Why does Hollywood now eulogise the Vietnam fiasco?

[Jon Miller]

Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
Yes but they are portrayed at the same rank and not having aged a day. The US armed forces must have the fountain of youth.

no

hollywood has the fountain of youth

Jon Miller

[Tingkai]

Are you really that surprised. Hollywood is in the business of selling movies. In the immediate post-war period, it pandered to the anti-war sentiment. Now a days, it is pandering to the "we didn't lose" sentiment. Hollywood doesn't like taking chances. Even a balanced story line would be too much of a risk for the Hollywood movie execs.

[Goingonit]

Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
The sad part is Vietnam was for a time excellent territory for film makers and with such good live footage to draw on - the Tet offensive attack on the U.S. embassy, the street execution of a Tet infiltrator by the Chief of the Saigon Police, Khe Sanh, the North Vietnamese tank crashing through the gates of the Saigon Presidential Palace flags unfurled, naked napalmed children running down the road out of a village on fire, the Mai Lae massacre, U.S. sailors pushing helicopters into the sea off the flight deck during the evacuation of Saigon, people fleeing from the roof of the U.S. embassy, fighting each other to get through the gates into the embassy compound.

One could argue that the US was forced to withdraw from Vietnam because of the picture of that napalm chick.

And my dad's just turning 50, and would have served in Vietnam had he not renounced his American citizenship.

[Alexander's Horse]

The rewriting of history in these films is just unbelievable. In this one, Brad Pitt plays a sniper in Vietnam working on operation Phoenix whose recruited to the CIA after the war. The Vietnam flashback shows him shooting a North Vietnamese General in the field for the CIA.

Now operation Phoenix was a program of detentions and assasinations not against North Vietnamese regulars but against South Vietnamese civilians suspected of communist sympathies. It was a complete disgrace and a **** up too because people were assasinated who had nothing to do with the communists, it was just used for local political and business score settling by South Vietnamese generals and political figures. U.S. intelligence was so hopeless that real communist sympathisers could influence the who was on the list and so of course used it get rid of anti-communist officials. Gee, what a great heroic policy that was.

Talk about a whitewash

[Felch]

Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
Tet offensive attack on the U.S. embassy, the street execution of a Tet infiltrator by the Chief of the Saigon Police, Khe Sanh

The Tet offensive was a resounding victory for the US and ARVN. It brought the elusive Viet Cong out into the open where we could crush them in a conventional battle which played to our advantages and training. Khe Sanh allowed the might of American air power and artillery, as well as our position on the high ground, to pulverize several elite Communist divisions. Furthermore, the entire sneak attack swung South Vietnamese opinion against the Communists, both due to the violation of the traditional cease-fire, and because of well-publicized atrocities committed in Hue. That execution wasn't great, but I've read (or maybe heard on the History Channel, I don't recall) that the infiltrator had killed some close relation of the police chief. It doesn't excuse summary execution, but it does put it into perspective.

Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
naked napalmed children running down the road out of a village on fire, the Mai Lae massacre

Atrocities, to be sure, and My Lai (Sp?) should have been dealt with more harshly, but it's hardly a defeat of the US forces.

Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
the North Vietnamese tank crashing through the gates of the Saigon Presidential Palace flags unfurled ... U.S. sailors pushing helicopters into the sea off the flight deck during the evacuation of Saigon, people fleeing from the roof of the U.S. embassy, fighting each other to get through the gates into the embassy compound.

We abandoned an ally who was being attacked by a foreign power. However dishonorable that was, I highly doubt that anybody could describe this as a defeat of the United States, especially since we weren't even there (aside from the embassy).

Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
Yep, that sure was one glorious victory

Let's just say that I hate Kissinger about as much as Che or Paiktis probably do.

[Inverse Icarus]

it's not so much "popular" as much as it is "revered". DURING the war all those hippies were screaming, crying, smoking up, whatever, and popular opinion was against the war.

but truth be told, they ARE war heroes. it doesn't matter if we didnt attain total victory, it doesnt matter if we shouldn't have been there, what matters is that these men put their life on the line because their country needed them (i was going to say "to defend our country", but that doesn't fit right).

