Does "dictatorship of relativism" exist?

[Agathon]

People generally don't make precisely the same assumptions. People create widely different moral systems with similar assumptions. So no, that's not the case.

No they don't. Two people with different moral systems can still have an intelligible debate about morality. The reason is that our moral systems are not free-standing, complete systems; rather they are reductionist attempts to understand our pretheoretical moral practices.

Without a practice, you don't have a moral theory. You don't have the ability to have meaningful conversations about something without a large degree of shared belief. You don't have a large degree of shared belief unless you have a shared practice that grounds those beliefs and provides the philosophical grammar of those beliefs.

We can have meaningful conversations with each other about moral issues – even if we have disagreements because we share a practice. In other words it is only because we agree about almost everything, that we are able to disagree about details. This is Wittgenstein's lesson: disagreement is only possible against a large background of agreement, because belief and meaning are interdependent concepts.

If you can talk about morality with someone, then that means you share a large background of belief about it. That is not relativism, which assumes that you can talk to someone about morality without sharing any of their moral beliefs. If that was the case, no one would be able to understand each other.

But you can understand people when they talk about morality with you: ergo relativism is false.

As I said: if you bothered reading more recent philosophy, you would see why relativism involves a misunderstanding of the way language works.

[Kidlicious]

Originally posted by Agathon
But you can understand people when they talk about morality with you: ergo relativism is false.

Case closed pretty much I think.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by Az

What are you trying to say here, really?

That utilitarianism is A method of moral reasoning, not THE method. Most people will, if they encounter enough moral dilemmas, find themselves using utilitarian moral reasoning and most wil, if they encounter enough moral dilemmas, move beyond utilitarianism.

Few actually do get that far, though, because the kinds of moral dilemmas that get one past stage four are rare and when they occur are usually abstract or hypothetical (and thus not always considered worth changing one's moral reasoning for).

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Kidicious
You mean like assuming that the universe actually exists regardless of whether or not I have proven it to?

It's some of your other axioms I take issue with.

Serious, reread the post. The suggestion that there can be some sort of inherent value to certain axioms is absurd.

[Kidlicious]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker


It's some of your other axioms I take issue with.

Serious, reread the post. The suggestion that there can be some sort of inherent value to certain axioms is absurd.

Since you are a moral relativist you take issue with all of them by definition, or are you backing down.

[Kuciwalker]

I don't take issue with axioms. We happen to have some axioms in common. I just don't pretend that there's some inherent truth value to them...

[Agathon]

Serious, reread the post. The suggestion that there can be some sort of inherent value to certain axioms is absurd.

No. It is obvious. It is the basis of our ability to reason.

Take this example:

I teach a person to do what we call "adding 2" – so he starts producing the number series 2,4,6,8....

He says: "now I know how to go on."

I'm happy. However, when he gets to 1000, he starts going 1004,1008,1012... – so I tell him that is wrong and that he didn't know how to go on.

"Oh", he says, " I thought that was what 'adding 2' means."

How I am supposed to know on the basis of the finite examples that he produces that he will always go on in the "right" way? I can't appeal to consistency, because you can invent any number of formal systems and prescribe what it means for each one of them to be consistent. So my student can apparently say with a straight face that his one is "consistent".

But everyone knows that the deviant method is the wrong one. Why? Because it is not what we do. It is not what we call "adding 2". All we have to appeal to is our own practice. Trying to imagine some other grounding for what "adding 2" means to show that ours is the correct one while all the others are wrong involves obvious absurdities.

But it doesn't mean that they are all equally right, because there is no talking about rightness or wrongness where there are no norms. But where there are norms, there is talking about rightness and wrongness. But the norms are just ours.

The relativist or sceptic tries to say that there is no objective standard of correctness by assuming that we need some other norms than the ones we currently have.

We cannot think without norms. Rationality is normative: it involves following rules which we may on occasion fail to follow. The relativist tries to say that the rules of rationality are arbitrary. But we know they are not: we can construct any number of counter logics, but we know that these aren't the right ones. The right one is the one we use.

It's just the same as the "adding 2" example. "Adding 2" could conceivably mean anything, and no amount of giving examples will ever be enough to satisfy us that someone knows what "add 2" means. But in practice we know exactly what adding two means and we can do it and recognize when someone else does it incorrectly. That just means that we have internalized a norm. You can't ask whether it is the "right" norm without appealing to some other norm, and if, as relativists do, you are going to doubt the legitimacy of all norms, then you are just ignoring the fact that you acknowledge thousands of norms every day without even thinking about it.

Relativism is patently dishonest position.

[Agathon]

I don't take issue with axioms. We happen to have some axioms in common. I just don't pretend that there's some inherent truth value to them...

Yes you do. Countless times a day.

[Kuciwalker]

No, I only assume them countless times a day.

[Agathon]

No, I only assume them countless times a day.

You don't even do that, you liar. You use them without thinking or assuming – it's just what you do.

You're asking an absurd question. What else would it mean for our norms to be the correct ones? Correctness is itself a normative notion.

If you won't acknowledge that you can't see the difference between the person who adds 2 in the way we do and the "deviant", then you are simply lying, because everyone can.

But I guess you'll come back with one of your pathetic one liners, which is what you always do when you don't know what you're talking about.

[Kidlicious]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker


I don't take issue with axioms. We happen to have some axioms in common. I just don't pretend that there's some inherent truth value to them...

Now you are using "inherent" as a synonum with "absolute." That's even more ridiculous as using "objective" as a synonym. "inherent" means "essential." Of course, axioms do not have "inherent" truth to them. Only absolutely true axioms are true at all. You actually support our argument.

[grumbler]

I always thought that "axiom" meant something which is accepted as true without proof. I don't know how any axiom could be "inherently" true, but axioms certainly have the same value as 'truths" because they are defined as such.

they can be challenged, i suppose, but if they are not universally accepted as truths they are not axioms, are they?

An example of an axiom would be "the universe we perceive is real." It cannot be proven to be true. You could argue with it, I suppose, but to what point?

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker
No, I only assume them countless times a day.

WTF? This is a weird typo... I'm not sure what I meant to say.

[Kidlicious]

Originally posted by grumbler
I always thought that "axiom" meant something which is accepted as true without proof. I don't know how any axiom could be "inherently" true, but axioms certainly have the same value as 'truths" because they are defined as such.

they can be challenged, i suppose, but if they are not universally accepted as truths they are not axioms, are they?

An example of an axiom would be "the universe we perceive is real." It cannot be proven to be true. You could argue with it, I suppose, but to what point?

You're right. Kuciwalker should have said "assumption," but they aren't very good with definitions so I didn't want to fight that battle.

[Immortal Wombat]

Originally posted by Agathon
But it doesn't mean that they are all equally right, because there is no talking about rightness or wrongness where there are no norms. But where there are norms, there is talking about rightness and wrongness. But the norms are just ours.

Surely this is the same as relativism? That the context defines (and allows to exist) the rightness or wrongness of any given addition to the system (be it mathematical or moral). Without the context of mathematics as we know it, adding 998, 1000, 1004, 1008 isn't wrong. It's a different system. Without the context of society, any given morality is neither right nor wrong. And thus neither better nor worse.

What have I misunderstood?