Does "dictatorship of relativism" exist?

[Agathon]

My point is that your hierarchy of moral reasoning necessitates subjective value judgements. The infant's morality is no better or worse than mine, absolutely.

There's really no such thing as subjectivity in the way you think of it. That is a relic of now discredited Cartesian philosophy. The rules of morality are not much different to many of the other rules we follow - for example rules to do with the use of words.

Of course there is doubt in some cases, and the system is incomplete - and that is where we start disagreeing. But that disagreement takes place in the face of massive agreement.

[Agathon]

I don't disagree, and the similarities are irrelevent to the argument that I'm making. Which is about the nature of logic, not an observation of human reasoning.

The two are not distinct. Again, read Wittgenstein.

[Whaleboy]

The problem with emotivism is that it's bollocks.

How so? I take it that we understand it to be descriptive and not prescriptive no?

In that case, any debate on anything is fallacious, because any argument appeals to emotion.

Well no not really since you're working with shared assumptions... if you have none then you either ***** to each other or go back to a point where you do have shared assumptions, a bit like communicating in another language.

This is down to the fact that propositions aren't infallibly self evident and that you can't really make someone believe something in a practical sense.

But that asks for verification which, as you point out re. Wittgenstein is meaningless if both parties agree. It means that one can't have an exhaustively definitive conversation about anything since one is limited into subjectivity by ones assumptions, all you're saying there is that humans cannot achieve objectivity to a given context, and I fail to see how that does anything except support relativism.

It's also a feature of human discourse that some things are just held true as a matter of practice, and that asking for a justification of said practice doesn't really make sense (this was Wittgenstein's much misunderstood point).

Again that's not refuting relativism, rather than highlighting the subject-predicate relationship, and Wittgensteins much misunderstood point was a criticism of Descartes iirc.

That is about all there is to say about relativism of all sorts. People disagree about some moral issues, but no one is a relativist in practice, just as no-one is an epistemological sceptic in practice - not because it's hard, but because it's impossible.

So relativism is just people engaging in mental masturbation – if they were honest about their own actions, they would realize that they don't believe in it either.

I think you're using some pretty opaque assumptions here, particularly that personal morality = a belief in it's objectivity. IMO, we have been conditioned in society to think in very categorical terms about our own morality which has more to do with the influence of Christianity on Western civilisation than anything. One could level a criticism here and say it's part of human nature, and perhaps so, in which case it's something that can be overcome by understanding relativism, so discussion of it is hardly mental masturbation at all if it helps us to understand what we mean when we say "chicken sex is morally wrong".

This is why relativism is wrong: if it were true it could not be communicated to any other person, and nor could one even articulate it to oneself.

But the statement, "there is no absolute truth", is not an absolute statement in itself; the proposition is only truth in as far as you or I know it to be truth... a human truth quantified by the subjective perspective of human observation and we have zero evidence to suggest that this is fundamentally, transiently absolute, which places the concept of "absolute" into abstraction within the mind as logic is itself.

Wittgenstein asks in a close passage to yours, Agathon (PI 245); "FOr how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression?" which emphasises the point that relativism can only be shown as something abstract. You say your passage is evidence of why relativism is false, but I see it as evidence that it is only as subjective as anything else since there is that predicate, relativism is, in that respect, just like any other philosophy.

To the MRs I say that the foundation of reason is making sense not mental masturbation.

And I ask you to define the "foundation of reason".

Now it seems that you are saying that assumptions to political arguments are relatively truthfull. Assumptions are either absolutely true are absolutely false.

That's ridicious. Assumption A: Mine is a winning lottery ticket -> Conclusion A: Next week I will be a millionaire. Assumption B: Mine isn't -> Next week I will still be skint. The context is the UK lottery ticket... in France I could have the winning the numbers, but we are still tied to context so it cannot be absolutely true or absolutely false, only contextually true/false.

Again we go back to that assumption of yours. What does your subjective context have to do with whether an assumption is true or not.

You lack a predicate, without it, the subject would be meaningless. The subject could be "green". If I just say "green" it would make no sense. If I said "oxygen is green", it would also make no sense because the context is non-absolute and in this case doesn't fit. If I were to say "plants are green", then it makes sense, but the subject cannot be absolute, and cannot make sense without a predicate that makes it subjective.

About as free as you are to stop breathing.