[Felch]

Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
Now operation Phoenix was a program of detentions and assasinations not against North Vietnamese regulars but against South Vietnamese civilians suspected of communist sympathies. It was a complete disgrace and a **** up too because people were assasinated who had nothing to do with the communists, it was just used for local political and business score settling by South Vietnamese generals and political figures. U.S. intelligence was so hopeless that real communist sympathisers could influence the who was on the list and so of course used it get rid of anti-communist officials. Gee, what a great heroic policy that was.

I'd ask for your sources, but I'm sure that they're reliable.

I will say that even though it wasn't perfect, the Phoenix program was both effective, and not nearly as lethal as advertised. The vast majority of the people targeted by it simply surrendered, or were captured. Lethal force was used only when the suspects were armed and hostile, in which case the arresting forces would happily kill them. The majority of the people involved were Ruff / Puffs, the regional and provisional defence forces (basically village militias), South Vietnamese police, and recon squads led by American Special Ops.

[Jon Miller]

sometimes for the good of the people a lie is best served

Jon Miller

[Alexander's Horse]

Originally posted by Felch X


The Tet offensive was a resounding victory for the US and ARVN.

This is a classic piece of revisionism. The Tet offensive was the turning point of the war. It convinced Johnson the war could not be won, not to seek re-election and Nixon to go to the 1970 Presidential election with an end the war platform. It turned the American public against continuing the war and made everyone realise that 4 years of US military statements that victory was just around the corner was just a bunch of hooey. To be sure the VC were decimated but they just replaced with North Veitnamese regulars and every one of those deaths was worthwhile in the light of the outcome i.e. victory.

[Tingkai]

I think most of us would agree that American sentiment about the Vietnam war has largely changed from anti-war to "we won".

What caused the change and what role, if any, did Hollywood play in this change of attitudes?

[DinoDoc]

Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
This is a classic piece of revisionism. The Tet offensive was the turning point of the war.

The Tet Offensive you are refering to was a colossal military disaster for Giap's forces. It's one saving grace was that it played well for the American public back home.

[Felch]

Tet was a military victory. Politically it was a defeat. Most of the political problems with it were a result of the pre-1968 "light at the end of the tunnel," bull****.

It was a turning point. From Tet on, the war strategy shifted from silly big unit tactics and Americanization, to the Vietnamization and effective strategies such as Phoenix. Tet essentially destroyed the VC, along with the Johnson administration.

[Alexander's Horse]

Now remember the "heroe" of this latest Hollywood spy drama is working on the Phoenxi program. Now just read some of this and tell me how you make a "heroe" out of a person like that:

Operation Phoenix

The Phoenix or Phuong Hoang Operation was originally designed to "neutralize," that is assassinate or imprison, members of the civilian infrastructure of the National Liberation Front (NLF). Phoenix offices were set up from Saigon down to the district level. Their functions were to: (1) collate intelligence about the "Vietcong Infrastructure"; (2) interrogate civilians picked up at random by military units carrying out sweeps through villages; (3) "neutralize" targeted members of theNLF. This third task was often carried out by CIA-led Vietnamese organized into Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU).

The original Phoenix concept was quickly dilute, for two main reasons: (1) pressure form the top to fill numerical quotas of person to be neutralized; (2) difficulties at the bottom of identifying NLF civilian infrastructure, who were often indistinguishable from the general population, and the near impossibility of proving anyone membership in the NLF. The result was vastly to increase the numbers of innocent persons rounded up and imprisoned, indiscriminately murdered, and brutally tortured in an effort to show results.

National Security Study Memorandum #1, prepared for Henry Kissinger in January 1969, makes it clear that Phoenix was an American creation. The State Department reported to Kissinger that:

"Although the program [Phoenix] was launched in December, 1967, Saigon-level Vietnamese cooperation was minimal until Thieu, after considerable American prodding, issued a presidential decree in July 1968 formally directing that the network be set up."

The Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were even more explicit in their report to Kissinger:

"The Phoenix-Phuong Hoang program is looked upon by many Vietnamese as being forced on the GVN by the Americans. Further, the PRU program is clearly identified as an American program--supervised, controlled and financed by the Americans."

William Colby, head of the Phoenix program, later testified before Congress in 1971 that Phoenix was an American responsibility:

"the American had a great deal to do with starting the program...we had a great deal to do in terms of developing the ideas, discussing the need, developing some of the procedures, and so forth... "

One of the principal tasks of high-level U.S. officials, led by Colby, was to establish quotas for the number of Vietnamese to be"neutralized" each month.

Vietnam Information Notes, published by the U.S. State Departmentin July 1969, reports that "The target for 1969 calls for the elimination of 1800 VCI per month....The Phoenix program...[has] served notice to Province Chiefs that their performance will in large part be measured by Phoenix results. "

MACV said until....Tet 1968, "the GVN was reluctant to carryout a systematic program of "neutralization"...as negotiations progress ...the pressures within families to reach accommodation will increase and, correspondingly, the effectiveness of the Phoenix-Phuong Hoang program could decrease."

U.S. advisers -- CIA, U.S. Army and Office of Public Safety were placed in the field to assess and direct operations. A number of such U.S. personnel testified that one of Phoenix's main results was the mass and indiscriminate murder of Vietnamese civilians.

In a document entitled Vietnam: Toward Peace and Prosperity, published by the Saigon Ministry of Information, the GVN states that

"The Phoenix program was launched on August, 1, 1968, in orderto eradicate the communist infrastructure, with the following results;...Killed--40,994."

Colby himself testified that Phoenix had resulted in the deaths of 20,587 persons as of May 1971. This number proportionate to population, would total over 200,000 Americans deliberately assassinated over a three-year period, were Phoenix in practice in the United States.

Michael Uhl, a Phoenix military intelligence operative, testified before Congress: "a Phoenix military intelligence team measured its success...not only by the body count and kill ratio but by the number of CD's [civil detaineess] it had captured.... "

Between 1968 and 1972 hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese civilians were rounded up and turned over to the Vietnamese police for questioning. Such interrogation has usually been marked by brutal torture. Uhl also said "All CD's, because of command pressure...were listed as VCI. To my knowledge, not one of these people ever freely admitted to being a cadre member. An again contrary to Colby's statement, most of our CD's were women and children. "

The yearly processing of hundreds of thousands, this detention of tens of thousands, inevitably led Phoenix to change judicial procedures.

Civilians rounded up by Americans.

The U.S. Phoenix program resuscitated the Security Committee as a means of jailing detainees without a trial. Under the An Tri law, the Security Committees have been empowered to jail any South Vietnamese citizen for up to two years, renewable. The Security Committee does not see or talk with the accused. The accused has no right to be represented by a lawyer, confront witnesses, present evidence, or even plead in his or her own behalf.

The quota system, was also used for sentencing. The Phoenix program decreed that at least 50 percent of those captured were to be sentenced. Colby said: The reason for putting in the 50 percent sentencing was to put a greater pressure on officials to do a more professional job of capturing and interrogating and then sentencing .... From: UNCLOAKING THE CIA, H. Frazier editor, 1978, The Free Press,pages 111-119.


A few CIABASE references to Phoenix report:
Vietnam, 67-73 CIA developed Phoenix program in 67 to neutralize: kill, capture or make defect VCI. VCI means civilians suspected of supporting communists. Targeted civilians not soldiers. Phoenix also called Phung Hoang by VNese. Due process totally nonexistent. svnese who appeared on black lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 13.

Vietnam, 67-72. K. Barton Osborn's testimony re the Phoenix Program before the house committee on government ops, 8/71. Osborn characterized program as a "sterile, depersonalized murder program." Andrade, D. (1990). Ashes to Ashes, xv-xvi.

