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"After the war, Grand Admiral Doenitz of the German Navy -- who had been selected by Hitler to replace him as fuhrer after his suicide -- was brought before the Nuremberg Tribunal on war crimes charges for the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare. American and British naval officials faced no such prosecution. Doenitz was found not guilty with respect to German actions against armed British merchant ships, since the fact of being armed removed those vessels from the protections of the London Protocol. It did find him guilty of ordering German submarines not to comply with the warning and rescue provisions within the German declared war zones. The Tribunal took note of the problem that these provisions put submarines at risk, but concluded: “This may be so, but the Protocol is explicit. If the commander cannot rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should allow it to pass harmless before his periscope.”
The centerpiece of the prosecution’s case was the Laconia Order of 1942 in which Doenitz prohibited German submarines from rescuing the survivors of sunken ships. Unfortunately, the prosecution was caught flat-footed when it became clear that they were unaware of the context of the Laconia order and the full story of the sinking of the Laconia. The Laconia was a lightly armed converted British ocean liner that was being used to transport some 1,500 Italian prisoners of war and 811 British passengers. The Laconia was sunk by a German U-Boat in the South Atlantic on September 12, 1942. The Laconia’s crew radioed for help as it was sinking. The German submarine commander also called for help from both Germany and Vichy France. Three more German submarines came to assist. All four submarines stayed on the surface for four days rescuing survivors and displaying large red cross flags. No allied ships were sent, but an American plane showed up and bombed the vulnerable submarines. It was at this point that Doenitz issued the Laconia Order. He claimed its harshness was necessary to force his officers to take actions which might be against their instincts. (Though at least one German submarine commander’s instincts led him to misinterpret the order as meaning that all survivors should be killed.)
The Tribunal did take the behavior of the allies into consideration in sentencing Doenitz. Given British and American practices of unrestricted submarine warfare, the Tribunal found Doenitz guilty of breaches of international law, but declined to assess a punishment for that violation. (On other issues, Doenitz was sentenced to spend ten years in the Spandau Prison.)
Current commentators are divided on whether the London Protocols still reflect the law. Some continue to argue that the positive law is clear and must be respected. Others argue that customary behavior has clearly evolved to make the Protocols’ rules with regard to submarine warfare obsolete.
Contemporary American naval rules allow for destroying enemy merchant ships without warning under a number of circumstances. If the enemy merchant is part of a convoy with military escort, if it refuses to stop or resists inspection for contraband, if it is armed, or if it is believed to be engaged in intelligence activities. American naval vessels are required to take “all possible measures” to ensure the safety of crew and passengers, but may still destroy an enemy merchant when such destruction is justified on military grounds.
The centerpiece of the prosecution’s case was the Laconia Order of 1942 in which Doenitz prohibited German submarines from rescuing the survivors of sunken ships. Unfortunately, the prosecution was caught flat-footed when it became clear that they were unaware of the context of the Laconia order and the full story of the sinking of the Laconia. The Laconia was a lightly armed converted British ocean liner that was being used to transport some 1,500 Italian prisoners of war and 811 British passengers. The Laconia was sunk by a German U-Boat in the South Atlantic on September 12, 1942. The Laconia’s crew radioed for help as it was sinking. The German submarine commander also called for help from both Germany and Vichy France. Three more German submarines came to assist. All four submarines stayed on the surface for four days rescuing survivors and displaying large red cross flags. No allied ships were sent, but an American plane showed up and bombed the vulnerable submarines. It was at this point that Doenitz issued the Laconia Order. He claimed its harshness was necessary to force his officers to take actions which might be against their instincts. (Though at least one German submarine commander’s instincts led him to misinterpret the order as meaning that all survivors should be killed.)
The Tribunal did take the behavior of the allies into consideration in sentencing Doenitz. Given British and American practices of unrestricted submarine warfare, the Tribunal found Doenitz guilty of breaches of international law, but declined to assess a punishment for that violation. (On other issues, Doenitz was sentenced to spend ten years in the Spandau Prison.)
Current commentators are divided on whether the London Protocols still reflect the law. Some continue to argue that the positive law is clear and must be respected. Others argue that customary behavior has clearly evolved to make the Protocols’ rules with regard to submarine warfare obsolete.
Contemporary American naval rules allow for destroying enemy merchant ships without warning under a number of circumstances. If the enemy merchant is part of a convoy with military escort, if it refuses to stop or resists inspection for contraband, if it is armed, or if it is believed to be engaged in intelligence activities. American naval vessels are required to take “all possible measures” to ensure the safety of crew and passengers, but may still destroy an enemy merchant when such destruction is justified on military grounds.
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