I want a new phone
But I need to breathe
But I need to breathe because I want to live
I want to live because I need to mate (or whatever)
I need to mate because I want to propagate my genes
etc etc etc

Want still comes into it (and could be argued to be a function simply of what other people have, relativism again ).

Sorry, you're just wrong. The similarities far outweigh the differences. It would be impossible to understand other people if this was not the case.

Then how do you explain the difference between, say, Kant and consequentialism, when they both operate on similar assumptions?

Your view is just out of date, and ignores the most important philosophical developments of the last 50 years. As I said, unless you address Wittgenstein's position, you can't hope to come close to a credible view.

Agathon I have to say that your own position on Wittgenstein is somewhat suspect, not least because context as he uses it is flexible (a subject with a predicate of its own), but that the difference between what can be said and what can be shown only renders relativism a subject, not a fallacy.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by Az
We'll define the total happiness level of a social system of humans as it's utility function.

from (3) and (2) We learn that we must maximize Utility, over time, that is that the we must strive to have as many people as happy as possible for as much time as possible, while reaching an optimum on the last 3 values.

Utilitarianism is, in general, late Stage 4 and early Stage 5 morality. It is not the end of moral reasoning development, just a stop along a path.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by Ramo
Morality is the judgement of social interactions as preferable or not.

How does the social interaction make this judgement? Or is this a passive voice senetence (in which case please make it active voice because the subject is obviously signicant to the meaning of the sentence).

My point is that your hierarchy of moral reasoning necessitates subjective value judgements. The infant's morality is no better or worse than mine, absolutely.

I am not sure of your point here. If you deconstruct any argument, you of course reduce it to meaninglessnes, and I could easily do that to yours as well, but will refrain.

Let us take a person named Ralph at two different ages. At age 2 or so, Ralph's moral reasoning says, roughly, "Good is what gets me rewarded by mom, or makes me feel good and bad is what gets me punished by mom, or what makes me feel bad." two year old Rallph will gladly steal a toy from another kid, or push him/her out of the way, regardless of how that other kid feels about it (the tears of the other kid have no effect). Ralph's warnings to his peers not to do something bad inevitably include the warning of punishment if caught. Ralph does not know how to behave in a moral sense in the absence of supervision, though, except for the old stage one appitite-based morality. This leads Ralph to be confused a lot about what is right and what is wrong, especially as Ralph gets older and starts to see his peers as real people like himself. In the absence of an adult, should Ralph take that toy that Suzi has, because Ralph wants o play with it? Ralph knows he would like to play with it, but is uncomfortable at the thought of making Suzi cry. Oh, what to do?

At age 13, Ralph is different. Now, Ralph knows that the tears of others are the same as his own tears, and Ralph knows that he is as likely to be a victim as a victor in immoral doings. Ralph's moral code still includes "Good is what gets me rewarded or makes me feel good and bad is what gets me punished or what makes me feel bad" but now includes "good is folowing the rules and bad is breaking the rules." Ralph now laughs at the idea that he was ever confused about whether or not to take the toy from Suzi. Of course not, because the rules say you cannot, and if Ralph does not folow the rules, who will?

Now, ralph's 13 year old moral reasoning is better than his 2 year old moral reasoning, because it can handle every moral dilemma of his two-year-old reasoning, plus ones his two-year-old reasoning could not handle.

Now, you could argue that in "absolute" terms (i.e. in terms of their impact on the "infinite and eternal" universe) the two sets of rules are identical. But no one but a pinhead would make such a sophomoric argument. The fact is that by any reasonable criteria, Ralph's 13-year-old reasoning is better than his 2-year-old reasoning, and so saying that moral reletivism (i.e. all moral codes have the same value) is true in the absence of absolute morality is untrue, and demonstrably so.

[Az]

Originally posted by grumbler
Utilitarianism is, in general, late Stage 4 and early Stage 5 morality. It is not the end of moral reasoning development, just a stop along a path.

What are you trying to say here, really?

[Kidlicious]

Originally posted by Ramo
People generally don't make precisely the same assumptions. People create widely different moral systems with similar assumptions. So no, that's not the case.

Doesn't matter if you disagree, that's how it is. Not everything needs to be common ground, but something. That's a fact of life. And there does tend to be some common ground on moral arguments among most people.

I think what you fail to understand is people's motives for making absurd assumptions, and creating rational arguments out of them. You want us to believe that it's not untrue that pigs fly because someone somewhere assumes that they do.