Vietnam, 65-72. During Nixon's first 2 1/2 years, State Department officially admits that the CIA-run Phoenix program murdered or abducted 35,708 VNese civilians, 4,836 more than the Pentagon claimed the NLF had assassinated or kidnapped during the same period, and a monthly increase over the 200 killed by the CIA every month under Johnson. Senator Gravel edition, (1971). Pentagon Papers v, 300.

Vietnam, 68-73. COS Shackley had orders to close down most paramilitary and pacification programs - Phoenix, census grievance, etc. Supposedly DCI Helms hoped to pass most such activity to Pentagon and Colby's Cords. Paramilitary and political programs claimed roughly 75% of CIA's budget; intel received rest - but primary target for intel budget was Thieu regime - enemy came second. No good intel on vc. CIA involved in VN for 20 years, yet it never approached VN in a true intel fashion. George Allen, DDI specialist on VN in 60 while on trip to VN found that not one CIA officer was more than marginally interested in burgeoning insurgency. Jack Horgan, Region V in delta in 66-67, said there no real intel ops. CIA interrogation center "beat the **** out of people. No captives admitted being vc. Daren Flitcroft, ROIC Region III, said "half the time we don't have any idea whats going on." Corn, D. (1994). blond ghost: ted shackley and the CIA's Crusades, 183-4.

Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix op from 1/68 thru 5/71, Cords reported 20,857 VCI killed. gvt of VN reported 40,994 from 8/68 thru mid 71. Per CORD statistics 12.4% deaths could be attributed to Phoenix ops. Kenneth Osborn of program said Phoenix became a depersonalized murder program. A Dept of Defense analyst Thayer, found that 616 suspected VCI targeted by Phoenix from 1/70 thru 3/71 were killed by Phoenix forces. After war nvnese foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach said CIA's assassination program slaughtered far more than the 21,000 officially listed by the U.S. In some parts of South 95% of communist cadre assassinated or compromised by Phoenix. Manning, R., (ed), (1988). War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience, 72.

Vietnam. Phoenix program to neutralize VCI (tax collectors, supply officers, political cadre, local military officials, etc). Plan to send PRU or police teams to get in practice, death the frequent result of such ops, some times through assassinations pure and simple. Powers, T. (1979). the Man Who Kept the Secrets, 181.

Vietnam, July 71. Colby inserted chart to representative reid showing that some 67,282 persons had been neutralized by Phoenix ops against VC between 68-71. Of these 31 percent had been killed, 26% rallied, and 43% captured or sentenced. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978). Uncloaking the CIA, 18.

Vietnam, 67-73. The Phoenix program used the CIA's assassination squads, the former counter terror teams later called the provincial reconnaissance units (PRU). Technically they did not mark cadres for assassinations but in practice the PRU's anticipated resistance in disputed areas and shot first. People taken prisoner were denounced in Saigon-held areas, picked up at checkpoints or captured in combat and later identified as VC. Sheehan, N. (1988). A Bright Shining Lie, 732.

Vietnam, 68. Phoenix ci/terror program was established by Thieu's presidential decree, literally written by CIA man William Colby. Decree and future authorizations indicated that suspects could be arrested without a warrant or copy of charges and detained on basis of police dossier heresay evidence. Once arrested, suspect could not confront accusers or see dossier, was denied bail, legal counsel, and was denied a trial or even a hearing. At best one's case was reviewed by province security committee composed of milt and intel officers. Under Phoenix all rights of due process stripped. Counterspy winter 78, 28.

Vietnam, 71. CIA had no intention handling over attack on VCI to National Police command. CIA advisers to special police advised to begin forming special intel force units (sifu). 8-man teams composed of 4 volunteers each from special police and field police. SIFU targeted at high-level VCI, as substitutes for PRU. They a sign CIA planned manage attack on VCI thru sb, while keeping Phoenix intact as a way of deflecting attention. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix program, 391.

Vietnam, 71. In revising Phoenix program (because of all communist penetrations in gvt) first steps to hire Southeast Asia Computer Associates (managed by a CIA officer) to advise 200-odd VNese techs to take over MACV and CORDS computers. Vnese were folded into big mack and Phung Hoang management info system (phmis). Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 363.

