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  • Siro, so you were saying you think that Jewish religion changed around 1700, or that various brands of Christianity, etc changed but Jewish religion didn't? I think the tie between nationality and religion among us Goyim was still fairly solid, except in America. In England there was the CofE. In Scotland there was Presbyterianism. In Germany and Norway(?) Lutheranism. In major Swiss cities, Holland, and various other places Calvinism. RCism and EOxy held in West, South, and East Europe, etc.


    I'm not saying that all Jews must have followed Judaism. But judaism was followed by jews and usually not other peoples.

    Judaism is a 'closed society' type of religion (actually there was lots of debate on this during the hellenic occupation of Judea, and apparently the anti-universalists won), as opposed to Islam and Christianity which are very universalist and their goal is to be spread to people.

    Judaism doesn't have that goal in mind - Judaism strives to be a religion of a selected few (selected not because of any superiority, but for a random tie with Abraham) that can prove the world that if people want - they can follow strict moral standards.

    Well, no matter. The tie between the Jews and their religion was fomented by separation from the Holy Lands, but not in 70 AD. During the exile in Babylon the Jews would leave one wall of the house unfinished, symbolizing their unwillingness to call anything but the Promised Land their home, in acknowledgment of the prophecy of Jeremiah that said the exile would be for 70 yrs.

    I agree. And yet when they returned there still were times of following foreign gods. During the building of the 2nd temple, many foreign women were deported out of Judea, for they were accused of diluting the jewish nationality and drawing people to other gods.

    After the return to Jerusalem they even changed their name. Before the exile they were usually referred to as "Hebrew" (as a race) but after they used the name "Juda" (or "Jew" in anglicized form) in honor of Judah (the smaller of the divided kingdoms/the larger of the 2 faithful tribes). They never again dabbled in idolatry. This change held fast for 300-400 years!

    I remember pretty well that they did idolized and Nehemia kicked out foreign women just for that reason.

    But I agree it was among the first steps that made Jews so tied to their religion.

    What happened in the diaspora was a change in the way the religion was reckoned. No Temple, no sacrifice, no Land = dilemma. They had to allegorize all rituals, recreating their religion from the ancient foundation. Without the tempering of the Exile they would not have had the mettle to survive losing the Promised Land again and without prophetic promise of return.

    So you basically agree with me that the diaspora had a huge impact on making jews adopt their religion into their national culture - beyond normal people-religion relationships which existed in the rest of the world.

    For example, the Romani ("Gypsies") were originally from India and practiced some form of Hinduism. Some might have picked up Zoroastrianism. But once they arrived in Europe they adopted RCism (maybe EOxy in the East?) and stuck with it. The Jews might have done the same, still retaining unique cultural attributes and separation, dumping Hebrew religion.

    Thus they have developed a tie with judaism that just isn't there when you talk about followers of christianity, islam (well islam actually is very strong, but it's universal and not limited to people of a singe ethnical descent) etc.

    That is why I think that you can't categorize Judaism into being purely religion. By now it has infiltrated the "Hebrew/Jewish" culture and nationality so much, that it exists as a cultural national component even for non-judaist or atheistic peoples.

    Many of us Christians are glad they didn't, because without the Jews, and especially the Masoretes, we wouldn't have nearly as reliable OT manuscripts or nearly as much understanding of ancient Hebrews.

    Comment


    • What am I, a historian?

      Well, we are summarizing huge events and centuries of time with a few paragraphs. I'd say we see eye to eye.
      …and a girlfriend
      Who's the avatar: gf or wishful thinking??
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      Comment


      • I think we did, but the search function is limited in scope.
        I have never had an opinion on whether Israel has or has had chemical weapons, and I know I haven't debated it.

        Gnu: Has nothing to do with it. The question was whether Arafat was democratically elected. Jimmy Carter, as head of the the UN election observers, declared that the election was fair and democratic.

        Good attempt of weasling out of admitting you were wrong though. Not succesful, but good. If I remember correctly, in the original thread you just disappeared...


        Siro: I wasn't wrong.

        You tell me: If prior to the 2000 elections, Bush had received 1.5 years of free presidency, with no balances for his executive power, and no media coverage for his opponent - Al Gore.

        Would you call that "fair" and "democratic"?