[Kidlicious]

Originally posted by Whaleboy
That's ridicious. Assumption A: Mine is a winning lottery ticket -> Conclusion A: Next week I will be a millionaire. Assumption B: Mine isn't -> Next week I will still be skint. The context is the UK lottery ticket... in France I could have the winning the numbers, but we are still tied to context so it cannot be absolutely true or absolutely false, only contextually true/false.

Truth must have context. Why should I state that something is contextually true.

You're still saying that something can be both true and false at the same time btw, which is a contradiction. I don't know why we should keep listening.

You lack a predicate, without it, the subject would be meaningless. The subject could be "green". If I just say "green" it would make no sense. If I said "oxygen is green", it would also make no sense because the context is non-absolute and in this case doesn't fit. If I were to say "plants are green", then it makes sense, but the subject cannot be absolute, and cannot make sense without a predicate that makes it subjective.

Not that I'm going for any of this, but what does this have to do with the question of whether or not "absolute" is "objective" by definition as Ramo claimed?

[Kidlicious]

grumbler,

It doesn't matter how much sense your arguments make, because we are debating one person who doesn't believe it is either true or untrue that pigs fly and another person who believes that it is both true and untrue that they fly.

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Kidicious
Well I won't agree with you that arguments only work if all participants agree on assumptions. I think that if people make the same assumptions they mostly agree. The problem really is people making absurd and biased assumptions.

Yes, like you.

[Kidlicious]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker


Yes, like you.

You mean like assuming that the universe actually exists regardless of whether or not I have proven it to?

[Agathon]

Agathon I have to say that your own position on Wittgenstein is somewhat suspect, not least because context as he uses it is flexible (a subject with a predicate of its own), but that the difference between what can be said and what can be shown only renders relativism a subject, not a fallacy.

Are you talking about the Tractatus? I'm talking about rule following in the investigations.

According to that line of reasoning, relativism is the product of a linguistic misunderstanding.

[Az]

It doesn't matter how much sense your arguments make, because we are debating one person who doesn't believe it is either true or untrue that pigs fly and another person who believes that it is both true and untrue that they fly.

nononono.

It all depends on how you define 'fly'.

[Agathon]

It doesn't matter how much sense your arguments make, because we are debating one person who doesn't believe it is either true or untrue that pigs fly and another person who believes that it is both true and untrue that they fly.

In other words, we are dealing with people who talk crap and don't even believe what they say - relativists.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by BeBro
Wouldn't the relativist ask at this point how you can say something about moral reasoning when relativism is true? I mean - are different solutions to a certain moral dilemma results of different people behaving "more" or "less" moral, or do they simply hold different views on morality, which a relativist would (if I understood it correctly) see all as basically equal. I mean - if we conclude something would be "more" or "less" moral - wouldn't we need a certain standard to determine what is moral? But if I understood them correctly here the relativists would simpy say we can't have such a standard....

This all depends on what you mean by "morality" (which is the question I have asked several people here, with no meaningful responses). I consider "morality" to be the process of deciding how one should act in situations involving "right and wrong." The outcome of this reasoning, IMO, is not morality but the product of morality.

Now, people with the same moral reasoning (say, the one based on the social contract and the balance between personal freedom neds and the needs of society for security) can, indeed, reach differnt conclusions. We saw this in the Teri Schiavo case, IMO, where people on both sides would argue the same basic tenet that people had to weigh the need of society to ensure that people were not allowed arbitrarily to die against the need of families to make decisions for their loved ones without the meddling of outsiders, and reach oposite conclusions.

IMO, these conclusions are equally moral, because they are based on the same moral reasoning, with simply different emphasis put on the relationships between factors. They are both the product of stage four moral reasoning.

They are both superior to the stage three moral reasoning of "if you let Teri die, god will be unhappy" and the stage two "you better not let her die 'cause God will punish you" (or, its counterpart, "there is no god so there is no reason not to let her die").

So, you see, I believe in neither absolute morality (except as a theoretical concept like an infinite number) nor in moral reletivism (as least when used in the simplistic fashion we have used it here). I think there IS a difference in the quality of moral reasoning, and the quality of the decisions that come out of it. Since education is the key indicator of higher-level moral reasoning, I support the highest possible education level for everyone in the world, because it will increase the quality of moral reasoning.