Vietnam, 72. In report on Phoenix effectiveness in 9/72 Phung Hoang crossed out and anti-terrorist inserted. The end of Phoenix? Some Phoenix ops in 73. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program. 403, 406.

Vietnam, 75. U.S. still involved in Phoenix in 75. Program renamed Special Police Investigative Service (SPIS). U.S. provides data processing facilities for SPIS thru Computer Science Services, Inc. which runs intel thru machines to classify and collate them and then turns info over to SPIS. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 415.

Vietnam. Phoenix program, resources control program, checkpoints, identification card program, paramilitary police called the police field force a 100 man mobile company at least one assigned to each province. aid helped upgrade police and developed national police academy, improved communications and files, established one two-way radio in every village. chieu hoi program. refugee generation programs. province coordinating committees supervised civic action on bridges, roads, public buildings, agricultural extension work, medical technicians and more. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, 217-8.

Vietnam, 62-73. First approach by CIA for Australian involvement in VN war made by CIA. In May 62, Canberra announced that 30 military instructors to be sent VN. This the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV), an elite unit of officers and NCOs which at peak numbered 200. some worked directly with CIA. Cover was nebulous combined studies division. They led team of guerrillas, often Montagnard mercenaries, on missions of sabotage, terror and assassination. They crossed illegally into Cambodia, North VN and Laos, often wearing uniform of enemy. Some with Phoenix op. Toohey, B., & Pinwill, W. (1990). Oyster: the Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, 87.

Vietnam, 59-69. The SEALs and the Phoenix Program. The intel coordination and exploitation program (icex) was a joint MAC-V/CIA op - forerunner of Phoenix. SEALs helped train vnese personnel. SEALs assigned ops detachments. SEALs worked with PRUs. by 68, with prisoner snatches, ambushes, and increasing vc defections, icex program neutralizing 800 VCI every month. Phoenix began 7/1/68. Description of the province intel ops coordinating center (piocc) and the district (DIOCC). Combatting VCI in urban areas responsibility of national police force and police field force. SEALs taught PRUs in Mekong delta. description of PRUs. they the most effective native troops. by end of 68, the iv corps PRUs were almost entirely advised by SEAL personnel. seal advisors accompanied PRUs on average of 15 missions a month. description of ops. Dockery, K. (1991). SEALS In Action, 167-176.

Vietnam, 68-73. Two small groups wreaked havoc on the VCI. The provincial reconnaissance units (PRU) and the navy's seals. PRUs and seals often worked together and both killed many VCI and guerrillas -- the enemy had wrapped itself in the population. together they were fewer than 6000 men. they had access to the best intel often coming directly from CIA. PRU had roots in the counterterror teams of the early 60s. in 66 the ct became PRUs. details of the makeup and recruiting source of the PRUs. PRUs often killed targets. military participation in the PRU program was to end in 10/70. PRU was the most effective action arm of the Phoenix program. details of the seals larger-than-life reputation earned in VN. Andrade, D. (1990). Ashes to Ashes, 171-199.

Vietnam, 69-71. K. Barton Osborn, Phoenix agent, testified to Congress "I never knew an individual to be detained as a vc suspect who ever lived through an interrogation in a year and a half. uc 114. note says this testimony given before U.S. congress, hearings of house committee on gvt op, July/August 71. U.S. Assistance Programs VN. 315-321

Vietnam. Colby supervised establishment of PICs in each of SVN's 44 provinces. each center constructed with CIA funds. agency personnel directed each center's op much of which consisted of torture carried out by VN nationals. coi 207. Colby admitted serious abuses committed under Phoenix. Former intel officers came before congressional cmttees to describe repeated examples torture. Marchetti, V., & Marks, J.D. (1974). The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 207 see fn.