        I'm sure you'd be one of the first people to accuse him of dictatorship.
        What I think doesn't matter. And what you think certainly don't. The appointed UN observer, Jimmy Carter, declared the election fair and democratic.

        So yes, you were wrong. Still are, apparently.
        Gnu Ex Machina - the Gnu in the Machine

        Comment


        • Who's the avatar: gf or wishful thinking??

          Straybow - it's my gf

          I have never had an opinion on whether Israel has or has had chemical weapons, and I know I haven't debated it.


          then i appologize.

          What I think doesn't matter. And what you think certainly don't. The appointed UN observer, Jimmy Carter, declared the election fair and democratic.
          So yes, you were wrong. Still are, apparently.

          Yes, we know how very reliable they are. Both the UN and Jimmy Carter.

          Do you recall the time in 1990 when UN inspectors declared Iraq had no nuclear program?

          It so happenned, that following the Allied invasion, it was discovered they were very wrong, and the nuclear program was quite advanced.

          Comment


          • then i appologize.
            thank you

            Yes, we know how very reliable they are. Both the UN and Jimmy Carter.
            In order, quite and very, I would say. The only peope who claims the UN is unreliable are Israeli or US, as far as I know. Furthermore, I've never even heard of a reason to doubt the word of Jimmy Carter.

            Do you recall the time in 1990 when UN inspectors declared Iraq had no nuclear program?
            Actually, I don't. In 1990? Seems very premature, that close to the Gulf War. Are you referring to 1998, perhaps?


            It so happenned, that following the Allied invasion, it was discovered they were very wrong, and the nuclear program was quite advanced.
            Are you talking about the aluminum tubing, that the US eventually admitted wasn't suitable for nuclear weapons after all? Well, I guess it served its purpose, as I'm sure it fooled some people into accepting Bush's ficticious claims for war...

            Funny, even in the intensely jingoistic US media there is a complete lack of information about an Iraqi nuclear program... On the other hand, there have been several stories about how so far, no weapons of mass destruction have been found. These stories only mentions biological and chemical weapons, indicating that the nuclear part is so far removed from the realms of possibility that it doesn't even deserve mentioning.

            For example: http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/...-chemical.html

            I've said it before, I'll say it again: You really should start reading real news for a change.
            Gnu Ex Machina - the Gnu in the Machine

            Comment


            • DP
              Gnu Ex Machina - the Gnu in the Machine

              Comment


              • Actually, I don't. In 1990? Seems very premature, that close to the Gulf War. Are you referring to 1998, perhaps?


                quote:
                It so happenned, that following the Allied invasion, it was discovered they were very wrong, and the nuclear program was quite advanced.


                Are you talking about the aluminum tubing, that the US eventually admitted wasn't suitable for nuclear weapons after all? Well, I guess it served its purpose, as I'm sure it fooled some people into accepting Bush's ficticious claims for war...


                no no no.

                infact there was a UN inquiry into Iraqi WMDs in late 1990 and they, after an inspection decided that the iraqis had no nuclear program, when infact they did.




                Bibliography: NEW YORK TIMES, 18 November 1990, PP. 1, 17-18, by Malcolm W. Browne
                Headline: UNLESS STOPPED, IRAQ COULD HAVE A-ARMS IN 10 YEARS, EXPERTS SAY
                Orig. Source:


