Not a bad assessment, although the "shock and awe" show didn't really start until that little column out of Baghdad suddenly found itself in a landscape of craters and hot steel rain.
One of the dirty tricks we have up our sleeves to discourage counterattacks in the north is that wide open desert to the west allows us to stack up B-52s, keep them on station, and have JSTARS call them in for strike missions against mobile targets. The Iraqi air force hasn't flown a single sortie (makes me think they'll be set for kamikaze use), and the 52's are beyond reach of any mobile air defense system. They can't be seen or heard, and the bombs are just there.
An enemy that realizes he can't make any offensive moves, anywhere, without them being almost immediately liquidated, has a hard time keeping morale and control of their units. It's just a matter of time - the IRG units in GW 1 ran like screaming girlies when their time came, too.
The only "negative" in this campaign so far is that it was based on an unrealistic timetable. Four days to get to Baghdad was the most nonsensical thing since Monty's timetable for XXX Corps to relieve the Red Devils in Arnhem. The difference is that the chickenhawks who created this timetable don't control the troops, so now that their fantasy has gone down the toilet, the professionals can go to work and win the war.
If we'd said it was going to take a month of cautious advances and hard fighting to reach Baghdad, people would be thrilled with the progress so far and the casualty levels - it's all about creating expectations.
Our two basic defects are being cured with time - our initial insufficiency of force is cured by the arrival of scheduled forces in theater, and the Iraqi "civilian" reaction is conditioned to their perception of the balance of power - they remember what happened twelve years ago, and nobody wants to risk a repeat. It was unrealistic for the US to expect help from an immediate Iraqi rebellion, but the finishing blows are likely to come from that source, or at least with the active help of an Iraqi uprising. The time to defect or to rise up is when the regime's enforcers are too busy thinking about how to cover their own asses to try to shoot yours, and that time hasn't come yet.
One of the dirty tricks we have up our sleeves to discourage counterattacks in the north is that wide open desert to the west allows us to stack up B-52s, keep them on station, and have JSTARS call them in for strike missions against mobile targets. The Iraqi air force hasn't flown a single sortie (makes me think they'll be set for kamikaze use), and the 52's are beyond reach of any mobile air defense system. They can't be seen or heard, and the bombs are just there.
An enemy that realizes he can't make any offensive moves, anywhere, without them being almost immediately liquidated, has a hard time keeping morale and control of their units. It's just a matter of time - the IRG units in GW 1 ran like screaming girlies when their time came, too.
The only "negative" in this campaign so far is that it was based on an unrealistic timetable. Four days to get to Baghdad was the most nonsensical thing since Monty's timetable for XXX Corps to relieve the Red Devils in Arnhem. The difference is that the chickenhawks who created this timetable don't control the troops, so now that their fantasy has gone down the toilet, the professionals can go to work and win the war.
If we'd said it was going to take a month of cautious advances and hard fighting to reach Baghdad, people would be thrilled with the progress so far and the casualty levels - it's all about creating expectations.
Our two basic defects are being cured with time - our initial insufficiency of force is cured by the arrival of scheduled forces in theater, and the Iraqi "civilian" reaction is conditioned to their perception of the balance of power - they remember what happened twelve years ago, and nobody wants to risk a repeat. It was unrealistic for the US to expect help from an immediate Iraqi rebellion, but the finishing blows are likely to come from that source, or at least with the active help of an Iraqi uprising. The time to defect or to rise up is when the regime's enforcers are too busy thinking about how to cover their own asses to try to shoot yours, and that time hasn't come yet.
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