjective is our particular take on it. The problem is how to be sure that what is "in here" accurately depicts what is "out there". Of course, if you believe this, then you can't really avoid scepticism.

On the other hand, if beliefs are not something "in here", but are part of the world, just as all other physical events are, then the correct way to study them and their methods of acquisition is by natural science and not philosophy. What else are beliefs going to be if they are not brain states? Fairy dust?

All you need to get what people want when they talk about objectivity is a guarantee that most of our beliefs must be true. In fact that is the case. It is in the nature of beliefs that most of them must be true. Of course you can't tell individually which ones are true and which aren't, but with holism that doesn't matter - it guarantees that most of them are true.

And how does this suppose guarantee work?

Because it is in the nature of beliefs that most of them are true. Belief is a conceptual instrument we use to communicate with others. That is its primary function. It is interdependent with meaning, which serves the same function. Both allow us to communicate effectively with other people.

If you want to communicate with another person, you need to understand their language. So you have to attribute to them your own beliefs in order to come up with a translation of what they are saying. You do this on the basis of their publicly scrutable behaviour. Of course translation is subject to the same indeterminacy as theory building for obvious reasons. Any number of translations will fit the evidence. We just choose the easiest one.

So for example (a tired old example), a rabbit runs past and the person you are interpreting utters "gavagai". You assume he means rabbit. But later on when no rabbits are present, he utters "gavagai" again. Does "gavagai" still mean rabbit, or were you wrong in the first place? From the point of view of the evidence, there is no way of telling. You face a choice. You can either invent a new story about the meaning of "gavagai" or you can simply attribute a false belief to him (he believes that there are rabbits here when there are none). The latter is simply easier in this case.

That is what the concept of belief does. It enables us to simplify communication.

Why must our beliefs be mostly true? Because you can't attribute a false belief to a person without attributing a large amount of true beliefs to him. In this case you couldn't attribute to him a false belief that there was a rabbit about if you didn't attribute to him true beliefs about rabbits themselves – otherwise, you couldn't say what his false belief was about - you couldn't understand him at all.

The same goes for other people. They must attribute to us beliefs that are mostly true if they are to attribute false beliefs to us.

Now, it is possible that there is someone or something who is omniscient (this is a logical possibility - it is all that is required to get the argument going). That person when he tries to interpet us, will have to attribute to us largely true beliefs. Hence, we can be confident that our beliefs as a group are largely true and scepticism is defeated.

In order to rid ourselves of scepticism, we simply need to look at the way the concept of belief is actually used.

[Last Conformist]

Originally posted by Agathon


Traditionally people define the objective as that which exists indepdently of our beliefs. The subjective is our particular take on it. The problem is how to be sure that what is "in here" accurately depicts what is "out there". Of course, if you believe this, then you can't really avoid scepticism.

On the other hand, if beliefs are not something "in here", but are part of the world, just as all other physical events are, then the correct way to study them and their methods of acquisition is by natural science and not philosophy. What else are beliefs going to be if they are not brain states? Fairy dust?

This just shifts the problem.

Let's look at a notebook instead of a brain to get rid of all pesky notions of the mind somehow being "outside" nature. In the notebook it says "Mt Everest is 8848m tall". How does one assertain that this agrees with the physical nature of Mt Everest itself? That the notebook is as much part of the physical world as the mountain is of absolutely no help.

Because it is in the nature of beliefs that most of them are true. Belief is a conceptual instrument we use to communicate with others. That is its primary function. It is interdependent with meaning, which serves the same function. Both allow us to communicate effectively with other people.

If you want to communicate with another person, you need to understand their language. So you have to attribute to them your own beliefs in order to come up with a translation of what they are saying. You do this on the basis of their publicly scrutable behaviour. Of course translation is subject to the same indeterminacy as theory building for obvious reasons. Any number of translations will fit the evidence. We just choose the easiest one.

So for example (a tired old example), a rabbit runs past and the person you are interpreting utters "gavagai". You assume he means rabbit. But later on when no rabbits are present, he utters "gavagai" again. Does "gavagai" still mean rabbit, or were you wrong in the first place? From the point of view of the evidence, there is no way of telling. You face a choice. You can either invent a new story about the meaning of "gavagai" or you can simply attribute a false belief to him (he believes that there are rabbits here when there are none). The latter is simply easier in this case.

That is what the concept of belief does. It enables us to simplify communication.

Why must our beliefs be mostly true? Because you can't attribute a false belief to a person without attributing a large amount of true beliefs to him. In this case you couldn't attribute to him a false belief that there was a rabbit about if you didn't attribute to him true beliefs about rabbits themselves – otherwise, you couldn't say what his false belief was about - you couldn't understand him at all.