                Abstract:
                Intelligence experts from the US, UK, and Israel have concluded that Iraq could have nuclear weapons within 10 years. Iraq has acquired information, tools, electronics components, machinery for processing, computers, uranium ore and other nuclear materials from foreign sources. Donald Kerr, analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, UK, said Iraq would have nuclear weapons in "five to seven years."
                In 1981, Israel destroyed the nuclear breeder reactor at Tuwaitha in Iraq. An intelligence analyst of the UK said Israel might bomb a uranium enrichment plant if it was found in Iraq. Iraq salvaged some highly-enriched uranium fuel from the breeder reactor after Israel bombed it.
                In November 1990, Iraq invited the IAEA to inspect the highly-enriched uranium in Iraq. In March 1990, customs officials in the UK seized a shipment of special capacitors that were destined for Iraq. On 15 July 1990, customs officials, in the FRG seized a shipment of items that were destined for Iraq. The items were fabricated from a special high-strength, corrosion-resistant steel that is used to make gas centrifuge parts.
                These centrifuge-related items were manufactured in Switzerland. Michael Eisenstadt, of the US Washington Institute for New East Policy wrote a study that stated that Iraq bought 250 tons of yellowcake from Brazil, Portugal, and Niger in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
                Engineers from Poland, who were held as human shields by Iraq, said that Iraq has a chemical plant, located at Al Qaim near Baghdad, where the first steps of converting yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas are being performed. The Simon Wiesenthal Foundation in Los Angeles, circulated a list of more than 200 firms in Europe, Asia, and the US that supplied nuclear weapons-related materials and technology to Iraq. In the 1970s and 1980s Iraq failed in its efforts to smuggle plutonium and weapons-grade uranium. Iraq decided to manufacture its own weapons-grade materials.
                Leonard S. Spector, director of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, said Iraq is years from making nuclear weapons. Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project of Nuclear Arms Control, said that if Iraq had only 26 centrifuges they couldn't make a bomb in at least one life time. Intelligence reports show no gas centrifuge plant construction in Iraq. Pakistan reportedly has built 14,000 gas centrifuges, of which only 1000 can operate at a time because of constant breakdowns, based on a design from Europe. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said Pakistan has enough fuel to build fewer than a dozen nuclear bombs.
                In 1986, Pakistan acquired enough material for a nuclear bomb. Dr. Sidney Drell, a physicist at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in the US, said he "would be very surprised if Iraq were to deploy implosion warheads without testing at least one of them." Mr. Donald Kerr said Iraq would find it difficult to hide a nuclear test.
                General Yehoshua Saguy, who until 1986 commanded the military intelligence apparatus of Israel, said Iraq was two years away from nuclear capability. Saguy warned that Saddam Hussein would build an entire nuclear arsenal if he isn't stopped.




                At the time of the Gulf War, most Western analysts -- with the notable exception of the French -- believed that the chemical enrichment facility at Tuwaitha "Building 90" was not yet operable. Subsequent inspections by the IAEA, under auspices of the UN Security Council Resolution 687, found lab-scale experiments in chemical enrichment, but no evidence of success or any plans for a production plant. Since the French technology is both proprietary and subject to export controls, the Iraqis reportedly resorted to clever negotiation tactics to garner considerable amounts of design information on the process, ostensibly with the goal of licensing the technology at some point in the future. Their techniques reportedly included pressing for more and more technical details during a contract negotiation and then breaking off discussions just before closing a deal.


                In light of the state of affairs in Iraqi nuclear technology, the implementation of a possible nuclear-weapons development program was believed to be unlikely to succeed prior to 1995 without significant support from abroad. As of early 1990 there was no evidence of direct support of Iraq in its development of nuclear weapons.

                The Iraqi nuclear program was massive, for most practical purposes it was fiscally unconstrained, was closer to fielding a nuclear weapon, and was less vulnerable to destruction by precision bombing than coalition air commanders and planners or US intelligence specialists realized before DESERT STORM. The target list on 16 January 1991 contained two nuclear targets; but after the war, inspectors operating under the United Nations Special Commission eventually uncovered more than twenty sites involved in the Iraqi nuclear program; sixteen of the sites were described as “main facilities.” Overall, the United States did not fully understand the target arrays comprising Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile capabilities before DESERT STORM.

                from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/when.htm



                This text from early 1991 demonstrates that IAEA thought that Iraq had almost no nuclear weapons:

                Iraq said it does not possess nuclear weapons; nuclear- weapons-usable materials; or research and development facilities to produce nuclear weapons.

                However, Ekeus said at a recent press conference that the commission estimates that Iraq has about 600 tons of chemical weapons and the commission has indications "from some governments that there are more chemical weapons than Iraq has disclosed."

                The plans for the third stage -- long-term monitoring and verification that Iraq does not resume manufacture of the destroyed weapons -- will be submitted after the commission has a complete picture of Iraq's capabilities and what must be destroyed. But the commission said the verification


                GE 3 POL108 will be by "full and effective on-site inspections including those on short notice." The frequency of on-site inspection will vary for each type of weapon and "will be contingent on previous findings and also on Iraq's clear and continuous demonstration of compliance with Resolution 687."

