The differences between America and Europe

[Sirotnikov]

Ok, this is a really really really long article that I spent quite a long time reading.

Generally I agree with it.

It is very long, often repetitive, and sometimes, some of you, would want to quit reading it in the middle.

Trust me - do not. Go on reading it. It'll come to a different conclusion than you think.

And as I see it, it's quite truthfull.

Again, I'm warning you - it's not for the trolling lightheaded types.

Read it all, and think.

http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html

Even though I strongly object to people not reading it fully, I created a MS Word summary (14%) below.

[alva]

eugh, you could'nt summarise it for us by any chance . just to get us going i mean

[Gatekeeper]

Siro, et al.:

I've only read part of the article so far, and it's interesting, to say the least. Some of the article's info may be a bit dated, though:

Americans can imagine successfully invading Iraq and toppling Saddam, and therefore more than 70 percent of Americans apparently favor such action. Europeans, not surprisingly, find the prospect both unimaginable and frightening.

I believe there's a poll in the weekend edition of USA Today that indicates support for an invasion of Iraq is down to 59 percent in America, although roughly 83 percent believe Saddam Hussein should be forced from power (presumably through means other than all-out military invasion).

Anyway, back to reading.

Gatekeeper

[Sirotnikov]

Ok this is a Microsoft Word summary (14%) of the text.

Don't be surprised if it makes no sense. Key elements are missing and after all - it's a Word summary.

--

Power and Weakness
On the all-important question of power — the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power — American and European perspectives are diverging. European intellectuals are nearly unanimous in the conviction that Americans and Europeans no longer share a common “strategic culture.” The United States, they argue, resorts to force more quickly and, compared with Europe, is less patient with diplomacy. One cannot generalize about Europeans: Britons may have a more “American” view of power than many of their fellow Europeans on the continent. Many Americans, especially among the intellectual elite, are as uncomfortable with the “hard” quality of American foreign policy as any European; and some Europeans value power as much as any American.
Nevertheless, the caricatures do capture an essential truth: The United States and Europe are fundamentally different today. Despite what many Europeans and some Americans believe, these differences in strategic culture do not spring naturally from the national characters of Americans and Europeans. The young United States wielded power against weaker peoples on the North American continent, but when it came to dealing with the European giants, it claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European empires.
Two centuries later, Americans and Europeans have traded places — and perspectives. When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers. The power gap: perception and reality
Europe lost this strategic centrality after the Cold War ended, but it took a few more years for the lingering mirage of European global power to fade. Those Americans and Europeans who proposed that Europe expand its strategic role beyond the continent set an unreasonable goal. During the Cold War, Europe’s strategic role had been to defend itself. Not only were Europeans unwilling to pay to project force beyond Europe. Despite talk of establishing Europe as a global superpower, therefore, European military capabilities steadily fell behind those of the United States throughout the 1990s.
Even during the Cold War, American military predominance and Europe’s relative weakness had produced important and sometimes serious disagreements. It may have reflected, too, Europe’s memory of continental war. By 1992, mutual recriminations were rife over Bosnia, where the United States refused to act and Europe could not act. The psychology of power and weakness
It is a power problem. Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power. In an anarchic world, small powers always fear they will be victims. Europeans fear American unilateralism. The United States is a behemoth with a conscience. Americans have never accepted the principles of Europe’s old order, never embraced the Machiavellian perspective. Americans even share Europe’s aspirations for a more orderly world system based not on power but on rules — after all, they were striving for such a world when Europeans were still extolling the laws of machtpolitik.
A better explanation of Europe’s greater tolerance for threats is, once again, Europe’s relative weakness. This perfectly normal human psychology is helping to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe today. According to one student of European opinion, even the very focus on “threats” differentiates American policymakers from their European counterparts. If Europe’s strategic culture today places less value on power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools as economics and trade, isn’t it partly because Europe is militarily weak and economically strong? The differing threat perceptions in the United States and Europe are not just matters of psychology, however. For Iraq and other “rogue” states objectively do not pose the same level of threat to Europeans as they do to the United States. If during the Cold War Europe by necessity made a major contribution to its own defense, today Europeans enjoy an unparalleled measure of “free security” because most of the likely threats are in regions outside Europe, where only the United States can project effective force. Both Europeans and Americans agree that these are primarily American problems.
This is why Saddam Hussein is not as great a threat to Europe as he is to the United States. The task of containing Saddam Hussein belongs primarily to the United States, not to Europe, and everyone agrees on this6 — including Saddam, which is why he considers the United States, not Europe, his principal adversary. In the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East, and in most other regions of the world (including Europe), the United States plays the role of ultimate enforcer. “You are so powerful,” Europeans often say to Americans. Americans are “cowboys,” Europeans love to say. The origins of modern European foreign policy
Important as the power gap may be in shaping the respective strategic cultures of the United States and Europe, it is only one part of the story. The modern European strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a rejection of the evils of European machtpolitik. The European Union is itself the product of an awful century of European warfare.
Some Europeans recall, as Fischer does, the central role played by the United States in solving the “German problem.” Fischer’s principal contention — that Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and discovered a new system for preserving peace in international relations — is widely shared across Europe. Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace. During the Cold War, few Europeans doubted the need for military power to deter the Soviet Union. But within Europe the rules were different.
Europe “has a role to play in world ‘governance,’” says Prodi, a role based on replicating the European experience on a global scale. In Europe “the rule of law has replaced the crude interplay of power . . . power politics have lost their influence.” The transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe’s new mission civilisatrice. America’s power, and its willingness to exercise that power — unilaterally if necessary — represents a threat to Europe’s new sense of mission. Turning Europe into a global superpower capable of balancing the power of the United States may have been one of the original selling points of the European Union — an independent European foreign and defense policy was supposed to be one of the most important byproducts of European integration. But, in truth, the ambition for European “power” is something of an anachronism. European leaders talk of Europe’s essential role in the world. It is obvious, moreover, that issues outside of Europe don’t attract nearly as much interest among Europeans as purely European issues do. Europeans often point to American insularity and parochialism. Can Europe change course and assume a larger role on the world stage? It is merely to rein in and “multilateralize” the United States. Even Védrine has stopped talking about counterbalancing the United States. War between the major European powers is almost unimaginable. European integration was an American project, too, after World War II. And so, recall, was European weakness. It was a commitment to Europe, not hostility to Europe, that led the United States in the immediate postwar years to keep troops on the continent and to create nato. The United States, in short, solved the Kantian paradox for the Europeans. By providing security from outside, the United States has rendered it unnecessary for Europe’s supranational government to provide it. Europeans did not need power to achieve peace and they do not need power to preserve it.
Europe’s rejection of power politics, its devaluing of military force as a tool of international relations, have depended on the presence of American military forces on European soil. American power made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important. And now, in the final irony, the fact that United States military power has solved the European problem, especially the “German problem,” allows Europeans today to believe that American military power, and the “strategic culture” that has created and sustained it, are outmoded and dangerous.
Some Europeans do understand the conundrum. American leaders, too, believe that global security and a liberal order — as well as Europe’s “postmodern” paradise — cannot long survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous, Hobbesian world that still flourishes outside Europe.
Contrary to what many believe, the United States can shoulder the burden of maintaining global security without much help from Europe. The United States spends a little over 3 percent of its gdp on defense today. Can the United States handle the rest of the world without much help from Europe? The United States has maintained strategic stability in Asia with no help from Europe. Europe has had little to offer the United States in strategic military terms since the end of the Cold War — except, of course, that most valuable of strategic assets, a Europe at peace.
The United States can manage, therefore, at least in material terms. The problem is that the United States must sometimes play by the rules of a Hobbesian world, even though in doing so it violates European norms. The danger — if it is a danger — is that the United States and Europe will become positively estranged. Europeans will become more shrill in their attacks on the United States. To those of us who came of age in the Cold War, the strategic decoupling of Europe and the United States seems frightening. Western Europe, DeGaulle insisted, was “essential to the West. Maybe concern about America’s overweening power really will create some energy in Europe. Americans can help. Even after September 11, when the Europeans offered their very limited military capabilities in the fight in Afghanistan, the United States resisted, fearing that European cooperation was a ruse to tie America down.