Why couldn't we just have the same false beliefs about rabbits?

The same goes for other people. They must attribute to us beliefs that are mostly true if they are to attribute false beliefs to us.

Now, it is possible that there is someone or something who is omniscient (this is a logical possibility - it is all that is required to get the argument going).

But we live in a world about which omniscience is impossible in principle.

That person when he tries to interpet us, will have to attribute to us largely true beliefs. Hence, we can be confident that our beliefs as a group are largely true and scepticism is defeated.

In order to rid ourselves of scepticism, we simply need to look at the way the concept of belief is actually used.

The comment about omniscience is pretty much a quibble. This argument seems to have two major weaknesses; i) that I and my interlocutor may hold the same false beliefs, meaning I can only establish that his beliefs are mostly concruent with mine, not that they are mostly true, and ii) solipsism, or in other words, how can I know I'm actually communicating.

[Agathon]

This just shifts the problem.

Let's look at a notebook instead of a brain to get rid of all pesky notions of the mind somehow being "outside" nature. In the notebook it says "Mt Everest is 8848m tall". How does one assertain that this agrees with the physical nature of Mt Everest itself? That the notebook is as much part of the physical world as the mountain is of absolutely no help.

This is a non-representational view of belief, so that complaint is irrelevant.

Why couldn't we just have the same false beliefs about rabbits?

That is possible. What is impossible is that most of your beliefs be false.

But we live in a world about which omniscience is impossible in principle.

You'll need an argument for that. In fact it doesn't make a difference. The omniscient intepreter is an heuristic device that is meant to demonstrate the implications of semantic holism.

This argument seems to have two major weaknesses; i) that I and my interlocutor may hold the same false beliefs, meaning I can only establish that his beliefs are mostly concruent with mine, not that they are mostly true, and ii) solipsism, or in other words, how can I know I'm actually communicating.

You are missing the central point of the argument. There is nothing more to belief and meaning that ensuring congruence. That's what it's for. The concept of truth is also part of this practice. You are substituting for it something that has nothing to do with truth as it is actually used.

How can you know you are communicating? Well, you are interpreting. As long as you successfully manage to interpret the other person (make their behaviour fit into a coherent pattern), then you've won.

You are making the mistake of asking that a revisionary conception of truth, belief and meaning fit the insane requirements of the old one. The point of the argument is to show that the old one has nothing to do with actual practice.

[Last Conformist]

Originally posted by Agathon

This just shifts the problem.

Let's look at a notebook instead of a brain to get rid of all pesky notions of the mind somehow being "outside" nature. In the notebook it says "Mt Everest is 8848m tall". How does one assertain that this agrees with the physical nature of Mt Everest itself? That the notebook is as much part of the physical world as the mountain is of absolutely no help.

This is a non-representational view of belief, so that complaint is irrelevant.

I have no idea what a "non-representational view of belief" is supposed to mean, but the complaint is very relevant to what, if anything, one can know of objective reality. And you've still not explained why it matters whether beliefs are part of the physical world or "fairy dust".

Why couldn't we just have the same false beliefs about rabbits?

That is possible. What is impossible is that most of your beliefs be false.

But we live in a world about which omniscience is impossible in principle.

You'll need an argument for that.

Bell's law.

In fact it doesn't make a difference. The omniscient intepreter is an heuristic device that is meant to demonstrate the implications of semantic holism.

This argument seems to have two major weaknesses; i) that I and my interlocutor may hold the same false beliefs, meaning I can only establish that his beliefs are mostly concruent with mine, not that they are mostly true, and ii) solipsism, or in other words, how can I know I'm actually communicating.

You are missing the central point of the argument. There is nothing more to belief and meaning that ensuring congruence. That's what it's for. The concept of truth is also part of this practice. You are substituting for it something that has nothing to do with truth as it is actually used.

How can you know you are communicating? Well, you are interpreting. As long as you successfully manage to interpret the other person (make their behaviour fit into a coherent pattern), then you've won.

This would seem to have unpleasant implications wrt voices in one's head.

Anyway, if congruence is goal of belief, the truth of the belief "the weight of an electron is 83kg" depends not on properties of the electron, but on the beliefs of those with those with whom I communicate. Correct?

You are making the mistake of asking that a revisionary conception of truth, belief and meaning fit the insane requirements of the old one. The point of the argument is to show that the old one has nothing to do with actual practice.

So, the way to defeat skepticism is to redefine truth to congruence with others' beliefs, while abandoning any hope of knowing anything about the inanimate world? If so, that's a victory that looks remarkably much like a surrender.