                The commission will have a small staff at U.N. headquarters in New York to plan the Iraqi field operations, such as the composition of the teams of experts, their movements and activities. A field office will be located in Bahrain where the teams will assemble, be briefed before entering Iraq, and return for debriefing and initial sample and data analysis.

                The IAEA conducted its first on-site inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities May 15. The 34-person team included IAEA officials, experts, and members of the special commission.

                The nuclear material is located in the Tuwaltha area, 30 kilometers north of Baghdad where there are two research reactors, the report said. According to Iraq's statement, the facilities "contain fresh or irradiate fuel assemblies" and "appears to be stored in accessible conditions."

                The material cannot be destroyed or rendered harmless in Iraq, the IAEA said, so the agency will have to take custody.

                Other direct-use material is buried under the rubble of a reactor building and "a complex and costly decommissioning operation will be needed to render this material accessible for removal and disposal," according to the IAEA.




                United Nations -- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said October 8 that its inspectors found "dramatic" new evidence of an "advanced and sophisticated nuclear weapons program" in Iraq, including work to produce a powerful thermo-nuclear bomb.

                In a report to the Security Council, IAEA director Hans Blix said that the documents found by the IAEA's sixth inspection team in Baghdad indicated that Iraq was in the process of producing several kilograms of lithium 6, whose only known use is in hydrogen bombs.

                "The key result of the sixth inspection is the uncovering of documents that show conclusively that Iraq was very well advanced in a program to develop an implosion-type nuclear weapon and that links existed to a surface-to-surface missile project," Blix said.

                The program was "so advanced," Blix said, "that the time needed to reach bomb-making capacity seems to have been determined by the time required for the enrichment activities rather than the weapons design activities."

                "Contrary to Iraq's claims of having only a peaceful nuclear program the team found documents showing that Iraq had been working on the revision of a nuclear weapons design and one linking the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission to work on a surface-to-surface missile project -- presumably the intended delivery system for their nuclear weapons," the IAEA preliminary report to the council said.

                The inspection unit -- which was in Iraq in late September and remained trapped in a parking lot under Iraqi guards rather than give up the documents it found -- also uncovered evidence of a "broad-based Iraqi international procurement effort," the IAEA director said.

                "It is quite possible -- even probable -- that some of the procurement that has taken place, e.g., of sensitive equipment or material, has occurred in violation of laws of states from which the export originated," he said.




                Then again :

                How close Iraq was to completing a bomb is still open to debate. At the request of the IAEA, a group of nuclear weapon designers from the United States, Britain, France, and Russia met in April 1992 to assess the progress of Iraq’s nuclear program prior to the Persian Gulf War, based on documents that had been obtained through subsequent inspections. These designers reportedly concluded that bottlenecks in the program could have delayed completion of a working bomb for at least 3 years, assuming Iraq had continued its multifaceted strategy and design approach.

                However, several experts familiar with the inspections believe that lraq could also probably have produced a workable device in as little as 6 to 24 months, had they decided to seize foreign-supplied HEU from under safeguards and focus their efforts on a crash program to produce a device in the shortest possible amount of time.

                Iraq had a very well-funded nuclear weapons program aimed at the indigenous development and exploitation of technologies for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material and the development and production of nuclear weapons, with a target date of 1991 for the first weapon. [S/1997/779] It is reasonable to suppose that the first device, containing indigenously produced HEU, would not have been available before late 1992. Equally, if it is accepted that Iraq's strategy was to acquire a small nuclear arsenal before testing, it is likely that the need to demonstrate a delivery capability would not have occurred until 1994. [GC 40-13]


                Last edited by Sirotnikov; April 5, 2003, 20:27.

                Comment


                • Dear Cyber-gnu, with regards to your doubting of the truthfullness and accountability of Israeli Intelligence sources:


                  NEW YORK TIMES, 18 November 1990, PP
                  ...
                  General Yehoshua Saguy, who until 1986 commanded the military intelligence apparatus of Israel, said Iraq was two years away from nuclear capability. Saguy warned that Saddam Hussein would build an entire nuclear arsenal if he isn't stopped.