[Sirotnikov]

As you can see, it's not actually dated. Just refers to history.

[Sirotnikov]

However, it really isn't worth much if you don't read the whole thing.

[Gatekeeper]

Siro:

I just finished the article. As I said earlier, the article was well worth the time investment and, towards the end, eye fatigue. You will be getting a bill from my opthmologist, Siro.

On a wee bit more serious note, I wonder what might happen if America shifts more of its miltary resources into the Pacific and Asia as time passes. Europe might very well have no choice then but to build up its military capabilities.

Gatekeeper

[DinoDoc]

If Americans were to decide that Europe was no more than an irritating irrelevancy, would American society gradually become unmoored from what we now call the West?

I'd like to see this point picked up here for discussion, if I may.

[DinoDoc]

BTW, what do the Euro's here think of the article and its thesis?

[KrazyHorse]

I'm not a Euro, but my nation has practiced the foreign policy that the article feels Europe is moving toward for the last 60 years...

[DinoDoc]

Do you agree with the reasons he points out that allow Europe to get away with its foreign policy?

[KrazyHorse]

You've completely misunderstood the article.

Europe's foreign policy hasn't been facilitated by the US; its internal policies have.

[KrazyHorse]

Europe has sufficient resources as it stands to resist any invader (probably including the US). he US isn't guarding Europe's borders; it's relieving fear of the other Euro nations from the hearts of Euros.

And if the question moves to that, then no: I don't believe that a strong US presence inside Europe is required any longer to keep the peace.

[TCO]

powerful article.

A bit long. But it describes the situation.

[Gatekeeper]

KrazyHorse:

Do tell me why the United States would ever want to invade Europe, thus *destroying* what the article says we spent so many years helping to build and then guarantee its security.

Furthermore, should the U.S. ever choose to remove — or have no choice in the matter — its military presence from Europe, there would be no choice except for them to have to devote more GNP to their own military, even if only for defensive purposes.

I agree with the idea that Europe is *not* the primary target of various terrorist groups and/or more aggressive nations. But do any of us really believe that a fat, tempting target like Europe would be ignored for long by less benevolent powers should this trans-Atlantic "rift" widen to the point where we leave Europe to itself and focus more on the Pacific and in Asia? Too much of the world is still in the "modern" and "pre-modern" state — using the article's terminology — for a "post-modern" Europe to survive in its current form w/o an increase in the GNP devoted to defense. Another factor to consider is immigration ... Europe is a destination for a good number of people from the Middle East and Africa. This can disrupt a post-modern Europe in terms of creating variables that may not have been taken into account before.

Gatekeeper