Does "dictatorship of relativism" exist?

[Ramo]

In that case, any debate on anything is fallacious, because any argument appeals to emotion.

That's why arguments only work when based on common ground. In math, we take various axioms for granted. In politics, we take certain moral precepts for granted (and that's why a debate with, say, a libertarian capitalist tends to be very different from a debate with a communist).

It's a feature of human discourse that a person can deny or pretend to deny anything that's claimed, no matter how absurd. This is down to the fact that propositions aren't infallibly self evident and that you can't really make someone believe something in a practical sense. It's also a feature of human discourse that some things are just held true as a matter of practice, and that asking for a justification of said practice doesn't really make sense (this was Wittgenstein's much misunderstood point).

That is about all there is to say about relativism of all sorts. People disagree about some moral issues, but no one is a relativist in practice, just as no-one is an epistemological sceptic in practice - not because it's hard, but because it's impossible.

So relativism is just people engaging in mental masturbation – if they were honest about their own actions, they would realize that they don't believe in it either.

That's an absurd argument. Being a "relativist in practice" in no way implies having an easily maleable morality. It's simply a recognition of the nature of logic.

[Kidlicious]

Ramo,

Now it seems that you are saying that assumptions to political arguments are relatively truthfull. Assumptions are either absolutely true are absolutely false.

[Ramo]

Assumptions have no truth value in the absence of a subjective context.

[Kidlicious]

Again we go back to that assumption of yours. What does your subjective context have to do with whether an assumption is true or not.

[Ramo]

Morality is a logical strucutre, and thus can be constructed arbitrarily.

[Kidlicious]

Originally posted by Ramo
Morality is a logical strucutre, and thus can be constructed arbitrarily.

We are talking about assumptions now.

[Ramo]

Yes, moral assumptions.

[Ramo]

Empirical assumptions as well depending on how you define "truth." But ignoring that for now...

[Kidlicious]

Well I won't agree with you that arguments only work if all participants agree on assumptions. I think that if people make the same assumptions they mostly agree. The problem really is people making absurd and biased assumptions.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by Ramo
[q] Moral system = system of morality. An ethic. I use system of morality since using two words for basically the same concept strikes my as inane.

But I do not understand the concept, whether one or two words. Is morality the product of moral reasoning, or the process of moral reasoning, or both? If either of the latter, it is a dynamic process.

Assuming that "moral development" theories are accurate, why is moral development relevant? IOW, why is the morality of an older person superior to the morality of a younger person.

Morality depends on physiological and mental development to some extent, because some of the concepts at higher levels of moral reasoning require formal operational thinking, and the average person is not even capable of that until age thirteen or so. However, beyond that, the stage of moral reasoning is not age dependent (nor culture-dependent, nor gender-dependent).

A person reasoning at a higher level of moral reasoning has superior moral reasoning skills than one using lower-stage moral reasoning because the higher-stage moral reasoning can solve at least one dilemma that the lower stage could not (and, indeed, had to for the person to advance). The higher-stage reasoner has, in all cases, used the lower-stage reasoninhg in the past, understands it, but rejects it as inadequate.

Thinki of the infant, whose moral code is Stage Onereasoning: "what makes me feel good is good, and what makes me feel bad is bad." The infant does not care what time it is, how late mommy stayed up or how early daddy has to get up tomorrow, the infant cries when it thinks bad things are hapening, and crying will make good things happen.

You know you went through that, and you accept it in infants, but you would never think of using that as yourr moral code - you long ago found it does not always work, and replaced it with stage two moral reasoning.

[Agathon]

We have observed that our physics has worked in the past; for our own reason, we will continue to use it. You're free to abstain if you want.

About as free as you are to stop breathing.

[Ramo]

People generally don't make precisely the same assumptions. People create widely different moral systems with similar assumptions. So no, that's not the case.

Doesn't matter if you disagree, that's how it is. Not everything needs to be common ground, but something. That's a fact of life. And there does tend to be some common ground on moral arguments among most people.

[Ramo]

But I do not understand the concept, whether one or two words. Is morality the product of moral reasoning, or the process of moral reasoning, or both? If either of the latter, it is a dynamic process.

Morality is the judgement of social interactions as preferable or not.

Morality depends on physiological and mental development to some extent, because some of the concepts at higher levels of moral reasoning require formal operational thinking, and the average person is not even capable of that until age thirteen or so. However, beyond that, the stage of moral reasoning is not age dependent (nor culture-dependent, nor gender-dependent).

A person reasoning at a higher level of moral reasoning has superior moral reasoning skills than one using lower-stage moral reasoning because the higher-stage moral reasoning can solve at least one dilemma that the lower stage could not (and, indeed, had to for the person to advance). The higher-stage reasoner has, in all cases, used the lower-stage reasoninhg in the past, understands it, but rejects it as inadequate.

Thinki of the infant, whose moral code is Stage Onereasoning: "what makes me feel good is good, and what makes me feel bad is bad." The infant does not care what time it is, how late mommy stayed up or how early daddy has to get up tomorrow, the infant cries when it thinks bad things are hapening, and crying will make good things happen.

You know you went through that, and you accept it in infants, but you would never think of using that as yourr moral code - you long ago found it does not always work, and replaced it with stage two moral reasoning.

My point is that your hierarchy of moral reasoning necessitates subjective value judgements. The infant's morality is no better or worse than mine, absolutely.

[Agathon]

People generally don't make precisely the same assumptions. People create widely different moral systems with similar assumptions. So no, that's not the case.

Sorry, you're just wrong. The similarities far outweigh the differences. It would be impossible to understand other people if this was not the case.

Doesn't matter if you disagree, that's how it is. Not everything needs to be common ground, but something. That's a fact of life. And there does tend to be some common ground on moral arguments among most people.

Not everything, but the vast majority of things. We just don't notice it, because it is so mundane. Understanding implies agreement - and more than mere agreement, massive agreement in substantive beliefs, not in concepts. We simply wouldn't be able to talk to each other if this were not true.

Your view is just out of date, and ignores the most important philosophical developments of the last 50 years. As I said, unless you address Wittgenstein's position, you can't hope to come close to a credible view.

[Ramo]

Sorry, you're just wrong. The similarities far outweigh the differences. It would be impossible to understand other people if this was not the case.

I don't disagree, and the similarities are irrelevent to the argument that I'm making. Which is about the nature of logic, not an observation of human reasoning.