                  A year later:
                  (October 8th 1991)

                  The program was "so advanced," Blix said, "that the time needed to reach bomb-making capacity seems to have been determined by the time required for the enrichment activities rather than the weapons design activities."


                  Two years later:
                  (April 1992)

                  However, several experts familiar with the inspections believe that lraq could also probably have produced a workable device in as little as 6 to 24 months, had they decided to seize foreign-supplied HEU from under safeguards and focus their efforts on a crash program to produce a device in the shortest possible amount of time.

                  Iraq had a very well-funded nuclear weapons program aimed at the indigenous development and exploitation of technologies for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material and the development and production of nuclear weapons, with a target date of 1991 for the first weapon. [S/1997/779] It is reasonable to suppose that the first device, containing indigenously produced HEU, would not have been available before late 1992.



                  It took 2 years of serious inspections for the inspectors to come to the same conclusion Israeli intelligence sources "invented" in 1990.

                  Obviously a tough blow to the reliability and accountability of Israeli intelligence sources

                  Comment


                  • You prove nothing more than ignorance and prejudice in each post you make.

                    you slam israeli sources, and then are again and again proven wrong.

                    you claim your ignorance as your shield - whenever i raise an issue that isn't comfortable to you (IAEA predictions failing / palestinian massacares aimed at kids) you claim you never heard of it, and make me go through tons of pages proving your ignorance yet again.

                    Comment


                    • Dear Cyber-gnu, with regards to your doubting of the truthfullness and accountability of Israeli Intelligence sources:

                      ...

                      It took 2 years of serious inspections for the inspectors to come to the same conclusion Israeli intelligence sources "invented" in 1990.

                      Obviously a tough blow to the reliability and accountability of Israeli intelligence sources

                      First off: Did you mean "accuracy" instead of "accountability"?

                      Second: What is this supposed to prove? That Israeli intelligence can both be competent and tell the truth when it serves Israels interests? Well, duh.

                      The problem is that this doesn't even tangentially touch on whether they are trustworthy in general.

                      You prove nothing more than ignorance and prejudice in each post you make.

                      you slam israeli sources, and then are again and again proven wrong.
                      Once, AFAIK. You, on the other hand, have been proven wrong TWICE in just this thread alone... And I'm not even counting your evasion of Kroeses posts.

                      you claim your ignorance as your shield - whenever i raise an issue that isn't comfortable to you (IAEA predictions failing / palestinian massacares aimed at kids) you claim you never heard of it, and make me go through tons of pages proving your ignorance yet again.
                      I'm terribly sorry. I assumed that your claim of failed UN inspections would have some kind of bearing on the subject. Since UN inspections started AFTER the war (which was in 1991) the only possible way for that to happen would have been if the 1998 report had been shown to be false.

                      Instead, it appears you intended something completely different and irrelevant.

                      Summarized from your post: Just before Desert Storm the IAEA conducted their semi-annual inspection of Iraqs uranium stockpile. The IAEA concluded that "Iraq did not have a weapons program". After the war, the UN inspected again, and found that Iraq did have a weapons program.

                      You seem to have a missed a few crucial points, however. The intention of the IAEA's routine inspections is to make sure that the uranium in the stockpile has not been diverted for other uses, i.e. been sold or used for a weapons program.

                      Furthermore, according to the bulletin for atomic scientists:
                      The IAEA had made a routine inspection in November 1990-after the invasion of Kuwait but before the initiation of the Coalition bombing campaign. The inspectors found that the safeguarded material was intact.


                      So it appears that the IAEA did exactly what they were supposed to do - report on Iraqs uranium stockpile. At no point was the IAEA authorized to inspect facilities that was not connected to the uranium stockpile - That is actually the job of intelligence agencies.

                      After the war, when UN inspection in accordance with resolution 637 (I think) started, the UN inspectors uncovered and completely dismantled Iraqs nuclear program. Again the IAEA did their job: they were charged with finding out if and how Iraqs nuclear program worked or even existed, which they did. In fact, they managed to completely dismantle the program, including the hidden enriched uranium Iraq had managed to salvage from the reactor Israel blew up.


                      So where is the untrustworthy part? That the IAEA did their job before the war? They they did their job afterwards? Thet even though Iraq deliberately tried to hinder their inspections they still managed to get the job done?