Vietnam, 66-74. CIA analyst, Nelson H. Brickman, on 11/66 produced basic guidelines for [the Phoenix program] in a memorandum that described the VCI and suggested which parts of it should be targeted. His memo said rank-and-file members were not legitimate targets "because they were most often unwilling participants in the revolution." Brickman called for using all available intelligence services to neutralize the VCI. Robert Komer was so impressed he assigned Brickman to the revolutionary development office. He adopted Brickman's suggestion that there was no need to begin a new anti-VCI program, only that the existing programs be brought together and managed by a single bureau. He recommended the U.S. agencies get their houses in order before bringing in the GVN. Brickman "deserved the credit" for the Phoenix program. a program called intel coordination and exploitation (ICEX) was the first structure. Evan Parker named director of icex but Komer had full control. U.S. military reluctantly participated initially. ICEX officially created on 7/9/67, although basic structure had been in place a year. Building of district ops and coordinating centers (doicc) which by late 67 were called district intel and ops coordinating centers (DIOCCs). MACV directive 381-41 stated: "to coordinate and give impetus to U.S. and GVN operations ..directed toward elimination of the vc infrastructure." ICEX placed under CORDS. South Vietnamese were unwilling to take program seriously. Andrade, D. (1990). Ashes to Ashes, 58-70.

Vietnam, Phoenix program, beginning circa 66-67 Cords pacification program. Komer settled on massive intel program on vc who could be neutralized by SVN forces. First called ICEX. name changed to Phoenix in 69 with SVN version Phung Hoang. had interrogation centers in each of svns 235 districts and 44 provinces, card files and computerized indexes. PRU's of 50 to 100 men. In Phoenix CIA provided weapons, paid for Saigon computer files, funded and trained PRU's and passed intel to Phoenix. Colby told Senate Phoenix killed 20,587 VCI. when questions arose re legality Colby retreated and said 87% killed in regular military actions. Two army lts. told federal judge they order to maintain kill quota 50 VCI a month. Prados, J. (1986). Presidents' Secret Wars, 307-310.

Vietnam. Phoenix program, 67-75 targets members VCI. 637 military intel advisers assigned to Phoenix. Much money given to vnese police to expand detention facilities. Phoenix org: first the district co - ordination center, DIOCC, that maintained dossiers on suspected vc. once enough evidence person placed on police green list. Suspect then jailed without right to civilian trail. In cordon and search ops all villagers lined up and walk past police checkpoint. Next level province interrogation center, PIC, staffed by SVNese, Americans and CIA. After interrogation, suspect passed on to province security committee, comprised of police chiefs, military and police intel and advisors. Finally suspects could be imprisoned under law for 2 years. This one way to neutralize. other way via provincial reconnaissance units, PRU's, who would kidnap or assassinate agents targeted by DIOCC. Had American advisors from SEALs, Green Berets. official amnesty program called chieu hoi used to convince vc to surrender. VC categorized as a,b, or c. a were key members, c least impt. National Police detention center processed 180,000 a year. American money and effort went into national identification card, id, project. All Vietnamese over age 15 jailed if did not carry a card a rand computer tracked the 15 million suspects also cross-linked to 10 million dossiers and fingerprints. "The Dossier" issue 6, 11/83, 14-5.

[Felch]

Nobody said they were nice guys. I only said that they were effective.

American heroes are supposed to be badasses. We're a nation of gun-toting maniacs who spit farther, **** longer, and fight harder than any Aussie you'll ever find. We all ride Harley Davidsons and drink warm piss "beer," and when we aren't working in our munitions factories making bombs to kills foreigners, we're beating each other up with two by fours.

Didn't you know that AH?

[Alexander's Horse]

Originally posted by Felch X
Nobody said they were nice guys. I only said that they were effective.

American heroes are supposed to be badasses. We're a nation of gun-toting maniacs who spit farther, **** longer, and fight harder than any Aussie you'll ever find. We all ride Harley Davidsons and drink warm piss "beer," and when we aren't working in our munitions factories making bombs to kills foreigners, we're beating each other up with two by fours.

Didn't you know that AH?

Actually I think Americans are very nice people - but, as Vietnam showed and maybe the current War on T will too, the road to hell is paved with good intentions