                      Of course, maybe these tiny details never appeared in Israeli "news"papers. Maybe you really believed that the UN was somehow to blame for not knowing about Iraqs nuclear program.

                      Either way, I suggest you start reading some real news for a change.
                      Gnu Ex Machina - the Gnu in the Machine

                      Comment


                      • BTW, what happened to Jimmy Carter? since "we all know how trustworthy he is" I would like to see some of this supposed common knowledge.
                        Gnu Ex Machina - the Gnu in the Machine

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by CyberGnu
                          Since UN inspections started AFTER the war (which was in 1991) the only possible way for that to happen would have been if the 1998 report had been shown to be false.
                          No, there were IAEA inspections before the war as well (every six months), as you even state in your post.

                          An example is that before the Gulf War Iraq - unbeknownst to the world -- had enough highly-enriched uranium to make a bomb. Nobody knew that. The reason for that was that the IAEA took the position that as long as the material was not all at one site then it wasn't enough to make a bomb or at least it wasn't enough to make a bomb quickly enough so that the IAEA had to inspect it every three weeks, which their rules require if a country has enough material to make a bomb.

                          They were inspecting only every six months because their rules provided that if it were not all at the same place, then they didn't have to inspect it so often.

                          That's just one example of the way the IAEA has defined its mission. And it's really defined its mission because it has another job, which is to promote nuclear power. And so and there are other cases.


                          But then, there were UN inspections in North Korea, too, and that didn't hinder NK from getting the bomb.
                          Last edited by Edan; April 6, 2003, 10:50.
                          "I read a book twice as fast as anybody else. First, I read the beginning, and then I read the ending, and then I start in the middle and read toward whatever end I like best." - Gracie Allen

                          Comment


                          • There's nothing evasive about my points to S Kroeze.

                            To the contrary - he keeps evading huge parts of my posts which he feels uncomfortable to answer.


                            The IAEA has proven that it is unreliable on it's own. The whole goal of the IAEA is to monitor country's nuclear programs without invading them and using absolute force to inspect every little possible hideout.

                            Obviously if a country is defeated, the victors can send anyone they like to discover nuclear weapon programs.

                            IAEA should be able to do that without the need to actually invade rogue countries, but have clearly failed this point.

                            And Jimi Carter has been making all kinds of statements as of lately, regarding cuba and arab nations iirc.


                            And your posts about the Israeli Intelligence are still moot. I've brought several examples when they have been proven correct and honest , and you contered that by bringing no examples of your own (of them lying) and saying: "well yeah, sure they CAN be accurate, but who knows if they always are?"

                            huh?

                            that is such a weak and stupid argument.

                            I could easily say the same thing about the NYT: "sure, they can tell the truth if they want to. Still doesn't mean they are generally trustworthy".

                            Face it - you're running out of arguments so you're trying to confuse logic.

                            Comment


                            • No, there were IAEA inspections before the war as well (every six months), as you even state in your post.
                              This is semantics. You are basing your argument on the fact that the word "inspections" is used in both instances, even though they purpose and the methods of those inspections were very different.

                              For either set of inspections to "fail", they would have to fail in their own mission. Thus, since the IAEA inspections prior to resolution 637 concluded that the stockpiled Iraqi nuclear material was intact, the only way the pre-Desert Storm inspections could have failed would be if the stockpiles were, in fact, not intact.

                              As the subsequent inspections and Iraqi testimony showed, this wasn't the case. The Iraqi plan was to keep the stockpile intact for the 1990 inspection, and then enrich it in the following months. That this would be an engineering impossibility should naturally be considered - even if the allies hadn't started the war in early 1991, the missing uranium would have been detected in the next scheduled inspection.
                              Gnu Ex Machina - the Gnu in the Machine

                              Comment


                              • But then, there were UN inspections in North Korea, too, and that didn't hinder NK from getting the bomb.
                                ?

                                North Korea has the bomb? I was under the impression that they had a weapons program, which they recently took out of mothballs. While withdrawing from the NPT, btw, thus implicitly showing that the IAEA inspections apparently IS a deterrent to the development of nuclear weapons.
                                Gnu Ex Machina - the Gnu in the Machine

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